Holding

Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act authorises the court to grant permanent alimony or maintenance even when the marriage is declared void under Section 11, and the second marriage is void because the first marriage was never dissolved by a court decree.

Summary

The wife, who had a prior marriage that was never dissolved by a court decree, married the appellant after his first wife's death. The husband filed a suit to declare the second marriage void under Section 5(i) and Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, while the wife sought judicial separation and maintenance for herself and their daughter. The Family Court granted separation and maintenance; the High Court declared the second marriage null and void but upheld the maintenance order under Section 25. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a marriage can be declared void only when the first marriage subsists due to lack of a court decree, and that Section 25's phrase "at the time of passing any decree" includes a decree of nullity, allowing maintenance even in a void marriage. Consequently, the Court dismissed both appeals, maintaining the High Court's declaration of nullity and the award of maintenance.

Issues considered

Whether a decree of nullity under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act precludes the award of permanent alimony or maintenance under Section 25.
Whether the expression "at the time of passing any decree" in Section 25 includes a decree of nullity of marriage.
Whether the first marriage subsisted in the absence of a court decree, rendering the second marriage void.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 10, s. 11, s. 12, s. 13, s. 25, s. 5(i), s. 9

Subjects

Hindu Marriage Actnullity of marriagebigamySection 25 maintenancepermanent alimonydecree of nullitycustomary dissolutionChhor Chithhi

Judgment

A RAMESH CHANDRA RAMPRA T APJI DAGA
v.
RAMESHWARI RAMESH CHANDRA DAGA

DECEMBER 13, 2004

B
[D.M. DHARMADHIKARI AND H.K. SEMA; JJ.]

Hindu Law:

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 :
c
Section I 1 rlw Section 5(i)-Void marriage-Marriage of present wife
arranged with one G-She filed a divorce petition but no decree of divorce
was passed-But a document of dissolution of marriage was executed was
passed-But a document of dissolution of marriage was executed between
D the present wife and her previous husband-Present husband remarried
· present wife after the death of his first wife-Decree ofjudicial separation
granted-On appeal, High Court declared second marriage of present wife
a nullity under S. 11 holding that the first marriage of the present wife
with her previous husband had not been dissolved by any Court-
Correctness of-Held : A Hindu marriage can be dissolved only in
E accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act by obtaining
a decree of divorce from the Court-In the absence of such decree, the
first marriage of the wife subsisted when she went through the second
marriage-Hence, High Court rightly declared the second marriage as null
and void
F
Section 25-Permanent alimony and maintenance-Maintenance to
wife children-Marriage declared null and void under S I I-Entitlement
to-Held: The expression "at the time ofpassing any decree" encompasses
all kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights, judicial
separation, nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage and divorce-Hence,
G maintenance can be awarded to wife and children even if the marriage
is declared null and void

Words & Phrases :

H "At the time of passing any decree "-Meaning of-Jn the context of
888
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA 889

S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A

The marriage of repondent-wife was arranged with one G. The
customary rituals of the marriage were not completed as in the marriage
ceremony the family members quarreled over dowry. The respondent-
wife filed a divorce petition but no decree of divorce was passed. How- B
ever, in accordance with the prevalent custom a "chhor Chithhi" or a
document of dissolution of the marriage was executed between the
respondent-wife and the previous husband .
•
The appellant-husband had remarried the respondent after
the death of his first wife. A daughter was born from this second C
marriage. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition before the
Family Court for grant of a decree of judicial separation and
maintenance for herself and for her daughter. The appellant-husband
disputed not only the validity of the marriage but also the parentage of
the daughter. D
The Family Court allowed the respondent's petition. On appeal,
the High Court held that the first marriage of the respondent-wife with
her previous husband having not been dissolved by any decree of the
Court, her second. marriage was in contravention on Section 5(i) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and had to be declared as nullity under E
Section 11 of the Act. However, the High Court maintained the decree
granting maintenance under Section 25 of the Act to the respondent and
her daughter. Hence the appeal.

