Holding

The word 'person' in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act is an inclusive definition that does not treat a group of co‑owners without a joint venture as a single person; each husband‑wife couple is a separate person for ceiling purposes.

Summary

Five couples entered into an agreement to jointly purchase about 172 acres of agricultural land in Gujarat, solely to simplify negotiations and later divide the land among themselves, with no intention of joint cultivation. After purchase they partitioned the land and obtained separate mutation entries. The Mamlatdar held that each couple could hold one unit (36 acres) and declared a surplus of 1 acre 31 guntas. The Deputy Collector, applying the Bombay General Clauses Act definition of "person", treated the ten co‑owners as a single association and declared a surplus of 145 acres. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal upheld this view, and the Gujarat High Court initially remanded the matter but later held that the definition of "person" includes an association, thereby restoring the Tribunal’s order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that a mere combination of persons without a joint venture does not create a "body of individuals"; each couple is a separate person for ceiling purposes, and surplus land must be computed per couple. The Court also held that the partition made before the 1972 amendment is deemed to defeat the amendment’s object and must be ignored, but this does not affect the surplus calculation. The matter was remitted to the Mamlatdar to determine any non‑agriculturist status and to compute surplus land accordingly.

Issues considered

Whether the definition of 'person' in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 includes a body of individuals or an association of persons.
Whether co‑ownership of land, absent a joint venture, constitutes a 'person' under the Act.
Whether the ten purchasers together constitute a single 'person' for the purpose of land‑ceiling calculations.
Effect of Section 8 of the Ceiling Act on partitions made between 24‑01‑1971 and the commencement of the 1972 Amendment.
Whether the Mamlatdar can examine the agriculturist status of the purchasers under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act while determining surplus land.

Legislation cited

Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904s. 3(35)
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948s. 63, s. 84C
Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960s. 20, s. 21, s. 2(21), s. 37, s. 6(1), s. 6(2), s. 8

Subjects

land ceilingdefinition of personassociation of personsco‑ownershipagricultural landsurplus landpartitionstatutory interpretationGujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling ActBombay General Clauses Act

Judgment

/

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 468

A RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
: (Civil Appeal No. 4420 of 2004)
I

FEBRUARY 5, 2008
B
[R.V. RAVEgNDRAN & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]
f
~.
Lands Ceiling :
i

Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960: ss. 6(2), 8,
c 20, 21, 37 -f Person - Meaning of-Agreement proposing to
purchase land I
in joint names entered into by five couples -
Agreement also stating that purpose was not joint cultivation
of land - After purchase, they entered into another agreement
recording d~vision of land into ten portions among them - Order
D of Deputy: collector that a group of persons purchasing
agricultural land together, being an association of persons,
had to be treated as 'a person' under the Act and therefore
they could: jointly hold only one unit in view of provision of
s. 6(1) of theI Ceiling Act and not five units as held by Mamlatdar
E - Correctness of - Held: Not correct - Mere combination of
persons ,,-without any intention to carry out a joint venture would
not conv~rt them into a body of individuals/association of
persons inI the absence of a deeming provision in a statute or
an agreement - Thus, each couple together with the members
F of the family (excluding major sons) is a person entitled to
j-
hold one µnit - Having regard to s. 6(2) of the Ceiling Act, the
share of $ach couple (husband and wife) in the land, plus any
other land individually held by them to be calculated to find
out whether they held any land in excess of the ceiling limit -
Directions issued - Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 -
G
s.3(35) --1 Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1948-
s. 63 - Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act, -..j
I
1972 - s.8(1), (2), (3) and (4).
I

Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act,
H 468
~
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 469
~
~
/
1972 - s.8(1), (2), (3) and (4) - Partition among co-owners A
taking place on 30. 12. 1971 - Held: By virtue of s. 8, partition
effected on 30. 12. 1971 was deemed to be made to defeat the
object of Amendment Act, 1972 and consequently partition
would have to be ignored while computing the surplus land.
Interpretation of statutes: Use of word 'include' - B
Connotation of- Held: Connotes intention to enlarge meaning
of word used in statufe.
~

Words and phrases: 'person', 'body of individual',
'association of persons' - Ordinary and legal meaning of c
The five appellants alongwith their respective
spouses entered into an agreement proposing to
purchase about 175 acres of land in their joint names. The
reason stated in the agreement forjoint purchase was to
avoid entering into separate agreements with several D
owners of the lands. They also agreed that there would
be no collective or joint cultivation of the lands proposed
--1 to be purchased by them. They purchased 172 acres 36
guntas of agricultural land under 4 sale deeds. After the
purchase of the lands, these ten purchasers (five couples) E
entered into another agreement recording that the total
sale price of Rs.46,300/- was paid equally by all of them
and division of land into ten portions among them. On
their applications, mutation entry was made showing each
co-owner as the separate owner of lands. F
~
In land ceiling proceedings, the Mamlatdar issued a
notice under s.20 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
Act, 1960, to the co-owners seeking particulars of lands
held by them to determine whether they held any surplus
land. After considering their statements, Mamlatdar held G
.,._ that the five couples were entitled to hold five units of 36
. '
acres each. He made a declaration that surplus holding
was 1 acre, 31 guntas, which vested in the Government.
Deputy Collector held that a group of persons or
H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . · [2008]2 S.C.R.
>'-
\
• l .

A association of persons,purchasing agricultural land
. ' .
together, had to be treated as ' a 'person' under the Act
and therefore they could jointly hold only one unit in view
of provision of s.6(1) of the Ceiling Act. As a consequence
he determined the surplus land as 145 acres, 36. guntas.
B Appellants filed revision before the Revenue Tribunal. The
Tribunal upheld the decision of Deputy Collector by
applying the definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act. Single
Judge of High Court allowed the petition of appellants and
remanded the matter to. the Revenue Tribunal to decide
C; whether the definition of .'person' in the Bombay General
Clauses Act, 1904 could be imported into the definition of
a·•person' under the Ceiling Act.: · · ·
i" • t' ' '•. · ' ' • . . • ..., •. ·. . ·.

