Holding

A landlord’s claim of bona‑fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) fails if he has another reasonably suitable residential accommodation, and non‑disclosure of such fact is not fatal absent prejudice; a revisional court may intervene where factual findings rest on an erroneous legal premise.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, claiming a bona‑fide need for the suit premises. The tenant contended that the landlord already possessed an alternate residence at Subzi Mandi, which was concealed, and that the landlord shifted to the suit premises merely to evict the tenant. The Rent Controller held the landlord’s non‑disclosure indicated mala‑fide intent and dismissed the petition; the Delhi High Court on revision reversed, finding the alternate accommodation not reasonably suitable and allowing eviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the existence of other suitable accommodation defeats a bona‑fide claim, held that it does, and clarified that non‑disclosure is not fatal if no prejudice arises and pleadings are vague. It also ruled that a revisional court may interfere with factual findings if they are based on a wrong legal premise. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the eviction order upheld, with the tenant given time to vacate.

Issues considered

The effect of non‑disclosure of an alternate residence on the landlord’s claim of bona‑fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e).
Whether the presence of other reasonably suitable residential accommodation negates the landlord’s bona‑fide requirement.
The scope of revision under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act concerning interference with findings of fact.
The relevance of vague pleadings in eviction proceedings and whether they prejudice either party.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e), s. 25B(8)

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementDelhi Rent Control Actnon‑disclosurerevision jurisdictionpleadingslandlordtenantreasonable suitable accommodation

Judgment

A RAM NARAIN ARORA
v.
ASHA RANI AND ORS.

AUGUST 31, 1998

B !DR. A.S. ANAND ANDS. RAJENDRA BABU, J.I.]

Re111 Colltrol and Eviction :

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :

C Section 14( l)(e)-Bona fide requirement of landlord-Landlord did
not disclose in the petition about l1is having another accommoda-
tion-Reasonably suitable residential accommodation-Availability of-Held,
Question intc11nired with the question regarding bona fide requirement-17zat
the landlord has another reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a
D good defence for fl1e tenant-But whether that accommodation is more
suitable than the suit premises--Such a question would not necessarily
depe11d upon the pleading:,~Hence, non-disclosure by landlord regarding
availability of a11other accommodation is not fat al to the eviction proceedings
if both paJties understood the case and placed mate11·a1s before the cowt, and
neither party is prejudiced.
E
Section 25(B)(8) proviscr-Revision-Scopc-Pure findings of fact--1n-
te1ference with-In revision-By High Cowt-Rent Controller took the view
that 11on-discfos11rc i11fonnation was fatal lo the cl'iction proceedings-Held,
Findings of fact given on a wrong premise of law can be inte1fered with-In
F the circumstances of the case, High Cowt lightly re-examined the matter and
took a different view--Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-S. 115.

Practice and Procedure.

Pleadi11gs--Vag11e pleadings-Effect of-Held: Not fatal to the eviction
G proceedings if both pwties understood the case and placed mateiials before
the cowt and neither pwty is prejudiced.

The respondent-landlord filed a petition under Section 14(1)(e) read
with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for eviction of the
appellant-tenant on the ground of respondent's bona fide re11uirement of
H the house. The appellant filed his written statement contending that the
188
RAM NARAIN ARORA v. ASHA RANI 189

landlord had alternate accommodation at Subzi Mandi and he had A
deliberately shifted to the disputed premises with an ulterior motive to
make out a case for the eviction of the appellant and this fact of availability
of the said premises in Subzi Mandi had not been disclosed in the petition.
In the course of the proceedings, the Rent Controller recorded a linding
that the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was too short and
if he did not have any other suitable residential accommodation he was
B
,
entitled to an eviction order.

On the question whether the respondent had disclosed the full facts
necessary for the disposal of the petition filed by him, the Rent Controller
noticed that from the evidence recorded, the allegation of the appellant in C
the written statement in respect of the accommodation in possession and
available to the respondent in Subzi Mandi stood proved. And, therefore,
the respondent had not come to Court \\ith clean hands and so with ma/a
fide intention to evict the appellant. ·

