Holding

The appeal does not abate as to the deceased respondent and the High Court’s refusal to restore the appeal against respondent No.3 was erroneous; the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The appellant appealed a decree directing execution of a sale deed for a plot that had been transferred to the deceased respondent No.3 (Tarabai). During the pendency of the second appeal, Tarabai died and her legal heirs (respondents 5, 6 and 7) were on record. The High Court dismissed the appeal against respondents 3 and 6 for want of prosecution and later restored it only for respondent 6, refusing restoration for the deceased respondent 3. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in refusing restoration for respondent 3 because her legal heirs were already parties, and that the appeal does not abate merely due to her death. It emphasized a liberal, justice‑oriented approach to abatement and ordered that the appeal be allowed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether the death of a party during the pendency of a suit or appeal automatically abates the proceeding.
Whether an application for restoration can be allowed for a deceased party when his legal heirs are already on record.
Whether the High Court erred in refusing restoration of the appeal with respect to respondent No.3.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 22 Rule 9, s. Order XLI Rule 19
Limitation Act, 1963s. Section 5

Subjects

abatement of suitrestoration of appeallegal representativesdeath of partyCPC Order XLI Rule 19civil procedurejustice oriented approach

Judgment

RAMDAS SHIVRAM SAITUR A
v.
RAMESHCHANDRA POPA TLAL SHAH AND ORS.

AUGUST 20, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

Code of Civil Procedure, I 908:

0. 41 r. 19-Abatement of suit/appeal-Dismissal of appeal in respect
of respondent No.3 and 6 for want of prosecution-Restoration application- C
Allowed by High Court in respect of respondent No. 6 and not in respect of
respondent No. 3 -Held: Respondent Nos. 5 to 7 were legal heirs ofrespondent
No. 3 and parties in suit/appeal-Hence, High Court was not justified in
refusing application for restoration of respondent No.3-But she is dead and
her LRs are already on record-Appeal shall not abate so far respondent D
No.3 is concerned as abatement occurs automatically on the expiry of 90
days-Courts to adopt justice oriented approach and be liberal and not too
technical.

The suit plot was owned by father of the appellant and respondent No. 3.
Name of respondent no. 3 was shown as nominee in the records of cooperative E
Society. The suit plot was transferred in the name of respondent No.~ on
death of father. She entered into an agreement to sell the suit plot with
respondent Nos.I and 2 (original plaintiffs 1 and 2), however she did not
execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs filed suit against respondent no. 3, her
three sons, one daughter and Cooperative Society. Trial Court decreed the
suit and directed execution of sale deed. First Appellate Court confirmed the F
decree. Aggrieved appellant filed the second appeal. The said appeal was
admitted by the High Court on 20.6.1986 and stay on the lower Court's decree
was granted. The Additional Registrar dismissed the appeal in respect of
respondent Nos. 3 and 6 for want of prosecution.
G
Subsequently, there was change of advocate. When another advocate
appeared, she found that record was not traceable and ultimately an application
was filed before the High Court in respect of respondent Nos. 3 and 6 and
restoration was prayed for in respect of the said respondents.

101 H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 9 S.C.R.

A The High Court found that the application was to be allowed in respect
of respondent No.6 but no case was made for restoration in respect of
respondent No.3. Accordingly the application was partly allowed.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the High Court's
approach is clearly erroneous. The position was the same for both respondent
B Nos. 3 and 6. It was pointed out that mistake committed by the previous advocate
was noticed in respect of respondent Nos. 5 and 7. It was noted that there was
no dispute that respondent Nos.5, 6 and 7 along with present appellant are
the only legal heirs of respondent no.3 who passed away during the pendency
of the appeal, therefore, dismissal order in respect of respondent Nos. 5 and
C 7 was set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The consequence of deletion of names of deceased defendants/
respondents is that the decree of the courts below as against the deceased
D becomes final. If the decree is inseparable and the rights of the parties are
indivisible between the contesting parties and the deceased, the consequence
would be that the suit/appeal stands abated as a whole. But if one of the
respondents or defendants is already on record, what needs to be done is an
intimation to the court by filing a formal application or memo to transpose
the existing defendant(s) or respondent(s) as legal representatives of the
E deceased defendant(s) or respondent(s). In view of the mistake committed by
the counsel, the court has to consider the effect thereof.
!Para 111 (106-B-DI

Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi (Dead) and Ors., 1199715
SCC 192 and Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ors. v. Annabi Devram Kini
F and Ors., 12003110 sec 691, relied on.

2. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law, though there may not
have been passed on record a specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet
the legal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any other
G applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party
on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement A prayer for bringing
the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect of setting
aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside abatement though not asked
for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily
implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for.
H !Para 1211106-G-H; 107-A, Bl
-+-
RAMDASSHIVRAMSAllllR v. RAMESHCHANDRA POPATLAL SHAH[PASAYAT,J.) l 03

3. High Court was not justified in refusing application for restoration A
so far as respondent no.3 is concerned. But she is dead and her legal
representatives are already on record i.e. appellant and respondents S, 6 and
7. The appeal shall not abate so far as respondent No. 3 is concerned.
(Para 131 (108-BJ

CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3807 of2007. B
From the final Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2006 of the Judicature
at Bombay in Civil Application No. 1362 of2002 in Second Appeal No. 357
of 1986.

Gaurav Agrawal for the Appellant. c
Prashant Kumar, Ajay Majithia, Rajesh Kumar and Kailash Chand for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. l. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court in the Second Appeal filed by the appellant;
the defendant no.3 in Special Civil Suit No. 42 of 1981; before the High Court
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'CPC'). During E
pendecny of the appeal, an application was filed in terms of Order XLI Rule
19 of the CPC for setting aside the order dated 20.3.1987 passed by the
learned Additional Registrar whereby he dismissed the second appeal against
respondent nos.3 and 6 for non-prosecution. The prayer was also made to
show the names of the applicant i.e. present appellant and respondent nos.5 F
to 7 in the second appeal as legal representatives of the deceased-respondent
No.3. By the impugned orderthe High Court while accepting the prayer vis-
a-vis respondent no.6 dismissed the same so far as respondent No.3 is
concerned.

3. A brief reference to the factual aspects would be necessary: G
The suit plot was owned by one Shivram i.e. the father of the appellant
and respondent no.3. Name of respondent no.3 Tarabai was shown as nominee
in the Cooperative Housing Society's record. After the death of Shivram the
suit plot was transferred in the name of Tarabai. She purportedly entered into
an agreement to sale with original plaintiffs I and 2 i.e. the present respondents H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 9 S.C.R.

A I and 2. As Tarabai did not execute the sale deed in pursuance of the said
sale agreement, the plaintiffs filed the suit against Tarabai and her three sons
and one daughter i.e. original defendants 3 to 6. The Cooperative Society was
also impleaded as defendant no.2. Tarabai filed written statement and denied
claim of the plaintiffs. Defendant no.3 i.e. appellant denied the suit claim and
B contended that Tarabai was, as stated in the written statement, only a nominee
and no exclusive ownership right was vested in her. The trial court came to
the conclusion that Tarabai had executed the agreement of sale and she
committed breach in collusion with the other defendants. Therefore, the
defendants l' and 3 were directed to execute the sale deed in favour of. the
plaintiff.
c Being aggrieved by the said order, Tarabai as well as the present
appellant and the Cooperative Society filed Civil Appeal No. 772 of 1984.
However, the appeal was dismissed and trial Court's decree was confirmed.
Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the Second Appeal against the original
plaintiffs, Cooperative Society and the respondents 3 to 7 i.e. defendants l
D to 4, 5 and 6. The said appeal was admitted by the High Court on 20.6.1986
and stay on the lower court's decree was granted.

4. It appears from the record that respondents I, 2 and 4 were served
personally while respondent no.3 was served by affixing the notice with ~ailiff
remarks "gone on duty". Notice to the respondent no.6 was also returned
E unserved with remarks "incomplete address". The High Court noticed that in
terms of the provisions of Rule 6(id) of Chapter 7 of Bombay High Court
Appeal Rules, 1960, the appellant was required to give postal stamps within
the stipulated period. That was not done. The Additional Registrar dismissed ·
the appeal in respect of Tarabai (respondent No.3 in the Second Appeal) and
F respondent no.6 for want of prosecution by order dated 20 .3 .1987. It also
appears that the appeal was dismissed for non-removal of objections. An
application for restoration was filed and the appeal was restored on 6.4.1999
by setting aside the order dated I 0.11.1997. At that time the appellant made
a statement that Second Appeal has abated against respondents 5 and 7 and
he was pressing civil application for restoration only against respondent
G nos. I and 2. It was accordingly restored.

5. Subsequently, it appears that the advocate who was earlier appearing
left the practice. When another advocate appeared, she found that record was f
not traceable and ultimately an application was filed before the High Court
H in respect of respondents 3 and 6 and restoration was prayed for in respect
RAMDASSHIVRAMSATIUR v. RAMESHCHANDRAPOPATLALSHAH[PASA YAT,J.) 105

of the said respondents. A
6. The prayer for restoration was resisted by the present respondents
l and 2. The High Court found that the application was to be allowed in
respect of respondent no.6 but no case was made for restoration in respect
of respondent no.3. Accordingly the application was partly allowed.
B
7. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the High Court's approach is clearly erroneous. The position was the
same for both respondents 3 and 6. It was pointed out that mistake committed
by the previous advocate was noticed in respect of respondents 5 and 7. It
was noted that there was no dispute that respondent No.5, 6 and 7 along with C
present appellant are the only legal heirs of respondent no.3 who passed
away during the pendency of the appeal, therefore, dismissal order in respect
of respondents 5 and 7 was set aside subject to payment of cost of
Rs. 5,000/-.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. I and 2 submitted that there D
has been long delay so far as the case relating to respondent no.3 is concerned.
The position is different for respondent no.3 and respondent no.6. Merely
because in respect of respondent no.6 the application has been allowed that
cannot be a ground for restoration of the appeal so far as respondent No.3
is concerned.
E
9. Since respondent No.3 has died, question of her being brought on
record does not arise. As was noted by the High Court in its order dated 23
March, 2004, in civil application 1361/2002, the appellant and respondents 5,
6 and 7 are the only legal heirs of respondent No.3. The order dated 23rd
March 2004, has become final, and respondents 5 and 7 are already on record.
By the impugned order also the High Court has directed restoration of the F
appeal so far as respondent no. 6 is concerned.

JO. The approachcto be adopted when dealing with a situation relating
to abatement has been dealt with by this Court in several cases.

11. In Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi (Dead) and Ors., G
[ 1997] 5 SCC 192. It was observed as follows:

"13. Shri Ranjit Kumar, obviously due to mistaken perception of the
procedural part, has, instead of seeking transposition of the legal
representatives to represent the estate of the deceased Respondents fl
+
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A 8 to 15, sought deletion of the names of the deceased. Without there
being already on record some persons eligible and entitled in law to
represent the estate of the deceased, the deceased defendants/
respondents were deleted. The consequence of deletion is that the
decree of the courts below as against the deceased becomes final. If
the decree is inseparable and the rights of the parties are indivisible
B between the contesting parties and the deceased, the consequence
would be that the suit/appeal stands abated as a whole. But if one of
the respondent/respondents or defendant/defendants is already on
record, what needs to be done is an intimation to the court by filing
a fonnal application or memo to transpose the existing defendant/
c defendants or respondent/respondents as legal representatives of the
deceased defendant/defendants or respondent/respondents. In view
of the mistake committed by the counsel, the court has to consider
the effect thereof. On the facts, we think that cause of justice would
get advanced if the misconception as to the procedure on the part of
the counsel is condoned and if Respondents 8 and 15 instead of being
D deleted Respondents 9 and l 0 are substituted and transposed as the
legal representative of the .deceased Respondent 8 and Respondent
16 is transposed as legal representative· of Respondent 15."

12. In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ors. v. Annabi Devram Kini and
E Ors., [2003) IO sec 691, inter a/ia, it was observed as follows:
"8, Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing on the
merits of the case, the provision of abatement has ·to be construed
· strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement
and the. dismissal consequent upon an abatement; have to be
c.onsidered liberally. A simple prayer for bringing the legal
F
representatives on record without specifically praying for setting aside
of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting
aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting aside abatement as
regards one of the plaintiffs can be construed as a prayer for setting
aside the abatement of the suit in its entirety. Abatement of suit for
G failure to move an application for bringing the legal representatives on
record within the prescribed period of limitation is automatic and a f
specific order dismissing the suit as abated is not called for. Once the
suit has abated as a matter of law, though there may not have been
passed on record a specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet
the legal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any
H
RAMDAS SHIVRAM SATTUR v. RAMESHCHANDRA POPATLAL SHAH [PASA VAT, J.] l 07
other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the A
deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement.
A prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed,
would have the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of
setting aside abatement though not asked for in so many words is in
effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied. Too technical B
or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for.

9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach dictated by
the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be
denied an opportunity of having a Ii!; determined on merits unless he
has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to C
misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the
court. The opinion of the trial Judge allowing a prayer for setting
aside abatement and his finding on the question of availability of
"sufficient cause" within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of
Order 22 and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, I963 deserves to be
given weight, and once arrived at would not normally be interfered D
with by superior jurisdiction.
10. In the present case, the learned trial Judge found sufficient cause
for condonation of delay in moving the application and such finding
having been reasonably arrived at and based on the mc1.terial available,
was not open for interference by the Division Bench. In fact, the E
Division Bench has not even reversed that finding; rather the Division
Bench has proceeded on the reasoning that the suit filed by three
plaintiffs having abated in its entirety by reason of the death of one
of the plaintiffs, and then the fact that no prayer was made by the two
surviving plaintiffs as also by the legal representatives of the deceased F
plaintiff for setting aside of the abatement in its entirety, the suit could
not have been revived. In our opinion, such an approach adopted by
the Division Bench verges on too fine a technicality and results in
injustice being done. There was no order in writing passed by the
court dismissing the entire suit as having abated. The suit has been G
treated by the Division Bench to have abated in its entirety by
operation of law. For a period of ninety days from the date of death
of any party the suit remains in a state of suspended animation. And
then it abates. The converse would also logically follow. Once the
prayer made by the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff for
setting aside the abatement as regards the deceased plaintiff was H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R.

A allowed, and the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff came
on record, the constitution of the suit was rendered good; it revived
and the abatement of the suit would be deemed to have been set aside
in its entirely even though there was no specific prayer made and no
specific order of the court passed in that behalf."

B 13. In view of the factual position noticed above, High Court was not
justified in refusing application for restoration so far as respondent no.3 is
concerned. But she is dead and her legal representatives are already on record
i.e. appellant and respondents 5, 6 and 7. The appeal shall not abate so far
as respondent No. 3 is concerned.
c 14. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

D.G. Appeal allowed.