Holding

A deposit under Section 7C is not conclusive; the tenant must show that the deposit was made because the landlord genuinely refused to accept rent, and in the present case no such justification was proved.

Summary

Ram Sewak, a tenant, was sued for eviction by his landlord Munna Lal under Section 3(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for non‑payment of rent for more than three months. The tenant claimed that he had tendered the rent, which the landlord refused to accept, and therefore deposited the arrears in court under Section 7C of the same Act. The trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court held that the statutory conditions for a valid deposit under Section 7C were not satisfied, and that the tenant remained in default. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that a mere deposit under Section 7C does not automatically defeat an eviction action; the tenant must prove circumstances justifying the deposit, such as a genuine refusal by the landlord. Since the tenant failed to demonstrate any valid tender or refusal, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the eviction decree. The decision emphasizes that Section 7C is a protective measure, not a conclusive defence, and that each case must be examined on its facts.

Issues considered

Whether a deposit of rent under Section 7C of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 automatically defeats an eviction suit under Section 3(1)(a).
Whether the tenant must establish circumstances justifying the deposit, such as a genuine refusal by the landlord to accept rent.
Whether the earlier order permitting deposit under Section 7C can operate as res judicata in the eviction proceedings.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947s. 3(1)(a), s. 7C(1), s. 7C(2), s. 7C(4), s. 7C(6)

Subjects

evictionrent depositSection 7Cdefault in rentlandlord-tenant disputeUttar Pradesh Rent Actres judicataequity

Judgment

A RAM SEWAK
v.
MUNNA LAL

DECEMBER 16, 1987

B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.)

Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of.Rent and Eviction Act,
!947: SS. 3( l)(a) & 7C-Default in payment of rent-Deposit in court-
Validity of-Tenant to show existence of circumstances justifying
deposit.
c
Section 3(l)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Evic-
tion Act, 1947 permits eviction of the tenant who is in arrears of rent for
more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord
within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand. When
a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him, s. 7C(l}
D entitles the tenant to deposit such rent in the court. Section 7C(4)
requires the court to cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the
landlord. Section 7C(6) provides that where a deposit has been made as
aforesaid, it shallbe deemed that the rent has been duly paid.

The appdlant-tenant was in arrears of rent of the demised shop
E from December, 1966 to February, 1971. The amount remained unpaid
despite notices dated March 22, 1971 and April 12, 1971. In the suit for
his ejectment under s. 3(1)(a), the tenant took the defence that he had
tendered the rent to the plaintiff-landlord but the latter had refused to
accept It, that even the rent sent by money order was refused, and
thereupon he had made the deposit in the court under s. 7C(l) of the
F Act, and there were no arrears of rent due from him.

The trial court and the first appellate court held that statutory
conditions requisite for a valid deposit were not fulfilled and, therefore,
the default in payment of rent within.the meaning of s. 3(l)(a) stood
establi.shed and the tenant was liable to eviction. The High Court dis-
G missed the appeal.

In the appeal before this Court in addition to the defence taken
before the courts below, .it was contended that though the landlord was
aware that the rent was being deposited in the court ever since August,
1967 he waited for a period of four years before issuing a notice of
H demand for arrears for rent.
416
RAMSEWAKv.MUNNALAL 417

Dismissing the appeal, A

~ HELD: 1. Both in law and equity the appellant had no case. The
ejectment suit was properly decreed by the Courts below. I429H; 430A]

2.1 The mere fact of a deposit under s. 7C.of the U.P. (Tempor·
ary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 in itself cannot be an B
answer to an action under s. 3(1)(a) for eviction of the tenant for
default in payment of rent. Irrespective of the fact of such deposit
the tenant has to show the existence of circumstances justifying the

r deposit. [421G; 423A]

Brahmanand v. Kaushalya Devi, [1977] 3 SCC 1, referred to.
' c
~
'

2.2 Readings. 7C, the rules framed thereunder and the statutory
forms together, it cannot be said that a deposit under s. 7C is necessar·
1 ily a valid one preceded by an enquiry or satisfaction of the Court that
the condition precedent set out in s. 7C(l) is fulfilled. Though the appl·
icant is asked to indicate briefly the circumstances in which he wants to D
make a deposit, there is no procedure contemplated for an enquiry into
those circumstances. The statutory provisions do not contemplate

l
transmission of the application to the landlord, the fixing of a date of
hearing on which both the tenant and the landlord could be heard or the
passing of a considered order by the Court thereafter and being
satisfied that there was in fact a tender of rent by the tenant and a E
refusal by the landlord to receive the rent or a dispute regarding the
l~ ownership of the property which rendered it difficult or impossible for
the tenant to send money to the landlord straight. The notice which is

