RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI & ANR.versusMUHAMMED KUNJU & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 224
- Decided
- 20 February 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court erred in holding that no plea regarding readiness and willingness was raised; the appeals are allowed and the respondents must execute the sale deeds.
Summary
The appellants filed two suits for specific performance of agreements to sell property, expressly stating in the plaints that they were always ready and willing to fulfil their part of the contracts. The defendants contested the validity of the agreements and claimed the suits were barred by limitation, but they never denied the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness. The trial court dismissed the suits on limitation grounds while holding the agreements valid. The Kerala High Court affirmed the validity and held the suits not barred by limitation, but dismissed them on the erroneous ground that no plea regarding readiness and willingness was raised. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong, as the plaintiffs had pleaded readiness and willingness and the defendants had not contested it; consequently, the appeals were allowed and the respondents were directed to execute the sale deeds within three months after receipt of the balance consideration.
Issues considered
- Whether the plaintiffs had pleaded and proved that they were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, and whether the defendants raised a defence to that plea.
- Whether the suit for specific performance is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether specific performance of the agreement to sell can be granted despite the alleged delay.
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 20
Subjects
Judgment
(2008] 3 S.C.R. 91
_;
w
RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI & ANR. A
v.
MUHAMMED KUNJU & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos.1396-1397 of 2002)
FEBRUARY 20, 2008
B
• (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.}
-/-
Suit- Suit for specific performance of agreement of sale-
Dismissal of suit by trial court on the ground of limitation -
High Court denying the claim on the ground of absence of c
plea regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiff- On
appeal, held: The plea was specifically taken by the plaintiff
and the same having not been denied by the defendants,
finding of High Court is erroneous.
~· Appellants filed two separate suits against the D
respondents for specific performance of agreement to sell
the suit properties. Clear averments were made in the
plaint that they were always ready and willing to perform
their part of agreement. Respondents-defendants
contested the suits on the grounds that the agreements E
were not valid and binding on them and that the suit was
barred by limitation. They did not deny the plea regarding
readiness and willingness. Trial Court dismissed the suit
'
.;: on the ground of limitation. On merit, it held that the
agreements were valid and binding. High Court held that F
the suit was not barred by limitation and the agreements
were valid and binding, but dismissed the appeal on the
ground that no plea was raised regarding readiness and
willingness and exercise of discretion. Hence the present
appeals. G
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: High Court's judgment is vulnerable. Firstly,
there was no dispute ever raised by the defendants about
91 H
1'
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
,,.
"
A the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to fulfill their
obligations. The High Court was clearly in error in holding
that no plea regarding readiness and willingness was
raised. The trial court in its judgment has referred to
various portions of the averments in the plaint where the
B plaintiffs had categorically stated that they were and are •
always willing to fulfill their part of the obligations. The -<--
High Court also failed to notice that there was no plea
either in the written statement or in the cross objections
filed in the appeal before the High Court that the plaintiffs
were not ready and willing to fulfill their part of the
c
obligation. [Para 4] [95-G; 96-A, B]
K.S. Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan (1997(3) SCC
1), K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. (1999(5) SCC
77), V Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal (2001 (7) SCC 617),
D Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa and Others (2003(10)
SCC 390) and Pukhraj D. Jain and Ors. v. G Gopala Krishna
(2004 (7) sec 251) referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
Nos.1396-1397 of 2002.
E
From the final Judgment and Order dated 09.07.200·1 of
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in A.S. Nos. 24 & 42 of
1993.
j.
T.L.V. Iyer, Jay Kishor Singh, Vivek Gupta and
F Subramonium Prasad for the Appellants.
C.S. Rajan, A. Raghunath and Romy Chacko for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in these appeals is
to thei judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court.
2. Background facts need to be noted in some detail.
Two suits were filed for specific performance of agreement
H
RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI & ANR. v. MUHAMMED KUNJU 93
J
& ORS. [PASAYAT, J.]
•
to sell the suit properties. Appellant No.1 is the plaintiff in OS A
No. 11 of 1997 which was filed in the Sub Court Mavelikara on
23.2.1987. Appellant No. 2 is the plaintiff in OS No. 17 of 1987
which was filed on 28.2.1987. The three defendants were
common to both the suits. Defendant no.1 is defendant No.2's
brother's son and defendant No. 3 is the wife of defendant No. B
• 2. Defendant No. 3 obtained the property mentioned in the two
-.-' suits under an exchange of properties between her and her
husband i.e. defendant no.2. She mortgaged the properties to
the Kerala Financial Corporation Limited. Sometime in 1970
defendant No.3 executed a Power of Attorney in favour of her
husband-defendant No.2 authorising him to deal with the
c
property. On 17 .5.1974 defendant No.2 sold portions of the
property to defendant No.1 acting on the power conferred by
the power of attorney vide Exhs. A 8 and A 18. Subsequently on
12.8.1974, defendant No.3 cancelled the power of attorney. In
D
't' 1979 the defendant No.1 executed a power of attorney
authorising defendant No. 2 to deal with the property. On the
basis of such power of Attorney he entered into an agreement
with appellant No. 2 on 6.8.1979 to sell 3.5. cents of the property
and the structures for a price of Rs.32,000/-. An advance of
Rs.10,000/- was paid. Appellant No. 2 was then the tenant of E
the possession of the structure and had paid Rs.7,000/- as
security. It was agreed that the amount shall be adjusted against
part payment of the price fixed and appellant No. 2 was to pay
J Rs.15,000/- as the balance consideration. The agreement
indicated that possession was delivered to appellant No.2. F
On 20.8.1979 defendant No.2 as power of attorney holder
entered into an agreement to sell 7.5 cents of property with
structures to appellant No. 1 for consideration of Rs. 43,500/-,
out of which Rs.27,000/-was paid as advance. Appellant No. 1
G
was already in possession of the structure as tenant. The terms
of the agreement i.e. Exh.A1 are similar to those as Exh. A14.
