Holding

A prospective allottee has no right to oppose a landlord’s release application, and a person who becomes landlord after an allotment cannot invoke Section 16(1)(b); the correct remedy is eviction under Section 21(1)(a).

Summary

The appellant, Ram Narayan Sharma, applied for allotment of a vacant premises under Section 16(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The landlord died, his heirs were substituted, and an allotment order was made, allowing the appellant to take possession. The heirs later became owners and sold the property to Shakuntala Gaur, who then filed a release application under Section 16(1)(b) claiming a bona‑fide requirement. Revision petitions challenging the allotment and release were entertained by lower courts, which set aside the allotment and released the premises to the respondent. The appellant filed a writ petition, which was dismissed, leading to the present appeal. The Supreme Court held that a prospective allottee cannot oppose a landlord’s release application, that the respondent was not the landlord at the time of allotment and therefore could not invoke Section 16(1)(b), and that the revision was infructuous. The correct remedy for the respondent would be eviction under Section 21(1)(a) after the statutory three‑year period. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the orders of the revisional and High Courts and restored the original allotment order.

Issues considered

Whether a prospective allottee has a right to oppose a landlord’s release application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act.
Whether the respondent, who acquired the property after the allotment, can invoke Section 16(1)(b) for release on the ground of bona‑fide requirement.
Whether the revision proceedings were infructuous and beyond the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 18.
Whether the respondent should have sought eviction under Section 21(1)(a) instead of a release order.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 12, s. 16(1)(a), s. 16(1)(b), s. 18, s. 21(1)(a)

Subjects

rent controlallotmentreleaseprospective allotteebona fide requirementrevision jurisdictionevictionlandlordtenantUttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act

Judgment

A RAM NARAYAN SHARMA
v.
SHAKUNTALA GAUR

APRIL 29, 2002

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

Rent and Eviction:

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and Eviction)
C Act, 1972: Sections 16(/)(a), 16(/)(b), 18 and 21(/)(a).

Allotment-Prospective allottee-Right to oppose-Exercise of-Held,
the prospective allottees shall have no right to oppose the release petition
moved by the landlord-On facts held, since the accommodation stood allotted
D before the landlady acquired right in the property, the allottee could oppose
the release petition.

Release Petition-On the ground of bonafide requirements-Landlord
could not move such an application for a period of 3 years as per provisions
contained in Section 21(/)(a).
E Revision Petition-On the ground that notice was not served to other
legal heir of the deceased landlord-Property in dispute settled in favour of
heirs other than Revision Petitioner-Landlady moved an application for being
impleaded as revisionist-Petition became inconsequential and infructuous-
Landlady not allowed to take advantage by defeating the provision of the Law
F to get the premises vacated from allottee.

Appellant moved an application for allotment of suit premises under
Section 16(1Xa) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, ..•
Rent and Eviction) Act Landlord of the premises died during the pendency
of the allotment proceedings. Appellant moved an application for substitution
G of the two sons of deceased-landlord as heirs, which was allowed, but they
did not contest the application for allotment Rent Control and Eviction
Officer allotted the premises to the appellant who took possession of the same.
Later on, one of the sons of the deceased-landlord filed a Revision Petition
challenging the order of allotment on the ground that other children of the
H deceased-landlord (other than the revision petitioner) had not been served
562
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR 563
- notice ofallotment proceedings. Jn the meanwhile the two sons of the deceased-
landlord as a consequence of settlement in arbitration proceedings, became
A

owners of the suit premises and they had transferred the suit premises in
• favour of the respondent who moved an application in the pending Revision
Petition for being impleaded as revisionist No. 2. However, the Revision
Petitioner moved an application not pressing his pending Revision Application.
Civil Court allowed the revision Petition and set aside the order of allotment
B
in favour of the appellant and remanded the case to the Rent Control and
. Eviction Officer to dispose of the same on merits. A Writ Petition preferred
against the said order was rejected.

