Holding

The 1978 Amendment Act is constitutionally valid; its provisions do not infringe Articles 14 or 19 and the Board’s powers are permissible, subject to judicial review under Article 226.

Summary

The petition challenged the constitutional validity of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1978, which omitted Sections 4 and 5 of the 1961 Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and Palace Fund (Partition) Act and excluded civil‑court jurisdiction over partition of the Cochin royal estate. The Court examined whether these omissions and the grant of plenary powers to a statutory Board of Trustees violated Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution or amounted to arbitrary, unreviewable power. It held that the omissions merely effected a drafting correction, that the Board’s role was a long‑standing, specialised mechanism suited to the unique size and composition of the royal family, and that any excesses could be reviewed under Article 226. Consequently, the amendment was found to be constitutionally valid. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

The omission of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1961 Act by the 1978 Amendment violates Articles 14 and 19.
Whether Section 7 excluding civil‑court jurisdiction over partition is unconstitutional.
Whether granting the Board of Trustees plenary, non‑appealable power is arbitrary and violative of natural justice.
Whether the amendment constitutes prohibited class legislation.

Legislation cited

Subjects

constitutional lawArticle 14Article 19partitionroyal estateKeralajoint Hindu familystatutory boardnatural justicequasi‑judicialcivil court jurisdictionclass legislation

Judgment

136

., A RAMA VERMA BHARATHAN THAMPURAN
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.
July 30, 1979
[\!. R. KmsHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.J

Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the Palace (Partition) and ~ ~
the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1978 (Act
15 of 1978), constitutional validity of.

The Maharaja of Cochin, reigned and ruled over a pretty State, Cochin,.
c \Vhich is now an integral part of the Keralai State. The Travancore-Cochin
State came into being on July 1, 1949. Two ·days before this constitutional
merger, the Mabaraja of Cochin issued a ProclamatiOA to provide for. the
impartibility, administration and preservation of the Royal Estate and the
Palace Fund through a Five-man Board of' Trustees. A small Process of
family legislation on the Cochin Palace followed the· political transformation
of the State. The first was the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate 3.nd
D the Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (Act 16 of 1961 ), the primary purpose
of which was to undo the impartibility of the Royal Estate, as declared by the
Proclamation of 1949. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act prescribed the shares of
the members, the mode of division and the machinery for partition under
these provisions, on a majority of the major members of the royal falll.l1y
expressing their wish to be divided, the Maharaja would consider \Vhether
it was. in the interest of the family to partition the estate among the members
E
and, if he did, direct the Board of Trustees to proceed with the partition
under his supervision and control, Each member including en ventra sa nz€re,
was eli&ible for a single sha.re on an equal basis.. The Board nominated
under the earlier Proclan1ation was continued but its responsibilities were
broadened. The privileges of the Maharaja were preserved as his personal
rights but vis-a-vis family assets feudal "primogeniture" fell to modem
egalite, within limits. As a result of the 26th Constitution Amendment Act
F
of 1971 which extinguished all royal privileges, privy purses and other dignities
of the erstwhile rulers of the Indian States, the Cochin Maharaja stepped
down to the level of the Karta of a Joint Hindu Family. The Marummakkatta~
yam system which ensured impartibility and management by the senior most
men1ber bad lost its functional value and virtually vanished from the Kera.la
coast with the passing of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition).
G Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976). Despite this revolutionary change, the Cochin !
royal family maintained its former status as Marummakkattayam undivided '
coparcenary since it was governed by special legislation which remained un~
repealed. Therefore, the Kerala Legislation enacted the Valiamma Thampuram
Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu
Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1978 (Act 15 of 1978). Before
the High Court and in the special leave petition, the vires of the Amending Act
B omitting sections 4 and 5 from the Principal Act 16/1961 was challenged as
offending Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the sp'ecial leave petition, the Court,
';: i R. v. B. THAMPURAN v. KERALA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 137