On behalfofthe appellant, it was contended that where a marriage F
was declared to be null and void by grant of a decree, no order awarding
permanent alimony or maintenance could be made in favour of the
unsuccessful party under Section 25 of the Act.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD : 1. A Hindu marriage can be dissolved only in accordance
with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by obtaining a
decree of divorce from the Court. In the absence of any decree of
dissolution of the marriage from the Court, it has to be held that in law
the first marriage of the wife subsisted when she went through the H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A second marriage with the appellant. The appeal preferred by the wife,
therefore, against grant of decree of declaration of her second marriage
as void, had to be rejected whatever may be the circumstances which
existed and the hardships that the wife had to undergo, as alleged, at
the hands of the husband. [894-B-C]
B
2. The expression used in the opening part of Second 25 of the Act
enabling the 'Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act' at the time
of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' to grant
alimony or maintenance cannot ~e restricted only to a decree of judicial
separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13. When the
c legislature has used such a wide expression as 'at the time of passing
any decree', it encompasses within the expression ali kinds of decrees
such as restitution of coniugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation
under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void under Section 11,
annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12 and Divorce under
D Section 13. [897-G-H]

Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan, [1993] 3 SCC 406, relied on.

Nazir Ahamadv. Emperor, AIR (1936) PC 253; Mohd. Jkram Hussain
v. State of UP., AIR (1964) SC 1625; Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v.
E Anantrao Shivram Adhav, 11988] 1 SCC 530; Rai Kumar Karwal v. UOI,
AIR (1991) SC 47; K. Vim/av. K Veeraswamy, JT (1991) 2 SC 182 and
Abbavolla M Subha Reddy v. Padmamma, AIR (1999) AP 19, referred to.

3. It is well known and recognized legal position that customary
F Hindu Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages,
which were prevalent in all Hindu families. It is only after the Hindu
Law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar
against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act.
Keeping into consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law,
a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of
G the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to
deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially
weak and economically dependant. It is with the purpose of not render-
ing a financially dependant spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the ·
court to award maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree
H resulting in breach in marriage relationship. [898-C-D]
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 891

4. Section 25 is an enabling provision. It empowers the Court in a A
matrimonial case to consider facts and circumstances of the spouse
applying and decide whether or not to grant permanent alimony or
maintenance. [898-E]

5. The impugned judgment of the High Court, to the extent of B
granting decree of declaration of marriage as a nullity and granting
maintenance to the wife and daughter is maintained. [899-F]

CIVIL APPELLAE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1774 and
1775 of 2001.
c
From the Judgment and Order date 20.1.2000 of the Bombay High
Court in F.C.A. No. 1 of 1996.

Sushi! Kumar Jain, Ms. Ruchi Kolhi, Ram Niwas, Sarad Singhania and'
H.D. Thanvi for the Appellant in C.A. No. 1774/2001 and Respondent in D
C.A. No. 1775/2001.

S.C. Birla and Surat Birla for the Respondent in C.A. No. 1774/2001
and Appellant in C.A. No. 1775/2001.
...
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E

DHARMADHIKARI, J. : These two cross appeals arise from mat-
rimonial proceedings. The wife is aggrieved by the impugned reversing
judgment of the High Court declaring her marriage as null and void under
Section 11 read with Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (here- F
inafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). The husband is aggrieved by the
part of the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby it maintained the
amount of maintenance fixed per month for the wife under Section 25 of
the Act.

The facts of this case tell the tragic tale of an Indian woman, who G
having gone through two marriages with a child born to her apprehends
destitution as both marriages have broken down.

The husband is an Income Tax Practitioner in the town of Ratlam in
the State of Madhya Pradesh. His first marriage was solemnized with late H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Smt. Usha in the year l 963 and from her he has two sons and one daughter.
The marriage of the present wife, it is alleged, was arranged with one
Girdhari Lal Lakhotia on 15.5.1979. According to the wife, the customary
rituals of marriage were not completed as in the marriage ceremony family
members quarrelled over dowry. She had filed a Divorce Petition No.76/
B 78 in Matrimonial Court at Amravati but it was not prosecuted and no decree
of divorce was passed. It is the case of the wife that in accordance with the
prevalent custom in Maheshwari community a Chhor Chithhi or a document
of dissolution of marriage was executed between the wife and her previous
husband on l 5 .5 .l 979 and it was later got registered.

c After the death of his previous wife, the present husband remarried the
present wife on l l.7.1981. According to the version of the wife the docu-
ment of registered Chhor Chithhi was shown and given to the present
husband before his accepting the second matrimony with the present wife.
A daughter, who is named Puja, was born from the second marriage on
D 14.7.1983.

