Holding

The landlord’s remedy after dismissal of an eviction suit is an appeal under Section 96 CPC; Section 14(8) does not allow revision of an appellate order, and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision as a second appeal because no substantial question of law was raised.

Summary

The landlord (appellant) filed an eviction suit under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on the ground of bona‑fide personal requirement. The trial court dismissed the suit; the landlord appealed and obtained a decree for eviction, which the tenants (respondents) challenged by filing a revision petition under Section 14(8) of the Act. The Patna High Court allowed the revision, setting aside the decree, but the landlord appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that when an eviction suit is dismissed, the only statutory remedy for the landlord is an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, and Section 14(8) does not permit a revision against an appellate order. Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision as a second appeal under Section 100 CPC because no substantial question of law arose; the bona‑fide requirement is a factual issue. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s revision order, restored the appellate decree for eviction, and allowed the civil appeal.

Issues considered

Whether an appeal against the dismissal of an eviction suit under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act is maintainable under Section 96 CPC despite Sections 13 and 14(8) of the Act.
Whether a revision petition under Section 14(8) of the Act is maintainable against an appellate order granting eviction.
Whether the High Court could entertain the revision as a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without a substantial question of law.
Whether the bona‑fide personal requirement is a question of law or a factual determination.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 96, s. Order 2 Rule 2

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementrent controlBihar Buildings ActCivil Procedure Codeappealrevisionsubstantial question of lawjurisdiction

Judgment

RAM PRASAD RAJAK A
v.
NANO KUMAR AND BROS. AND ANR.

AUGUST 18, 1998

[DR. AS. ANAND AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.] B

Rent Control & Eviction :

Bihar Buildings (lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1981:-Section
14-Eviction suit-Dismissal of-Remedy agai11sHfeld, la11dlord can cl!al- C
lenge it by filing appeal u/s 96 Civil Procedure Code-No Provisio11 in the Act
prescribing any remedy to the landlord-Revision 11/s 14(8) of the Act against
decree of eviction passed by Appellate Cowt-Whether maimainable-Held,
No.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section lOfJ-£victio11 suit-Bonafide Re- D
quireme11t-Findi11g offact-High Cowt, in second appeal not empowered to
reappreciate evide11ce 011 record and i11te1fere with finding recorded by llial
Cowt.

The appellant, landlord of a shop which was occupied by the respon-
E
dents as tenants, filed Eviction Suit u/s 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease,
Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on the ground of bo11afide requirement
for personal oci:u1iation. That suit was dismissed by the Trial Court.
However, on appeal, the appellant got a decree for eviction against the
respondents. The respondents filed a Civil Revision Petition u/S 14(8) of
the. Act, which was allowed. This appeal had been filed against the judg- F
ment of the High Court.

TI1e respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appellant's
appeal against the dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court was not
maintainable as by virtue of the provisions contained in Sections 13 and G
14(8) of the Act, the only remedy available to the appellant was an appiica-
tion to the High Court for revision of the order llf the Trial Court.

The appellant alleged that as decided by the Full Bench of the Patna
High Court in Mohd. Jai1111lA11sali v. Kllalil, (1990) 2 PWR 378 which holds
.J
the field, if a suit for eviction ends in dismissal by the Trial Court, the H
1

\
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A remedy of the landlord is to challenge the same under Section 96 CPC as
there is no provision in Section 14 or in the Act prescribing·any remedy to
the landlord.

Allowirig the Appeal, this Court

B HELD : 1.1. The decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court
in Mohd. Jainul Ansaii v. Khalil, holding that if a snit for eviction filed
under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & l~viction)
Control Act, 1982, ends in dismissal by the Trial Court, the remedy of the
landlord is to challenge the same u/S 96 Civil Procedure Code as there is
C no provision in Section 14 or in the Act prescribing any remedy to the
landlord, is correct in law. The reasons given by the Full B1~nch are
appropriate. The Full Bench has referred to the judgment of this Court in
Vi11od Kumar Chowdluy v. Smt. Narain Devi Ta11eja and rightly distin-
guished the same on the footing that the provision of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 and the Ribar Act are not paii-mate1ia. [4-F-H; 5-B]
D ~.
Vi11od Kumar Clwwdluy v. Smt. Narain Devi Ta11eja, [1980] 2 SCC
120, distinguished.

Mohd. Jai11ztl Ansaii v. Khalil, (1990) 2 PWR 378 (FB), approved.
E
1.2. The respondents filed a Revision under Section 14(8) of the Act
against the judgment of the Appellate Court granting a decree for evictirm
in favour of the Appellant. Obviously that revision was not maintainable as
there is no provision in Section 14(8) of the Act for a revision against an
Appellate Order. The said sub-section refers only to an order passed by the
F Trial Court for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord. If the Trial
Court dismisses the suit, the only remedy of the landlord is to file all appeal
under Section 96 CPC. When such an appeal is disposed of by thn! Appel-
late Court, the further remedy of the aggrieved party is only under Section
100 CPC and there is no c1uestion of reverting back to Section 14(8) of the
G Act. The appellate order or decree can not be considered to be an order of
the trial Court for recovery of possession within the meaning of Section
14(8) of the Act. Hence, the revision petition filed by the respondent before
the High Court was not maintainable. [5-F-H; 6-A]

