Holding

Section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act does not require prior government sanction, so the time spent obtaining the order cannot be excluded under Section 470(3) CrPC, and the complainant may obtain an extension of limitation under Section 473 CrPC, rendering the complaint timely.

Summary

A criminal complaint under Sections 5(4) read with 5(2) and 5(3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 was filed by the Union of India through the CBI against Rakesh Kumar Jain. The appellant sought discharge under Section 245 of the CrPC, arguing that the complaint was barred by limitation because the order authorising the complaint had not been passed by an appropriate authority and that the time spent obtaining such sanction should be excluded under the Explanation to Section 470(3) CrPC. The trial court and the High Court held that Section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act required prior sanction, allowing the exclusion of the sanction‑obtaining period. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 13(3) merely requires the complaint to be made by order or authority of the appropriate government and does not demand a prior consent or sanction; consequently, the period spent obtaining the order cannot be excluded under Section 470(3). However, the complainant is entitled to seek an extension of the limitation period under Section 473 CrPC, which was granted, making the complaint timely. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 requires prior government sanction or consent before filing a complaint, thereby allowing the time spent obtaining such sanction to be excluded under the Explanation to Section 470(3) of the CrPC.
Whether the period spent obtaining the order for filing the complaint can be excluded from the limitation period computation under Section 470(3) CrPC.
Whether a complaint filed after the statutory limitation period, but with a claim of delay due to obtaining sanction, must be dismissed under Section 245 CrPC or can be validated by an extension of time under Section 473 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 245, s. 470(3), s. 473
Official Secrets Act, 1923s. 13(3), s. 5(2), s. 5(3), s. 5(4)

Subjects

Official Secrets Actlimitation periodSection 470 CrPCSection 245 CrPCSection 473 CrPCsanctionconsentcriminal complaintappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

RAKESH KUMAR JAIN A
v.
STATE THROUGH CBI, NEW DELHI

AUGUST 8, 2000

[K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 245, 470(3) & 473-0.fficial
Secrets Act, 1923-Sections 5(4) rlw 5(2) and (3) & 13(3)-Complaint
under-Filed beyond limitation period-Due to delay in obtaining sanction-
Plea that since no sanction is required under the Act, the accused should be c
discharged in terms of Section 245-Held, since no sanction is provided to be
taken under the Act, the period spent in obtaining the sanction cannot be
excluded under Explanation to Section 470( 3)-'-But mere delay does not
entitle the accused to be discharged, because the complainant is entitled to
extention of period of limitation u/s. 473.
D
Words & Phrases-'Made by order of'-Meaning of in the context of
Official Secrets Act, 1923-Section 13(3).

A criminal complaint u/s. 5(4) r/w section 5(2) & (3) of Official
Secrets Act, was filed against the appellant by Union of India. Appellant
filed an application under Section 245 Cr.P.C. for being discharged, on the E
grounds that the order of the prosecution had not been passed by an
appropriate authority and that cognizance could not have been taken as
the complaint was barred by limitation. Respondent pleaded that the
period of 79 days, required for obtaining the sanction, should be excluded
in computing the period of limitation. The application was rejected by the F
trial court and the revision against the order of the trial court was also
dismissed, holding that Section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act provided
the taking of previous sanction of the appropriate government and the
time required for obtaining such consent or sanction was to be excluded in
terms of Section 470(3) Cr.P.C.
G
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that as no sanction or
consent was provided to be taken from the government under Section
13(3) of the Act, the complaint was required to be dismissed. The respond-
ent contended that the complaint was filed within time as it was mandatory
to obtain sanction u/s. 13(3) of the Act; that Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of H
275
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A the Act was in two parts • one dealing with the passing of the order which
necessarily meant consent or sanction and the second dealt with the person
authorised to file the complaint; and that even if no sanction was required,
the complaint would be deemed to have been filed within time as the
complainant and other officials bonafidely believed that such a sanction
was necessary before filing of the complaint.
B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. Sub-Section (3) of Section 13 of the Official Secrets Act
provides that cognizance of offence under the Act can be taken only upon
C complaint which is (a) filed by order of appropriate government; or (b)
filed under authority from the appropriate government; or (c) by some of·
fleer empowered by .the appropriate government. No consent or sanction of
the Government or any authority, as contemplated by Explanation to Sub·
section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C., is required for filing the complaint under
the Act. 'Consent' or 'sanction' envisaged under Section 470 Cr.P.C. cannot
D
be equated with the 'order' or 'authority' for the purposes of filing the
complaint as envisaged by Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act. Specific
provisions have been made in various statutes requiring previous consent
or sanction for the purposes oflaunching of prosecution against the accused
under those enactments. Explanation to Sub-section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C.
E obviously refers to such consents and sanctions and not the order or author·
ity as required under the Act. Consent sanction as are referred to in the
Prevention of Corruption Act, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, vari·
ous Foodgrains Control Orders, and other similar enactments envisage the
application of mind before the grant of such consent or passing of order,
F individually or generally, or conferment of authority individually or gener·
ally, or empowering a person for the purpose of filing a complaint is only an
administrative action facilitating in identifying the complainant before the
Court for the purposes of filing and prosecuting the case under the Act. The
legislature, in its wisdom, thought it appropriate to exclude only such pe-
riod which is required for obtaining the previous consent or sanction of the
G Government for institution of any prosecution of an offence and not obtain·
ing of orders or authority or naming a person for the purpose of filing the
complaint. [279-G-H; 280-A·D]