The wife alleges that the husband started ill-treating her due to
non-fulfulment of his demands by her father. She was driven out of
the house in the year l 989. She thereafter filed proceedings in the
E Family Court, Bombay for grant of a decree of judicial separation
and maintenance of Rupees three thousand per month for herself and for
her daughter~

The husband filed a counter-petition seeking declaration of his second
marriage with the present wife, as nullity on the ground that on the date of
F
second marriage, her marriage with the previous husband Girdhari Lal
Lakhotia, had not been dissolved by any court in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. The husband not only disputed validity of the second
marriage· but also parentage of daughter Puja.

G The Family Court, Bombay allowed the petition of the wife and granted
in her favour, a decree of judicial separation. It also granted maintenance
in the sum Rupees one thousand per month to the wife and Rupees two
thousand per month to the child. The Family Court dismissed the counter
petition filed by the husband seeking declaration of his marriage with the
H present wife as null and void.
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 893

The.husband went in appeal to the High Court and the wife preferred A
a cross objection. By the impugned judgment the High Court held that the
first marriage of the present wife with her previous husband having not been
dissolved by any decree of the Court, her second marriage is in contraven-
tion of Section 5(i) of the Act and has to be declared as nullity under Section
11 of the Act. The High Court, on the above finding, granted a decree of B
declaration of marriage as nullity in favour of the husband. Consequently,
the High Court set aside the decree of judicial separation granted to the wife.

Even though the High Court dismissed the wife's petition for decree
of judicial separation and granted declaration of the second marriage as null
and void in favour of the husband, it maintained the decree granting main- C
tenance to the wife and her daughter. Aggrieved by the order of the High
Court, both the parties are before this Court in these two cross appeals.

Learned counsel ·appearing for the husband took us in great detail in
the evidence of the parties led before the Family Court. He advanced lengthy D
arguments in support of his contention that where a marriage is declared to
be null and void by grant of a decree, no order awarding permanent alimony
or maintenance could be made in favour of the unsuccessful party under
Section 25 of the Act. Reliance is placed on Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR
(1936) PC 253; Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of UP, AIR (1964) SC 1625;
Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, [1988] I sec E
530; Raj Kumar Karwa/ v. UOJ, AIR (1991) SC 47; K. Vim/a v.
K. Veeraswamy, JT (1991) 2 SC 182 and Abbayolla M Subba Reddy v1
Padmamma, AIR (1999) AP 19.

Learned counsel Shri SC Birla appearing on the other side for the wife F
also took us through the relevant evidence of the husband and wife recorded
before the Family Court and tried to persuade us to set aside the decree of
nullity of marriage granted by the High Court and refusing grant of decree
of judicial separation to the wife.

So far as the appeal preferred by the wife is concerned, on reconsid- G
_.
1
eration of the evidence on record, we find no ground to take a view different
from the one taken by the High Court and upset the conclusion that the
second marriage was null and void. The wife did not deny the fact that her
marriage was arranged with Girdhari Lal Lakhotia in the year 1973 and after
marriage she lived with the members of the family of her previous husband. H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A It is also an admitted fact that she instituted proceedings for obtaining decree
of divorce being Divorce Petition No. 76/78 in the Family Court at Amravati.
It is also not denied that no decree of divorce was obtained from the Court
and she only obtained a registered document -0f Chhor Chithhi from her
previous husband on 15. 5.1979. Existence of such customary divorce in
B Vaish community ofMaheshwaris has not been established. A Hindu marriage
can be dissolved only in accordance with the provisions of the Act by
obtaining a decree of divorce from the Court. In the absence of any decree
of dissolution of marriage from the court, it has to be held that in law the
first marriage of the wife subsisted when she went through the second
marriage on 11. 7.1981 with the present husband. The appeal preferred by
C the wife, therefore, against grant of decree of declaration of her second
marriage as void, has to be rejected whatever may be the circumstances
which existed and the hardships that the wife had to undergo, as alleged,
at the hands of her second husband.