Transferee-Respondent moved an application for release of
accommodation on the ground of bona.fide requirements, which was dismissed.
c
Consequently an order of allotment was also passed. Aggrieved, respondent
preferred Revision Petitions, and the Court set aside the Order of allotment
and released the accommodation in favour of the respondent. Appellant filed
Writ Petition against the order of release of accommodation and it was
dismissed. Hence the present appeal. D

> It was contended for the appellant that Revisional Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Act and High Court
erred in not taking note of the same as reappraisal of evidence for recording
of finding of facts is not permissible.
E
Allowing the appea~ the Court

HELD: 1. A prospective allottee shall have no right to oppose an
application for release moved by the landlord. The need of the landlord is
bona.fide or not is a matter for the satisfaction of the District Magistrate and
on being so satisfied, an order of release could be passed. The Release F
application is to be disposed of first before passing an order on the application
for allotment. But in the instant case the position is very peculiar which has
not been properly appreciated in correct perspective. [570-G-H; 571-A-B)

1.2. The position that emerges is that respondent was not the landlady G
when the accommodation was allotted to the appellant nor later on when the
two sons of deceased-landlord became owners, Revision Petitioner's interest
in property coming to an end, the revision filed by him even tho_11gh it was
pending, it was an inconsequential and infructuous petition. The respondent
had purchased the house from the sons of the deceased-landlord who became
owners of the said property and moved an application for release the~eafter. H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A It is significant to note that the order, of allotment passed earlier was in
operation when two L.Rs. of the deceased-landlord became owners of the
accommodation. [571-E, F, G]

1.3. Respondent had no connection with the then Landlord or his heirs
so as to be entitled for moving an application under Section 16(l)(b) for release
H of accommodation already allotted to the appellant before her predecessor-
in-interest had acquired rights in property exclusively. The appellant,
therefore, could not be treated as a prospective allottee, nor the respondent
as owner subsequent to allotment could take up Revision. [571-G, H; 572-A]

Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi v. /Ind Addi. District Judge, Lucknow, (1981) ARC
C 34; Mahkar Singh v. Vlth Addi. District Judge, Meerut, (1994) ALR 2 107 and
Taukhid Khan v. Special Judge. Nainital, (1996) 1 ARC 505, referred to.

1.4. Perhaps due to the hurdle in the way of the landlady for moving
an application for eviction under Section 21(1Xa) for the period of three years
by virtue of proviso, she tried to find a short cut to be impleaded as one of
D the revisionists. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Revisional Court
and the High Court both erred in consid~ring the appellant as a "prospective
allottee'~· His position was more akin to an allottee in possession. The only
course open to the Respondent was to move under Section 2l(l)(a) of the Act
for his eviction. The release application under Section 16(l)(b) of the Act
E moved by the Respondent was misconceived. The order passed on the
infructuous proceedings, namely, Revision would be inconsequential and shall
not enure any benefit either to the petitioner who had filed the revision or to
the respondent who moved application for.impleadment as a revisionist
[572-H; 573-A, B, C]

F 1.5. Respondent's impleadment as one of the revisionists, rightly or lo-'
wrongly, would also be inconsequential since she had purchased the property
from L.Rs. of the then landlord as the owners and predecessor-in-interest in
the property and not as heirs. It is thus clear that there is no re!lson to treat
the appellant as prospective allottee. The bona fide requirement of the
respondent could not be considered in the)nfructuous proceedings of the
G Revision. The order passed in infructuous proceedings is inconsequential and
ineffective. She could not be permitted to do something indirectly which was
impermissible directly, in view of proviso to sub-section (1) Of Section 21 of
the Act, namely, she could not get the premises vacated on the ground of her
bonafide requirement within three years of purchasing the property.
H ~~~~~
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 565

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3159 of A
2002.

.. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.99 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 47673 of 1999.

Aman Hingorani and Ms. Priya Hingorani, for Hingorani and Associates B
for the Appellant.