Electrical Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. D.D. Bhargava, [1968] 1SCR394;
,H S.A. Venkataraman v. The State, [1958] SCR 1037, relied on.
R.K. JAIN v. STATE THROUGH CBI 277
2. On critical examination of the plain words of sub-section (3) and A
the object underlying it, it cannot be said that sub-section (3) of Section 13
has two parts. Sub-section (3) envisages only the filing of the complaint, by
order of or under authority from the appropriate government or by an
officer empowered by such Government. If the intention of the Legislature
was to have the Section in two parts, one dealing with the grant of consent B
or sanction by way of order and the other part dealing with the authority
of the person to file the complaint, in that case after the words "made by
order of', there should not have been a "comma" and the word "or". In
that event for the word "or'' the Legislature must have used the word
"and" and omitted the comma. [281-C-D]
c
3. No sanction or consent is provided to be taken from the Govern·
ment under Section 13(3) of the Act and the period spent in obtaining the
orders for filing the complaint cannot be excluded under Explanation to
sub-section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C. [281-G]
D
4. The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry
of the period of limitation, did not entitle the accused to seek his discharge
under Section 245 Cr.P.C. because the complainant has, under law, a right,
to seek for extension of time under Section 473 Cr.P.C. The complainant
could satisfy the Magistrate on the facts and circumstances of the case that
the delay was explainable which was occasioned on account of bonafide E
belief to obtain the sanction for purpose of filing the complaint. The
complaintant was entitled to extension of period of limitation under Section
473 Cr.P.C. No useful purpose would be served by again directing the com·
plainant to approach the Trial Magistrate for the purposes of seeking ex ten·
sion of period of limitation. The complaint is, therefore, within time and F
petitioner is not entitled to be discharged on this ground. [281-H; 282-A-C]

(The Court directed that the present judgment would not, in any
way, affect the continuing proceedings in any court wherein the com-
plaints, under the Act, have been filed after obtaining the sanction and the
courts have given remission of the period in terms of Explanation to Sub- G
Section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C. All such extensions shall be deemed to be
valid even under Section 473 Cr.P.C.) [282-E-F]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 555
of 1999.
H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment and Order dated 17.4.98 of the Delhi High Court in
Crl.R. No. 104 of 1995.

Vijay Bahuguna and D.K. Garg for the Appellant.

K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General, R.N. Verma and P. Parmeswaran
B for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by .
SETHI, J. The criminal complaint under Section 5(4) read with Sections
5(2) & (3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (hereinafter called "the Act") was
filed against the petitioner in the Court of Chief Meu·opolitan Magistrate, Delhi
c by the Union of India through Deputy Superintendent of Police, Centtal Bureau
of Investigation, SPE, Anti Corruption Unit, New Delhi. The petitioner filed
an application under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Trial
Court for being discharged on the grounds that the order of the prosecution had
not been passed by an appropriate authority and that the cognizance could not
D have been taken as according to him the complaint was barred by limitation.
The Magistrate rejected the application by his order dated 17 .3.1995 and the
revision filed in the High Court was dismissed vide the order impugned in this
appeal. Relying on the provisions of Section 13(3) of the Act, the Trial Mag-
istrate as well as the High Court held that Section 13(3) of the Act provided
E the taking of previous consent or sanction of the appropriate Government and
the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction was to be excluded
in terms of Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noticed
at this stage that limitation in the instant case is stated to have started from 24th
April, 1985 and the complaint was filed in the Court on 19th May, 1988
apparently beyond 25 days of the period of limitation prescribed. The plea of
F the complainant was that period of 79 days required for obtaining the sanction
order should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Pointed ref-
erence was made to the order of sanction dated 21st April, 1988, copy of which
has been placed on the paperbook of this appeal. Accepting the plea of the
complainant, the complaint filed against the petitioner was held to be within
G time.