: · The Division Bench of High Court allowed the appeal
in part holding that there was no need for remand as the
D question whether the definition of 'person' included an .
association of persons, was a pure question of law which
could be decided by the High Court itself. The order of
.Tribunal.was thus restored .. Hence the present appeal. ·
· . Allowing the appeal, the Court· .. ·
E
· HELD: 1.1. The word 'person' is defined in the Gujarat
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, ·.1960, but it is an inclusive
definition; that is '_'a person includes a joint family." Where
the definition is an inclusive definition, the .use of the word
F 'includes' indicates an- intention to !ilnlarge the. meaning
of the word used in the Statute. Consequently, the word
must be construed as comprehending not only such
things which they signify according tc) their natural import,
but. also those things which the interpretation clause
G decla.res that they shall include. Thus, where a definition
uses
, -
the. word
. .
'includes',
\ • I
as, , co'ntrasted
·-
from 'means', .the
word defined not only bears. its ordinary popular and
natural meaning, but in addition also bear the extended
statutorY meaning. [Para 15] [486-C, b, E]
H S.K. Gupta v. K.P. Jain AIR (1979) SC 734; Dilworlh v.
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 471

~ Commissioner of Stamps - 1899 AC 99; Jobbins v. Middlesex A
County Council - 1949 (1) KB 142 - rel.ied on.
1.2. The ordinary, popular and natural meaning of the
word 'person' is 'a specific individual human being'. But
in law the word 'person' has a slightly different.
connotation, and refers to any entity that is recognized 8
by law as having the rights and duties of a human being.
The word 'person', in law, unless otherwise intended, refers
not only to a natural person (male or female human being),
but also any legal person (that is an entity that is
recognized by law as having Qr capable of having rights C
and duties). The General Clauses Act defines a 'person'
as including a corporation or an association of persons
or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not. The
said general legal definition is, however, either modified
or restricted or expanded in different statutes with· o
reference to the object of the enactment or the context in
which it is used. [Para 16) [486·F, G; 487·A, BJ
Salmond's Jurisprudence : 12th Edition Page 299 -
referred to.
E
1.3. Both definitions of the word 'person', in General
Clauses Act and Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions. The
inclusive definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act
applies to all Gujarat Act unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or the context. The inclusive
definition of 'person' in s.2(21) of the Ceiling Act, does not F
indicate anything repugnant to the definition of 'person'
in General Clauses Act, but merely adds 'joint family' to
the existing definition. Therefore the definition of person
in the Ceiling Act, would include the definition of person
in s.3(35) of General Clauses Act. The definition of 'person' G
in General Clauses Act, being an inclusive definition,
would include the ordinary, popular and general meaning
..
' and those specifically included in the definition. Thus, the
word 'person' in the Ceiling Act will,. unless the context
otherwise requires, refer to : a natural human being, (ii) H
'·
472 ' "- SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 2 S.C.R. ~

A any legal entity which is capable of possessing rights and
duties, including any company.or association of persons
or body of individuals {whether incorporated or not); and
(iii) a Hindu Undivided Family' or any other group or unit
of persons, the members of which by custom or usage, ·
8' are jointin estate.and residence. [Para 17] [487-D, E, F, G, ·
. H; 488-A, 8] .
I , . . ' - , ., . ." .
· Hasmukhafal Dahayabhai v. State. of Gujarat • 1976 (4)
sec 100 - referred to ..
. '
.·1 -----..._ ., ,. I -

c . 2.1 When several persons acquire undivided shares
. (as contrasted from defined portions) in a property, either
equal or unequal, they become co-owners' of the property;
or where an owner of a property transfers a 'share in the
property to another, the. transferee becomes a rec-owner
0 along with the original owner. To be termed as co-owners,
the right of each owner should be co-ordinate with the
other 'owners'. If the right of one is higher in degree than
that of the other, there is no co-ownership. Whether the
I shares are equal or not, each co-owner is entitled to be in
E possession of every part of the property, jointly with the
Ii other co-owners. [Para 19] [489-F, G, H; 490-A]
' ' ' . '.' ) ' ,
I Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath AIR (1976) SC 2335:;..
I referred to. · · ·
' , \ ,·
Salmond's Jurisprudence' - referred to.
F
. 2.2. A mere. combination of persons or. coming
together of persons without anything more, without any
intention to have a joint venture or'carry on some common
activity with a common understanding and. purpose will
G not convert two or more persons into a body of individuals/
association of persons. An 'association .of persons/body
of individuals' is one in which two or more persons join in
I : •
' a common purpose and common action to achieve some
. common benefit; Where there is com bfnation of a
i f'~ · individual~ by volition of the parties, engaged tog7th~r in .
1:,, '?,
'11

,i
..

. .
'/

·-------~ .
.1
/1
·/
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
[2008] 2 S.C.R.

A any legal entity vyhich is capable of possessing rights and
duties, including any company or association of persons
1
or body of indivi duals (whether incorporated or not); and
(iii) a Hindu Undivided Family or any other group or unit
of persons, the :members of which by custom or usage,
B are joint in estate and residence. [Para 17] [487-D, E, F, G, L
I
H; 488-A, B] I
I
Hasmukhalal Dahayabhai v. State of Gujarat - 1976 (4)
1

sec 100 - referred to. '
""
c 2.1 When ~everal persons acquire undivided shares
(as contrasted from defined portions) in a prop~rty, either. r
:
equal or unequial, they become co-owners of the property; \

or where an owner of a property transfers a share in the t
'
property to an other, the transferee becomes a ..-co-owner
1

along with the roriginal owner. To be termed as co-owners,
0
the right of e~ch owner should be co-ordinate with the
other 'owners'. If the right of one is higher in degree than
that of the otber, there is no co-ownership. Whether the
shares are eq~al or not, each co-owner is entitled to be in ~ ·
E possession of every part of the property, jointly with the
other co-own~rs. [Para 1~] [489-F, G, H; 490-A]
I
Sri Ram iPasricha v. Jagannath AIR (1976) SC 2335 -
referred to. :
I
SalmonCi:l's Jurisprudence' - referred to.
F I