Parag P. Tripathi, A.K. Yadav, Ms. Sangita Garg and K.V. Mohan for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
BRIJESH KUMAR, J, Leave granted.

The order, dismissing a writ petition, preferred by the present appellant
in the High Court, has been impugned by means of the appeal in hand. The
Vlth Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar passed an order dated D
30.10.1999 in revision, setting aside the order of allotment in favour of the
appellant and releasing the accommodation in question, in favour of the
• respondent-landlady on the ground of her bona fide requirement. A learned
Single Judge of Allahabad High Court by order dated 16.11.1999 upheld the
order passed in revision.
E
The dispute as evident, relates to the letting and release of the
accommodation in question governed by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972,
hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'. It appears that one Bankey Lal was
the owner and landlord of House No. 179/18, Sanjay Marg, South Bhopa
Road, Muzaffar Nagar. The ground floor of the house was in the tenancy of F
one Trilok Chand who vacated the premises and the appellant moved an
application for its allotment under Section 16 (I) (a) of the Act. This petition
was registered as Suit No. 63/89. Bankey Lal, the landlord of the house died
during pendency of the proceeding for allotment. The appellant moved for
substitution of the heirs of late Bankey Lal and brought on record his two
sons, namely,, Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar. They did not
G
tum up to contest the application for allotment though served. By order dated
3.8.1990 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises to the
appellant who also entered into possession of the same. Later, however, Ravi
Mohan Bhatnagar, son of late Bankey Lal who was brought on record as one
of his heir, filed a revision No.19 of 1990, challenging the order Of allotment
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 3 S.C.R.

A on the ground that late Shri Bankey Lal had also left behind another son Shri
Hari Mohan and a daughter Smt. Swaraj as his heirs but they had no notice
of the proceedings. Needless to mention that the revisionist, namely, Ravi
Bhatnagar, though served had not taken any such or other objection before
allotment of the accommodation to the appellant.

B Later on, however, Hari Mohan and Mohan Bhatnagar, namely, the
other two sons of late Shri Bankey Lal, as a consequence of settlement in
arbitration proceedings, undisputedly became owners of the house in question.
That is to say Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar was now left with no intere~t in the
property at all so as to be entitled to prosecute revision filed by him against
c allotment order. His brothers also never at any stage showed any interest
against allotment in favour of the appellant. A further development which
needs to be noted is that Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar
transferred the property on 15.9.1994 in favour ofSmt. Shakuntala Gaur, the
respondent who was already a tenant of the first and second floors of the

-
house. She moved an application No. 83A in revision RCA No. 19 of 1990
D for being impleaded as revisionist No. 2 along with Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar.
Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar on the other hand moved an application and rightly,
not pressing his RCA No. 19 of 1990.

The Addi. District Judge, however, by order dated 15.1.1996 allowed
E the RCA No. 19 of 1990 filed by Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar and set aside the
order of allotment dated 3.8.1990 which was passed in favour of the appellant,
on the ground that Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and Smt. Swaraj, other two heirs
of Bankey Lal had no notice of the proceedings of allotment. The Addi.
District Judge also seems to have allowed the application moved by the
respondent for being impleaded as revisionist No.2 but no order appears to
F have been passed on the application of Hari Mohan Bhatnagar not pressing
the revision. The case was remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer
to dispose of the same on merits. A writ petition preferred against the order
dated 15.1.1996, it is informed, had been rejected.

During the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer,
G after the remand, the respondent moved an application dated 15.2.1996 for
release of the accommodation in her favour saying that she bona fide required
the same. The case was decided by order dated 27.3.1997 passed by RCEO
in Suit No. 63 of 1989, recording a finding that the respondent did not have
bona fide need of the accommodation and dismissed the Revision and her
H application for release moved in Suit No. 63 of 1989. As a consequence
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 567

thereof an order of allotment was again passed on 31.3.1997 by the Rent A
Control and Eviction Officer.