, sent to the landlord merely sets out that the landlord is at liberty to
withdraw it ifhe so desires. [424C-FI

2.3 In the instant case, the trial court, the first appellate court
and the High Court have concurrently found that there was no valid
tender of rent by the tenant or refusal thereof by the landlord. The
F

application filed by the tenant under s. 7C gave no details in the space
against column 6 of the form prescribed in Appendix 'A' to the Rules
)
framed under the Act, setting out the circumstances in which it was G
alleged that the landlord had refused to receive-the rent. The applica-
-).- tion barely asserted that the landlord had refused to accept the rent.
There was no information as to the nature of notice served on the
landlord. [424H; 42SB·Cl

There was no enquiry or finding recorded in the proceedings H
'
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A under s. 7C which could at all operate as res judicata against the land-
lord in the suit under s. 3(1)(a). Though the order of the Munsif under
s. 7C mentioned that the landlord was absent though served sufficien- 1-
tly, the order was only that the landlord may withdraw the amount
deposited on proper application. It does not indicate any application of
mind by the Munsif as to whether the conditions precedent for a valid
B deposit under s. 7C were satisfied. There was certainly no finding at
that stage on this vital requirement. The grant of permission to ~
deposit under s. 7C; in the case cannot, therefore, be treated as
conclusive of the fact that a valid deposit had been made under that
section. [427B; 425D-E] -i
Haji Abdul Karim v. Mohd. Ismail, [1978] U.P. Rent Cases 691,
c referred to.

Fateh Chand, v. Bal Saroop Goel, [1967] 65 ALJ 979; Kaloo and
Others v. Gauri Shankar, [1981] 3 SCC 51 and Kameshwar Singh
Srivastava v. IV Add!. District Judge, Lucknow and others, AIR 1987
D S. C. 138 distinguished.

3. The contention of the appellant that though the landlord was

E
aware that the rent was being deposited in the court ever since August,
1967 he waited for a period of four years before issuing a notice of
demand for arrears of rent was without substance. The delay was not
due to any !aches on the part of the respondent but was caused on
j
account of the pendency of the litigation instituted by the tenant claim-
ing refund of a sum of Rs.275 paid towards rent. [429C-D] ~·I
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1654
of 1979.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.3.1979 of the Allahabad
High Court in Second Appeal No. 3064 of 1972.

J.P. Goyal and S.K. Jain for the Appellant.

G S.N. Kacker and D.K. Garg for the Respondent. <

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. The question which has come up for con-
sideration in this appeal from judgment of the Allahabad High Court is
H whether the <leposit of rent by a tenant under section 7-C of the Uttar
RAM SEWAJ( v. MUNNA LAL [RANGANATHAN ,J.I 419

Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 A
(hereinafter called the 'Act') as such entitles him to resist successfully
eviction under the provisions of the Act on the ground of default in
payment of rent.

2. The appellant, Ram Sewak, was a tenant of the respondent,
Munna Lal in respect of a shop on a rent of Rs.25 per month. The rent B
upto 30. 11.66 had been paid by the tenant. The landlord, however.
claimed that the rent for the period from I. 12.66 till 28.2. 1971. less an
amount of Rs.c75 which had been received by him by way of money
order, was due from the appeJ!ant-tenant. This remained unpaid
despite notices of demand dated 22.3.7 ! and 12.4.1971, and a notice of
termination of the tenancy dated 27.4.·1971..0n these allegations. The
landlord instituted a suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of
c
non-payment of rent. He also claimed the recovery of arrears of rent.
mesne profits and certain taxes, which were alleged to be payable by
the tenant. This suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Jhansi. A first
appeal was unsuccessful insorfar as the decree related to the eviction
of the petitioner was concerned but the claim for arrears of rent was D
rejected in part on the ground of limitation. A second appeal was also
dismissed by the High Court and hence the present appeal.

