Holding

The suit was barred by limitation because the State of Tamil Nadu was not impleaded at the time of institution and, under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period for the newly added party runs from the date of its impleadment.

Summary

The State of Tamil Nadu, acting under the Revenue Recovery Act, auctioned a 2‑acre land after a loan default, which was purchased by the appellant. The respondent filed an application under Section 38 of the Act to cancel the sale, which was rejected on 11‑Jan‑1977, and subsequently filed a suit for declaration of title and possession on 12‑Feb‑1977 without impleading the State. The State was later impleaded on 11‑Oct‑1979. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the six‑month limitation under Section 59 of the Act; the High Court set aside that order, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the suit was incompetent until the State was added and, absent a specific court order, the limitation period for the newly added party runs from the date of its impleadment, making the suit time‑barred. The appeal was allowed, restoring the trial court’s dismissal. The Court interpreted Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and its proviso, to determine the effect of adding parties on limitation periods.

Issues considered

The suit for declaration of title and possession is barred by the six‑month limitation under Section 59 of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864.
Whether the addition of the State of Tamil Nadu as a defendant after the suit was instituted triggers the limitation period from the date of addition or from the date of institution of the suit under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to deem the suit as instituted from the earlier date of filing.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 21
Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864s. 38, s. 5, s. 59

Subjects

limitationimpleadmentTamil Nadu Revenue Recovery ActLimitation Act 1963Section 21Section 59civil suitauction saledeclaration of titlepossession

Judgment

RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR A
v.
P.K. PATTABIRAMAN AND ANR.

FEBRUARY21, 2001

[V.N. KHARE AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B

Limitation :

Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, I 864 : Section 59.

Declaration of title and possession-Suit for-Plaintiff challenged the c
sale of land in favour of auction-purchaser-Challenge dismissed-Suit filed
within period of/imitation-But State impleaded as defendant beyond period of
limitation-Maintainability of-Held: Though suit as initially laid is within
period of limitation it is incompetent as State not impleaded-On the date of
impleadment of State suit was barred by time-Hence, trial cou11 rightly
D
dismissed the suit as not maintainable.

Limitation Act, 1963 :

Section 2 I proviso-Declaration oftitle and possession-Suit for-limi-
tation-Suit against auction-purchaser filed within period of limitation-But
State impleaded as defendant beyond period of limitation-No specific order
that impleadment of state is with effect from institution of suit-Held: Merely
adding or substituting a paT1y by CouT1 is not enough-In the absence of
specific order that impleadment of a pa11y is from the date of institution ofsuit,
limitation will run from the date of impleadment-Hence, suit barred by
limitation. F

The respondent-plaintiff tiled an application under Section 38 of the
Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 for cancellation of auction sale of
the suit land iu favour of the appellant-defendant. After enquiry, the
Collector, on 11.1.1977, rejected the respondent's application and con·
G
firmed the sale in favour of the appellant.

On 12.2.1977 the respondent tiled a suit for declaration of title and
possession of the suit land, Initially the respondent did not implead the
State as a defendant in the suit. Subsequently, the trial court, on 11.10.1979,
allowed the impleadment of the State as defendant No. 2. H
23
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.

A The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was
barred by limitation as it was not brought within six months of the date ~
when the cause of action arose. However, the High Court set aside the trial
court's order. Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that under the proviso
B to Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the impleadment of defendant
No. 2 should be deemed to be which effect from the date of institution of
suit and, therefore, the suit was within the period of limitation.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

c HELD : 1. In the present case, the cause of action arose when the
application of the respondent was rejected and the sale was confirmed,
that is, on 11.1.1977. It is also true that the suit was laid in the civil court
within six months from the time at which the cause of action arose. But in
the said suit, the State was not impleaded as defendant and in the absence
D of the State, the suit instituted by the plaintiff was incompetent. [27-D-E]

2. Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates two situations
- one under the substantive provision which provides that where after
filing of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit
shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been brought on the day when he
E was added or substituted as a party in the suit. The second situation con- ·"f--
templated under the proviso to the substantive provision is where the court
is satisfied that a new plaintiff or defendant was omitted to be added or
substituted due to a mistake in good faith, the court may direct that the
suit, as regards the newly added or substituted party, shall be deemed to
have been instituted on any earlier date. Merely adding or substituting a
F
plaintiff or defendant by the court is not encugh. In the absence of any
order that the impleadment of newly added or substituted party shall take ·"·
effect from the date of institution of a suit, the period of limitation so far as
the newly added or substituted party is concerned shall run from the date
of their impleadment in the suit. There is no such order passed under
G proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the suit filed by
the respondent was barred by limitation as contemplated under Section 59
of the Act. [28-A-C; D-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2462 of 1991.
--
H From the Judgment and Order dated 203.91 of the Madras High Court
RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR v. P.K. PATTABIRAMAN [Y.N. KHARE, J.] 25
in S.A No. 1721 of 1983. A

K.V. Vishwanathan and S.R. Selia, Advs for the Appellant.

K.K. Mani for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
V.N. KHARE, J. One Subramania Pillai took loan. It appears that he
committed default in repaying the loan. With the result, the State of Tamil
Nadu took proceedings for recovery of dues under Section 5 of the Tamil
Nadu Revenue Recovery Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). In the said
'proceedings, the laud measuring 2 acres 47 cents was put to sale by public c
auction treating the land as if it was owned by Subramania Pillai. Tbe
appellant herein purchased the said property at the said auction held on
21.11.1974. On 2.12.1974, the plaintiff-respondent filed an application under
Section 38 of the Act praying therein for cancellation of auction sale in favour
of the appellant. His case was that Subramania Pillai was not the owner of
the said property and in fact it belonged to him. The respondent, on 1.4.1975,
D
filed further objections. It appears that on the basis of the two objections filed
by the respondent, the Collector ordered for an enquiry. After the matter was
enquired into, the Collector on 11.1.1977, rejected the application of the
respondent and confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant herein. On
4.2.1977, the sale certificate was issued in favour of the appellant and the E
possession of the land was delivered to him on 11.2.1977. On 12.2.1977, the
respondent filed a suit for declaration of his title to the land, delivery of
possession of said land to him and for setting aside the auction sale in favour
of the appellant. Initially, the respondent, in the said suit, did not implead the
State of Tamil Nadu as one of the defendants. Subsequently, the defendant
F
in the suit, by a separate application i.e. I.A. No. 164/1979 prayed for
impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu as defendant No. 2. The said application
was allowed by the trial court on 11.10. 1979 directing for impleadment of
the State of Tamil Nadu. The trial court framed several issues. One of the
issues was whether the suit brought by the plaintiff was within the period of
limitation. The trial court after considering other issues held that tl1e suit was G
barred by limitation as the same was not brought within six months of the date
when the cause of action to the plaintiff arose. The Suit was thus dismissed.
The plaintiff thereafter preferred an appeal before the first appellate court.
The first appellate court was of the view that since the plaintiff was stranger
to the proceedings, the period of limitation provided under Section 59 of the H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Act is not applicable. In view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and the
suit filed by the respondent was decreed, as prayed for. The appellant thereafter
filed second appeal before the High Court but the same was dismissed. It is t
against the said judgment of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal before
us.

B Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the suit brought
by the plaintiffs-respondents was barred by limitation and, therefore, it ought
to have been dismissed on that ground alone. We find substance in the
arguments. Section 38 of the Act provides thus:

"Section 38 (I) : At any time within thirty days from the date of the
c sale of immovable property, application may be made to the Collector
to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity, or
mistake or fraud, in publishing or conducting it; but, except as
otherwise is hereinafter provided, no sale shall be set aside on die
ground of any such irregularity or mistake unless the applicant proves
D to the satisfaction of the Collector that he has sustained substantial
injury by reason thereof.

(2) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(3) On the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale, if no
E such application is made or if such application has been made and
rejected, the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale;
provided that, if he shall have reason to think that the sale ought to
be set aside notwithstanding that no such application has been made
or on grounds other than those alleged in any application which has
been made and rejected, he may, after recording his reasons in
F
writing, set aside the sale.