The respondent preferred two revisions No.4 of 1997 and 5 of 1997 in
the Court of the Addi. District Judge, impugning the orders dated 27.3.1997
and 31.3.1997. The learned Addi. DistrictJudge allowed the revisions, setting
aside the order of allotment dated 31.3.1997 passed in favour of the appellant B
and released the accommodation in favour of the Respondent. The writ petition
preferred against the order passed in the two revisions mentioned above was
dismissed by order dated 16.11.1999 which is under challenge in this appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant apart from raising other grounds has C
urged that scope of revision under Section 18 of the Act is limited and
reappraisal of evidence for recording findings of fact is not permissible.
Hence, the order of revisional court suffers from infirmity of exceeding its
jurisdiction in exercise of its revisional power and the High Court erred in
not talcing note of the same and further submits that the application for
release of the accommodation moved by the respondent could not be D
entertained.

• Before dealing with questions raised, it may be better to peruse the
>
provisions as contained under Sections 16 and 18 of the Act which read as
follows:
E
"16. Allotment and release of vacant building-

(I) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may
by order:-

(a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen F
vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but
not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order
(to be called an allotment order); or

(b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land G
appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a
release order):

[Provided that in the case ofa vacancy referred to in sub-section (4)
of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the
landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said H
.·~

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A section is not attracted to his case before making an order under
clause {a)].

2. No release order under clause {b) of sub-section ( 1) shall be made
unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any
part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required,
B either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction,
by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his
family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade, calling or ,...
where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the
c objects of the trust, or that the building or any part thereof is in a
dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition, and
new construction, or that any land appurtenant to it is required by
him for constructing one or more new buildings or for dividing it into
several plots with a view to the sale thereof for purposes of construction
of new buildings:
D

.
....
(a)

.. E (b) in the case of business purposes, the names of proprietors or
partners of the business;

(c) the date, which shall not be earlier than seven days after the
date of the order, by which the landlord shall deliver
possession to the allottee;
F
(d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.

G

H (7) Every order under this section, shall subject to any order made
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 569
under Section 18, be final. A
(8) The allottee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) and
(9) of Section 18, be deemed to become tenant of the building from
the date of allotment or where he is unable to obtain possession by
reasons of a stay order or of any other person having occupied or
continued to occupy the building, from the date on which he obtain B
possession.

18. "Appeal against order of allotment or release. (1) No appeal shall
lie from any order under Section 16 or Section 19, whether made
before or after the commencement of this section, but any person
aggrieved by a final order under any of the said sections may within C
fifteen days from the date of such order prefer a revision to the
District Judge on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:-

(a) that the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested
in him by law; (b) that the District Magistrate has acted in D
exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,
)
(2) The revising authority may confirm or rescind the final order
made under sub-section (I) or may remand the case to the District
Magistrate for rehearing and pending the revision may stay the
operation of such order on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. E
Explanation.- The power to rescind the final order under this sub-
section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to
direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different
from the allottee mentione1 in the order under revision.
F
(3) Where an order under Section 16 or Section 19 is rescinded, the
District Magistrate shall on an application being made to him on that
behalf, place the parties back in the possession which they would
have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been
rescinded, and may be that purpose use or cause to be used such
force as may be necessary." G
From a perusal of the provisions quoted above, namely, Sections 16
and 18 of the Act, it is clear that a person is entitled to make an application
under sub-section (1) (a) of Section 16 for allotment in respect of a building
which has or is about to fall vacant. Under clause ( 1) (b) the landlord is H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A entitled to move an application for release of the accommodation sub-section
(7) of Section 16 provides that every order passed under Section 16 shall be
final subject to any order passed under Section 18 of the Act. The order
passed under Section 16 can be interfered with in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act in cases where the District Magistrate
B had exercised jurisdiction not vested or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction
or has exercised it illegally or with irregularity. Under sub-section (2) of
Section 18, the revisional authority is entitled to confirm or rescind or remand
the case to the District Magistrate for re-hearing.