D
The matter was carried to the High Court in Revision. The High
Court agreed with the finding of the Rent Controller as regards bona fide
requirement of the respondent-landlord. On the controversy of the non-
disclosure of the availability of accommodation at Subzi Mandi and that
·-> there was no true disclosure of the facts, the High Court examined the
matter in detail. The High Court noticed that the father of the respondent E
D, had rented the premises at Subzi Mandi from a Trust in the year 1944
and thereafter he was residing in the said premises with his family, D died
in 1980. After his death, R, the original petitioner in the eviction petition
continued to reside in that accommodation at Subzi Mandi where his
father was a tenant. R shifted from the said accommodation when the same F
became available to him sometime in 1982. The landlord of Subzi Mandi
property had served a notice upon the respondent to vacate the premises
in the year 1981. The actual possession of the Subzi Mandi house was
handed over to the landlord in March 1984 as per receipt. The said receipt
disclosed the name of D though he bad demised long back and thus the
landlord did not accept or recognize the respondent R as a tenant. For G
about two years prior to the actual handing over of the possession of the
premises, the same remained locked and in possession of the respondent,
since R had shifted to the suit property along with his family in the year
- 1982. The High Court felt that in the peculiar facts of this case it was
necessary to examine whether the said accommodation could be said to be H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A "other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available to the
respondent" and held firstly that the respondent had shifted to the ground
floor in the suit premises long before filing of the present eviction petition
and the Subzi Mandi accommodation was not a reasonably suitable
residential accommodation available for him and his family; secondly in
B view of the notice of eviction served on the respondent by the landlord of
the Subzi Mandi property, he was under pressure of being evicted from
the said premises. The High Court was of the view that the respondent
could not be said to have other reasonable suitable accommodation and,
therefore, non-disclosure thereof could not be fatal to the petition and 011
that basis allowed the petition. Hence this appeal.
c
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
contemplates in making a claim, that the suit premises is required bona
fide for the landlord's occupation as a residence for himself and other
D members of his family dependent on him, the fact that he has no other
reasonably suitable accommodation is a requirement of law before the
Court can state whether the landlord requires the premises bona fide for
his use and occupation. In doing so, the Court must also find out whether
the landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises is re-
E quired has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It
cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is not intermixed with
the question of finding out whether he has any other reasonably suitable
accommodation. If he has other reasonably suitable accommodation, then
necessarily it would mean that he does not require the suit premises and
his requirement may not be bona fide. In such circumstance further inc1uiry
F would be whether that premises is more suitable than the suit premises.
Therefore, the questions raised hefore the Court would not necessarily
depend upon only the pleadings. It could be a good defence that the
landlord has other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and
thereby defend the claim of the landlord. (195-G-H; 196-A-B]

G 1.2. There cannot be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter
of analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. It is no doubt
true that if the pleadings were clearly set out, it would be easy for the Court
to decide the matters. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and both
parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with
H reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the court,
RAM NARAIN ARORAv. ASHA RANI [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 191

neither party is prejudiced. Analysing from this angle, the High Court was A
not justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller.
[196-C-D]
1.3. It is no doubt true that the scope of revision petition under
Section 25 (B)(8) proviso of the Act is a very limited one, but even so in
examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent B
Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to
find out whether he had correctly or on firm legal basis approached the
matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open
to be interfered with, but in a given case if the finding of fact is given on
a wrong premise of law, it would be open to the revisional court to interfere
with such a matter. In this case, the Rent Controller proceeded to analyse c
the matter that non- disclosure of a particular information was fatal and,
therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in these cir-
cumstances it became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the
matter and then decide the entire question. [196-E-G]

-
.. Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdlzwy, [1962] Supp. 1 SCR
933; Sushi/a Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain, [1987] 2 SCC 219; Meenal
Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies, [1996] 5 SCC 344 and Ram Dass
D

v. Ishwar Clzande1; [1988] 3 SCC 131, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8494 of E
1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.2.95 of the Delhi High Court
in C.R. No. 991 of 1985.

Ranjit Kumar, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Ms. Binu Tamta and Ms. F
Anu Mohla for the Appellant.

Gopal Subramaniam, S.K. Mathur and V.B. Saharya Advs. for M/s.
Saharya & Co. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
•.,

RAJENDRA BABU, J. This is a tenant's appeal arising out of certain
proceedings initiated under the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act"). The· respondent-landlord filed a petition under
section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act seeking for the posses- H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A sion of the house by evicting the appellant as he required the same for his
bona fide need and occupation. The appellant before us filed his written
statement contending that the landlord has alternate accommodation at
Subzi Mandi and he has deliberately shifted to the disputed premises with
an ulterior motive to make out a case for the eviction of the respondent
B and this fact of availability of the said premises in subzi Mandi had not
disclosed in the petition.

In the course of the proceedings before the Rent Controller a fmding
was recorded by him as to the bona fide requirement of the respondent in
the following terms:-
c
"If the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner on the
ground floor of the house in dispute is compared with the extent
of the family members of the petitioner excluding of course
Kishan Sarup Bhatnagar, the petitioner would be said to be too
short of accommodation and if tlze petitioner does not have any ··
D
otlzer suitable residential accommodation he should be entitled to
an eviction order."