HELD : The public policy behind Section 7 of the Valiamma Tham- A
puram Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961, exclud-
ini civil court jurisdiction is not merely the special situation of the former
royal family but the virtual impossibility within a life-time of division by
meteS aod bounds and al1'1tment of aha.r'es to the 800 odd members, most
of whom are real royalties in rags, homeless and hungry, seeking to survive
by the small pieces from the large cake if ever it will be sliced and distributed.
[141A-BJ B

Civil litigatio.Q for partition is the surest punishment to the tattered
~princelings' by pauperising them through the justice process and giving them
stones instead of bread in the end, if the end would arrive at all. The com-
pulsive pragmatics of distributive justice elicited legislative compassion for this
uniquely numerous crowd of pauperised patricians by exclusion of civil courts
jurisdiction. Th!! pathology of protracted, exotic processual legalistics needs com- c
prehensive renovation if the Justice System is to survive but the legislature sal-
vaged the largest royal family with the littlest individual resources without \Vaiting
for the remote undertaking to overhaul Processual Justice to the People. Socio-
logy is the mother of law, lest ll\w in the books should be bastardised by the
law of. life. [14!D·FJ
2. Our constitutional order is sensibly and sensitively allergic to arbitrary D
power and the Supreme CourtJ will unhesitatingly strike down any provision
which can be i!l.nathematis:ed as creating uncanalised and Neronised power.
Section 4_ of the Principal Act of 1961 provided for an equal opportunity for
every mcn1ber including those en ventre sa mere. This provision was deleted
becaus'e its purpose WaB otherwise served by the substituted Section 3 af 1\ct
16 of 196_1 by including a direction to the Board "to effect partition of tI:.e
Estate _and the Palace Fund among all the' members entitled to a share" .... E
under Section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition} Act,
1975 (Act 30 of 1976)." The effect of the importation of Section 4 of the
Ab0lition 'Act is to ensure partition per capita aimong all the members as in
the case of a Joint Hindu Family othef'. than 3-n undivided n1itakshara
Hindu family. What was otiose, namely, Section 4 of Act 16 of 1961, was
cut out. This was merely a drafting operation not making any change in the
substanHve -law bearing upon the shares of the members. The cont'ention tlr1t F
by this deletion the members of the Kovilagam had been made over as
hostages to 'the caprice of the Board of Trustees is a frightful error or disingenu-
ous ·sdare:· [!4!-F·G, 143H, 144A-B]
3. Section 5 of the 1961 Act arrogated to the Maharaja of Cochin the power
to exclude any properties from the category of partible estate. If most members
were to·.b.e .indigent, the infliction upon· such members by the Maharaja's act
'• of excliision of as many properties as he. thought should not be divided would
G
be. unjust.. : Since every member was. entitled tO an equal share with the Maharaja
himself all the properties should he available far partition and this result, which
is eminently .just, is achieved by the omission of Section 5 ftom Act 16 of 1961.
Therefore; the provision in Aci 15 of 1978 omitting Section 5 from the principal
ACt'is a; virtile to be commended, .not a vice to-be· condetnned. It is. eminently
reasonable and to contend against it is obviously unreasonable. [143D-FJ
H
·4'.· ."ipo t°1asphcme the Board as· an in1periuni'-i11 ';fnpe6o, a Jaw unto it.self and
therefore, arbitrary is an egregious error. The Board v.ras not a ile~;- Creation
138 SVl'REME COVRT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R.

but ·an old concoction brought into being by the Ruler thirty years ago. cootinued
by the Kerala Legislature in Act 16 of 1961 and recognised by the fatest a.Qlend-
ment Act. Tire Board is a time honoured entity wherein the heads of .the four
branches are rnembers and is entrusted ·with the work of division of 3Slif;lis. The
Board, being an old institution in plenary management since 1949 and wisely.co1n-
posed of senior-most members of the four branches, is sentimentally and .func- •
tionally the best instrument to divide and distribute. Indeed Act 16 of "196.l •had
B also entrusted the task of partition to the same Board and no member had during
nearly two decades challenged the wisdom of the provision. [144B-D]