Mr. Vijay Bahuguna, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner sub-
mitted that as no sanction or consent was provided to be taken from •.'le
Government under Section 13(3) of the Act, the complaint admittedly filed
after the period of limitation was required to be dismissed and the accused
H discharged in terms of Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He did
R.K. JAIN v. STATE THROUGH CBI [SETHI, J.] 279
not urge any other point. In support of his contention he has relied upon the A
judgment of this Court in Electrical Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. D.D. Bhargava,
[1968] I SCR 394. Shri Kirit N. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor General,
defending the impugned judgment has submitted that the judgment relied upon
is distinguishable as the mandate of Section 13(3) is clear and unambiguous
providing the obtaining of sanction before filing the complaint. He drew our
B
attention towards the averments made in the petition and the order of sanction
. to urge that even if no sanction was required, the complaint be deemed to have
been filed within time as the complainant and the other officials bonafidely
believed that such a sanction was necessary before the filing of the complaint.

In order to appreciate the rival submissions of the learned counsel ap- c
pearing in the case, a cursory look at some of the provisions of the Act is
necessary. The Act has been enaeted to consolidate the law relating to official
secrets. Section 5(2) provides that if any person voluntarily receives any secret
official code or pass word or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document
or information knowing or having reasonable ground to believe, at the time
when he receives it, that the code, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note,
D
document or information is communicated in contravention of the Act, he shall
be guilty of an offence under the section for which punishment as provided
under sub-section (4 ). Section 6 deals with and provides punishment for un-
authorised use of uniforms, falsification of reports, forgery, personation and
false documents. Section 11 authorises a Presidency Magistrate, Magistrate of E
first class or Sub-divisional Magistrate to issue such warrants under the circum-
stances as specified therein. Section 13 provides that no court other than that
of the Magistrate of First Class specially empowered in that behalf, shall try
any offence under the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 13, reads:

"No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act unless F
upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the Appro-
priate Government or some officer empowered by the Appropriate
Government in this behalf'

Sub-section (3) provides that cognizance of offence under the Act can
be taken only upon complaint which is (a) filed by order of appropriate
G
government; or (b) filed under authority from the appropriate government; or
(c) by some officer empowered by the appropriate government. No consent or
sanction of the Government or any authority, as contemplated by Explanation
to Sub-section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C., is required for filing the complaint
under the Act. 'Consent' or 'sanction' envisaged under Section 470 Cr.P.C. H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A cannot be equated with the 'order' or 'authority' for the purposes of fillng the
complaint as envisaged by Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act. Specific
provisions have been made in various statutes requiring previous consent or
sanction for the purposes of launching of prosecution against the accused under
those enactments. Explanation to Sub-section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C. obvi-
ously refers to such consents and sanctions and not the order or authority as
B
required under the Act. Consent or sanction as are referred to in the Prevention
of Corruption Act, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, various Foodgrains
Control Orders, and other similar enactments envisage the application of mind
before the grant of such consent or sanction which is a quasi-judicial function,
whereas the passing of order, individual or general, or conferment of authority
c individually or generally, or empowering a person for the purposes of filing a
complaint is only an administrati"e action facilitating in identifying the com-
plainant before the court for the purposes of filing and prosecuting the case
under the Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it appropriate to exclude
only such period which is required for obtaining the previous consent or
D sanction of the Government for institution of any prosecution of an offence and
not obtaining of orders or authority or naming a person for the purpose of filing
the complaint.