On the question whether the respondent had disclosed the full facts
necessary for the disposal of the petition filed by him, the Rent Controller
E noticed that from the evidence recorded, the allegation of respondent No.
1 in the written statement in respect of the accommodation in possession
and available to respondent in No. 2772, Subzi Mandi, Delhi stands proved.
And, therefore he has not come to the Court with clean hands. He had
suppressed the information which was in his possession as to the availability
p of the house at Sub7j Mandi at the time of filing of the petition and as well
as filing of their replication. He surrendered this accommodation only on
21.8.1984, that is, during the pendency of the petition. The Respondent No.
1 has alleged that the appellant shifted to the ground floor of the house in
dispute about a year prior to 1.1.1983 and the petition was filed on
G 24.7.1983. He accepted the stand of the appellant that the respondent had
done so with the mala fide intention to evict him.

Matter was carried to the High Court in Revision. The High Court
agreed with the finding of the Rent Controller as regards bona fide require-
ment of the landlord-respondent. On the controversy of the non-mention-
H ing of the availability of accommodation at 2772, Subzi Mandi and that
RAM NARAIN ARORAv. ASHA RANI [RAJENDRA BABU,J.] 193

there was not true disclosure of the facts, the High Court examined the A
matter in detail. The High Court noticed that father of the respondent Din
... Dayal Bhatnagar had rented the premises at 2772, Subzi Mandi from a
Trust in the year 1944 and thereafter he was residing in the said premises
with his family. Din Dayal Bhatnagar died in the month of August 1980.
After his death, Rameshwar Sarup Bhatnagar, the oribrinal petitioner in the
eviction petition continued to reside in that accommodation al Subzi Mandi
B
· where his father was a tenant. Rameshwar Sarup Bhatnagar shifted from
the said accommod~tion to the ground floor accommodation when the
same became available to him sometime in 1982. The landlord of Subzi
Mandi property had. served a notice upon the respondent to vacate the
premises in the year 1981. The actual possession of the Subzi Mandi house C
was handed over to the landlord in March 1984 as per receipt at Ex. AWl/1
to AWl/3. The said receipts disclose the name of Din Dayal Bhatnagar
though he had demised long back and thus the landlord did not accept or
recognize the respondent Rameshwar Sarup Bhatnagar as a tenant. For
about two years prior to the actual handing over of the possession of the D
premises, the same remained locked and in possession of the respondent,
since Rameshwar Sarup Bhatnagar had shifted to the suit property along
with his family in the year 1982. The High Court felt that in the peculiar
facts of this case it was necessary to examine whether the said accommoda-
tion could be said to be "other reasonably suitable residential accommoda-
tion available to the respondent" and held firstly that the respondent had E
shifted to in the suit premises long before filing of the present eviction
petition and the Subzi Mandi accommodation was not reasonably suitable
residential accommodation available for him and his family. Secondly, in
view of the notice of eviction served on the respondent by the landlord of
the subzi Mandi property, he was under pressure of being evicted from the F
said premises. The High· Court was of the view that the respondent could
_not be said to have other reasonably suitable accommodation and therefore
non- disclosure thereof could not be fatal to the petition and on that basis
allowed the petition.

Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that G
the landlord had not approached the Court with the necessary candor
required under law in not disclosing the availability of the premises. In the
petition filed before the Rent Controller by the landlord at column No. 18,
he has claimed that the suit premises is required by him for his occupation
for himself and members of his family dependent on him and he has no H
r.

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Again in column No.
19 at para (vi), the respondent states that he has no other residential
accommodation except the suit property. In the affidavit tiled by the
respondent, the appellant has no answer to the petition filed by the
respo~dent for his eviction. He has referred to the accommodation in
-
B house No. 2772, Gali Lala Ram Roop, Subzimandi in the 1st floor and the
2nd floor. He also refers to one more accommodation in Subzimandi which
the respondent has deliberately concealed Jrom the Court. It is claimed t
that in the written statement this position is reiterated. In the Rejoinder
Affidavit filed by the respondent, he stated that it is wrong to state that he
has any residential accommodation in House No. 2772, Gali Lala Ram
C Roop, Subzi Mandi as alleged and he has no portion in his possession and
he has also denied that he has any other residential house in Subzi Mandi.
The Secretary of the Trust who own the property at No. 2772, Subzi Mandi,
Delhi stated that the property had been originally let out to Din Dayal
Bhatnagar and he died about three years back. The original respondent
D was the son of Din Dayal Bhatnagar and the same remained locked for
about two years and thereafter Ram Sarup Bhatnagar delivered vacant
possession to them in 1984. He stated that he has no personal knowledge
of the accommodation available in the suit premises.