The revisional court while dealing with Revisions No. 4 & 5 of 1999
C held that the position of the appellant was that ofa 'prospective allottee' vis-
a-vis application for release moved by the respondent-landlady. The revisional
court placing reliance upon certain decisions of the High Court on the point,
held that a prospective allottee has no right to file objection or to be heard
against an application moved by the landlord for release and that the release
application has to be heard and disposed of first. Therefore, the revisional
D court further held that the RC & EO erred in considering the application of
the appellant for allotment and in not taking into account the affidavit filed
by the landlady making averments regarding her bona fide need for the
accommodation. So far the question of scope of the power of the revisional
court under Section 18 of the Act is concerned, the revisional court relying
E upon the decisions reported in (1981) ARC 34 - Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi v.
/Ind Addi. District Judge, Lucknow, (1994) ALR 2 107; Mahkar Singh v.
Vlth Addi. District Judge, Meerut and (1996) I ARC 505; Taukhid Khan v.
Special Judge, Nainita/ held that in appropriate cases the revisional court has
power to pass an order of release of the accommodation in favour of the
landlord instead of remanding the matter. Thus holding that the petitioner
F being in a position of prospective allottee had no right to be heard in the
matter of release of the accommodation in favour of the landlora. ('
consideration of the affidavit of the landlady the revisional court found that
her requirement was bona fide thus passed an order of release of
accommodation in her favour. In the writ petition the High Court found the
G appellant was rightly treated as a prospective allottee and the need of the
landlady having been found to be bona fide by the revisional court, it
committed no error in releasing the accommodation in her favour. So far the
legal position is concerned, we feel that there is hardly any doubt that a
prospective allottee shall have no right to oppose an application for release
moved by the landlord. The need of the landlord is bona fide or not is a
H matter for satisfaction of the ,District Magistrate and on being so satisfied, an
•
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 5 71

order of release can be passed. The Release application is to be disposed of A
first before passing an order on the application for allotment.

In the present case, we find that the position is very peculiar which has
not been properly appreciated in correct perspective. Undisputedly, the
accommodation in question had fallen vacant and the appellant had applied
for its allotment but in the meantime landlord Bankey Lal died. The appellant B
brought on record two sons of late Bankey Lal as his heirs and legal
representatives viz. Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar but they
filed no objection and order of allotment was passed on 3 .8.1990 in Suit No.
63/89. The appellant also got possession of the accommodation. Later,
however, same Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar who was substituted and had chosen C
not to file any objection though served, preferred a revision on the ground
that Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and Smt. Swaraj, the other two heirs of Bankey
Lal had no notice although they had not raised any such objection. Later Hari
Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar became owners and landlord of the
house on March 20, 1994. Even after becoming the landlord of the
accommodation, Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar raised no D
objection regarding allotment and tenancy of the appellant. Later they sold
the property in favour of the respondent on 15.9.1994. Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar
moved application for not pressing Revision No.19 of 1990 filed by him
against allotment in favour of the appellant. The position that emerges is that
respondent was not the landlady when the accommodation was allotted to the E
appellant in 1990 nor on March 20, 1994 when Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and
Mohan Bhatnagar became landlords thus on Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar's interest
in property as an heir of Bankey Lal coming to an end, the revision No.19
of 1990 filed by Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar even if it was pending, it was an
inconsequential and infructuous petition having no life so as to be prosecuted
by him. The respondent had purchased the house from Hari Mohan and F
Mohan Bhatnagar and not from Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar who obviously was
left with no right or interest in the property. She moved an application for
release thereafter on 15.2.1996. It may be particularly noted that the order of
allotment passed on 3 .8.1990 was in operation on March 20, 1994 when Hari
Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan Bhatnagar became owner of the accommodation. G
Between Bankey Lal and his heirs including Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar and the
landlady-Respondent there stood her vendors having ownership rights of
their own which they transferred to her. She had no connection with Bankey
Lal or his heirs so as to be entitled for moving an application under Sectien
16 (l )(b) for release of accommodation already allotted to the appellant before
her predecessor in interest had acquired rights in property exclusively. The H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) 3 S.C.R.