D So far as the husband's appeal against grant of maintenance under
Section 25 of the Act to the wife is concerned, this Court has granted him
leave to appeal confined to the question as to 'whether the wife is entitled
to maintenance after the Court held that the marriage was nullity.'

Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act confers jurisdiction on the
E Matrimonial Court to grant permanent alimony and maintenance to either
of the spouses ' at the time of passing of any decree' or 'at any time
subsequent thereto.' Section 25 which arises for interpretation in the hus-
band's appeal reads as under:

F "25. Permanent alimony and maintenance (1) Any Court exercis-
ing jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any
decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to
it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may
be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or
his maintenance and support such gross sum or such qionthly or
G periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as,
having regard to the respondent's own income and other property,
if any, the income and other property of the applicant the conduct
of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to
the Court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if
H necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respond-
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 895

ent. A.

(2) If the Court is satisfied that there is a change in the circum-
stances of either party at any time after it has made an order under
Sub-section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify
or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem B
just.

(3) If the Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order
has been made under this section has remarried or, if such party
is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such party is
the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman C
outside wedlock, it may at the instance of the other party vary,
modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may
deem just."

[Emphasis supplied] D

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents took us through the Full
Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (supra) and earlier
decisions of this Court to persuade us to take a view that where the marriage
is found to be null and void under Section 11, question of grant of permanent
alimony or maintenance can never arise in favour of either of the spouses. E

The decisions of this Court and High Courts which have been relied,
in .our opinion, are distinguishable and are not directly on the point of law
before us. We find that taking into consideration the divergent views of
various High Courts, this Court in the case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal F
Dhawan, [1993) 3 SCC 406 has dealt with the point on the interpretation
of Section 25 read with Sections 9 to 13 read with Section 5 of the Act. The
decision in Chand Dhawan (supra) squarely covers the point against the
husband. It is true that Chand Dhawan 's case (supra) arose from different
facts but the statement of law on the interpretation placed on Section 25
answers the question raised by the husband against him on the competence G
of the court to grant maintenance under Section 25. In the case of Chand
Dhawan (supra) a joint petition filed by the spouses for grant of a decree
of divorce by mutual consent failed as they withdrew their consent during
the statutory waiting period. Thereafter the wife moved a petition for grant
of maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. This Court held that Section H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A 25 can be invoked by either of the spouses where a decree of any kind
governed by Sections 9 to 13 has been passed and the marriage-tie is broken,
disrupted or adversely affected by such a decree of the Court. The view
expressed is that where the marriage is not dissolved by any decree of the
Court, resort to Section 25 of the Act is not allowed as any of the spouses
B whose marriage continues can resort to other provisions for seeking main-
tenance, like Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code or provisions of
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

In interpreting the provision of Section 25 in the case of Chand
Dhawan (supra) the Supreme Court categorically held that the expression
C 'at the passing of passing any decree,' as has been used in Section 25,
includes a decree of nullity of marriage. The relevant observations read
thus:-

"On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her
D claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated (sic) on the pendency
of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or
alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status
has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of
conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or
E her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with
or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be
affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or
against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the
court being seisin of the matter, invokes its ancillary or incidental
F power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains
the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfill this incidental or
ancillary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf
by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to
change or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances.
Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit (sic gamut) of a
G diseased or a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of
perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act
preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the .
husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court
passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14
H of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 897

or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage A
Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary
or incidental to such affectation or disruption. The wife's claim to
maintenance necessarily has then to be agitated under the Hinqu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which is a legislative meas-
ure later in point of time than the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, though B
part of the same socio-legal scheme revolutionizing the law appli-
cable to Hindus.

c
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that
when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affec-
tation or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that
juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power
D
to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is in-
voked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be
invoked on application by a party entitled to relief. And such order,
in all events, remains within the jurisdiction of that court, to be
altered or modified as future situations may warrant.
[Emphasis supplied} E