(4) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(5) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx."
G A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that any person aggrieved
against an auction sale o( property is entitled to file an application before the
Collector within expiry of thirty days from the date of sale of immovable
property on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake or frand in
publishing and conducting the sale. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs did
H file the said application for setting aside tl1e auction sale within thirty days
RAMAL!NGAM CHETTIAR v. P.K. PATTABIRAMAN (Y.N. KHARE, J.] 2:i
and was rejected by the Collector. The question therefore arises is, what is A
~ the period of limitation for bringing a suit in the civil court for cancellation
of an auction sale.

Section 59 of the Act provides thus:

"Nothing contained in this Act shall be held to prevent parties B
deeming themselves aggrieved by any proceedings under this Act,
except as hereinbefore provided, from applying to the Civil Courts
for redress; provided that Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of
any suit instituted by such parties for any ;-uch cause of action, unless
such suit shall be instituted within six months from the time at which
the cause of action arose."
c
The said provision shows that parties aggrieved by any proceedings
under the Act can bring a suit in the civil court within six months from the
time at which the cause of action arose. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff
was aggrieved by the proceedings unde< the Act and was thus entitled to D
institute a suit in the civil comt. It is also not disputed that in the present case,
the cause of action arose when the application of the respondent was rejected
and the sale was confirmed that is on 11.1.1977. It is also true that the suit
was laid in the civil court within six months from the time at which the cause
of action arose. But in the said suit, State of Tamil Nadu was not impleaded
as defendant and in the absence of State of Tamil Nadu, the suit instituted by E

- the plaintiff was incompetent. It was only when I.A. No. 164/1979, filed by
the defendant for impleadment of the State of Tamil Nadu was allowed by
the trial court, the suit laid by the plaintiff became competent. It is also not
disputed that I.A. No. 16411979 for impleadment of the State was
allowed on 11.10.1979. Section 21 of the Limitation Act provides that where F
after the institution of a suit, if a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or
added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when
he was so made a party. In view of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, so far
_as the State of Tamil Nadu was concerned, suit filed by respondent has to be
treated as instituted when th_e application for impleadment of State of Tamil
Nadu was allowed, i.e. on 11.10.1979 and by that time the suit stood barred
G
by time.

Learned counsel for the respondent referred the proviso to Section 21
of the Limitation Act and on the strength thereof argued that even if the
application for impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu was allowed on 11.10.1979 H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A the said order has to be understood as if impleadrnent of defendant no.2 was
with effect from the date of filing the suit. There is no substance in the
argument. Section 21 of the Limitation Act contemplates two situations - one
under the substantive provision which provides that where after filing of a
suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as
regards him, be deemed to have been brought on the day when he was added
B
or substituted as a party in the suit. The second situation contemplated under
the proviso to the substantive provision is where the court is satisfied that a
new plaintiff or defendant was omitted to be added or substituted due to a
mistake in good faith, the court may direct that the suit, as regards the newly
added or substituted party, shall be deemed to have been instituted on any
C earlier date. Tims, under the proviso, if the court is satisfied, it can direct that
the suit as regards newly added or substituted plaintiff or defendant shall be
deemed to have been instituted on an earlier date. In such a case, the court
after substituting or adding a party in the suit is required to pass a separate/
further order that the suit as regards the newly added defendant or plaintiff
shall be deemed to have been instituted with effect from the date the suit was
D
laid. Merely adding or substituting a plaintiff or defendant by the court is not
enough. In the absence of any order that the impleadment of newly added or
substituted paity shall take effect from the date of institution of a suit, the
period of limitation so far as t:ie newly added or substituted shall rnn from
the date of their impleadment in the suit. We have looked into the records but
E do not find any order having passed under the proviso to Section 21 of the
Limitation Act that the imple,,dment of the State of Tamil Nadu would take
effect from the date of institution of the suit. In the absence of such an order
by the trial court, the suit filed by the respondent was barred by limitation
as contemplated under Section 59 of the Act.
-
F For the aforesaid reasons, we set asiJe the judgment under challenge
and restore the decree of the trial court. The appeal is allowed. There shall
be no order as to costs.

v:s.s. Appeal allowed.