3. The defence of the tenant to the suit was that he had tendered
the rent to the plaintiff-lan9J0rd but the latter had refused to accept it.
The rent was sent by money order but even then it was refused. It was E
submitted that the tenant had thereupon made an application on
3 !. 7. 1967 under section 7-C of the Act in the court of the learned
Munsif, Jhansi, for permission to deposit the rent in the court. The
Court issued a notice to the landlord, which was also duly served on
him. On the date of bearing there was no appearance on behalf of the
landlord. Thereupon the learned Munsif passed an order, on F
11. l !. 1967, permitting the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent as well
as future rent in court. It was claimed that the tenant had deposited
arrears of rent amounting to Rs.200 for the period from 1. 12. 1966 to
31. 7. 1967 in the court along with application and that he continued to
deposit in court the rent thereafter from month to month. It was,
therefore, submitted that there were no arrears of rent due from the G
tenant to the landlord and that, therefore, the suit for eviction was not
maintainable.

4. The learned Munsif and, on appeal, the learned Subordinate
Judge found as a fact that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had
tendered the rent to the landlord or that the latter had refused to H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) 2 S.C.R.

accept it. This being so, they held, the statutory conditions requisite
A
for a valid deposit under section 7C were not fulfilled. Neither the
application made by the plaintiff under S. 7C nor the order passed by
the learned Munsif on 11.11.67 could therefore, help the plaintiff. In
this view of the matter, both the courts held that the default in pay-
ment of rent, within the meaning of sec. 3(1)(a) of the Act, stood
B established and the plaintiff was, therefore, liable to eviction. Before
us, as before the courts below, learned counsel for the tenant based his
case solely bn the order under the provisions of S. 7C of the Act. That
section reads as follows:

"7-C-Payment by Deposit of Rent-( 1) When a landlord -~
refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by a tenant
c in respect of any accommodation the tenant may in the
prescribed manner deposit such rent and continue to
deposit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect
of such accommodation unless the landlord in the mean-
time signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willing-
D ness to accept.

(2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen
as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent referred
to in sub-section (1) in respect of any accommodation, the
tenant may similarly deposit the rent stating the circumst-
E ances under which such deposit is made and may until such
doubt has been removed ·or such dispute has been settled
by the decision of any competent court, or by the settle·
men! between the parties, continue to deposit, in like man-
ner, the. rent that may subsequently become due in respect
of such building.
F
(3) The deposit refei;red to in sub-section (1) or (2)
shall be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction
in the area where the accommodation is situate.

(4) On any deposit being made under sub-section (1)
{
G the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on
the landlord, and the_amount of deposit may be withdrawn
by the landlord on application made by him to the Court in
this behalf.

(5) When a deposit has been made under sub-section
H (2) the amount of the deposit shall be held by the Court for
RAM SEWAK v. MUNNA LAL [RANGANATHAN ,J.] 421

the benefit of the person who may be entitled to it and the A
same shall be payable to such person.

(6) In any case where a deposit has been made, as
aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the rent has been duly
paid by the tenant to the landlord."
B
Learned counsel submitted that, in the event of a landlord's refusal to
accept the rent, the tenant had no other alternative but to deposit the
same in the court under the above special provision. It was open to the
landlord to have appeared before the learned Munsif at the time of
hearing of the application for deposit and put forward any pleas, which
he might have had. The landlord not having aone this, it was claimed C
that the order passed by the learned Munsif on l l.11. 1967 provides a
complete defence to the action under section 3( l)(a) of the Act against
the tenant particularly in view of the language of sub-section (6) of s.
7C. It was contended that the statute should not be constured as
requiring that a tenant should prove the fact of his having tendered the
rent and the landlord having refused it twice over once while making a D
deposit under s. 7C and, again, in proceedings under s. 3(l)(a). If,
despite a deposit under section 7-C, an action under section 3(1)(a)
were to be permitted, it was urged, section 7-C would be rendered
nugatory and otiose. Learned counsel also made a point that though
the landlord in this case had knowledge that the rent was being
deposited in court since August 1967, he chose to keep quiet for a E
period of four years before issuing a notice calling upon the appellant
to pay the arrears of rent.

6. Prima facie, the arguments of the appellant appear to have
some force. However, after hearing learned counsel for the respon-
dent and considering the facts of this case and the relevant statutory F
provisions, we have come to the conclusion that this appeal must fail
both on technicalities as well as on equities.