Section 3 of the Act 15 of 1978 does not dispense with canons .of fair
play of natural justice and of quasi-judicial values. A non-curial ,ioatrumen·
tality and procedure for partitioning cannot be condemned as discriminatory.
The alternative created by rt.he statute is quite reasonable and is a better ins-
c trument having regard to the totality of factors. Law is not' a cocoon and
keeps its eyes wide awake to the realities of life. The legislation in .question
has takei.1 note of all facts namely; (a) absence of any complaint 'tgdin!t
their management ever since the Boord's creation; (b) sanctification Qf the
Board by the principal Act 16 of 1961 by conferring powers of ,partitioning
the "Kovilagam" properties on this very Board; and does nothing .more
What \Vas good and valid in 1961 could not become vicious and invalid iu
D 1978. [145 B-D, E]

Quasi-judicial responsibilities are implied by the· statute in the ·Board's
fuaction and if the Board breaches these norms and canons, the constitut~ona!
remedy under Article 226 comes into play. After all, the Board is a :statutory
body and not an executive creature. It has been saddled with effecting the
rights of parties and is bound to act quasi-judicially. Its deviances are not
E unrcviewablc in \Vriit jurisdiction. Sufficient guidelines are built in Seetion 3 and
therefore Section 3(2) is not unbridled and unconstitutional. [1'45F"-G, -t46E]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1976] Suppl. S.C.R. 489; M •. S. Gill
and Anr. v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, Organo Che111ical !Industries
and Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [1980] 1 S.C.R. p. 61 referred ·lo.

F 5. 1\bsence of appeals does not jettison justice, though often tim~. 'ft.ppeals
are the bane of the justice system, especially ·because the rich caut·defettt the
poor and the weak can be baulked of their rights indefinitely th.at ,w~y. The
Boa.rd is a s-tatutory body and when it violates th'e prescriptions of the \"law or
otherwise actc; arbitrarily or nu1lafide, Art. 226 of the Constitution is a correc-
tive. [146 F-G]

G 6. Act 15 of 1978 has ~one of the characteristi'CS of class Jegi.ihitioo <lnd j
is an th~ other hand, an equalising measure with a pragmatic :touth,, IT"be •
Cochin Kovilagan1 vis-a-vis the1Kerala State is sui generis. lt'haslbem: 11.e&is-.
latively dealt with as a special. class 'throughout the history of 1Ken1Ja end
before.. Partitioning of the royal family .estates on principles similar fto i'those
applicable to .all other Kemla IHindu ·Families with the only diff«elHll>ilhat a
,,..'
Board instead of a Civil ·~Coutt allots shares by ·metes and bound,s, - !fully
O justifiable by the special dreumstances. [1'47 A·Bl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition ~vii)
No. 5863 of 1979.
R. v. B. THAMPURAN v. KERALA (Krishna Tyer, J.) 139