In the course of the affidavit of Ram Sarup Bhatnagar, it was stated
E that he was not in possession of any part of the property and Din Dayal
Bhatnagar was a tenant of the property which he has vacated on 21.3.1984.
His father was a tenant of the first floor and the barsati on the second floor.
Three rooms with kitchen and bath were in tenancy of his father and he
cannot say that the size of one room was 14" x 18" and that the barsati was
F a pucca room and had a door. The trust has given a notice to him to vacate
the premises in 1981.

Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant contended that
under Section 25B(8) proviso, the powers of revision of the High Court
G were limited and would not extend to the re- examination of findings of
fact in the case and suppression of the fact as to the availability of the
premises was one such finding. The Rent Controller also found that with
a ma/a fide intention to evict the appellant from the suit premises he shifted
the suit premises from Subzi Mandi. In support of his contention he relied
H upon the decision in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhwy, (1962)

•
RAM NARAIN ARORAv. ASHA RANI [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 195

Supp 1 SCR 933, and Sushi/a Devi and Others v. Avinash Chandra Jain and A
Others, (1987) 2 SCC 219. He submitted that unless the findings are
manifestly unjust the High Court could not have interfered in the matter.

Shri Gopal Subramaniam, learned Senior Advocate in his reply
submitted that the power of revision includes correction of errors of law
and on occasions would include intervention of findings of facts where the
B
right of a party is involved which is conferred on a party; that when the
bona fide requirement of the landlord was established, the fact that there
was suppression of certain fact becomes extraneous; that the trial court
having taken into consideration the accommodation available in Subzi
Mandi premises came to the conclusion that the requirement of the c
landlord was bona fide, but even so it came to the conclusion that the
suppression would not affect the case at all; that pleas are raised in order
to put the other party to notice and when the other party is already in the
knowledge of such information, the relevance of the lack of pleadings is of
no effect; that ascertainment of facts for the purpose of finding are require- D
ment whether bona fide or not is a matter of detail and that exercise has
been done in this case. Therefore, he submitted relying on the decisions in
Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (M1)') v. Traders & Agencies and Another, (1996)
5 SCC 344, and Ram Dass v. lshwar Chander and Others, [1988) 3 SCC 131,
that the view taken by the High Court must be upheld.
E
Section 14(1) (e) of the Act reads as follows : -

"Sec. 14(1) (e). that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence
for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if p
he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the
premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation: "

In making a claim that the suit premises is required bona fide for his
own occupation as a residence for himself and other members of his family G
dependent on him and that he has no other reasonably suitable accom-
modation is a requirement of law before the Court can state whether the
landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation. In
doing so, the Court must also find out whether the landlord or such other
person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other reasonably H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A suitable residential accommodation. It cannot be said that the requirement
of the landlord is not intermixed with the question of finding out whether
he has any other reasonably suitable accommodation. If he has other
reasonably suitable accommodation, then necessarily it would mean that he
does not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona
B fide. In such circumstances further inquiry would be whether that premises
is more suitable than the suit premises. Therefore, the questions raised
before the Court would not necessarily depend upon only the pleadings. It
could be a good defence that the landlord has other reasonably suitable
residential accdmmodation and thereby defend the claim of the landlord.

c There cannot be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter of
analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. It is no doubt
true that if the pleadings are clearly set out, it would be easy for the Court
to decide the matters. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and if both
parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with
D reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the court,
neither party is prejudiced. If we analyse from this angle, we do not think .
that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order made by
the Rent Controller.

E It is no doubt true that the scope of revision petition under Section
25B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is very limited one, but even
so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent
Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to
find out whether he had correctly or on firm legal basis approached the
F matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open
to be interfered with, but in a given case the finding of fact is given on a
wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to
interfere with such a matter. In this ca~e, the Rent Controller proceeded
to analyse the matter that non-disclosure of a particular information was
G fatal and, therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in these
circumstances it became necessary for the High Court to re- examine the
matter and then decide the entire question. We do not think that any of
the decisions referred to by the learned counsel decides the question of
the same nature with which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed refer-
ence to them is not required. In the result, this appeal stands dismissed,
H but in the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.
RAM NARAIN ARORAv. ASHARANI[RAJENDRABABU,J.) 197

In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate A
that the appellant be allowed time to vacate the premises till 31st of May,
1999 subject to his furnishing the usual undertaking in the Court within
four weeks from today.

v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.
B