7. S. 7C is no doubt a provision intended to protect the interests
of the tenant. But there is the authority of this Court holding that the
mere fact of a deposit under this Section, in itself cannot be an answer G
to an action u/s. 3(l)(a). In Brahmanand v. Kaushalya Devi, [!977] 3
SCC I, the relations between the landlord and tenant were highly
strained. The tenant therefore deposited the moneys into court and
pl7aded this as a defence to an action u/s. 3(l)(a). The High Court
reiected this plea on the ground that there was nothing to show that
the tenant had tendered the rent physically to the landlord and so the H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A deposit could not be treated as a valid deposit u/s. 7C( I) so as to
attract the deeming effect in S. 7C(6). This Court held that the High
Court had taken too narrow a view of the words 'paid to' the landlord.
Krishna Iyer J. observed:

"a liberal construction of the expression 'paid to him by a
B tenant' in. section 7-C{ 1) is necessary. Physically offering
payment when the relations between the parties are
strained is to ask for trouble and be impractical. But haras-
sing the landlord by straight-way depositing the rent in
court without fulfilment of the conditions required by sec-
tion 7-C(I) is also unwarranted. Section 7-C{6) by using the
expression 'where the deposit has been made as aforesaid'
c takes us back to section 7-C( I). That is to say the deposit is
permissible only when the condition in section 7-C(I) is
complied with. If the landlord refuses to accept rent paid to
him a deposit is permissible. But payment need not be by
physical tender, person to person. It can be by money
b order, or through messenger or by sending a notice to the
landlord asking him to nominate a bank into which the
rents may be regularly paid to the credit of the landlord. If
. the landlord refuses under these circumstances, then a
court deposit will be the remedy."

E In the present case, on account of the bad blood bet-
ween the parties a physical tender of the rent is ruled out.
At the same time the Courts below have not considered
whether the circumstances which drove the appellant into
depositing the rent in court were such as eliminated the
other possibilities of direct payment we have indicated. It is
F therefore fair to set aside the finding of the Courts below
and remand the case to the lower appellate Court (which is
the final court of fact under ordinary circumstances) to
ascertain whether any of the alternatives we have indica-
ted, or may otherwise be made out by the tenant as equiva-
lent to payment of rent, is present in the case. if no such
G circumstances is made out by the tenant justifying deposit
of rent in court, the decree for eviction will stand. Other-
wise, the petition for eviction will be dismissed."

It is important to note that this Court did not view the deposit u/s. 7C
as conclusive of the issue. On the other hand, it held that if no
H circumstance was made out by the tenant justifying the deposit in
RAM SEWAK v. MUNNA LAL [RANGANATHAN ,J.I 423

court, the decree for eviction will stand. In other words, this Court the A
view that, irrespective of the fact of deposit u/s. 7C, the tenant has to
show, when a suit is under S. 3(1)(a), that the existence of circumst-
ances justifying a deposit under S. 7C. In the present case, the Courts
have been concurrently found that there was no valid tender of rent by
the tenant or refusal thereof by the landlord. There is no ground.
B
therefore to interfere with the decision of the Courts below.

8. A careful perusal of S. 7C and the rules and forms made
thereunder also supports the above conclusion. The application for a
deposit under this section has to be made in the form prescribed in
Appendix A to the rules framed under the Act. The appellant's appli-
cation to the court was filed in this form. Column 6 of the application c
form is filled in by the tenant may be extracted:

(A) (B)

6. Whether deposit is made "The deposit is being
D
under sub-section (1)/(2) of made under sub-section ( 1)
Section 7-C.-In case of of 7-C of the Act. Fact in
Sub-section (I) briefly brief is that the landlord
state the circumstances of has refused to accept the
refusal by the owner. In rent. It is being deposited
case of sub-section (2), under section 7-C of the
mention circumstances of E
UP Act 3 of 1947."
doubt or dispute about
ownership.

The rules framed under the Act also prescribed the form in which
notice is to be served on the respondent when an application is made F
under section 7-C. This form reads as follows:

I
xxxx xx
"To G

Whereas . . . . . . . . . . has deposited Rs ........ as
rent for the period ...... for the premises ...... -
. . . . of which you have been mentioned as the
landlord.
H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A Notice is hereby given to you under sub-section
(4) of Section 7-C of the U.P. (Temporary) Control
of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, that the said amount
will be paid to you on an application for withdrawal
being presented to this Court.