From the Judgment and Order dated 15-12-1978 of the Kcrala A:
High Court in Origi·nal Petition No. 679 /78-Il.
N. Sudhakaran for the Petitioner.
A. S. Nambiar for the Respondents.
The, Order of the Court was delivered by
B
• ,1 KRISHNA !YER, J. All the parties are represented by counsel and
we have heard them in extenso. We therefore proceed to pass a
speaking order.
The. princely family of Cochin with a proletarian plurality of
members has been the cynosure of spocial legislations, the last of c
which is Act 15 of 1978, the target of attack in this special leave
petition. Articles 14 ahd 19 of the Constitution have been th•e ammu-
nition used by the petitioner in the High Court and here to shoot down
the 1egis1ation as ultra vires.
A brief sketch of the family law of the Cochin royalty may serve
to appreciate the scheme of the latest legislation under challenge.
The. Maharaja of Cochin, reigned and ruled over a pretty prirn;ely
State, Cochin, which is now an ihtegral part of the Kerala State.
When the. curtain of history rose to find India free, the constellation
._., of princedoms fused into Independent India's democratic geography .
Cochin and Travancore finally fell in with this trend. As a first step
they were integrated into the_ Travancore-Cochin State which came
into being on July 1, 1949. Two days before this constitutional
merger,. the Maharaja of Cochin issued a Proclamation to provide for
the impartibility, administratioµ and preservation of the Royal Estate
a·nd> the Palace Fund through a Board of Trustees. A small process
of family legislation on the Cochin Palace followed the political trans-
formation of the State. The Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate
and the palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (Act hi of 1961) was
the fir!lt, the primary purpose of which was to undo the impartibility
of the royal estate as declared by the Proclamation of 1949. The
t shares of the members, the mode of division and the machinery for
• partition were statutorily prescribed by Sections 4 ahd 5 of the said
G

Act,. The basics of those two sections were that on a majority of the
major members of the royal family expressing their wish to be divi-
ded;. the Maharaja would consider whether it was in the interest of
the family to partition the estate among the members and, if he did,
cjirect the Board of Trustees to proceed with the partition under his 8
supervision and control. Each member, including a child in the
womb, was eligible for a sihgle share on an equal basis. The privi-
140 Sl•PREME COURT REPORTS

A lcges of the Maharaja were preserved as his personal right but vi,5-a-vis .,,..
family assets feudal 'Primogeniture' fell to modern egalite, wiihin •
limits.
The next epochal legislation was the 26th Constitution Amendment
Act of December 1971 which extinguishei.I.all royal privileg.;s, privy
purses and cher dignities of the erstwhile rulers of the Indian States.
With the denudation of his royal privileges the Cochin Maharaja
stepped down to the level of the karta of a joint Hindu family. The
...
royalty which was once a reality became a mere memory and with
the statutory injection of democratic rights into this blue-blooded
family. p:ebian claims for equal shares began to be voiced, especially
C · because the multifid of little royalties of the Maharaja's matriarchal
family lived in lurid poverty, as counsel distressingly described.
Indeed, the marummakkattayam system which at one time en.sured
impartibility and management by the senior-most member had lost its
functional value and virtually vanished from the Kerala coast, thanks
o: toto this
the erosive process of legislative individualism. The final blow
system was delivered by the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System
(Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) which fully wiped out the
matriarchal pat~orn of holding and the Hindu undivided family system
in the State of Kerala. Despite this revolutionary change, the Cochin
royal family maintained its former status as a marummakkattayam
E; undivided coparcenary since it was governed by special legislation
which remained unrepealed. Tbis regal matriarchal survival levelled
into the main-stream of proprietary life with equal, partible shares
for young and old, like the rest of the community when the Kerala
legislature enacted the Valiamma Thampnram Kovilakam Estate and
the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family Sys-
F lcm (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1978 (Act 15 of 1978) (preceded
by Ordinance No. 1 of· 1978).
A close-up of this statutory scheme is necessary since it is this
legislation which is furiously fusilladed as unconstitutional by counsel
for the petitioner. The legislative Proclamation of 1949, if we briefly
G recapitulate, commended the Constitution by His Highness the •1
Maharaja of a five-man Board of Trustees charged with the plenary
task of 'admi'nistration, management and conservation' of the 'Estate'
and 'Palace Fund'. Act 16 of 1961 brought about a degree of eco-
nomic democratisation while preserving some of the sP"cial legal
habiliments of the· royal estate. The Board nominated under the
H earlier Proclamation was continued but its responsibilities were
broadened to include partitioning of the Kovilakam assets if a majority
cf major members-the voice of Palace democracy-asked for divi-
R. v. B. THAMPURAN v. KERALA (Krishna Iyer,!.) 141