Since defendant no.3 did not discharge the dues to the Financial
Corporation, recovery proceedings were started and the rent
payable by the appellant was attached. It appears thereafter
H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R'.
,.
•
A there was a dissension amongst the defendants and Defendant
No.3 filed a suit (OS No. 42of1982) challenging the sales made
by Defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1. The appellants were
not parties to the said suit. Defendant No. 1 took the stand that
the sales in favour of defendant No. 2 as power of attorney holder
B was valid and defendant No. 3 was not entitled to the relief
prayed. Thereafter the dispute was settled recognizing the rights •
..,_
of defendant No.3. She undertook to honour all commitments
made by defendant no. 2 in respect of the property. In 1986
appellants called upon the defendants to execute the sale deed
c in their favour. A reply was given on 13.11.1986 refusing to
execute the sale deeds. Two suits were filed, as noted above,
for specific performance. There were clear averments to the
effect that the appellants were and are always ready and willing
to perform their part of the agreement. The defendants 1 and 3
contested the proceedings. It was their stand that the agreements
D
sued on, namely Exhs. A 1 and A19 are not valid and binding on ...
the defendant. A plea of limitation was also taken. But there
was no denial to the plea regarding readiness and willingness.
There was specific reference to the earlier disputes between
the defendants. The trial court by judgment and decree dated
E 19.3.1992 dismissed the suit as barred by limitation after holding
on merits that the agreements are valid and binding the
defendant. The plaintiffs filed separate appeals in the High Court.
Defendant No.3 also filed separate memo of cross- objections
challenging the trial court's finding on the valid and binding nature
.,.
F of the agreements. By the impugned judgment dated 9. 7.2001,
the High Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the agreement
are valid and binding, and also held that the suits were not barred
by limitation. However the High Court dismissed the suit on the
ground that there was no plec;i raised regarding readiness and
G willingness and exercise of discretion. However, the High Court
granted a decree for refund of the amount paid as advance
covered by the agreement, but that no credit was to be given for
further payments of Rs.3,800/- and 4,460/- by the plaintiffs.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
H
I
RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI & ANR. v. MUHAMMED KUNJU 95
_;..
& ORS. [PASAYAT, J.]
~
High Court fell into grave errors by h·ofding that the plea of A
readiness and willingness was not raised by the plaintiffs. In
this connection, reference is made to averments in the plaint as
noted in the judgment of the trial court. Reference was also made
to the issues framed and the written statements filed by the
defendants. It was pointed out that in the written statements there B
• was no plea taken by the defendants that plaintiff was not ready
and willing to fulfil their part of the obligation. It was, therefore,
submitted that the High Court non suited the plaintiffs on a grourid
which was not raised by the defendants and which was not
considered by the trial court. It was also pointed out that factually c
the High Court was wrong in holding that no plea in that regard
was taken.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submitted, that while considering a case of this nature, the
parameters of Section 20 have to be kept in view. It is pointed D
y
out that suits were not filed within a reasonable time and the
subsequent events by considerable effect. It w~s submitted that
the High Court has rightly held that there was no material to
show that at all relevant points of time the plaintiff was ready
and willing to fulfill their part of the obligation. Reference was E
placed on-several decisions of this Court in support of the stand
e.g. K.S. Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan (1997(3) SCC
1), K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. (1999(5) SCC
j
77), V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal (2001 (7) SCC 617),
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa and Others (2003(10) F
SCC 390) and Pukhraj D. Jain & Ors. v. G Gopa/a Krishna
(2004 (7) SCC 251). There can be no quarrel with the position
in law urged by learned counsel for the respondent about the
parameters to be considered while dealing with a suit for specific
performance. But the High Court's judgment is clearly vulnerable.
G
Firstly, there was no dispute ever raised by the defendants about
the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to fulfill their
obligations. The High Court was clearly in error in holding that
no plea regarding readiness and willingness was raised. As
. noted above, the trial court in its judgment has referred to various
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A portions of the averments in the plaint where the plaintiffs had
categorically stated that they were and are always willing to fulfill
their part of the obligations. The High Court also failed to notice
that there was no plea either the written statement or in the cross
objections filed in the appeal before the High Court that the
B plaintiffs were not ready and willing to fulfill their part of the
obligation.
5. The conclusions of the High Court are to the following
effect:
c "Then the question is whether the respective plaintiffs have
pleaded and proved that they were always ready and willing
to perform their part of the contracts. Even though time did
not start to run on the expiry of two months from the dates
of the agreements, certainly, the plaintiffs were aware that
the defendants had to discharge their obligation and get
D
a release of the mortgage in two months of the dates of
the agreements. Until the sending of the notices preceding
the suits, there is nothing to show that the plaintiffs at any
time called upon the defendants to perform their part of
the contract."
E
6. The conclusions are clearly contrary to the pleadings of
the plaintiffs. It was categorically stated in the plaint in both the
suits that the plaintiffs are always ready and willing to fulfill their
part of the obligations and that defendants were evading the
F execution for one reason or the other.
7. Above being the position, the appeals deserve to be
allowed, which we direct. The respondents shall execute the
sale deed after receiving the balance of the consideration within
a period of three months. If that is not done it shall be open to
G the appellants to move the trial court for necessary steps in that
regard.
8. The appeals are allowed without any order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeals allowed.
H
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