In the present case, on the husband's petition, a decree declaring the
second marriage as null and void has been granted. The learned counsel has
argued that where the marriage is found to be null and void - meaning non-
existent in eye of law or non est, the present respondent cannot lay a claim F
as wife for grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. We have cr;tically
examined the provisions of Section 25 in the light of conflicting decisions
of the High Court cited before us. In our considered opinion, as has been
held by this Court in Chand Dhawan 's case (supra), the expression used in
the opening part of Section 25 enabling the 'Court exercising jurisdiction
under the Act' 'at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent G
thereto' to grant alimony or maintenance cannot be restricted only to, as
contended, decree of judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under
Section 13. When the legislature has used such wide expression as 'at the
time of passing of any decree, ' it encompasses within the expression al/
kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A judicial separation under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void
under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12 and
Divorce under Section 13.

Learned counsel for the husband has argued that extending the benefit
B of Section 25 to even marriages which have been found null and void under
Section 11 would be against the very object and purpose of the Act to ban
and discourage bigamous marriages.

It is well known and recognized legal position that customary Hindu
Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages which were
c prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is
only afier the Hindu Law was codified by enactments including the present
Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the
Act. Keeping into con5ideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law,
a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the
D provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even
the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and
economically dependant. It is with the purpose ofnot rendering a financially
dependant spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the court to award
maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach
in marriage relationship.
E
Section 25 is an enabling provision. It empowers the Court In a mat-
rimonial case to consider facts and circumstances of the spouse applying and
decide whether or not to grant permanent alimony or maintenance.

F The facts of the present case fully justify grant of maintenance both
to the wife and the daughter. The evidence of the wife has been believed
by the <>ourts below and according to us rightly so. From circumstances
preceding and attending the marriage, it can safely be inferred that the
present husband must have made reasonable enquiries about the previous
marriage of the present wife. The wife's version is natural and inspires belief
G that the document of Chor Chhithi was shown and given to the husband.
It is proved from the photocopy of the foil of Registration, placed on record. ....
According to the wife, the husband did receive the document of Chor
Chhithi but has not produced it before the Family Court. It is argued that -
it is open to the wife, if the document was registered, to get a copy from
H the Registration office. Even if that was possible, we find no ground to
R.C.R. DAGA v. R.R.C. DAGA [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 899

disbelieve her version that the fact of her previous marriage was not con- A
cealed from the present husband. The husband is an advocate. His falsehood
went to the extent of denying his second marriage and calling his wife only
to be a governess of his children from the first wife. He unsuccessfully
denied even the parentage of daughter Puja, born through him. He failed
to lead any evidence on the illegitimacy of the child. After the second B
marriage the parties lived as husband and wife and they had a considerably
long married life of about nine years from 1981 to 1990. In such a situation,
the Family Court and High Court were fully justified in holding that the wife
deserves to be granted maintenance under Section 25 of the Act.

Lastly, it is urged by counsel for the wife that daughter Puja is now C
of marriageable age and the maintenance of total Rupees three thousand
granted to them, therefore, deserves to be suitably enhanced to fulfill their
present needs. We say nothing on this prayer at this stage because it is always
open to the wife and the daughter in accordance with sub-section (2) of
Section 25, to approach the Matrimonial Court to suitably enhance the D
quant~m of maintenance granted to them. If such an application is made to
the Matrimonial Court, it shall be decided after hearing the husband in
accordance with law.

We are told that the order of the High Court in so far as it directs the
husband to return ornaments of the wife or its equivalent value in the sum E
ofRs.3,25,650 with 9% per annum, is a subject-matter of a separate appeal.
We, therefore, express no opinion with regard to the same.

In the result, both the appeals preferred by the parties are dismissed
and the impugned judgments of the High Court, to the extent of granting F
decree of declaration of marriage as nullity and granting maintenance io the
wife and daughter are maintained. The husband shall pay all the arrears of
maintenance to the wife and daughter. The earlier order made on 2.3.2001
passed in Civil Appeal No. 1775 of 2000 granting stay of maintenance to
the wife is hereby vacated. In the circumstances, the husband shall bear his
own costs and pay costs to the wife incurred in these proceedings. G

v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.