- sion and the Maharaja deemed it desirable i'n the interests of the
family. This was a half way house between the impartible old and
partible-at-will new. A short provision of great relevance to the issue
> of constitutionality is to be found in &~ction 7. The public policy
behind this Section excluding civil court jurisdiction is not merely the
speci'al situation of the former royal family but the virtual impossibility B
within a life-time of division by metes and bounds and allotment of
shares to ti>~ 800 odd members, most of whom are little royalties in
-' rags, homeless and hungry, seeking to survive by the small pieces from
the large cake if ever it will be sliced and distributed. The exaspera-
ting longevity qf partition litigation, what with the present
cantankerous orientation and procedural interminability, preliminary 0
decree, appeals thereo'n, commission~, objectioll!\, revisions, final
decrees, and a ruinous crown of other interlocutory proceedings punc-
tuating the suit, followed by inevitable appeals and special leave
petitions and the like, baflles the humble and baulks their hope of
getting a morsel in their short life span. When this pheilomenon-a'n
ludo-Anglican processual bequest-is compounded by the calamitous D
fact that there are around 800 sharers and a variety of considerable
assets to be divided, civil litigation for partition is the surest punish-
ment to the tattered 'princeli'ngs' by pauperising them through the
justice process and giving them stones instead of bread in the end,
if the end would arrive at all ! The compulsive pragmatics of distri-
butive justice elicited legislative compassion for this uniquely numerous E
'-~
crowd of pauperised patricians by exclusion of civil court's jurisd1~
tion. The pathology of protracted, exotic processual legalistics needs
comprehensive renomtion if the Justice System is to survive but the
legislature salvaged the largest royal family with the littlest individual
resouro~s without waittng for the remote undertaking to overhaul
ProcessuaJ Justice to the People. Sociology is' the mother of law, lest
law in the books should be bastardised by the law of life.

A radical measure which swept off the matriarchal system and the
Joint family form of estate for Hindus is the next statutory even which
t
needs mention. Kerala Act 30 of 1976 (The Kerala Joirrt Hindu G .
' Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975), abolished at one stroke the
Hindu undivided family and converted them into tenancies-in-common
with the rule of one member one share. The Cochin 'Kovilagam'
was not affected because neither Act 16 of 1961 nor the prior royal
proclamation expressly repealed. But the individualist spirit of Act
30 of 1976 invaded the royal family legislatively as there is no basis HI
for proprietary privilege, ev,"n as vestiges of past glory, in a democracy
charged with social justice. So, Act 15 of 1978 (The Valiamma
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l ·S.C.R.

Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and
the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System {Abolition) Amendment Act, (

1978) came to be pas&ed whereby division of the Kovilakam assets
was freed from the Maharaja's subjectivism and made a mandate of
the statute, in tune with the common trend. The modus operandi
to work out partition was the Board and no specific pl'~scription ·'
regarding the shares of members is give'n. No appeal from the parti-
tion effected by the Board is specified and Sections 4 and 5 of Act 16
of 1961 aP~ deleted retrospectively.
A quick glance at the provisions gives the impression that the
legislature merely equated the right In partition of ti>~ junior members
c of the Kovilakam with that of the commonalty of marumakkattayam
families save that instead of the Civil Court the division by met~ and
bounds was to be carried out by the Board which was already in
management and was familiar with the features of the family and the
assets. A closer look, rn the light of the constitutional challenge
D which was repelled by th~ High Court, leaves us cold, hot submissions
to burn down the allegedly arbitrary and irresesonable legislation not-
withstanding.

Let us dissect the anatomy of the Amending Act of 1978. Be
it remembered that Act 16 of 1961 (the principal Act) is not and
has never been attacked as ultra vires. If the principal Act was good
E
the search for the invalidatory vice must be confined to the cluster
of new claus•es.