2.2. A mere combination of persons or coming
together of persons without anything more, without any
intention to ~ave a joint venture or carry on some common
activity withr a common understanding and purpose will
G not convert ~o or more persons into a body of individuals/
association rof persons. An 'association of persons/body
of individuajs' is one in which two or more persons join in
a conimon purpose and common action to achieve some
common ~enefit. Where there is a combination of
H individuals :by volition of the parties, engaged together in .
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 473

some joint enterprise or venture, it is known as A
'association of persons/body of individuals'. The common
object will have some relevance to determine whether a
group or set of persons is an association of persons or
body of individuals with reference to a particular statute.
[Para 20] [490-G, 491-A, B, C] B
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Indira Balkrishna AIR
1
(1960) SC 1172; Mohammed Noorulla v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Madras AIR (1961) SC 1043; M. V Shanmugam
v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras AIR (1970) SC 1707;
Meera and Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1997) C
4 sec 677 - relied on.
2.3 Normally, where a group of persons have not
become co-owners by their volition with a common
purpose, they cannot be considered as a 'person'. When 0
the children of the owner of a property succeed to his
property by testamentary succession or inherit by
operation of law, they become co-owners, but the co-
ownership is not by volition of parties nor do they have
any common purpose. Each can act in regard to his/her
share, on his/her own, without any right or obligation E
towards the other owners. The legal heirs though co-
owners, do not automatically become an 'association of
persons/ body of individuals'. When different persons buy
undivided shares in a plot of land and engage a common
developer to construct an apartment building, with F
individual ownership in regard to respective apartment
and joint ownership of common areas, the co-owners of
the plot of land, do not become an 'association of persons/
body of individuals', in the absence of a deeming
provision in a statute or an agreement. Similarly, when G
two or more persons merely purchase a property, under
a common sale deed, without any agreement to have a
common or joint venture, they will not become an
'association of persons/body of individuals'. Mere
purchase under a common deed without anything more, H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R..

A will not convert a co-ownership into a joint enterprise ..
Thus when there are ten co-owners of a property, they
are 'ten persons and not a 'body of individuals' to be
treated as a 'single person'. [Para 21] [491-F, G;
492-A, 8, C]
B 2.4. It cannot be said that merely because the sale
deed is in the joint names of ten persons, they purchased
the land as "an association of persons" or as "body of
individuals" wit~ the common intention of carrying on
agricultural activities jointly or producing income, profit
.C or gain or carry on some common joint venture. In fact
before purchasing the lands, the ten persons had entered
into an agreement placing on record that the object of
purchasing the lands jointly was only to facilitate
negotiations and avoid duplicating the purchase
D procedures and not to cultivate them jointly. There is no
evidence of .any joint cultivation, nor any evidence of any
intention to have a joint venture. On the ottier hand, after
purchase, they divided the lands and informed the land
revenue authorities and, each co-owner was registered
E as the owner of the respective land allotted to him/her.
This is not a case where a body of individuals purchased
the land with the intention of having a continued
community of interest by way. of a joint venture or as a
business venture. It is therefore not possible to treat the
F ten purchasers as an 'association of persons/body of
individuals' nor is it permissible to treat them as a single
'person', thereby restricting their entitlement to hold land
to only one unit, even though there are ten purchasers.
[Para 23] [493-8, C, D, E, F]
G 3.1. The Tribunal and the High Court were right in
holding that the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act includes
an 'association of persons/body of individuals'. But they
were not justified in treating the co-owner~ as an
'association of persons', or in holding that the ten co-
H owners will be entitled to own only one unit. Having regard
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF <'.3UJARAT 475

·to section 6(2) of the Act, the share of each couple A
(husband and wife) in the land, plus any other land
individually held by them will have to calculated to find
out whether they held any land. in excess of the ceiling
limit. Therefore the shar.e of each appellant in the lands
jointly purchased, with the addition of the lands held by B
his spouse, and addition of any other land held by them,
will give the basis :for determining the surplus land.
[Para 24] [493-F, G; 494-A, B]
3.2. The partition among the co-owners on 30.12.1971
was between 24.1.1971 and the date on which the Gujarat C
Agricultural Land Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 came into
effect. The statu!ory presumption that a partition made
·between those dates was intended to defeat the object of
the Amendment Act cannot be displaced unless an
. appl"ication is made under sub-section (2) and a D·
declaration is made by the Collector under sub-section
(3). In this case, neither any application was made under
sub-section (2) nor any declaration was made under sub-
. section (3). Therefore it has to be held that the partition
effected on 30.12.1971 was deemed to have been made E
in order to defeat the object of the Amendment Act, 1972
and consequently, the partition will have to be ignored
while computing the surplus land. But in this case the
exclusion of the partition may not have any significant
effect. [Paras 25 and 26] [494-C, D, G; 495-A, B, C] F
4. The Mamlatdar is directed to decide whether any
of the ten purchasers is a non-agriculturist and if so the
extent of transfer in favour of such non-agriculturist which
will be invalid and pass consequential orders in respect
of such land in accordance with law; to determine G
- ·whether any of the ten purchasers who are agriculturists,
holds excess land by considering their share in the lands
purchased as co-owners, with other lands as provided in
ss.6· to 8 of the Ceiling Act, and pass appropriate orders
in accordance with ·law. [Para 28] [496-B, C, D, E] H.
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4420 of 2004
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.03.2003 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal
B No. 123 of 2000 in Misc. Civil Application No. 208 of 2000.
Ravindra Shrivastava, Ajay Kumar Jha, Shakun Tiwari,
Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Kunal Verma, Arjun Garg, M. Mannan and
Raju I Shrivastava (for M/s. P.H. Parekh & Co.) for the Appellants.
R.P. Bhat, Hemantika Wahi and Pinky Behera for the
C Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. This appeal by special leave,
against the judgment dated 4.3.2003 passed by the Gujarat
D High Court in LP.A. No.123 of 2000, relates to the interpretation
of the word 'person' in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
Act, 1960 ('Ceiling Act' for short). ~