1.3. Considering that the objection as to the maintainability of the
H revision petition was not taken by the appellant in the High Court and the
R.P. RAJAK v. NANO KUMAR AND BROS.[SRINIVASAN,J.] 3

revision was entertained and allowed, in order to meet the ends of justice A
that revision petition was to be treated as a second appeal u/S 100 CPC.
Therefore, unless there was a ~ubstantial question of law, the High Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal and consider the merits,
existence of a substantial c1uestion of law being sine qua non for the exercise
of jurisdiction u/S 100 CPC. The only c1uestion raised in the instant case
related to the bona fide requirement of the appellant. It was entirely a
B
matter to be decided on an appreciation of the evidence, it therefore, did
not give rise to any substantial c1uestion of law. The High Court interfered
with a finding of fact arrived· at in the first appeal on an appreciation of
the evidence. The High Court made an attempt to reappreciate the
evidence and come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his C
bona fide rec1uirement. TI1e High Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction
in appreciating the evidence on record. TI1e first Appellate Court had
discussed the evidence threadbare and con'sidered the matter in the
proper perspective. [6-B-H; 7-A]

Panchugopal Bama & Ors. v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & Ors., J.T. D
(1997) 2 SC 554; Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors.,
J.T. (1997) 5 SC 202, relied on.
/

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJCTIQN Civil Appeal No. 95 of
1997.
E
From the Judgment ,a11d Order dated 15.5.96 of the Patna High Court
in C.R. No. 416 of 1995.

KR. Nagaraja, K.K. Tyagi and Anand Kumar Sharma for the Appel-
lant.
F
S.B. Sanyal and Ranjan Mukherjee for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SRINIVASAN, J. The appellant is landlord of a shop measuring
6'xl 7-1/2' which is occupied by the respondents as tenants. The appellant G
't filed Eviction Suit No. 19/85 under the general law in the Court of District
Munsif, Giridih for evicting the respondents on two grounds :

_(i) non-payment of rent and

(ii) bona fide personal requirement. H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A The suit was dismissed and an appeal by the appellant also failed. He filed
a second appeal, during the pendency of which he filed the present
Eviction Suit No. 35/89 on the file of the District Munsif, Giridih under
Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act,
1982, ('for short, 'the Act') on the ground of bona fide requirement for
B personal occupation. That suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. On
appeal, the appellant succeeded and got a decree for eviction against the
respondents. Against the said decree, the respondents filed a Civil Revision
Petition under Section 14(8) of the Act. When.the said Revision Petition
was pending the appellant withdrew his Second Appeal filed in the earlier
proceedings and got it dismissed. Thereafter, the High Court allowed the
C Revision Petition filed by the respondents on two grounds, namely :

(i) the' second suit for eviction filed by the appellant was barred by
the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. and

(ii) the appellant's requirement for personal occupation was not bona
D fide. It is that judgment of the High Court which is challenged in this
appeal.

2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents at the
hearing of the appeal that the appellant's appeal before the District Court
E against the dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court was not maintainable
and, consequently, the judgment rendered by the Appellate Court in favour
of the appellant was invalid. The contention of the respondents is that by
virtue of the provisions contained in Sections 13 and 14(8) of the Act, the
only remedy available to the appellant against the dismissal of his suit for
eviction was an application to the High Court for revision of the order of
F the Trial Court. In answer to the said contention, learned counsel for the
appellant submits that the question has been discussed and considered in
detail by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Mohd. Jainul Ansa1i
v. Khalil, (1990) 2 P.L.J.R. 378 and that it has been decided by the Full
Bench if a suit for eviction ends in dismissal by the Trial Court, the remedy
G of the landlord is to challenge the same under Section 96 C.P.C. as there
is no provision in Section 14 or in the Act prescribing any remedy to the
landlord. Learned counsel represented that the said judgment of the Full
Bench has not been challenged in this Court and it holds the field.

2. It is the contention of the respondents that the Judgment of the
H Full Bench is erroneous as it runs counter to the judgment of this Court
R.P. RAJ AK v. NAND KUMAR AND BROS.[SRINIVASAN, J.] 5

in Vinod Kumar Chowdluy v. Smt. Narain Devi Taneja, (1980) 2 SCC 120 A
in which a corresponding provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
was considered. According to learned counsel for the respondents the
provisions in the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Bihar Act are pwi materia
and the judgment of the Supreme Court would govern the question. We
are unable to agree.
B
4. The Full Bench has referred to Vi11od Kumar's case and distin-
guished the same on the footing that the provisions of the two enactments
are not pwi-materia . The Full Bench has also considered the provisions of
the two enactments. The reasons given by the Full Bench are appropriate
and we agree with the same. We are also ofthe opinion that the decision c
of this Court in Vinod Kwiiar Chowdluy's case will not apply. As we are in
agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench, it is unnecessary for
us to consider the question in detail. Suffice it to hold that the decision of
the Full Bench is correct in law. Hence,· the preliminary objection raised
by learned counsel for the respondents is over-ruled.
D
5. Learned counsel for the respondents has stated before us that he
is not supporting the judgment of the High Court in so far as it holds that
the present suit for eviction filed by the appellant is barred by the
provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. Even apart from his statement we find
that the cause of action for the second suit is entirely different from the E
cause of action for the earlier suit and there is no chance of Order 2 Rule
2 barring this suit.