The principal violation pressed before 11s by Sb.ri Govindan Nair
for the petitioner, who is a senior member of the family, is of Art.
14 and the customary contention, more easily waged than established,
F
is that arbi_trary, ungnided, naked and tyrannical power is conferred
on the Board and therefore the whole Act is bad because th~ central
piece of the statutory scheme is this machinery. True, our consti-
tutional order is sensibly and sensitively allergic to arbitrary power
and we have no hesitation in striking down any provision which can
G be anathematised as creating uncanalised and Neronised Power. The
t
very creation of the Board was challenged as violative of Art. 14
6ihce the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is the common forum with
•
other judicial remedies, appellate and revisional, available for the
aggrieved party. Whilei the Board is given plenary power to divide
and distribute with validity being conferred on such partition the
H grievance is that there are no appeals and revisions ·and the arbitra-
ment of the Board e»en if it is arbitrary becomes final. This is casti-
gated as a caprice of the legislature. More than all, the very singling
R. v. B. THAMPURAN v. KERALA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 143

ouf of the ruler's family, populous though it be, is anathematised
)
as· discriminatory. Incidentally, the powers of the Board are charged
as· uftreasonable since there is no provision to give a hearing to the
affected parties in the process of adjudication and the whole process
>
rnay "\11(!11 be the deliberations of a secret campaign. These violent
vices imputed to the statute will certainly i•nvalidate the Act 15 of
1978, if there were some substance therein. Even an imaginative B
~xercise, jf inforn1ed by rca1isn1, discovers no such infirmity.
/
Let us clear the confusion caused by the omission of Sections 4
a:nd 5 of the principal Act. Shri Govindan Nair for the petitioners
relied on this omission to contend that the wholesome provisions of
sections 4 and 5 of the Principal Act of 1961 have been waywardly
c
withdrawn leaving it to the Board to award such shares as they fancied
to the various members. This submission proceeds on a simple mis-
conception. Section 4 provides for an equal share for •every member
including a child in the womb and Section 5 arrogates to the Maharaja
of Cochin the power to exclude any properties from the category of
partib1e estate. No democrat will shed a tear if Section 5 were dele-
ted. The members, as Shri Govindan Nair himself urged, were mostly
indigent. IE that were so, the infliction upon such members by the
Maharaja's act of exclusion of as many propert;es as he thought
should not be divided would be unjust. Since every member was
entitled to an equal share with the Maharaja himself all the properties
should be available for partition and this result, which is eminently
just, is achieved by the omissio"n of Section 5 from Act 16 of 1961.
Therefore, the provision in Act 15 of 1978 omitting Section 5 from
the principal Act is a virtue to be commended, not a vice to be con-
demned. It is eminently reasonable and to contend against it is
obviously unreasonable. F

A different criticism has been made regarding the deletion. of
Section 4 by Shri Govindan Nair; but it is equally mis-conceived, if
we may say so. Section 4 of Act 16 of 1961 provided for the share
of members including those m ventre sa mere. This provision was
I G
• deleted because its purpose was otherwise served by the substituted
Section 3 of Act 16 of 1961 by including a direction to the Board
"to effect partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among all the
members entitled to a, share .... under Section 4 of the Kerala Joint
Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975. (Act 30 of 1976) ."
The effect of the importation of Section 4 of the Abolition Act is to
ensure partition per capita among all the members as in the case of a
Joint Hindu Family other than an undivided Mitakshara Hindu family.
.
144 Slll'REME COURT REPORTS [ 1980) I S.C.R.