B Given under my hand seal this day of

Munsif."

Reading section 7-C, the rules framed thereunder and the above
statutory forms together, it would appear that this provision envisages
c that where a tenant finds that the landlord refuses to accept the rent or
J.
there is some dispute regarding the ownership, he can, in order to
protect his interests seek the permission of the Court to deposit the
arrears of rent as well as future rent in the court instead of running •
after the landlord. Though the applicant is asked to indicate briefly the
D circumstances in which he wants to make a deposit, there is no proce- ..,
dure contemplated for an enquiry into those circumstances. The sec-
tion or rules do not seem to contemplate the transmission of this appli-
cation to the landlord, the fixing of a date of hearing on which both the
tenant and the landlord could be heard or the passing of a considered
order by the court after hearing both sides and being satified that there -k
E was in fact a tender of rent by the tenant and a refusal by the landlord
to receive the rent or a dispute regarding the ownership of the prop-
erty which rendered it difficult or impossible for the tenant to send the ·-;
money to the landlord straight. The notice which is sent to the landlord

~
merely sets out that money has been deposited in the court and that
the landlord is at liberty to withdraw it if he so desires. All that the
F landlord can do on receipt of the notice is either to withdraw the
moneys deposited 'or stop future deposits by expressing a willingness
directly to the tenant to accept direct payment of rent thereafter. On
the language of the statutory provisions therefore, it is not possible to
say that a deposit u/s. 7C is necessarily a valid one preceded by an
enquiry or satisfaction of the court that the condition precedent set out ....
G in S. 7C(l) is fulfilled.
..J,.~
9. Counsel for the petitioner submits that in Fateh Chand v. Bal
Saroop Goel, [ 1967] 65 ALJ 979 and other cases, the Allahabad High
Court has held that a deposit u/s. 7C is not a mere formality and that
before directing or permitting a deposit the court has to go into the
H question whether there has been a tender and a refusal. In fact, the
RAM SEWAK v. MUNNA LAL [RANGANATIIAN ,J.) 425

High Court has gone further and held that the Court has to go into that A
question, at two stages: one, when an application is presented and
before issuing notice to the landlord; and the other when the landlord
appears before the court and disputes the validity of the procedure
sought to be invoked by the tenant. Perhaps these requirements have
been read into the section on grounds of equity and natural justice.
Whatever that may be, we are constrained to say that .such procedure B
does not appear to have been followed in this case. As we have already
mentioned the application in the present case gave no details in the
space against column 6. Instead of setting out the circumstances in
which it was alleged that the landlord had refused to receive the rent,
the application barely asserted that the landlord had refused to accept
the rent. There is no information as to the nature of the notice served
on the landlord but it must have been only in the form of Appendix B
c
already set out. Again, though the application of the1 appellant under
section 7-C appears to have come up before the Munsif on 11.11.1967,
and the order mentions that the landlord is "absent though. served
sufficiently", the order is only that the landlord may withdraw the
amount deposited on proper application. It does not indicate any D
application of mind by the learned Munsif as to whether the conditions
precedent for a valid deposit u/s. 7C were satisfied. There is certainly
no finding at that stage on this vital requirement. The grant of permis-
sion to deposit under s. 7C, in the circumstances of the case, cannot
therefore be treated as conclusive that a valid deposit had been made
under that section. E

• 10. Sri Kackar took up the stand that even if S. 7C is interpreted
as providing an opportunity to both parties and even if a clear finding
is recorded in these proceedings, after hearing both parties, that the
preconditions of a valid deposit under that section are satisfied, that
will not constitute res judicata or take away the court's rights in an F
action u/s. 3(1)(a), of being satisfied on the evidence before it to the
same effect. He relied in this context on two decisions of the
Allahabad High Court. It is sufficient to refer to extract some portions
from the head note of one of them, viz. Hazi Abdul Karim v. Mohd.
Ismail, [1978] U.P. RentCases691)P.
G
"A finding merely on a collateral fact of jurisdiction cannot
operate as res-judicata in later proceedings between the
. same parties. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of Eng-
land, Th.ird Edition (Volume XV) paragraph 367 (at page
192~. It is a fun.damental rule that a judgment is not con-
clusive to anythmg but the point decided, or of any matter H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!988] 2 S.C.R.

which came collaterally in question or of any matter inci-
A
dentally cognizable.