6. We have noticed that the respondents filed a Revision under
Section 14(8) of the Act against the judgment of the Appellate Court F
granting a decree for eviction in favour of the appellant. Obviously that
revision was not maintainable as there is no provision in Section 14(8) of
the Act for a revision against an Appellate Order. The said sub-section
refers only to an order passed by the Ttial Court for recovery of possession
in favour of the landlord. If the Trial Court dismisses the suit, the only
remedy of the landlord is to file an appeal under Section 96 CPC. When G
such an appeal is disposed of by the Appellate Court, the further remedy
of the aggrieved party is only under Section 100 CPC and there is no
question of reverting back to Section 14(8) of the Act. By no stretch of
imagination, the appellate order or decree can be considered to be an
order of the Trial Court for recovery of possession within the meaning of H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A Section 14(8) of the Act. Hence, the revision petition filed by the respon-
dents before the High Court was not maintainable.

7. We find, however, the objection as to the maintainability of the
revision petition was not taken by the appellant in the High Court. The
revision was entertained and allowed by the High Court. In order to meet
B the ends of justice we treat the said revision petition as a second appeal
under Section 100 CPC and proceed to consider whether the .iudgment of
the High Court is sustainable or not. Once the proceeding in the High
Court is treated as a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the restrictions
prescribed in the said Section would come into play. The High Court could
C and ought to have dealt with the matter as a second appeal and found out
whether a substantial question of law arose for consideration. Unless there
was a substantial question of law, the High Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain th~ second appeal and consider the merits. It has been held by
this Court in Panclmgopal Banta & Ors. v. Umesh Chandra Goswami &
D Ors., J .T. (1997) 2 SC 554 and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar
Purkait & Ors., J.T. (1997) 5 SC 202, that existence of a substantial question
of law is sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100
CPC. In both the aforesaid cases, one of us (Dr. Anand, J .) was a party to
the Bench and in the former, he spoke for the Bench.

E 8. That apart, on merits, the only other question relates to the bona
fide requirement of the appellant that does not give rise to any substantial
question of law. It is entirely a matter to be decided on an appreciation of
the evidence. On a perusal of the judgment of the High Court it is evident
that it had interfered with a finding of fact arrived at by the Second
p Additional District Judge, Giridih in the first appeal on an appreciation of
the evid!!nce. The High Court made an attempt to re-appreciate the
evidence and come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his
bona fide requirement. In fact after a 'scanty discussion of the evidence, the
High Court observed, "in this view of the matter I find and hold that the
plaintiff miserably failed on factual aspect also to prove his bona fide
G necessity." The High Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction in appreciating
the evidence on record.

9. We have also been taken through the judgment of the Second
Additional District Judge rendered in the first appeal against the judgment
H of the Trial Court. We find that the Appellate Court has discussed the
R.P.RAJAKv. NAND KUMAR AND BROS.[SRINIVASAN,J.] 7

evidence threadbare and considered the matter in the proper perspective. A
The Appellate Court has considered all the materials on record and
nothing has been omitted to be referred. Learned counsel for the respon-
dents has contended that the Appellate Court omitted to consider an
admission made by the plaintiff that his need could be satisfied if the
adjacent shop occupied by another tenant Harish Chandra Bagga was
delivered to him. We do not find any such admission on record. On the
B
other hand, the categoric case of the appellant is ·that his requirement can
be fulfilled only by vacating both the premises occupied by the tenants
including the respondents. In so far as Harish Chandra Bagga is concerned
it is stated by the appellant that he had earlier undertaken to vacate the
shop in his occupation and ultimately handed over possession of the said c
shop to the appellant on 20.9 .97 during the pendency of this appeal. On a
perusal of the record we are of the opinion that the finding of fact rendered
by the Second Additional District Judge in the first appeal is conclusive
and the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the said
finding.
D
10. Consequently, the Civil Appeal is allowed and the judgment and
order of the High Court of Patna in Civil Revision No. 416 of 1995 (R) is
set aside. The judgment and decree for eviction ·passed by the Second
Additional District Judge, Giridih in Eviction Appeal No, 6 of 1990 are
restored. There will be no order as to costs. E
11. Learned counsel for the respondents prayed for grant of one year
time to vacate the premises. Learned counsel for the appellant has agreed
to the same after obtaining instructions. In the circumstances, the respon-
dents are granted time to vacate the suit premises till 14.8.1999 on condi-
tion that the respondents file the usual undertaking in this Court within a F
period of eight weeks from this date failing which, the benefit of grant of
time will not be available to them.

R.A. Appeal allowed.