A What was otiose, namely, Section 4 of Act 16 of 1961, was cut out.
This was merely a drafting operation 'not making any change in .the
substantive law bearing upon the shares of the members. The conten-
tion that by this deletion the members of the· Kovilagam had _been
made over as hostages to the caprice of the Board of Trustees is a
frightful error or disingenuous scare.
8
In the course of his submissions, counsel had a dig at the Board,
which, according to him, was an imperium in imperio, a law unto itself
a'nd, therefore, arbitrary. This again is an egregious error. The
Board was not a new creation but an old concoction. Thirty years
ago the Ruler brought it into being. Since then, the Kerala legis-
c lature, in Act 16 of 1961, continued it and the latest legislation now
denounced before us recognised this time-honoured entity wherein the
heads of the four branches were members and entrusted it with the
work of division of assets. The Board, being an old institution in
plenary management since 1949 and wisely composed of the senior-
most members of the four branches, is sentimentally and functionally
D
the best instrument to divide and distribute. Indeed Act l 6 of 1961
had also entrusted the task of partition to the same Board and no
member had during nearly two decades challenged the wisdom of the
provision. We see no legal ground to blaspheme this Board.

The greater grievance of counsel about the Board was something
E
else. He cont•e'nded that the Board under Section 3(2) was em-
powered to effect the partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund "and
the partition so effected shall be valid .... " From this the criticism
was spun out that the Board was likely to act in any manner it pleased,
sell the properties at any price, distribute the ass•ets at its sweet will
F or whim and thus reduce the partition of Kovilagam properties to a
mock exercise by an unchal!engable Board. He contrasted this grim
picture with the advantageous alternative of a civil suit where the
shares were fixed according to law, the properties were valued by a
Commissioner, objections to the report of the Commissioner were
considered by the Court and a decw~, preliminary or final, was subject
G to appeal and further appeal. The judicial process was a great
t
guarantee of the rights of parties which was unavailable before the
statutorily immunised and potentially eccentric Board of Trustees .
•
. We remained unmoved by this sombn; picturisation made up of
illusory apprehensions. We have earlier pointed out that the strength
of the Cochin Royal family is around 800. The properti•es consist of
urban lands, rural lands, buildings and other assets considera hie in
volume and value. A litigative resolution of the conflicts among
members with the plethora of interlocutory proceedings plus revisions
R. v. B. THAMPURAN V. KERALA (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 145

and appeals may be an endless adventure which would surely bank-
rupt the poorer members and deny to ewrycme a share in the proper-
ties by metes and bounds for a generation to come. Of course, those
• who are already in possession of pro1mtics-and counsel for the res-
pondent hinted that the petitioners belong to this category-would
benefit by striking down this legis:ation and delay in legislative recti-
fication o~ the situation and the further litigation that might be B
launched aod so on. Those who have, have a vested interest in pro-
cratination; those who have not, have an urgent interest in instant jus-
tice. In this view, a non-curial instrumentality and procedure for
partitioning the properties cannot be condemned as discriminatory. The
alternative createld by the statute is quite a reasonable and in our view
a better instrument having regard to the totality of factors. Law is not c
a cocoon and keeps its ey~s wide awake to the realities of life. The
legislation in question bas takc"n note of the fact that the Board has
been for decades entrusted by the Maharaja by his Proclamation with
the administration of tho;o family estate and no complaints have ever
been voiced against their managemerrt The latter legislation of 1961
D
has sanctified this Board. That legislation has gone to the exte'nt of
corrferring powors of partitioning the Kovilagam properties on this
Board and the prese·nt Act of 1978 does nothing more. We are un-
able to understand how what was good and valid in 1961 Act could
become vicious and invalid i'n 1978. The composition of the Board
and its history and experieno:: convince us that it was a fit instrument E
for the task entrusted.
The fear expressed before us that the Board may ignore the norms
of judicial procedure while settling the rights of parties is misplaced.
We do not regard Section 3 of Act 15 of 1978 as dispensing with
canons of fairplay of 'natural justice and of quasi-judicial values.
F
We realise that the enormous work of dividing the properties has
to be carefully carri~d out. Quasi-judicial responsibilities are implied
by the statute in the Board's functions and if the Board breaches thesf
norms and canons the constitutional remedy under Article 226 comes
into play. After all, the Board is a statutory body and not an exe-
I
, cutive creature. It has been saddled with effecting the rights of G
parties and is bound to act quasi-judicially. Its deviances are not
unreviewable in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, we direct the Board to
comply with the requirements prescribed in several decisions of this
Court in quasi-judicial jurisdictions. Natural justice is obviously the
first as this Court has ruled in a shower of cases especially highlighting
in Ma11eka Gandhi's case(') and M. S. Gilfs case( 2 ). This Court has H
(!) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1976] Supp. SCR 489.
(2) M.S. Gill & Anr v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621.
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [.l98Qj 1 S.C.R ..