This Court in Electrical Mamifacturing Co. Ltd. 's case (Supra) while
dealing with Section 6 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947 which
E provided that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under
the Act except upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorised in that
behalf by the Central Government, by general or special order, held that the
principles applicable to cases requiring sanction have no application to filing
of complaints under the Act. Section 6 of that Act only insisted that complaint
was to be made in writing and must have been filed by an officer authorised
F
in that behalf. In that case the Court relied upon the observations made in S.A.
Venkataraman v. The State, [1958] SCR 1037, wherein it was held:

"In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in •·
the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words
G used therein, if those words are clear enough. It is only in the case of
any ambiguity that a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole and
taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which
led to the enactment of the statute."

H Though Sub-Section (3) of Section 13 of the Act is not pari materia to
R.K. JAIN v. STATE THROUGH CBI [SETHI, J.] 281
Section 6 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947, yet we find that the A
insistence of the order or authority is intended to ascertain the f,;ing of the
complaint under the Act without requiring giving consent or sanction to pros-
ecute.

Learned Additional Solicitor General wanted to impress upon us that
Sub-section (3) was in two parts - one dealing with the passing of the order B
which necessarily meant consent or sanction and the second dealing with the
person authorised to file the complaint. On critical examination of the plain
words of the sub-section and the object underlying it, we do not agree that the
aforesaid sub-section has two parts, as argued. We conceive no doubt that sub-
section (3) of Section 13 envisages only the filing of the complaint, by order C
of or under authority from the appropriate government or by an officer empow-
ered by such Government. If the intention of the Legislature was to have the
section in two parts, one dealing with the grant of consent or sanction by way
of order and the other part dealing with the authority of the person to file the
complaint, in that case after the words "made by order of', there should not
have been a "comma" and the word ":ir". In that event for the word "or" the D
Legislature must have used the word "and" and omitted the comma.

- The High Court was not justified in reading between the lines to hold:

" .... that the requirem.,nt in Section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act
amounts to taking of previous consent or sanction of the appropriate E
Government. One should not go by the actual words used. What should
be seen is the intention of the legislature. The purpose of providing for
previous consent, sanction or authorisation from the appropriate gov-
ernment or other authority before launching prosecution is for the
protection of the alleged offender so that irresponsible prosecution is F
not launched."

We, therefore, agree with the submissions made by Mr.Bahuguna that no
sanction or consent is provided to be taken from the Government under Section
13(3) of the Act aud the period spent in obtaining the orders for filing the
complaint cannot be excluded under Explanation to Sub- section (3) of Section G
... 470 Cr.P.C.

The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry of
the period of limitation, did not entitle the accused to seek his discharge under
Section 245 Cr.P.C. because the complainant has, under law, a right to seek for
extension of time under Section 473 Cr.P.C. The complainant could satisfy the H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Magistrate on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay was
explainable which was occasioned on account of their bonafide belief to obtain
the sanction for the purpose of filing the complaint. After noticing the aver-
ments made in the complaint and perusing the record particularly order of the
Government of India dated 21st April, 1988, authorising Sh.K.N. Tiwari,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi
B
to lodge the complaint, it can be safely held that the complainant was entitled
to extension of period of limitation under Section 473 Cr.P.C. No useful
purpose would be served by again directing the complainant to approach the
Trial Magistrate for the purposes of seeking extension of period of limitation.
The complainant is held to have explained the delay in filing the complaint
c which required extension. The complaint is, therefore, held to be within time
and the petitioner is not entitled to be discharged on this ground.

During the arguments it was pointed out that as various complaints filed
after obtaining sanction froin the Central Government and the courts having
given the exclusion of the period in terms of Explanation to sub-section (3) of
D Section 470 Cr.P.C., this judgment of ours may amount to upsetting all such
orders and affect the pending on-going proceedings under the Act. The accused
in those cases, in such event, may be lured to raise similar pleas as have been
raised in this case for the purposes of quashing the proceeding on the basis of
this judgment. Though the apprehension appears to be misconceived, yet we
-
E make it clear that the present judgment would not, in any way, affect the
continuing proceedings in any court wherein the complaints, under the Act,
have been filed after obtaining sanction and the courts have given remission
of the period in terms of Explanation to Sub-Section (3) of Section 470 Cr.P.C.'
All such extensions shall be deemed to be valid even under Section 473 Cr.P.C.

F There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with the direction to
the Trial Magistrate to deal with the case in accordance with law and expedite
the disposal of the complaint.

K.K:T. Appeal dismissed.

...