Holding

The Supreme Court held that the respondents' possession was continuous from May 1958, the limitation period had expired before consolidation, and the appeal was dismissed.

Summary

The appellants challenged the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that evicted them from land, invoking Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the respondents had been in possession since May 1958 and that the six‑year limitation period for an eviction suit had expired before consolidation began, thereby perfecting the respondents' title by adverse possession. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, contending a break in possession between May 1958 and January 1960 when the land was in the custody of the criminal court. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, deeming the court’s custody as a continuation of possession on behalf of the eventual possessor, and affirmed that the respondents’ possession was continuous, the limitation period had run, and the title was valid. The Court also dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds, refusing to recall the default dismissal but hearing the matter to avoid prejudice to the appellants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s decision upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the respondents' possession of the land was continuous for the purpose of the limitation period under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
Whether the period of limitation began on 1 July 1958 and expired on 30 June 1964, pre‑empting the consolidation operations.
Whether custody of the land by the criminal court between 8 May 1958 and 29 January 1960 constitutes a break in possession.
Whether an appeal dismissed for default can be recalled on the ground that counsel was engaged elsewhere.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 145
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Acts. 209

Subjects

evictionadverse possessionlimitation periodZamindari Abolitionland reformsconsolidationdefault dismissalSupreme Court

Judgment

RAM NATH AND OTHERS
v. A
DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION AND OTHERS

NOVEMBER IO, 1987

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) B

Suit for eviction from land under section 209 of the Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act-Title to land by adverse possession.

The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order
\ of the Deputy Director of consolidation. The appellants filed appeal in
this Court against the order of the High Court. The appeal came up for C
hearing on May 7, 1987, when it was dismissed for default of appeara-
nce, whereafter an application for restoration was filed on the ground
that counsel for the appellants was busy in the High Court at the time of
hearing of the appeal. This Court found no justification for recalling its
order, dismissing the appeal, hut in view of the fact that the appellants D
would suffer for no fault of theirs, decided to hear the matter, directing
that this practice should not he permitted in this Court any further.

Dismissing the appeal (on merits), the Court,
y
HELD: There is no merit in the appeal. The High Court was right E
in holding that the respondents (concerned) were in possession of the
land in 1958 when the case started under section 145 of the Cr. P. C. and
r their date of occupation could not be later than 8.5.1958, so that the six
years' period of limitation for a suit for their eviction under section 209
of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would start running
from July 1, 1958 and expire on June 30, 1964 i.e. before the consolida- F
tion operations commenced. The appellants contended that there was a
break in the possession of the respondents concerned between 8.5.1958
and 29.1.60, but during that period the land was in the custody·ofthe
Criminal Court which must be deemed to have been holding possession
of the land on behalf of the person eventually found to be entitled to
possession. The respondents had matured their title by adverse posses- G
1 sion and there could he no warrant for denying them the status of
rightful owners. There was no break in the possession of the respon-
dents and they must he held to have been in continuous occupation at
least from May, 1958. [877A-Fl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Miscellaneous H
875
.'
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 1 S.C.R.

Petition No. 1483 of 19.87. (In Civil Appeal No. 573 of 1974).
A
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.4.1973 of the Allahabad
High Court in Special Appeal No. 537 of 1970.

P.K. Bajaj and S.K. Bagga for the Appellants.
B
G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents. )----·

The following Order of the Court was delivered: .,._
ORDER
c The appeal was listed on 7.5.1987 before a bench consisting of
'f
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.L. Oza and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Singh.
The order recited "Heard learned counsel for the respondent for suffi-
cient time. No one appears for the appellants. The appeal is, there-
fore, dismissed in default."
D
This C.M.P. was subsequently filed for recalling the order on the
ground that the learned counsel was busy in the Delhi High Court on
that date. It was further stated there "But when after arguing two
cases viz. Company Petition No. 110 of 1983 Ishwar Singh and Others
v. Dharam Singh and others, (final hearing) and also other regular y
E matter Suit No, 49 of 1976 A.C. Tamra v. Mercury Production (part
heard) in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi he (meaning thereby
the counsel for the appellant) came to this Hon'ble Court, he came to
know that this appeal had reached for hearing and was dismissed for
.....'
default". This petition is signed not by the appellant but by M/s. Bagga
& Co., Advocates for the appellant. It is verified by an affidavit of one
F P.K. Bajaj who state that he had been instructed to appear and argue ~(
the appeal. W.e are not sure as to who is making this application and
whether the appellant is at all aware of these events. We find no
justification for recalling the order on the plea that the counsel was
busy somewhere. We were not inclined to act upon this kind of plea
but on the basis that otherwise the appellant would suffer loss for no
G fault of his, we have decided to hear the counsel. This practice should r
not be permitted in this Court any further.

On perusal of the judgment of the High Court we find no merit in
'r''
this appeal. By the impugned judgment of the High Court of
Allahabad, writ petition was allowed and the order of the Deputy
H Director of Consolidation dated the 25th October, 1967 was quashed.
RAM NATH v. DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION 877

"}' The learned Judge has recorded that the respondents herein A
have been held to be in possession in 1958 when the case started under
Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their date of occu-
pation could not be later than 8.5.1958 with the result that the spc
years' period of limitation for a suit for their eviction under Section
209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would start to
B
run from 1st July, 1958 and would expire on 30th June, 1964 i.e. before
~ the consolidation operations commenced.

It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellants herein
that there was a break in the possession of the respondents between
8.5.1958 and 29.1.1960, but it was obvious that though the land was in
l the custody of the criminal court during that period the court must be
deemed to have been holding possession on behalf of the person
c
eventually found to be entitled to possession. We are of the opinion
that the learned Judge was right in so holding. It was argued that there
was no justification for treating the respondents to be entitled for
possession of the land as they had occupied the land as mere trespas-
sers but it was found that they had matured their title by adverse D
possession and there could be no warrant for denying them the status
of rightful owners. The learned Judge did in the absence of any finding
by a competent court negativing the respondents claim was of the
opinion that they must be deemed to have been in persons entitled to
y possession of the disputed plots with the result that during the period
between 8.5.1958 and 29.1.1960 the criminal court must be held to E
have been in possession of the land. In that view of the melter there
was no break in the possession of the respondents and they must be
held to have been in continuous occupation at least from May, 1958. In
that view of the matter the other contentions urged before the High
Court need not be noticed.
}~
F
In that view of the matter the appeal fails and is dismissed
accordingly.

No one appears for the respondent. Therefore, there is no ques-
tion of costs. We, however, direct the Registry to transmit a copy of
this Order to the appellant directly at the costs of Advocate for the G
appellant.
~
S.L. Appeals dismissed.