gone to the extent of holding that natural justice require reasons· to·
be written for conclui;ions made. The Organo Chemical /ndMslrles I
& Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.C) this Court has held that t!Jcr, ab-
sence of a right of •appeal does not spell arbitrariness. It is further
held in the same rulibg that giving of reasons for conclusions is
ordinarily an important component of natural justice in quasHmllcial
tribunals. In short, every facility that a party will reasonably reeeive
befbre a quasi-judicial body when rights are adjudicated upon, wilt
be available befo~e this Board and we mandate it to extend such
facilities and opportunities. Wc need hardly mention that when pro·
perties are sold parties must be intimated and the principles, embedded
c in the Partition Act must be taken note of when properties are valued
and allotted. The servio"s of valuers of properties or of Commis·
sioners must also be used. Moreover, parties must be given; oppor-
tunity to object to reports of Commissioners, if any, appointed. Tn
short, the general law, processual and substantive, bearing on allot-
ment of properties cannot be thrown to the winds by th•" Board merely
because Section 3 does not write these details into it. We must hasten
lo caution that no party can hold the Board in ransom by raising
vexatious and frivolous objections and puttjng in proceeding after pro-
ceeding merely to delay or defeat. The Board is geared to comple-
tion of the partition with a reasonable sp"ed and that purpose ~ust
inform its activities. While every party is entitled to a reaso¥1able.
E voice in the proceedings no party can enjoy the privilege of thwarting
the processes of justice. These observations and directions which are
bnilt-in in Section 3, in our view, ar~ sufficient guidelines to repel the
submission that the power under Section 3 (2) is unbridled and un-
cd!\stitntional. Partitions are best done by a broad consensus and the
Board will remember that constant consultation with the meml!'"r&
F may facilitate its work and reduce tension and friction.

Nor are we impressed with the argument that because appeals
are absent justice is jettisoned. Oftentimes, appeals are the baae of
the justice system, especially because the rich can defeat the poor
and the weak can be baulked of their rights indefinitely that way.
G
We do not mean to d"cry the right of appeal, but may not gCJ with
•'
the petitioner in glorifying it in all situations. We have emphaised
that the Board is a statutory body and when it violates the prescrip- ..
/'•
tions of the law or otherwise acts arbitrarily or mala fide, Art. 226
of the Constitution is a corrective. Nothing more is needed because
B everything needed is implkd in that power.

(!) [1980] I S.C.R. 61
d\. v. B. THAMPURAN v. KERALA (Krishna Tyer,!.) 147

The last and perhaps the least valid snbmission, with meretrieions A
\ ,attraction, is the challenge based on unequal legislation picking out
,one from among equals for hostile treatment. We have held that
~he royal family estate is being partitioned on principles similar to
; those applicable to all other Kerala Hindu families and the only
.difference is a Board instead of a court to allot shm'"S by metes and
bounds. This, we have shown, is fully justified by the special circum- B
'Stances. The Cochin Kovilakam vis-a-vis the Kerala State is sui
•generis. It has been legislatively dealt with ali a special class
throughout the history of Kerala and before. The Act impugned
:has none of the characteristics of class legislation and, is on the other
tiand, an equalising measun~ with a pragmatic touch.
c
We negative the specious submission.

We ·find no merit in this Special Leave Petition and dismiss it with-
-Out costs.

'V.D.K. Petition dismissed.

I
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