A appellant, therefore, could not be treated as a prospective allottee nor the ...
respondent as owner subsequent to allotment could take up Revision filed by
Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar whose interest as an heir of Bankey Lal had ceased
on the property vesting in Hari Mohan and Mohan Bhatnagar by virtue of
arbitration.

B In such a situation, as indicated above, the landlady, namely, the
respondent in case had any bona fide requirement of the accommodation
could only move for eviction of the appellant under the provisions of Section
21 of the Act. Section 21 reads as under:

"21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant-
c (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord
in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under
tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the
following grounds exists, namely-

D (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form
or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for
occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any
person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential
purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or
where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for
E the objects of the trust;

(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for
purposes of demolition and new construction:

Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant
F since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made -.
after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained
on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a) unless a period of three years
has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has
given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months
before such application, and such notice may be given even before
G the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years:

"
H Perhaps due to the hurdle in the way of the landlady for moving an
R.N. SHARMA v. SHAKUNTALA GAUR [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 573

-. application for eviction under Section 21 (l)(a) for period of three years by A
virtue of proviso, she tried to find a short cut to be impleaded as one of the
revisionists i'1 RCA No. 19 of 1990 in which the Respondent Ravi Mohan
Bhatnagar was not left with any kind of interest nor even semblance of any
right to challenge the allotment.

In the facts and circumstances indicated above the Revisional Court B
and the High Court both erred in considering the appellant as a "prospective
allottee". His position was more akin to an allottee in possession. The only
course open to the respondent was to move under Section 21 (l)(a) of the Act
for his eviction.
c
The release application.under Section 16 (!) (b) of the Act moved by
the respondent was misconceived. The order passed on the infructuous
proceedings, namely, Revision No.19/90 would be inconsequential and shall
not enure any benefit either to Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar who had filed the
revision nor to the respondent who moved application for impleadment as a
revisionist. Initially also Ravi Mohan Bhatnagar had no justifiable reason to D
file the revision once having failed to file objections to the allotment application
in the year 1990 more particularly on the ground that notice was not served
upon some other heirs of late Bankey Lal. Whatever right, if at all he had to
file the revision as one of the heirs of Bankey Lal, he had lost the same after
the property came to be owned by Hari Mohan Bhatnagar and Mohan E
Bhatnagar on March 20, 1994 by virtue ·of arbitration award in their favour.
So far respondent is concerned, her impleadment as one of the revisionists
rightly or wrongly would also be inconsequential since she had purchased the
property from Hari Mohan and Mohan Bhatnagar as the owners and
predecessor in interest in the property and not from heirs of late Bankey Lal.
It is thus clear that there is no reason to treat the appellant as prospective F
allottee. The bona fide requirement of the responJent could not be considered
in the infructuous proceedings of the Revision 19/1990. The order passed in
infructuous proceedings is inconsequential and ineffective. She could not be
permitted to do something indirectly which was impermissible directly, in
view of proviso to sub-section (l) of Section 21 of the Act, namely, she G
could not get the premises vacated on the ground of her bona fide requirement
within three years of purchasing the property.

In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court as
well as of the revisional court are set aside and that of the Rent Control &
Eviction Officer is restored. In case the appellant has been dispossessed from H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A the premises in pursuance of the orders passed by the revisional court or the
High Court, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer will take steps to restore
possession of the premises to him. The appellant on getting possession of the
premises will pay to the respondent-landlady arrears of rent for the period he
was in occupation of the premises, within three months. It will, however, be
B open to the respondent, if so advised, to move any appropriate application as
may be permissible under the law for eviction of appellant. There shall,
however, be no order as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed.