RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITEDversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

                     (2015] 5 S.C.R. 283


     RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED                        A

                              v.

                    STATE OF GUJARAT

              Criminal Appeal No. 600 of 2007                    B

                      MARCH 16, 2015

    [T. S. THAKUR, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND
                R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]                               C

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

        ss.156(3) and 202(1) - Investigation under- Scope
of - Complaint before Magistrate alleging forgery and D
seeking investigation u!s. 156(3) - The Magistrate instead
directed the police to give report u/s. 202(1) - High Court
declined to interfere with the order- Held: The parameters
for exercise of power under both the provisions are different
- Direction under 156(3) can be issued where an account of E
credibility of information is available, or weighing the interest
of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct
investigation - The nature of cases dealt with u/s. 202 are
those where material available are not clear to proceed further
- The present case was primarily of civil nature - On the F
allegation of forgery, Magistrate did not find clear material to
proceed against the accused - Therefore, the Magistrate
rightly passed direction u/s. 202 as in the facts of the case,
direction u/s. 156(3) was not warranted.
                                                                 G
         s. 202 (3) - Power of police to arrest - During
'investigation under - Held: Section 202 (3) does not give
power to the police to arrest- Merely negating the power of
 arrest to person other than police, does not mean that police
                                                                 H
                             283
284         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A could exercise such power.

             Maxims - 'Expressio unius est exclusion alterious'
      (express mention of one thing excludes others)-Applicability
      of.
B
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1.1 The direction uls. 156(3) Cr.P.C is to be
    issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate.
C   When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does
    not find it necessary to postpone instance of process
    and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction
    under the said provision is issued. Cases where
    Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance
D   of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to
    determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed".
    Category of cases i.e. Matrimonial disputes/family
    disputes, Commercial offences, Medical negligence
    cases, Corruption cases, Cases where there is abnormal
E   delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
    example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter
    without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay,
    may fall under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Subject to these brc.:.ld
    guidelines available from the scheme of Cr.P.C, exercise
F   of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of
    justice from case to case. [Para 22] [306-B-D]

         1.2. Section 156(3) and Section 202(1) are in two
  different chapters of Cr.P.C. though common expression
G 'investigation' is used in both the provisions. Normal rule
  is to understand the same expression in two provisions
  of an enactment in same sense unless the context
  otherwise requires. Heading of Chapter XII is
  "Information to the Police and their Powers to
H
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS. PRIVATE LTD. v. STJ.\TE ·285
              OF GUJARAT

Investigate" and that of Chapter XV is "Complaints to A
Magistrate". Chapter XV deals exclusively with
complaints to Magistrates. [Para 14) [296-D]

       1.3 While prompt registration of FIR is mandatory,
checks arid balances on power of police are equally B
important. Power of arrest or of investigation is not
mechanical. It requires application of mind in the manner
provided. Existence of power and its exercise are
different Delicate balance had to be maintained between
the interest of society and liberty of an individual. C
Commercial offences have been put in the category of
cases where FIR may not be warranted without enquiry.
[Para 19) [304-D-E]

      1.4 Power uls. 202 Cr.P.C. is of different nature. D
Report sought under the said provision has limited
purpose of deciding "whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding". If this be the object, the
procedure uls. 157 or Section 173 is not intended to be
followed. [Para 21) [305-E-F]                            E

  Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1; Anil
  Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC 705: 2013 (9)
   SCR 869; Devrapal/i Lakshminaryanan Reddy & Ors.
  Vs. Narayana Reddy & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976       F
  (0) Suppl. SCR 524; National Bank of Oman vs.
  Barakara Abdul Aziz &Anr., (2013) 2 SCC 488: 2012
  (11) SCR 500; Madhao&Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra
  & Anr., (2013) 5 sec 615: 2013 (5) SCR 484;
                                                         G
  Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau vs. State of Gujarat,
 · (2010) 4 SCC 185: 2010 (3) SCR 522 - relied on.

  Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shiva/ingappa Konjalgi
  & ors.(1976) 3 sec 736: 1976 (O) Suppl. SCR 123;
                                                         H
286      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2015) 5 S.C.R.


A     MohinderSingh vs. Gu/want Singh, (1992) 2 SCC 213:
      1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 478; Manharibhai Muljibhai
      Kakadia & Anr. Vs. Shaileshhai Mohanbhai Patel &
      Ors., (2012) 10 SCC 517: 2012 (8) SCR 1015;
      .Raghuraj Singh Rousha vs. Shivam Sunadaram
B     Promoters Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 363 2008 (17)
       SCR 833; Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prokas Chandra
      Bose, (1964) 3 SCC 252 - referred to.

         2.1 In the course of investigation under Section
C 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate to
  enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further
  existed, power of arrest is not available with the police.
  [Para 23] [306-F]

D         2.2 The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusion
  altE~rious' (express mention of one thing excludes others)
  has been called a valuable servant but a dangerous
  master. The maxim does not apply for interpretation of
  Section 202(3). The correct interpretation of the
E provision is that merely negating the power of arrest to
  a person other than police officer does not mean that
  police could exercise such power. The emphasis in the
  provision is to empower such person to exercise other
F powers of incharge of a police station than the power of
  arrest. As regards the power of police to arrest, there are
  express provisions dealing with the same and power of
  police to arrest is not derived from or controlled by
  Section202(3). The said power is available under Section
G 41 or under a warrant. The power remains available
  subject to conditions for exercise thereof. Under Section
  202, since the Magistrate Is in seisin of the matter and
  has yet to decide "whether or not there Is sufficient
  ground for proceeding", there Is no occasion for
H
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 287
              OF GUJARAT

formation of opinion by the police about credibility of A
available information necessary to exercise power of
arrest as the only authority of the police is to give report
to Magistrate to enable him to decide whether there is
sufficient ground to proceed. Power of arrest is not to
be exercised mechanically. [Para 24] [306-G; 309-B-F]        B

       2.3 Nature of cases dealt with under Section 202
are cases where material available is not clear to proceed
further. The Magistrate is in seisin of the matter having
taken the cognizance. He has to decide whether there is C
ground to proceed further. If at such premature stage
power of arrest is exercised by police, it will be
contradiction in terms. The police of its own cannot
exercise its power of arrest in the course of making its D
report in pursuance of direction under Section 202. [Para
25] [310-G-H; 311-A-B]

  Emperor vs. Bikha Moti, AIR (1938) Sind 113; Asha
  Das and others vs. The State, AIR (1953) Assam 1 -
  overruled.                                                E

  Mary Angel and others vs. State of T.N., (1999) 5 SCC
  209: 1999 (3) SCR 594; M.C. Abraham vs. State of
  Maharashtra, (2003) 2 SCC 649: 2002 (5) Suppl.
   SCR 677 - relied on.                                     F

  Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel, Emperor vs.
  Nurmahomed Rajmahomed (1929) 31 BOMLR 84;
  Mahendrasinh Shanabhai Chauhan and Ors. Vs. State
  of Gujarat and Anr. (2009) 2 GLR 1647; Harsh Khurana      G
  vs. Union of India 121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB) - upheld.
  H.N. Rishbud and lnder Singh vs. The State of Delhi,
  (1955) 1 SCR 1150 - referred to.
                                                            H
288       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015) 5 S.C.R.


A         3. In the present case the Magistrate ought not to
   have proceeded u/s. 156(3) instead of Section 202. The
   magistrate has given reasons, which have been upheld
   by the High Court. The case has been held to be primarily
  of civil nature. The accused is alleged to have forged
B partnership. Whether such forgery actually took place,
  whether it caused any loss to the complainant and
  whether there is the requisite mens rea are the questions
  which are yet to be determined. The Magistrate has not
C found clear material to proceed against the accused.
  Even a case for summoning has not yet been found.
  While a transaction giving rise to cause of action for a
  civil action may also involve a crime in which case, resort
  to criminal proceedings may be justified, there is
o judicially acknowledged tendency in the commercial
  world to give colour of a criminal case to a purely
  commercial transaction. The Magistrate and the High
  Court rightly held that in the present case report u/s. 202
  was the right course instead of direction u/s. 156(3). [Para
E 30, 33] (314-D-F; 3106-E]

      Indian Oil Corpn. Vs. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC
      736: 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 704; Pepsi Food Ltd. Vs.
      Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: 1997
F     (5) Suppl. SCR 12- relied on.

                     Case Law Reference
        (2014) 2 sec 1                 relied on     Para 17

G       2013 (9) SCR 869               relied on     Para 19
        1999 (3) SCR 594               relied on     Para 24
        2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 677        relied on     Para 24
        (1929) 31BOMLR84               upheld        Para 29
H       (2009) 2 GLR 1647              upheld        Para 29
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 289
              OF GUJARAT

    121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB)        upheld         Para 29    A
    AIR (1938) Sind 113             overruled     Para 29
    AIR (1953) Assam 1              overruled     Para 29
    2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 704         relied on     Para 31
                                                             B
    1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 12          relied on     Para 32
    1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 524         relied on     Para 34
    2012 (11) SCR 500               relied on     Para 34
    2013 (5) SCR 484                relied on     Para 34    c
    2010 (3) SCR 522                relied on     Para 34
    1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 123         referred to   Para 34
    1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 478         referred to   Para 34
    2012 (8) SCR 1015               referred to   Para 34    D

     2008 (17) SCR 833              referred to   Para 34
     (1964) 3 sec 252               referred to   Para 34
     (1955) 1SCR1150                referred to   Para 36
                                                             E
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 600 of 2007

       From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2006 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad in Special Criminal       F
Application No. 1821/2005

       S. V. Raju, Huzefa Ahmadi, Siddharth Luthra,
Meenakshi Arora, Pradhuman Gohil, Taruna Singh, Vikash
Singh, Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Prabuddha Sharma, Rohan Sharma, G
Hemantika Wahi, Jesal, Preeti Bhardwaj, GissAntony, Shamik
Sajjanwala, Vivek Jain, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, E.,
C. Agrawala, Shashank Manish, Manav Mehta, Mahima
Sareen, Devika Mohan, DivyaA. for the appearing parties.
                                                            H
290       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                          -   -~
         ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. This appeal by
  special leave has been preferred against the Judgment and
  Order dated 17th February, 2006 of the High Court of Gujarat
B at Ahmedabad in Special Criminal Application No.1821 of
  2005.

         2. The High Court declined to interfere with the Order
  dated 16th August, 2005, of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
c San and on a complaint filed by the appellant against fourteen
  accused for alleged commission of offences under Sections
  409, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B and
  114 of the Indian Penal Code directing the Police Sub-
  Inspector, Sanand, to give a report to the Court within thirty
D days under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  1973 (for short "the Code") instead of directing investigation
  under Section 156(3) of the Code, as sought by the appellant.

          3. The case of the appellant-complainant in complaint
E filed by it before the Magistrate is that it is running business of
  food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala
  Factory, wherein accused No.1 Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai
  Patel was one of the partners, to use the trademark "Ramdev"
  for seven years under agreement dated 4th June, 1990.
F However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory was closed on
  3Q1h May, 1994. Accused No.1 executed forged partnership
  documents with the help of other accused and thereby
  committed the alleged offences.
G         4. The appellant sought direction for investigation under
  Section 156(3) of the Code. However, the Magistrate instead
  of directing investigation as prayed, thought it fit to conduct
  further inquiry under Section 202 and sought report of the Police
H Sub Inspector within thirty days. Grievance of the appellant
    RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD.. v. STATE 291
        OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

before the High Court was that in view of the allegation that A
documents had been forged with a view to usurp the trademark,
which documents were in possession of the accused and were
required to be seized, investigation ought to have been ordered
under Section 156(3) instead of conducting further inquiry under
Section 202. Thus, there was non application of mind by the B
Magistrate. It is also submitted in the alternative, that even in
the course of investigation for giving report under Section 202,
police is entitled to arrest the accused as arrest is part of
'investigation' but the police failed to effect the arrest.
                                                                     c
         5. The High Court did riot accept the stand of the
appellant. It was observed that the appellant had approached
the High Court against the Order of the Magistrate after delay
of four months from the date of the Order which itself disentitled   D
it to a direction under Section 156(3). It was further observed
that the Magistrate had given reasons for declining to direct
investigation under Section 156(3) and the said Order did not
call for any interference. The reasons given by the Magistrate,
inter alia, are that the Police had refused to register a case.      E
There was civil litigation which had gone up to the Supreme
Court and thus the case was of civil nature. The fact whether
the documents in question were forged or not could be
ascertained in civil proceedings by getting the opinion of the
hand writing expert. Scope of inquiry under Section 202 was          F
limited to find out whether a case was made out for issue of
process. Suppression of material fact of pendency of civil
dispute by the complainant also justified the order of the
Magistrate to proceed under Section 202 instead of Section
156(3). It was further observed that a Magistrate is not justified   G
in ordering police investigation in mechanical manner as laid
down by the Gujarat High Court in Arvindbhai Ravjibhai Patel
vs. Dhirubhai Shambhubhai Kakadiya1 .

1
                                                                     H
    1997 (2) GLR 1572
292         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A           6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. When
      the matter came up for hearing on 11th April, 2007, this Court
      framed the question as follows:

             '.'The question involved in the instant Special Leave
B       Petition is as to the extent of power that may be
        exercised by a police officer while making an inquiry
        under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
        particularly, whether he has power to arrest in course of
        the inquiry entrusted to him by the Magistrate. Reliance
c       is placed on Sub-Section 3 of Section 202 to contend
        that the power to ~arrest without warrant cannot be
        exercised by a person not being a police officer.
        Impliedly it is contended that so far as the police officer
        is concerned that constraint is not there."
D
             However, in the light of submissions made during the
      hearing, we frame following questions for consideration:

        "(i) Whether discretion of the Magistrate to call for a
E       report under Section 202 instead of directing
        investigation 156(3) is controlled by any defined
        parameters?

        (ii) Whether in the course of investigation in pursuance
F       of a direction under Section 202, the Police Officer is
        entitled to arrest an accused?
        (iii) Whether in the present case, the Magistrate erred
        in seeking report under Section 202 instead of directing
G       investigation under Section 156(3)?"
         7. Contention on behalf of the appellant is that the
  Magistrate and the High Court erred in declining to order
  investigation under Section 156(3) which was necessary in
H viiew of the allegation of forgery of documents and stamp
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 293
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

papers by the accused to create back dated partnership deeds A
by forging signatures of a dead person. Such documents being
in custody of the accused could not be otherwise produced
except on arrest in the course of investigation and in
accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Option of
proceeding under Section 202, as against Section 156(3), has B
to be exercised only when evidence has already been collected
and what remained to be decided was whether there was
sufficient ground to proceed. Mere fact that the appellant first
approached the Police and the police did not register First C
Information Report could not be taken against it nor the dispute
being of civil nature was a bar to criminal proceedings, if a
case was made out.

        8. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that D
direction under Section 156(3) for investigation was all the
more necessary in view of interpretation given by the Gujarat
High Court in San kale hand Valiibhai Patel vs. J.P. Chavda
and Ors.i that under Section 202, the Police Officer had no
power of arrest. In such a situation calling for report under E
Section 202 will not serve the purpose of finding out the truth.
It was also submitted that the said view was erroneous and
contrary view in other judgments was sound and needs to be
approved by this Court. Referring to Section 202 (3), it was
pointed out that a person other than police officer could not F
exercise power of arrest but police officer was not so debarred.
Moreover, arrest was integral part of investigation.

        9. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel, the alleged accused
has filed an application for impleadment stating that dispute G
between the parties is of civil nature. His contention is that the
appellant is attempting to abuse the process of law to arm-
twist the accused by having him arrested by the police. In the
circumstances, no interference was called for by this Court.
                                                                H
2 (1979) 1 GLR 17
294        SUPREME COURT REPORT?                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A This application has been opposed by the appellant on the
  ground that during the stage of inquiry under Section 202 of
  the Code, the accused has no right to be heard as laid down
  by this Court in Ada/at Prasad vs. Rupal Jindal & Others1.
  Having regard to the legal issue involved, we have heard
B learned counse.1 for the accused on the questions involved.

          10. As already observed, the contention of the appellant
  is that when there is allegation of forgery and discovery of
  documents is necessary, a Magistrate must order investigation
C under Section 156(3) instead of proceeding under Section 202.
  Alternatively, direction to the Police to investigate and give a
  report under Section 202 implies arrest and discovery which
  under Section 157 of the Code are integral parts of
  investigation. Contrary view of Gujarat High Court in
D Sankalchand Valiibhai Patel (supra) and other High Courts
  was erroneous while the view taken by other High Courts to
  which reference will be made in later part of this Judgment is
  correct. Section 202 (3) expressly provides that if a person,
E other than police officer is required to conduct investigation
  under Section 202 (1 ), he is not authorized to arrest without
  warrant which implied that there is no such restriction on power
  of arrest available with a police officer.

          11. On the other hand, contention on behalf of the alleged
F
  accused is that both the powers of the Magistrate- (i) directing
  investigation under Section 156(3); and (ii) direction under
  Section 202 to seek a report from police after investigation to
  enable the Magistrate to decide whether to proceed further
G and issue process are qualitatively different and are in different
  chapters of the Code. Thus, as per scheme of the Code, power
  of police in pursuance of directions under the said two
  provisions is not the same.

H          The Magistrate has discretion either to direct
    '(2004) 1 sec 338
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 295
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

registration of a case under Section 156(3) or to conduct A
inquiry himself as the situation may warrant. This discretion is
to be exercised by the Magistrate in his wisdom and having
regard to the nature of material available. Direction under
Section 156(3) to register a criminal case and to investigate
is to be exercised where the Magistrate is satisfied that prima B
facie a cognizable offence has been committed. On the
contrary, where he thinks it necessary to conduct further inquiry
before deciding whether he should proceed further in the matter,
matter has to be dealt with under Section 202. Mere allegation C
of forgery is not enough to require the Magistrate to pass the
order under Section 156(3).

         12. It is further submitted that.in the present case, the
civil proceedings are pending between the parties where the
                                                                     0
question of genuineness or otherwise of the partnership deed
is an issue. The process of criminal law cannot be used when
a dispute is primarily of civil nature. Simultaneously initiation
of criminal proceedings may be permitted where an offence
is shown to have been committed. Thus, the Magistrate was            E
entitled to satisfy himself as to whether any cognizable offence
had been committed before proceeding further. The Magistrate
was not satisfied from the material available that any
cognizable offence had been committed and he rightly decided
to conduct further enquiry under Section 202. Having regard          F
to the limited nature of inquiry under Section 202 which option
had been rightly chosen by the Magistrate, direction to the
police to investigate and give a report was limited by the very
purpose for which the limited inquiry was to be held, as against
procedure for investigation in cases not covered under Section       G
202 of the Code. The purpose was to enable the Magistrate
to decide whether there was ground to proceed further. The
Magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence and the
police having not registered a criminal case nor the Magistrate      H
296           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A having directed registration of criminal case, procedure and
  power of the Police in the matter are different and in such a
  situation police did not have the power to arrest, without
  permission of the Magistrate as was the view of the Gujarat
  and other High Courts.
B
          13. We may first deal with the question as to whether
  the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3)
  or was justified in proceeding under Section 202( 1) and what
  are the parameters for exercise of power under the two
C provisions.

          14. The two provisions are in two different chapters of
  the Code, though common expression 'investigation' is used
  in both the provisions. Normal rule is to understand the same
D expression in two provisions of an enactment in same sense
  unless the context otherwise requires. Heading of Chapter XII
  is "Information to the Police and their Powers to Investigate"
  and that of Chapter XV is "Complaints to Magistrate". Heading
  of Chapter XIV is "Conditions Requisite for Initiation of
E Proceedings". The two provisions i.e. Sections 156 and 202
  in Chapters XII and XV respectively are as follows :

      "156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable
      case.
F
      (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without
      the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable
      case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local
      area within the limits of such station would have power
G     to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter
      XIII.

      (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case
      shall at any stage be called in question on the ground
H
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 297
    OF GUJARAT[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

. that the case was one which such officer was not             A
  empowered under this section to investigate.

 (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may
 order such an investigation as above- mentioned.
                                                               B
 202. Postponement of issue of process.·
 (1) Any Magistrate , on receipt of a complaint of an
 offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or
 which has been made over to him under section 192,
 may, if he thinks fit, [and shall in a case where the
                                                               c
 accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which
 he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of
 process against the accused, and either inquire into
 the case himself or direct an investigation to be made        D
 by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks
 fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is
 sufficient ground for proceeding:
 Provided that no such direction for investigation shaff       E
 be made, -
    (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the ·offence
    complained of is triable exclusively by the Court at
    Sessions; or                                               F
   (b) where the complaint has not been made by a
   Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses
   present (if any) have been examined on oath under
   section 200.
                                                               G
 (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1 ), the Magistrate
 may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath:
 Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the
                                                               H
298         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 5 S.C.R.
                            '

A       offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court
        of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to
        produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.

        (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made
B       by a person not being a police officer, he shall have
        for that investigation all the powers conferred by this
        Code on an officer in charge of a police station
        except the power to arrest without warrant."

c             15. Cognizance is taken by a Magistrate under Section
      190 (in Chapter XIV) either on "receiving a complaint", on "a
      police report" or "information received" from any person other
      than a police officer or upon his own knowledge.

D         Chapter XV deals exclusively with complaints to
  Magistrates. Reference to Sections, 202, in the said Chapter,
  shows that it provides for "postponement of issue of process"
  which is mandatory if accused resides beyond the Magistrate's
  jurisdiction (with which situation this case does not concern)
E and discretionary in other cases in which event an enquiry can
  be conducted by the Magistrate or investigation can be
  directed to be made by a police officer or such other person
  as may be thought fit "for the purpose of deciding whether
  or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". We
F are skipping the proviso as it does not concern the question
  under discussion. Clause (3) provides that if investigation is
  by a person other than a police officer, he shall have all the
  powers of an officer incharge of a police station except the
G power to arrest.
         16. Chapter XII, dealing with the information to the police
  and their powers to investigate, provides for entering
  information relating to a 'cognizable offence' in a book to be
H kept by the officer incharge of a police station (Section 154)
 RAMDEV FOOD/PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 299
     OF GVJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

and such,entry is called "FIR". lffrom the information, the officer A
incharge of the police station has reason to suspect
comryl'ission of an offence which he is empowered to
investigate subject to compliance of other requirements, he
shall proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and
circumstances and, if necessary, to take measure, for the B
discovery and arrest of the offender (Section 157(1).

        17. In Lalita Kumarivs. Govt. ofU.P.1, this Court dealt
with the questions :
                                                                   c
   "30.1. (i) Whetherthe immediate non-registration of FIR
   leads to scope for manipulation by the police which
   affects the right of the victim/complainant to have a
   complaint immediately investigated upon allegations
   being made; and                                                 D

   30.2. (ii) Whe~her in cases where the complaint!
   information does not clearly disclose the commission
   of a cognizable offence but the FIR is compulsorily
   registered then does it infringe the rights of an accused."     E

         18. These questions were answered as follows :

   "49. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non
   for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is           F
   that there must be information and that information must
   disclose a cognizable offence. If any information
   disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer
   in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement
   of Section 154(1 ), the said police officer has no other        G
   option excep1 to enter the substance thereof in the
   prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the
   basis of such information. The provision of Section 154
   of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is
                                                                   H
4 (2014) 2   sec 1
300      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015) 5 S.C.R.


A     duty-bound to register the case on the basis of
      information disclosing a cognizable .offence. Thus, the
      plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be
      given their literal meaning.

B     "Shall"
      72. It is thus unequivocally clear that registration of FIR
      is mandatory and also that it is to be recorded in the
      FIR book by giving a unique annual number to each
c     FlR to enable strict tracking of each and every registered
      FIR by the superior police officers as well as by the
      competent court to which copies of each FIR are
      required to be sent.

o     "Information"

       73. The legislature has consciously used the
      expression "information" in Section 154(1) of the Code
      as against the expression used in Sections 41(1)(a)~
E     and (g) where the expression used for arresting a person
      without warrant is "reasonable complaint" or "credible
      information''. The expression under Section 154(1) of
      the Code is not qualified by the prefix "reasonable" or
      "credible". The non-qualification of the word "information"
F     in Section 154(1) unlike in Sections 41(1)(a)~ and (g)
      of the Code is for the reason that the police officer should
      not refuse to record any information relating to the
      commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that
      he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility
G     of the information. In other words, reasonableness or
      credibility of the said information is not a condition
      precedent for the registration of a case.

      94. Principles of democracy and liberty demand a
H
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 301
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

 regular and efficient check on police powers. One way        A
 of keeping check on authorities with such powers is by
 documenting every action of theirs. Accordingly, under
 the Code, actions of the police, etc. are provided to be
 written and documented. For example, in case of arrest
 under Section 41 (1)(b) of the Code, the arrest memo         B
 along with the grounds has to be in writing mandatorily;
 under Section 55 of the Code, if an officer is deputed to
 make an arrest, then the superior officer has to write
 down and record the offence, etc. for which the person
 is to be arrested; under Section 91 of the Code, a written
                                                              c
 order has to be passed by the officer concerned to seek
 documents; under Section 160 of the Code, a written
 notice has to be issued to the witness so that he can be
 called for recording of his/her statement, seizure memo/     D
 panchnama has to be drawn for every article seized,
 etc.

 107. While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of
 the accused immediately on registration of FIR is not        E
 at all mandatory. In fact, registration of FIR and arrest
 of an accused person are two entirely different concepts
 under the law, and there are several safeguards
 available against arrest. Moreover, it is also pertinent
 to mention that an accused person also has a right to        F
 apply for "anticipatory bail" under the provisions of
 Section 438 of the Code if the conditions mentioned
 therein are satisfied. Thus, in appropriate cases, he can
 avoid the arrest under that provision by obtaining an
 order from the court.                                        G

 108. It is also relevant to note that in Joginder Kumar v.
 State of U.P(1994) 4 SCC 260], this Court has held
 that arrest cannot be made by the police in a routine
                                                              H
302       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015) 5 S.C.R.

A     manner. Some important observations are reproduced
      as under: (SCC pp. 267-68, para 20)

       "20. ... No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a
       mere allegation of commission of an offence made
B      against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer
      in the interest ofprotection of the constitutional rights of
      a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest
      should be made without a reasonable satisfaction
      reached after some investigation as to the genuineness
c     and bona tides of a complaint and a reasonable belief
      both as to the person's complicity and even so as to the
      need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is
      a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police
      Commission merely reflect the constitutional
D
      concomitants of the fundamental right to personal
      liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest
      merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence.
      There must be some reasonable justification in the
E     opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest
      is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences,
      an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues
      notice to person to attend the Station House and not to
      leave the Station without permission would do."
F
      111. Besides, the Code gives power to the police to clo~e
      a matter both before and after investigation. A police
      officer can foreclose an FIR before an investigation
      under Section 157 of the Code, if itappears to him that
G     there is no sufficient ground to investigate the same.
      The section itself states that a police officer can start
      investigation when he has "reason to suspect the
      commission of an offence". Therefore, the requirements
      of launching an investigation under Section 157 of the
H
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 303
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

 Code are higher than the requirement under Section            A
 154 of the Code. The police officer can also, in a given
 case, investigate the matter and then file a final report
 under Section 173 of the Code seeking closure of the
 matter. Therefore, the police is not liable to launch an
 investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily               B
 registered on receiving information relating to
 commission of a cognizable offence.

 114. It is true that a delicate balance has to be
 maintained between the interest of the society and            c
 protecting the liberty of an individual. As already
 discussed above, there are already sufficient
 safeguards provided in the Code which duly protect the
 liberty of an individual in case of registration of false
                                                               D
 FIR. At the same time, Section 154 was drafted keeping
 in mind the interest of the victim and the society.
 Therefore, we are of the cogent view that mandatory
 registration of FlRs under Section 154 of the Code will
 not be in contravention ofArticle 21 of the Constitution      E
 as purported by various counsel.

 115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that
 Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory
 registration of FlRs on receipt of all cognizable offences,   F
 yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry
 may be required owing to the change in genesis and
 novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One such
 instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical
 negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and      G
 inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only
 on the basis of the allegations in the complaint.
  120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
 inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and       H
304        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A      circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
       which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
       (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
       (b) Commercial offences
B
       (c) Medical negligence cases
       (d) Corruption cases
       (e) Cases where there is abnormal delayllaches in
       initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3
c      months' delay in reporting the matter without
       satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay."
           19. Thus, this Court has laid down that while prompt
  registration of FIR is mandatory, checks and balances on
D power of police are equally important. Power of arrest or of
  investigation is not mechanical. It requires application of mind
  in the manner provided. Existence of power and its exercise
  are different. Delicate balance had to be maintained between
E the interest of society and liberty of an individual. Commercial
  offences have been put in the category of cases where FIR
  may not be warranted without enquiry.

         20. It has been held, for the same reasons, that direction
F by the Magistrate for investigation under Section 156(3) cannot
  be given mechanically. In Anil Kumar vs. M.K Aivappa~. it
  was observed :

     "11. The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for
     consideration before this Court in several cases. This
G    Court in Maksud Saiyed case [(2008) 5 SCC 668]
     examined the requirement of the application of mind
     by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under
     Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is
     exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section
H
  s (2013) 1o sec 105
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 305
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

  156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required       A
  to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge!
  Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3)
  against a public servant without a valid sanctio~ order.
  The application of mind by the Magistrate shduld be
  reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has       B
  gone through the complaint, documents and heard the
  complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not
  be sufficient. After going through the complaint,
  documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed
  with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section
                                                               c
  156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a
  detailed expression of his views is neither required nor
  warranted. We have already extracted the order passed
  by the teamed Special Judge which, in our view, has           D
  stated no reasons for ordering investigation."
      The above observations apply to category of cases
mentioned in Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra).

        21. On the other hand, power under Section 202 is of E
different nature. Report sought under the said provision has
limited purpose of deciding ''whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding". If this be the object, the procedure
under Section 157 or Section 173 is not intended to be F
followed. Section 157 requires sending of report by the police
that the police officer suspected commission of offence from
information received by the police and thereafter the police is
required to proceed to the spot, investigate the facts and take
measures for discovery and arrest. Thereafter, the police has G
to record statements and report on which-the Magistrate may
proceed under Section 190. This procedure is applicable
when the police receives information of a cognizable offence,
registers a case and forms the requisite opinion and not every
                                                                 H
306         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A case registered by the police.

           22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that
   the direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after
   application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate
B does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to
  postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to
  proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued.
   In other words, where on account of credibility of information
  available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered
C appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a
  direc:tion is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance
  and postpones issuance of process are cases where the
  Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground
  to proceed". Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in
D Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall under Section 202. Subject
  to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the
  Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is.puided by
  interest of justice from case to case. •
E        23. We now proceed to deal with the second question
  of power of police to arrest in the course of investigation under
  Section 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate to
  enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further existed.
F Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals that in
  such situation power of arrest is not available with the police.
  Contention based on language of Section 202(3) cannot be
  accepted.
G          24. The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusion alterious'
    (express mention of one thing excludes others) has been called
    a valuable servant but a dangerous master. In Marv Angel
    and others vs. State of T.N. •,this Court observed as follows
    on the scope of the maxim:
H
    • (1999) s sec 200
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 307
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

 "19. Further, for the rule of interpretation on the basis of   A
 the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", it has
 been considered in the decision rendered by the
 Queen's Bench in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund
 ((1955) 2 QB 120 : (1955) 2 All ER 432]. The Court
 considered the said maxim and held that after all it ;..;;     B
 no more than an aid to construction and has little, if
 any, weight where it is possible to account for the
 "inclusio unius" on grounds other than intention to effect
 the "exclusio alterius". Thereafter, tl1e Court refeffed to
 the following passage from the case of Colquhoun v.
                                                                c
 Brooks-{(1887) 19 QBD 400: 57 LT 448] QBD at 406
 wherein the Court called for its approval-

 "... 'The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
 has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in
                                                                D
 the court below by Wills, J. about this maxim. It is often
 a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in
 the construction of statutes or documents. The exclusio
 is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the       E
 maxim ought not to be applied, when its application,
 having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be
 applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.' In my
 opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead
 to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section         F
 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its
 operation."
 20. The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court
 in the case of CCE v. National Tobacco Co. of India            G
 Ltd. [(1972) 2 sec 560]. The Court in that case
 considered the question whether there was or was not
 an implied power to hold an enquiry in the
 circvmstances of the case in view of the provisions of
                                                                H

              •
308       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [201515 S.C.R.


A      Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rufe 10-A
       of the Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid
       passage "the maxim is often a valuable servant, but a
       dangerous master ... " and held that the rule is
       subservient to the basic principle that courts must
B      endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and
      purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which
      effectuates rather than one that may defeat these.
      Moreover, the rule of prohibition by necessary
      implication could be applied only where a specified
c     procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty. In
      the case of Parbhani Transport Coop. Society Ltd. v.
      Regional Tran sport Authority. [AIR 1960 SC 801 : (1960)
      3 SCR 177] this Court observed that the maxim
D     "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is a maxim for
      ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where
      the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear,
      there is no scope for applying. Further, in Harish
      Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh-[AIR 1957 SC 444 :
E     1957 SCR 370, 389] SCR at p. 389 the Court referred
      to the following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation
      of Statutes, 10th Edn., pp. 316-317:

       "Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting
F     imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was
      already and more widely the law, have occasionally
      furnished ground for the contention that an intention to
      alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial
      or limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio
G     unius, exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable
      in such cases. The only inference which a court can
      draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally
      find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and
      idle doubts), is that the legislature was either ignorant
H
    RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 309
        OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.)

     or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it acted       A
     under the influence of excessive caution."

        We are of the view that the maxim does not apply for
interpretation of Section 202 (3) for the reasons that follow. In
our view, the correct interpretation of the provision is that merely   B
negating the power of arrest to a person other than police officer
does not mean that police could exercise such power. The
emphasis in the provision is to empower such person to
exercise other powers of incharge of a police station than the
power of arrest. As regards the power of police to arrest, there       C
are express provisions dealing with the same and power of
police to arrest is not derived from or controlled by Section
202 (3). The said power is available under Section 41 or under
a warrant. The power remains available subject to conditions
                                                                       0
for exercise thereof. For example it can be exercised if
cognizable offence is committed in the presence of a police
officer (Section 41 (1 )(a). Under Section 202, since the
Magistrate is in seisin of the matter and has yet to decide
"whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding", there      E
is no occasion for formation of opinion by the police about
credibility of available information necessary to exercise power
of arrest as the only authority of the police is to give report to
Magistrate to enable him to decide whether there is sufficient
ground to proceed. Power of arrest is not to be exercised              F
mechanically. In M.C. Abraham vs. State of Maharashtraz,
it was observed :

     "14 . ..... .In the first place, arrest of an accused is a part
     of the investigation and is within the discretion of the          G
     investigating officer. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal
     Procedure provides for arrest by a police officer without
     an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. The
     section gives discretion to the police officer who may,
                                                                       H
1
    c2003J 2 sec 649
310       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 5 S.C.R.


A      without an order from a Magistrate and even without a
       wan-ant, arrest any person in the situations enumerated
      in that section. It is open to him, in the course of
      investigation, to arrest any person who has been
      concerned with any cognizable offence or against whom
B     reasonable complaint has been made or credible
      information has been received, or a reasonable
      suspicion exists of his having been so concerned.
      Obviously, he is not expected to act in a mechanical
      manner and in all cases to an-est the accused as soon
c     as the report is lodged. In appropriate cases, after some
      investigation, the investigating officer may make up his
      mind as to whether it is necessary to arrest the accused
      person. At that stage the court has no role to play Since
D     the power is.discretionary, a police officer is not always
      bound to arrest an accused even if the allegation against
      him is of having committed a cognizable offence. Since
      an arrest is in the nature of an encroachment on the
      liberty of the subject and does affect the reputation and
E     status of the citizen, the power has to be cautiously
      exercised. It depends inter alia upon the nature of the
      offence alleged and the type of persons who are
      accused of having committed the cognizable offence.
      Obviously, the power has to be exercised with epution
F     and circumspection."

         25. Nature of cases dealt with under Section 202 are
  cases where material availabl~is not clear to proceed further.
  The Magistrate is in seisin of the matter having taken the
G cognizance. He has to decide whether there is ground to
  proceed further. If at such premature stage power of arrest is
  exercised by police, it will be contradiction in terms. As regards
  denial of opportunity to record confession under Section 27 of
H the Evidence Act, it has to be kept in mind that admissibility of
    RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 311
        OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

such confession cannot guide exercise of power of arrest. A
Source of power of arrest is governed by other provisions and
not by Section 27. It is only if arrest is otherwise permissible
that provision of Section 27 may be invoked. If exercise of
power of arrest is not otherwise warranted, admissibility of
confession under Section 27 cannot facilitate such exercise. B
We, thus, hold that the police of its own cannot exercise its
power of arrest in the course of making its report in pursuance
of direction under Section 202.

       26. We may now proceed to deal with the conflict in C
decisions which has been pointed out to us. Bombay, Gujarat
and Delhi High Courts in Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel
(supra}, Emperor vs. Nurmahomed Rajmahomed!!.,
Mahendrasinh Shanabhai Chauhan and Ors. vs. State of
                                                                D
Gujarat and Anr.!l. and Harsh Khurana vs. Union of lndia!Jl
have held that in the course of investigation directed under
Section 202 (1) the police cannot exercise the power of arrest.
Reasoning is by and large similar. Cases covered by Section
202 are such where Magistrate is yet to decide whether the E
material was sufficient to proceed. Till formation of such
opinion, arrest will be incongruous. We may only refer to the
observations of M.P. Thakker, J. (as he then was) in
Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel (supra) :
                                                                 F
     "2. The question that has surfaced in the back drop of
     the aforesaid facts and circumstances is: when upon
     receipt of a complaint of an offence a Magistrate instead
     of issuing process postpones the issue of process
     against the accused and direct? a police officer to make    G
     an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether or
     not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, can the
     police officer in charge of the investigation on his own,
8 (1929) 31  BOMLR 84
9
   (2009) 2 GLR 1647                                             H
10
    121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB)
312            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 5 S.C.R.


A           place the accused under arrest? Section 202 (1) in so
            far as material reads as under:

              202. (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of
              an offence of which he is authorised to take
B             cognizance or which has been made over to him
              under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the
              issue of process against the accused, and either
              inquire into the case himself or direct an
              investigation to be made by a police officer or by such
C             other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of
              deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for
              proceeding."

          27. On the other hand in Emperor vs. Bikha Moti11 and
D Asha Das and others vs. The Sta tell, Sind and Assam High
  Courts respectively have taken a contrary view by holding that
  when direction for investigation issued under Section 202 (1)
  is issued, the police is to investigate precisely in the same
  manner and arrest the accused in precisely the same manner
E as they would have done if they had recorded First Information
  Report.

             28. We may only refer to the observations of Devis,
      CJ in Bikha Moti (supra) as follows:
F
           "Now S. 202(1) refers not only to an enquiry but also to
           an investigation : and Section 202(2) confers upon a
           person other than a Magistrate or a police officer all
           powers conferred upon a police officer in charge of a
G          police station except the power of arrest without warrant.
           Surely this implies that a police officer to whom a
           complaint has been referred for investigation has the
           power to arrest without warrant under S. 54, Criminal P. C.
H     11   AIR(1938)Sind 113
      12 AIR (1953) Assam  1·
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 313
    OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

 and all other powers which may be exercised by a police       A
 officer in the course of an investigation. To us, the
 scheme of the section appears to be that when a
 complaint is sent to the police for investigation and
 report, they are to investigate in precisely the same
 manner and to arrest in precisely the same way as they        B
 would have done if their powers had been first invoked
 by a first report under S. 154, their being only this
 difference, that in the one case the police embody the
 result of their investigation to the Magistrate in a report
                                                               c
 which the Magistrate proceeds to consider under S. 203,
 while in the other case the police embody the result of
 their investigation in what is called a cha/Ian or charge-
 sheet, but which is really a police report under S. 190(b),
 the term cha/Ian or charge sheet not occurring in the         D
 section, the accused person, in any case, if arrested by
 the police, being produced before the Magistrate in the
 ordinary way. To hold otherwise would be to leave the
 proceedings started by the Magistrate under S. 202,
 Criminal PC. unfinished, and in the air; for, he would        E
 not have, as the law contemplates, a report of the
 investigation but he would have a refusal by the police
 to report as in this case, and other and independeni
 proceedings in the same matter initiated by them. But
 the law contemplates that proceedings, begun by the           F
 acceptance by a Magistrate of a complaint under S. 200,
 Criminal PC. and sent to the police for investigation
 under Section 202, should be terminated by the
 Magistrate as set out in Section 203 and the following
                                                               G
 sections. The proceedings are not terminated when
 the Magistrate's authority is defied, his jurisdiction in
 effect denied and the order to investigate and report
 disobeyed. The law does not contemplate this, and we
 cannot see that this aspect of the case has been              H
314         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A       considered in any of the judgments which have been
        cited to us in support of the case of this Court in 27 SLR
        67."

            29. For the reasons already discussed above, we
B     approve the view taken in Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel
      (supra), Nurmahomed Rajmahomed (supra),
      Mahendrasinh Shanabhai Chauhan (supra) and Harsh
      Khurana (supra) and overrule the rule taken in Bikha Moti
      (supra) and Asha Das (supra).
c
          30. We now come to the last question whether in the
   present case the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under
  Section 156(3) instead of Section 202. Our answer is in the
  negative. The Magistrate has given reasons, which have been
D upheld by the High Court. The case has been held to be
  primarily of civil nature. The accused is alleged to have forged
  partnership. Whether such forgery actually took place, whether
  it caused any loss to the complainant and whether there is the
  requisite mens rea are the questions which are yet to be
E determined. The Magistrate has not found clear material to
  proceed against the accused. Even a case for summoning
  has not yet been found. While a transaction giving rise to cause
  of action for a civil action may also involve a crime in which
F case resort to criminal proceedings may be justified, there is
  judicially acknowledged tendency in the commercial world to
  give colour of a criminal case to a purely commercial
  transaction. This Court has cautiorted against such abuse.

G              31. In Indian Oil Corpn. vs. NEPC India Ltd. 13 , it was
    .observed:

        "13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice
        of a growing tendency in business circles to convert
        purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is
H
    ,, (2006) 6 sec 736
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 315
    OF GUJARA:r [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

  obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil     A
  law remedies are time consuming and do not
  adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
  Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also,
  leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/
  families. There is also an impression that if a person        B
  could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,
  there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort
  to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve
  any criminal offence, by applying pressure through
  criminal prosecution should be deprecated and
                                                                c
  discouraged. In G Sagar Suri v. State of U.P [(2000) 2
  SCC 636] this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8)

     "It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a
                                                                D
     civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal
     offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of
     other remedies available in law. Before issuing
     process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal
     of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This   E
     Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which
     the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under
     Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this
     section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the
     process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends       F
     ofjustice."

      32. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial
MagistrateM, it was observed :
                                                                G
    "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a
    serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion
    as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has
    to bring only two witnesses to support his a/legations in
    the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion.     H
,. (1998) s sec 749
316             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A             The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused
             must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of
             the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to
             examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint
             and the evidence both oral and documentary in support
B          · thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant
             to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It
             is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time
             of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning
             of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully
c            scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even
             himself put questions to the complainant and his
             witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of
             the a/legations or otherwise and then examine if any
D            offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
             accused."

         33. In view of above, we find that the Magistrate and
  the High Court rightly held that in the present case report under
E Section 202 was the right course instead of direction under
  Section 156(3). The question is answered accordingly.

             34. We may now also refer to other decisions cited at
      the barand their relevance to the questions arising in the case.
F            In Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa
      Konjalgi & Ors.ll, referring to earlier Judgments on the scope
      of Section 202, it was observed :
            "3. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose
G           [AIR (1963) SC 1430 this Court had after fully
            considering the matter observed as follows:

               "The courts have also pointed out in these cases that
               what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is
H     1
       •   (1976) 3   sec 736
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 317
    OF GUJARAT[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

   evidence in support of the a/legations of the               A
   complainant and not whether the evidence is
   sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned Judges
   in some of these cases have been at pains to
   observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is not to
   be likened to a trial which can only take place after       B
   process is issued, and that there can be only one
   trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section
   202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the
   truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate
   making the enquiry has to do this only with reference
                                                               c
   to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before
   him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the
   complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the
   complainant and the statements made before him              D
   by persons examined at the instance of the
   complainant."

 Indicating the scope, ambit of Section 202 of the Code
 of Criminal Procedure this Court in Vadila/ Panchal v.        E
 Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker [AIR (1960) SC 1113]
 observed as follows:

    "Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he
   thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing,          F
   postpone the issue of process for compelling the
   attendance of the person complained against and
   direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the
   truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words,
   the scope of an inquiry under the section is limited        G
   to finding out the truth or falsehood of the complaint
   in order to determine the question of the issue of
   process. The inquiry is for the purpose of
   ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint;
                                                               H
318            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A             that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in
              support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of
              process and commencement of proceedings
              against the person concerned. The section does not
              say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or
B             otherwise of the person complained against should
              take place at that stage; for the person complained
              against can be legally called upon to answer the
              accusation made against him only when a process
              has issued and he is put on trial."
c
               Same view has been taken in Mohinder Singh vs.
      Gu/want Singh!§., Manharibhai Muliibhai Kakadia & Anr.
      vs. Shai/eshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & Ors.11, Raghuraj
      Singh Rousha vs. Shivam Sunadaram Promoters Pvt.
0
      Ltd.1§., Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prokas Chandra Bos~~

         In Devrapalli Lakshminaryanan Reddy & Ors. vs.
  V. Narayana Reddy & Ors.111, National Bank of Oman vs.
  Barakara Abdul Aziz & Anr.11, Madhao & Anr. vs. State of
E Maharashtra & Anr.11, Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau vs.
  State of Gujaraf-J., the scheme of Section 156(3) and 202
  has been discussed. It was observed that power under Section
  156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking
F cognizance and was in the nature of pre-emptory reminder or
  intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of
  investigation beginning Section 156 and ending with report
  or chargesheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section

G     1
       •(1992) 2 sec 213
      11 c2012i 1o sec 511
      " c2009) 2 sec 363
      19
           (1964) 1 SCR 639
      20 c1976) 3   sec 252
      21   c2013) 2 sec 488
H     22 (2013) 5  sec 615
      23 c201 oi 4 sec 185
 RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. v. STATE 319
     OF GUJARAT [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

202 applies at post cognizance stage and the direction for A
investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether there
was sufficient ground to proceed.

       35. These aspects have already been discussed above
and are indeed undisputed.                                 B

        36. In H.N. Rishbud and lnder Singh vs. The State
of Delh~. this Court explained the scope of investigation by
the police and held that investigation included power to arrest.
There is no dispute-With this legal position.                       c
       37. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to
find any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High
Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted
in the present case and the police may not be justified in D
exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report
under Section 202.

      38. The questions framed for consideration stand
answered accordingly.                                  E
        39. The appeal is dismissed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy                             Appeal dismissed.

                                                                    F




"(1955) 1 SCR 1150