The principle behind this rule seems to be that even
though in the previous proceedings a decision on a collat-
eral fact about jurisdiction, wrongly given may be binding
B on the parties for a limited purpose i.e., only so far as those
proceedings are concerned, yet it would completely defeat
the ends of justice, ifsuch erroneous decision were allowed
to become final and perpetuate itself. It would be con-
ducive to the ends of justice that in later regular proceed-
ings the parties should not be thwarded by an earlier wrong
finding and should be afforded full opportunity of demon-
c
~
strating that the condition precedent to the exercise of
jurisdiction were absent.

D
It cannot, therefore, operate as res-judicata and the
parties must be left free to agitate the same question again
in a subsequent suit for ejectment or other appropriate
r\
proceedings. The whole scheme of Section 7-C is inconsis-
tent with any adjudication of the rights of the parties.
Under this section the learned Munsif is not required to
determine the rights and obligations of the landlord and the
tenant in these proceedings. All that he has to do on
E deposit of rent under Section 7-C (!) is to issue a notice to
the landlord informing him that such deposit has been
made.

The deposi: made under section 7-C is by itself a
neutral act and it acquires its legal completion only when
F the rights of the parties are later determined in appropriate
proceedings. The deposit is thus without prejudice to the
rights of the parties which ought to be determined in the
appropriate proceedings.

x x x x x x
G
..... the entire scheme of Section 7-C leads to the inescap-
able conclusion that it is merely a tentative or provisional
--',··
forum provided for the purpose of checkmating any sinister
attempt on the part of the landlord for letting it appear that
no rent had been actually paid to him and thereby procur-
H ing the ejectment of a tenant. It is a legal fiction operating
r
RAM SEWAK v. MUNNA LAL (RANGANATHAN ,J.I 427

for the benefit of tenant in order to destroy a substerfuge A
which may unjustly result in the eviction of the tenant. A
deposit, therefore, per se does not decide the rights of the
parties. Its significance and legal impost actually take shape
according to the tenor and upshot of other subsequent pro-
ceedings in which such rights any be actually adjudicated ...
B
For the purposes of the present case, we need not go into this larger
question. In view of our conclusion regarding the scope of S. 7C and
our finding that, here. there was no enquiry or finding recorded in the
proceedings u. s. 7C which could at all operate as res judicata against
the landlord in the suit uis. 3( l)(a).

11. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on two
c
decisions of this court in support of his contention. The first was Kaloo
and Others v. Gauri Shanker, [1981] 3 S.C.C. 3 I. 51. Learned counsel
relied on certain passages in paragrphs 13, 19 and 23. In our opinion
this decision is not of much help as the court in that case was concerned
with a clear case of refusal of rent by the landlord fully justifying the D
.• deposit under section 7-C. This is deary from various passages in the
judgment particularly in paragraphs 19 and 20. The other judgment
relied upon is that of this court in Kameshwar Singh Srivastava v. IV
Add!. District Judge, Lucknow and others, AIR 1987 S.C. 138. This
h was a decision under a later Act of Uttar Pradesh, namely Act 13 of
1972. Section 30 of the said Act is a provision similar to section 7-C of E
the Act presently in question. In this case also it was found as a fact
that there had been a tender of rent to the landlord, who did not accept
the same and this was held to be a complete answer in proceedings for
eviction. There can be no doubt that, by virtue of section 7-C(6) a
deposit properly and justifiably made under section 7-C would be
deemed to be a payment of rent to the landlord himself. Once there is F
a proof of a valid deposit, then there can be no eviction of the tenant
under section 3( l)(a) since the section equates such a deposit to a
payment to the landlord, thus negativing the existence of any arrears
of rent or any wilful default. But, at the same time it is necessary for
the courts to ensure that the tenants do not resort to the provisions of
section 7-C merely to harass the landlord. The decision in Kameshwar G
..)c Singh's case emphasises this aspect in paragraph 7:

"7. We should not be understood to have laid down that
the tenant should deposit rent in court instead of paying the
same to the landlord. Primarily, a tenant is under a legal
obligation to pay rent to the landlord as and when due and H
.,
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A if he fails to pay the same on demand from the landlord and
if he is in arrears for a period of more than four months he
would be liable to ejectment. Where there is a bona fide
dispute regarding the landlord's right to receive rent on
account of there being several claimants or if the landlord
refuses to accept the rent without there being any justifica-
B tion for the same, the tenant would be entitled to take
proceedings under s. 30 of the Act and deposit the rent in
court thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent
to the landlord, consequently he would be relieved of his
liability of eviction. It does not however follow that the .
i
tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his
demand for payment of rent to him. The provisions of the
c
Act safeguard tenants interest but it must be kept in mind
that the landlord's right to receive rent and in the event of
th.e tenant's being in arrears of rent for a period of more
than four months, his right to evict the tenant is preserved, if
the tenant makes the deposit in court without there being
D any justification for the same or it he refuses to pay the rent
. even on the service of notice of demand by the landlord, he
would be liable to eviction. However, the question whether
the tenant is justified in depositing the rent in court and
whether deeming provision of s; 30(6) would be available to
him to relieve him from the liability of eviction would depend
E upon facts of each case. As noted earlier on the special facts of
the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the appellant
had relieved himself from the liability of eviction and he was
not in arrears ofrent for a period of more than four months."

This decision also, incidentally, proceeds on the basis that, despite an
F order u/s. 30, it is open to the Court in the proceedings for eviction, to
consider whether the deposit was a valid one or not. In the light of the
above observations also, were justified, having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the present case, in ordering eviction.

12. Learned counsel for the a_J>Pellant submitted that such an
G interpretation as we have upheld would completely render section 7-C a
dead letter. This is not so. Section 7-C, as we have pointed out earlier,
is only intended as a protection to the tenant to tide-over a particular
genuine difficulty. It enables the tenant to deposit the rent from time
to time in the court so that the arrears of rent do not accummulate and
he is not constrained to pay large sums of money owing to the landlord
H on a future date. Secondly, it safeguards the landlord inasmuch as the
RAM SEWAK v. MUNNA LAL [RANGANATIIAN ,J.J 429
~.
rent from month to month is being deposited in the court and the A
landlord is not prejudiced by a huge accummulation of rent which he
t may find it later on, difficult to recover. Thirdly, it also protects the
·tenant in this that, if ultimately he is able to show in the eviction
proceedings that the deposit was made because of the refusal of the
landord to accept the rent, it provides a complete answer to the plea of
eviction under section 3(1)(a). It cannot, therefore, be said that sec- B
tion 7-C loses all its meaning and becomes otiose if it is interpreted in
the restrictive manner above discussed.

13. This leaves only the equities of the matter to be considered.
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that though
the landlord was aware that the rent was being deposited in the court c
ever since August 1967, he waited for a period of four years before
issuing a notice of demand for arrears of rent is seen to be without
substance, Shri Kacker has pointed out that the appellant h.ad filed a
suit (No. 786 of 1968) claiming that he had paid Rs.275 towards rent by
money order and claiming refund of the same. This suit was pending
till April 1971. On 19.4.1971, the suit was dismissed. The Third Addi- D
• tional Munsif, Jhansi found that the sum of Rs.275 had been paid
towards rent for tlie period ending 30.11.1966 and that the appellant
was not entitled to the refund thereof. Shri Kacker rightly points out
that since the appellant had raised a plea in this suit that the sum of
Rs.275 had been paid by him towards the arrears of rent due after
November 1966, the landlord was disabled from instituting proceed- E
ings for eviction until this issue was decided in the suit. In other words,
,,. the delay from August 1967, when the appellant started depositing the

,
reilt in court till 1971, when the proceedings for ejectment were
started, was not due to any !aches on the part of the respondent but
was caused on account of the pendency of the litigation instituted by
the tenant. Indeed it is rather unbelievable that, after having alleged in F
the application under 'section 7-C that the landlord had refused to
accept the amount tendered and deposited the arrears of rent in court,
the tenant would have sent a sum of Rs.275 by money order on
30.11.67, as alleged. In fact the findings in that suit, incidentally, also
_, negative the tenant's allegation that he had sent several money orders
which the landlord had refused to receive. But this aspect need not G
~)...
detain us as all the three courts have concurrently found that in the
present case the appellant had not been able to prove that there had
been a tender of the rent by him and refusal thereof by the landlord.

14. In the result we have come to the conclusion that both in law
and in equity the appellant has no case and that the ejectment suit was H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A properly decreed by the courts below. The appeal, therefore, fails and
is dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs, since the arrears
J
of rent are available to the landl9rd for being withdrawn from the
court.

P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

1