The Facts :
E 2. The five appellants along with their respective spouses
purchased 172 acres and 36 guntas of agricultural land in
Madheli village under four sale deeds dated 14.11.1970 (128A,
26G), 29.4.1971 (26A, 37G), 23.6.1971 (1 OA, 14G) and
18.12.1971 (6A, 39G) for a total consideration of Rs.46,300/-.
F Before such purchase, the ten purchasers entered into an + ·
agreement dated 15.9.1969 proposing to purchase about 175
acres of land in their joint names and recording the conditions
subject to which they proposed to purchase such land. The
reason stated in the agreementfor the joint purchase, was to
G avoid each of them having to individually negotiate and enter
into separate agreements with several owners of the lands. They
agreed that one of them would be authorized to hold negotiations
and go through the procedural requirements for the purchase;
and that after purchasing the land in their names, they would
H divide the lands equally as early as possible. They also agreed
- t
-i,
,..
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
477

that there will be no collective or joint cultivation of the lands A
. proposed to be purchased by them.
j
3. After the purchase of the lands, the ten purchasers
entered into another agreement on 30.12.1971 recording that
the total sale price of Rs.46,300/- was paid equally by all of
B
them. The said agreement also recorded the division of 172A,
36G of land purchased by them into ten portions among them.
{
...!, Under the said agreement, they also agreed to get their names
registered in the Land Revenue Records as per the division.
Subsequently, on their applications, Mutation Entry No.1371
dated 25.2.1976 (duly verified and approved on 19.4.1976) was c
made showing each co-owner as the separate owner of the
lands respectively allotted to him/her, vide Hak Patrak (Village
Form No.6), issued by the Land Revenue authorities.
The Proceedings :
D
4. The Mamlatdar issued a notice dated 5.11.1976 under
section 20 of the Ceiling Act to the co-owners seeking
particulars of the lands held by them, to determine whether they
held any surplus land. After considering their statements, he
. passed an order dated 30.4.1983. He held that the total land E
held by them was 182 A. 23 Guntas; that when the lands were

.. '

-+
converted into 'C' Class category, th~ extent was 181A, 31 G;
that each couple (husband and wife) were together entitled to
one unit (36 acres of 'C' category land); and that therefore the
five couples (the five appellants with their spouses) were entitled F
to hold five units, that is, 180 acres. Consequently, he made a
declaration under section 21 of the Ceiling Act, that the surplus
holding was 1 acre, 31 guntas and that such surplus land (in Sy.
No.643/43 in Madheli) shall vest in the Government.
5. The Deputy Collector, Dabhoi, in exercise of suo motu G
power of revision under section 37 of the Ceiling Act, issued a
show cause notice dated 3.5.1984 to the appellants, being of
the view that the determination of surplus land by the Mamlatdar
was contrary to the provisions of the Ceiling Act. After hearing,
he passed an order dated 23.8.1984 holding that a group of H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A persons or association of persons purchasing agricultural land
together, had to be treated as 'a person' .under the Act and
therefore they could jointly hold only one unit (36Acres) in view
of the. provision of section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act. As a ·
consequence,_he determined the surplus land as 145 A, 31 G
B and directed the Mamlatdar to obtain selection of the land to be
surrendered. The said order was challenged by the appellants
before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, by invoking its revisional
jurisdiction. The Tribl!nal, by its judgment dated 29.12.1987,.
upheld the decision of the Deputy Collector, by applying the
c definition of 'person' in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904,
to the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act. ·
6. The appellants challenged the order of the Tribunal
before the Gujarat High Court. A learned Single Judge by order
dated 30.12:1999 allowed the petition and remanded the matter·
D to the Revenue Tribunal to decide whether the definition of
'person' in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 ·('General
Clauses Act' for short) could be imported into the definition of a
'person' under the Ceiling Act. The appellants challenged the
order of the learned Single Judge in appeal.A Division Bench
E of the Gujarat High Court allowed the appeal in part, by judgment
dated 4.3.2003. It held that there was no need for remand, as
the question whether the definition of 'person' included an
association of persons, was a pure question of law which can
be decided by the High Court itself, It held that definition of
F 'person' in the General Clauses Act has to be read into the
definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act and therefore, the decision
of the Revenue Tribunal treating the ten co-owners as an
association of persons, and consequently, a 'person' for the
purpose of the Ceiling Act, entitling them to hold only one unit
(36 acres), did not suffer from any infirmity. The order of th~ .
. G Tribunal was thus restored. The said order of the Division Bench
of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
The Contentions :
7. The appellants contend that the definition of 'person' in
H.
rl
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 479
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
~
General Clauses Act cannot be read into the definition of A
'person' in the· Ceiling Act. They submitted that the general
definition in the General Clauses Act would apply only in the
absence of a specific definition in the concerned enactment;
that as the Ceiling Act itself defined the word 'person', there
was an legislative intention to exclude· the general definition of B
the word 'person' in the GC Act; and that consequently the
t definition of 'person' in section 2(21) should be interpreted as
,.&
referring only to a natural person (a human being) or a joint family
as defined in the Ceiling Act; and that therefore, an association
of persons or body of individuals will not be a 'person' for the c
purpose of Ceiling Act.
7.1) Alternatively, it is· submitted that even if the word
·'person' is held to include an association of persons or body of
individuals, a co-ownership cannot be considered as a body of
individuals or association of persons and each co-owner should D
be considered as a person for the purposes of the Ceiling Act.
7.2) The appellants contende(j tha,t section 6(~) of the
Ceiling Act provided that while calculating the holding of an
individual who is a member of a family, the land held by the
spouse {as also minor sons and minor unmarried daughters) E
has to be clubbed with the individual's holding; and therefore, in
this case, the holding of wife of each appellant should be added
to his holding for the purpose of considering whether he held
any surplus land. In other word$, each couple (each ofthe five
appellants with his wife) was a 'person' entitled to hold one unit F
(36 acres); and therefore, the decision of the Mamlatdar that
the appellants were entitled to hold five units (180 acres) and
only the land in excess of five units was surplus land was in
accordance with law.
G
8. On the other hand, the respondent State contended that
-+ the definition of 'person' in the GC Act will have .,to be read
'
into
the definition of 'person' in section 2(21) of the Ceiling Act and
therefore any 'association· of persons' or 'body of individua\s'
will have to be treated as a person. It is submitted that when the
H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A five appellants and their respective spouses joined together to
purchase 172 acres 36 guntas of land, they constituted an
'association of persons' or 'body of individuals' and therefore,
the purchase by the ten purchasers was a purchase by a 'person'
and the ten co-owners as a 'person' were entitled to hold only
B one unit (36 acres of 'C' class land).
8.1) The respondent's next contention is based on section
8 of Ceiling Act which provides that any transfer or partition
effected between 24.1.1971 and the date on which the Gujarat
Agricultural Land Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972 came into
C force shall be deemed to have been made in anticipation in
order to defeat the object of the said Amending Act unless it is
proved to the contrary. It is contended that the partition effected
among the ten co-owners under the unregistered agreement
dated 30.12.1971 should be deemed to have been effected
D with the intention of defeating the object of Gujarat Agricultural
Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972, (Amending Act for short)
having regard to the provisions of section 8 of the Ceiling Act. It
is pointed out that the only way to avoid such a presumption
was to make an application to the Collector under sub-section
E (2) of section 8 in the prescribed form within the prescribed
period seeking a declaration that such partition was not made
in anticipation in order to defeat the object of the Amending Act,
1972. It is contended that as such an application was not made
to the Collector, the partition will have to be deemed as having
F been made to defeat the object of the Act and consequently the
partition shall have to be ignored in computing the surplus land
under the Act.
8.2) Lastly it is submitted by the respondents that the joint
purchase by ten persons was a ruse to circumvent the bar
G contained in section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 ('Tenancy Act' for short) which prohibits sale of +
agricultural land in favour of non-agriculturists. It is alleged that
most of the ten purchasers were non-agriculturists who could
not have purchased agricultural land, and they have attempted
H to circumvent the bar contained in Tenancy Act, by nominally
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 481
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

joining with some agriculturists and buying land as co-owners A
and thereafter effecting a partition and claiming exclusive
ownership. It is contended that if each co-owner is a distinct
'person', then sale in favour of non-agriculturists will not be valid,
even if the purchase was jointly in the names of agriculturists
and non-agriculturist and consequently, the lands to the extent B
purchased by the non-agriculturists will vest in the State
Government.
9. The appellants replied that even if the partition was
ignored under section 8 of the Ceiling Act, it would not affect the
calculation of surplus land, as each co-owner was a 'person' C
and each family (husband and wife) will be entitled to one unit.
In regard to contention based on section 63 of the Tenancy Act,
it was submitted that while determining the surplus land under
the provisions of the Ceiling Act, there was no question of holding
any enquiry under section 63 of Tenancy Act. And at all events, D
even if the question as to whether the purchasers were
agriculturists or not, has to be gone into, the same being a
question of fact that will have to be decided by a separate inquiry
under the Tenancy Act and not in the proceedings under the
Ceiling Act. E
10. On the contentions raised, the following questions arise
for our consideration :
(i) Whether the definition of 'person' in the Gujarat
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, includes a body F
of individuals/association of persons ?
(ii) Whether co-ownership, per se, is an 'association of
persons/body of individuals' and therefore,
constitutes a 'person'?
G
(iii) Whether the ten purchasers, who became co-owners
of the land, together constitute a 'body of individuals/
association of persons' and therefore a 'person'
within the meaning of that expression in the Ceiling
Act?
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.

A (iv) Whether the partition dated 30.12.1971 among the
co-owners is 'deemed to have been made in
anticipation to defeat the object of Gujarat Agricultural
Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972' under section
8(1) of the Ceiling Act; and if so what is the effect of
B failure to make an application under sub-section (2)
of section 8 of the Ceiling Act.
(v) What would be the position if some of the co-owners . ,.
were nori- agriculturists at the time of purchase of
the lands? Whether the Mamlatdar can examine this·
c issue when considering the question of surplus land
under the Ceiling Act?
Statutory Provisions :
11. The Ceiling Act was enacted to fix a ceiling on holding
·· D of agricultural lands and to provide for the acquisition and
disposal of surplus agricultural land. Section 4 relates to
delimitation of local areas and provides that there shall be
different classes of local areas in the state as specified in
Schedule I and the local areas falling in each such class shall
E be as respectively specified in Schedule II. Section 5 deals with
ceiling areas. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to
the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), in relation to each
class of local area as specified in Schedule I, the ceiling area
with reference to each class of land shall be as specified in the
F .said s·chedule against the respective class of local area.
Madheli village, Waghodia Taluk (Baroda District) is specified
as class C area under Schedule II. It is not in dispute that the
lands in question were found to be dry crop land, and therefore
the unit.ceiling area was 36Acres under Schedule I to the Ceiling
G Act.
11: 1) Section 6 deals with ceiling on holding of land. +
Sub-sections (1), (2), 3(8), 3(C), and 3(0fwhlch are relevant
are. ;extracted below :
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
H
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 483
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

time being i·n force or in any agreement, usage or decree A
or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day, no
person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2),
(3), (38) and 4 be entitled to hold whether as owner or
tenant or partly as Qwner and partly as tenant land in excess
of the ceiling area. B
(2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a member of
a ·famHy, not being a joint family which consists of the
individual and. his spouse (or more than one spouse) and
their minor .sons and minor unmarried daughters,
irrespective of whether the family also includes· any major C
son, land is also separately held by such individual's
spouse or minor children, then the lands held by the
individual and the said members of the individual's family
excluding the major sons, if any, shall be grouped together
for the purposes of the Act and the provisions of the Act D
shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such
land had been held by one person.
xxxxxxx
(38) Where a family or a joint family consist of more than E
five members comprising a person and other members
belonging to all or any of the following categories, namely:
(i) minor son,
(ii) widow of a pre-deceased son, F
(iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-
deceased son, where his or her mother is dead,
such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the·
ceiling area to the extent of one fifth of the ceiling area for G
each member in excess of five, so however that the total
holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling
area; and in such a case, in relation to the holding of such
family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area:
xxxxx H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A (3C) Where a family or a joint family irrespective of the
number of members includes a major son, then such major
son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the
purposes of sub-section (1).
xxxxx
B
11.2) Section 8 deals with transfers and partitions
effected to defeat the objects of the Ceiling Act. Sub-section
(1) provides that where after 24.1.1971 but before the stipulated
date (the date on which the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
c (Amendment) Act, 1972 - Gujarat Act 2of1974) came into force),
any person has transferred or partitioned any land held by him,
then notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force, such transfer or partition, shall, unless it is proved
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in anticipation
in order to defeat the object of the Amending Act of 1972. Sub-
0
sections (2) and (4) of section 8 read as under:
"(2) Any person effected by the provisions of sub-section
(1) may, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed
form, make an application to the Collector for a declaration
E that the transfer or partition was not made in anticipation
in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may
be, of the Amending Act of 1972.
xxxxx
F (4) Where the application is rejected, the transfer or, as
the case may be, the partition shall be ignored in computing
under this Act the area of surplus land, if any, held by such
person."
11.3) Section 2 contains the definitions. Clauses (16)
G and (21) which are relevant are extracted below:
"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context
requires otherwise - +
xxxxx
H
-i,
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 485
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

y (16) "Joint family" means a undivided Hindu family A
A and in the case of other persons a group or unit the
members of which by custom or usage are joint in
estate or residence;
-=1
xxxxx
B
(21) "person" includes a joint family;"
12. Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 also defines the
~ word 'person'. The said definition in section 3(35) is extracted
below:
c
"3. Definitions : In this Act, and in all Bombay and Gujarat
Acts made after the commencement of this Act, unless
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, ........
(35). "Person" shall include any company or association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;
D
13. Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948, as applicable in Gujarat bars transfer to non-
agriculturists. Sub-section (1) of section 63 provides that save
as otherwise provided in the Act, no sale shall be valid in favour
of a person - (i) who is not an agriculturist, or (ii) who being an E
agriculturist cultivates lands not less than ceiling area, or (iii)
who is not an agricultural labour. The first proviso to sub-section
(1) provides that the Collector (or an officer authorized by the
r State Government) may grant permission for such sale, but the
second proviso to sub-section (1) provides that no such F
permission shall be granted where the land is being sold to a
person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose, if the
annual income of such person from other sources exceeds
Rupees five thousand.
Question (i) - who is a 'person' ? G

14. The extent of land that could be held by the appellants
--+ depends upon the interpretation of the word 'person' in section
6(1) of the Ceiling Act which provides that "no person shall ...
be entitled to hold ... land in excess of the ceiling area". If the
H
1-
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. ~
I

A ten co-owners are considered gs an 'association of persons' --./
or 'body of individuals', and consequently as a 'person', then "
the ten co-owners together as a person, will be entitled to only
one unit of land which is the ceiling area per person. But if
'association of persons' or body of individuals is not a 'person',
B or if a co-ownership is not an association of person/body of
individuals, then each co-owner or the family of each co-owner,
as the case may be will be a separate 'person' having regard to
the definition of person in section 2(21) of Ceiling Act, in which ~-
event, each family will be entitled to hold one unit of land.
c 15. The word 'person' is defined in the Act, but it is an
inclusive definition, that is "a person includes a joint ·family."
Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the use of the '
word 'includes' indicates ~n intention to enlarge the meaning of
the word used in the Statute. Consequently, the word must be
D construed as comprehending not only such things which they
signify according to their natural import, but also those things
which the interpretation clause declares that they sha·11 include.
Thus, where a definition uses the word 'includes', as contrasted ~
.
from 'means', the word defined not only bears its ordinary
E popular and natural meaning, but in addition also bear the
extended statutory meaning (See S.K. Gupta v. K.P Jain -AIR
1979 SC 734 following Dilworth vs. Commissioner of Stamps
- 1899 AC 99 and Jobbins vs. Middlesex County Council -
1949 (1) KB 142). '

F 16. The ordinary, popular and natural meaning of the word
:y-
'person' is 'a specific individual human being'. But in law the
word 'person' has a slightly different connotation, and refers to
any entity that is recognized by law ~s having the rights and
duties of a human being. Salmond defines 'person' as 'any
G- being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties' or
as 'a being, whether human or not, of which rights and duties
are the attributes (Jurisprudence : 12th Edition Page 299]. Thus +-
the word 'person', in law, unless otherwise intended, refers not
only to a natural person (male or female human being), but also
H any legal person (that is an entity that is recognized by law as
I
....._

RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 487
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
,.,.
having or capable of having rights and duties). The General A
-\ Clauses Act thus defines a 'person' as including a corporation
~
or an association of persons or a body of individuals whether
incorporated or not. The said general legal definition is, however,
either modified or restricted or expanded in different statutes
with reference to the object of the enactment or the context in B
which it is used. For instance, the definition of the word 'person'
~
in Income Tax Act, is very wide and includes an individual, a
"' Hindu Undivided Family, a company, a firm, an association of
persons or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, a
local authority and every other artificial juridical person. At the c
other extreme is the Citizenship Act, section 2(f) of which reads
thus : "Person does not include any company or association or
body of individuals whether incorporated or not." Similarly, the
definition under Section 2(g) of Representation of People Act
1950, is "person" does not include a body of persons.
D
17. Both definitions of the word 'person', in General
....... Clauses Act and Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions. The
inclusive definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act applies
to all Gujarat Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or the context. The inclusive definition of 'person' in section 2(21) E
of the Ceiling Act, does not indicate anything repugnant to the
definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act, but merely adds
'joint family' to the existing definition. Therefore the definition of
person in the Ceiling Act, would include the definition of person
"it in section 3(35) of General Clauses Act. The resultant position F
can be stated thus : The definition of person in General Clauses
Act, being an inclusive definition, would include the ordinary,
popular and general meaning and those specifically included in
the definition. The inclusive definition of 'person' in the Ceiling
Act, in the absence of any exclusion, would have the same
G
..,. meaning assigned to the word in the General Clauses Act, and
in addition, a 'joint family' as defined. Thus, the word 'person' in
the Ceiling Act will, unless the context otherwise requires, refer
to:
(i) a natural human being, H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 2 S.C.R.

A (ii) any legal entity which is capable of possessing rights
and duties, including any company or association of
persons or body of individuals (whether incorporated
or not); and
(iii) a Hindu Undivided Family or any other group or unit
8 of persons, the members of which by custom or
usage, are joint in estate and residence.
18. We are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court
in Hasmukhalal Dahayabhai vs. State of Gujarat - 1976 (4)
c SCC 100, wherein this Court had occasion to consider the
definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act, in a different context. It
was contended in that case that in view of the definition of
'person' in General Clauses Act, 1897, a central enactment, that
is, 'person' shall include any company or association or body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not, there cannot be a
0
different definition in the Ceiling Act, and therefore, section 6(2)
of the Ceiling Act treating family as a 'person' was
unconstitutional. It was pointed out that section 6(2) had the effect
of making a person who held land within ceiling limit, to lose
part of his/her holding, on marriage to someone who also held
E land within ceiling limit. (For example, if a bachelor who was
holding 35 acres of land which is within ceiling limit, married
someone who held 20 acres, they will together lose 19 acres by
reason of the fact that they formed a 'family'). This Court negatived
the challenge to the definition of 'person'. In that context this
F Court observed that the term 'person' is not, strictly speaking,
defined in the Act, and the definition merely clarified that the
term includes a joint family and did not exclude an individual
from being a person in the eye of law. This Court observed that
the term 'person' for the purposes of Ceiling Act would include
G individuals as natural persons as well as group or body of
individuals as artificial persons, as also a joint family and a
family. This Court proceeded to explain section 6(2) thus:
"We do not find any fixed concept of "person" anywhere.
No doubt the concept is wide so that it could be contended
·H
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 489
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

~ that it should not be narrowed down or confined. But does A
Section 6(2) do that? Section 6(2) does not either disable
a husband or wife from owning or holding their separate
properties separately. It does not merge or destroy their
separate legal personalities. It requires their separate
holdings to be grouped together as though they were held · B
by one person only for the purpose of determining the
ceiling limit for each member of a family. It may indirectly
-1., have· the effect of disabling a member of a family from
holding land upto the prescribed ceiling limit for a person
holding as an individual. In other words, the result is that c
such a member of a family will have to be content with a
holding less than that of an unmarried individual. It has the
effect of making it clear that what have to be grouped
together are the separate properties of individuals
belonging to families other than what are "joint families",
D
in law. It takes in and applies to members of families other
than undivided Hindu families. It means that married
persons and their minor children will have to be viewed as
~
though they hold one lot together even though they retain
their separate legal personalities and remain competent
owners of their separate holdings. It does not affect either E
th'eir legal status or competence. It does reduce their
individual holdings."
Question (ii) - Whether co-owners are together a
'person'? F
19. When several persons acquire undivided shares (as
contrasted from defined portions) in a property, either equal or
unequal, they become co-owners of the property; or where an
owner of a property transfers a share in the property to another,
the transferee becomes a co-owner along with the original owner. Gi
To be termed as co-owners, the right of each owner should be
~ co-ordinate with the other 'owners'. If the right of one is higher in
degree than that of the other, there is no co-ownership. For
example, a mortgagor and mortgagee are not co-owners. A
lessor and lessee are not co-owners. Whether the shares are H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

'
A equal or not, each co-owner is entitled to be in possession of '
every part of the property, jointly with the other co-owners. In Sri
Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [AIR 1976 SC 2335], this Court
observed:
"Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of
B a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the
composite property along with others and it cannot be
said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of
.the property. The position will change only when partition
takes place ... "
c
·. This Court also relied on the following passage from
Salmond's 'Jurisprudence':
"It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time
in more than one person ... The several ownership of a
D part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole.
So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part
·of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership
has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process
known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided
E integrity of what is owned."
20. The terms 'association of persons' and 'body of
individuals' (which are interchangeable) have a legal connotation
and refer to an entity having rights and duties. They are not to
be understood literally. For example, if half a dozen people are
F travelling in a car or a boat, or standing in a bus stop, they may
be a group of persons or a 'body of individuals' in the literal
sense. But they are not an association of persons/body of
individuals in the legal sense. When a calamity occurs or a
disaster strikes, and a band of volunteers or doctors meet at
G the site and associate or co-operate with each other for
providing relief to victims, and not doing anything for their own
benefit, they may literally be an association of persons, but they
are not 'an association of persons/body of individuals' in the
legal sense. A mere combination of persons or coming together
H of persons without anything more, without any intention to have
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 491
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

a joint venture or carry on some common activity with a common A
understanding and purpose will not convert two or more persons
into a body of individuals/association of persons. An 'association
of persons/body of individuals' is one in which two or more
persons join in a common purpose and common action to .
achieve some common benefit. Where there is a combination B
of individuals by volition of the parties, engaged together in
some joint enterprise or venture, it is known as 'association of
persons/body of individuals'. The common object will have some
relevance to determine whether a group or set of persons is an
association of persons or body of individuals with reference to c
a particular statute. For example, when the said terms
'association or persons' or 'body of individuals' occur in a section
which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one
the object of which is to produce income, profit or gain. [vide :
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Indira Balkrishna (AIR 1960 D
SC 1172), Mohammed Noorul/a vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1043, M. V Shanmugam vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (AIR 1970 SC 1707)]
and Meera and Company vs. Commissioner of Income Tax -
1997 (4) SCC 677. But the object need not always be to carry
on commercial or business activity. For example, when the word E

- 'person' occurs in a statute relating to agriculture or ceiling on
land holding, the term 'association of persons/body of
individuals' may refer to a combination of individuals who join
together to acquire and own land as co-owners and carry on
agricultural operations as a joint enterprise. F
21. Normally, where a group of persons have not become
co-owners by their volition with a common purpose, they cannot
be considered as a 'person'. When the children of the owner of
a property succeed to his property by testamentary succession
or inherit by operation of law, they become co-owners, but the G
co-ownership is not by volition.of parties nor do they have any
common purpose. Each can act in regard to his/her share, on
his/her own, without any right or obligation towards the other
owners. The legal heirs though co-owners, do not automatically H .
}
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

"<f
A become an 'association of persons/ body of individuals'. When
different persons buy undivided shares in a plot of land and
engage a common developer to construct an apartment building,
with individual ownership in regard to respective apartment and
joint ownership of common areas, the co-owners of the plot of
B land, do not become an 'association of persons/body of
individuals', in the absence of a deeming provision in a statute
or an agreement. Similarly, when two or more persons merely ~

purchase a property, under a common sale deed, without any >-·
agreement to have a common or joint venture, they will not
c become an 'association of persons/body of individuals'. Mere
purchase under a common deed without anything more, will not
convert a co-ownership into a joint enterprise. Thus when there
(
are ten co-owners of a property, they are ten persons and not a
'body of individuals' to be treated as a 'single person'. But if the
co-owners proceed further and enter into an arrangement or
D
agreement to have a joint enterprise or venture to produce a
common result for their benefit, then the co-owners may answer
the definition of a 'person'.
Question (iii) - Whether the ten purchasers constitute
E a 'person'?
22·. We will now examine whether a group of individuals ....
purchasing agricultural land jointly as co-owners, not with the
intention of retaining the property in co-ownership and carrying
on agricultural activities jointly, nor with the intention of managing
F it as a joint venture nor with the intention of holding it together to ~
generate income, profit or gain, but solely with the intention of
dividing the land so purchased and hold their respective shares
separately and individually, can be considered as a 'person' for
the purposes of the Ceiling Act. The Tribunal and the High court
G have proceeded on the basis that the ten purchasers constituted
an 'association of persons' and therefore a separate juristic
""'('
person. Let us examine whether the said conclusion is correct.
23. Instead of buying the land (172 acres, 36 guntas) jointly
under the four sale deeds it was open to the ten persons to
H
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 493
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

have bought the lands individually, that is each of them A
purchasing such extent of land as he or she wanted. If they had
registered the sale deeds individually (subject to each of them
being entitled to buy agricultural land, under the land reforms
laws In force) each couple would have been entitled to hold land
to the extent of one unit. Instead of each individual or couple B
purchasing the land in their respective names, if for convenience
in negotiations, ten individuals buy the land jointly, the position
will be no different. It cannot be said that merely because the
sale deed is in the joint names of ten persons, they purchased
the land as "an association of persons" or as "body of individuals" C
with the common intention of carrying on agricultural activities
jointly or producing income, profit or gain or carry on some
common joint venture. In fact before purchasing the lands, the
ten persons had entered into an agreement placing on record
that the object of purchasing the lands jointly was only to facilitate .
0
negotiations and avoid duplicating the purchase procedures and
not to cultivate them jointly. There is no evidence of any joint
cultivation, nor any evidence of any intention to have a joint
venture. On the other hand, after purchase, they divided the lands
and informed the land revenue authorities and each co-owner
was registered as the owner of the respective land allotted to E
him/her. This is not a case where a body of individuals purchased
the land with the intention of having a continued community of
interest by way of a joint venture or as a business venture. It is
therefore not possible to treat the ten purchasers as an
'association of persons/body of individuals' nor is it permissible F
to treat them as a single 'person', thereby restricting their
entitlement to hold land to only one unit, even though there are
ten purchasers.
24. The Tribunal and the High Court were right in holding G
that the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act includes an 'association
of persons/body of individuals'. But they were not justified in
treating the co-owners as an 'association of persons', or in
holding that the ten co-owners will be entitled to own only one
unit. Having regard to section 6(2) of the Act, the share of each H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A couple (husband and wife) in the land, plus any other land -""(
individually held by them will have to calculated to find out
whether they held any land in excess of the ceiling limit.Therefore
the share of each appellant in the lands jointly purchased, with
the addition of the lands held by his spouse, and addition of any
B other land held by them, will give the basis for determining the
surplus land. For example, if a husband's share as co-owner is
20 acres and wife's share as co-owner is 20 acres, and their
other individual holding is another 10 acres (all of the same -!!'.'
category in C class), the total holding of the family will be 50 .).... \
c acres (20+20+10 acres) and the surplus will be 14 acres.
Question (iv) - What is the effect of section 8 of Ceiling
Act? I
I
I

25. The fact that the partition among the co-owners on ~

30 .12 .1971 was between 24.1.1971 and the date on which the
D
Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 came
into effect, is not in dispute. Sub-section (1) of section 8 makes
it clear that where any person has transferred or partitioned any
land held by him between those dates then notwithstanding
anything contained in any law, such partition shall be deemed
E to have been made in anticipation in order to defeat the object
of the said Amendment Act unless it is proved to the contrary.
Sub-section (2) provides how the affected person may prove
the contrary by filing an application to the collector seeking a
declaration to that effect. When such an application is made,
F sub-section (3) requires the Collector to hold an inquiry and make
an order either rejecting the application or declaring that the ,,
partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the
object of the Amending Act, 1972. Sub-section (4) lays down
that where an application for declaration is rejected, the transfer
G or partition shall be ignored in computing the area of surplus
land held by such person. The same will be the effect where no
application is made at all. It is thus clear that the statutory
""f"'
presumption that a partition made between those dates was
intended to defeat the object of the Amendment Act cannot be
H displaced unless an application is made under sub-section (2)
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 495
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

and a declaration is made by the Collector under sub-section A
(3). In this case, neither any application was made under sub-
section (2) nor any declaration was made under sub-section
(3). Therefore it has to be held that the partition effected on
30.12.1971 was deemed to have been made in order to defeat
the object of the Amendment Act, 1972 and consequently, the B,
partition will have to be ignored while computing the surplus
land.
26. But in this case the exclusion of the partition may not
have any significant effect. As we have held that the ten co-
owners together are not to be treated as a person, the share of C
the co-owner will have to be calculated and the lands individually .
held by such co-owner will have to be added to determine his
holding. Thereafter, the holdings of the person with that of his
spouse and minor sons and unmarried daughter will have to be
aggregated to determine the surplus. D
Question (v) - What requires to be done?
27. The Mamlatdar will have to decide the matter by
holding an enquiry under section 21 of the Ceiling Act keeping
in view the principles laid down in sections 6 to 8 of the Ceiling E
Act. Further section 63 of the Tenancy Act also has to be kept in
view while examining the claim of co-owners. If the sale was
effected jointly in the name of ten persons to enable some non-
agriculturists who were barred from buying agricultural land, to
buy agricultural land by joining some agriculturists as co- F
purchasers, the sale to the extent it is in favour of non-
agriculturists will not be valid and the consequences on account
of sale not being valid for violation of section 63 of Tenancy Act
will follow as provided in section 84C of that Act. For example if
ten purchasers purchase hundred acres of land with equal G
shares, and six of them are non-agriculturists, then the sale in
respect of the six non-agriculturists (to an extent of 60 acres)
will not be valid and such land purchased by non-agriculturists •
may have to vest in the State Government as provided in section
84C of the Tenancy Act. In this case no such enquiry has been H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. 'I""

A held to find out about the validity of the sale. Therefore, the matter
will have to be remitted to the Mamlatdar to hold an enquiry
under sections 63 and 84C of Tenancy Act to decide whether
all the purchasers were agriculturists who were entitled to
purchase agricultural land and whether transfer in favour of all
B of them is valid or invalid and to make consequential orders.
28. We therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders
of the High Court as also that of the authorities below. As a
consequence, we direct the Mamlatdar :
c (a) to decide whether any of the ten purchasers is a non-
agriculturist and if so the extent of transfer in favour of
such non-agriculturist which will be invalid and pass
consequential orders in respect of such land in accordance
with law;
D (b) to determine whether any of the ten purchasers who
are agriculturists, holds excess land by considering their
share in the lands purchased as co-owners, with other
lands as provided in sections 6 to 8 of the Ceiling Act, and
pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
E D.G. Appeal allowed.