RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHIversusTHE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

                      [2014] 1 S.C.R 1112


A            RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI
                               V.
             THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.
              (Criminal Appeal No. 434 of 2014)
                     FEBRUARY 18, 2014.
B
    [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND JAGDISH SINGH
                   KHEHAR, JJ.]

       NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881:
c
       s.138, proviso(a) - Dishonour of cheque - Presentation
  of cheque "within a period of six months from the date on
  which it is drawn" - Connotation of - Held: The word "month"
  has been defined u/s 3(35) of the General Clauses Act to
  mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.
0
  Accordingly, the period of six months cannot be calculated
  on 30 days in a month basis -- Once the word 'from' is used
  for the purpose of commencement of time, in view of s. 9 of
  the General Clauses Act, the day on which the cheque is
  drawn has to be excluded - Cheque drawn on 31.12.2005 and
E presented on 30.6.2006 was presented within the period
  prescribed - Therefore, prosecution is not time barred -
  General Clauses Act, 1897 - ss.3(35) and 9.

        WORDS AND PHRASES:
F
       Words, 'from' and 'month' as occurring in s.138(a) of
    Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - Connotation of        ·

       The instant appeal arose out of the criminal
  proceedings initiated uls 138 of the Negotiable
G Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of a cheque drawn
  on 31.12.2005 and presented for payment on 30.6.2006.
  The accused-appellant filed before the trial court an
  application for discharge contending that as the period

H                             1112
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1113
               GUJARAT
of six months had lapsed between the date of drawl of           A
the cheque and its presentation, the accused-appellant
could not be prosecuted. The application was rejected.
The criminal revision of the accused-appellant before the
Court of Session and his petition u/s 4823 Cr.P.C. before
the High Court were also dismissed.                             B

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 It is apparent from a plain reading of
proviso (a) to s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 that the Section would apply only when the cheque          C
is presented to the Bank within a period of s'ix months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of
its validity, whichever is earlier. [Para 7] [1117-E-F]

     1.2 The word "month" has been defined u/s 3(35) of         D
the General Clauses Act to mean a month reckoned
according to the British calendar. Accordingly, the period
of six months cannot be calculated on 30 days in a month
basis. [para 15] [1121-D-E]

    1.3 Proviso (a) to s. 138 of the Act uses the               E
expression "six months. from the date on which it is
drawn". Once the word 'from' is used for the purpose of
commencement of time, in view of s. 9 of the General
Clauses Act, the day on which the cheque is drawn has
to be excluded. Thus, six months would expire one day           F
prior to the date in the corresponding month and in case
no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous
month. Therefore, for all purposes, the date on which the
cheque was drawn, i.e., 31.12.2005 will be excluded and
the period of six months will be reckoned from the next         G
day i.e. from 1.1.2006, as according to the British calendar,
the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th
day of June, 2006. Since the cheque was presented on
30.6.2006, it was presented within the period prescribed.
Therefore, the prosecution is not time barred and cannot        H
    1114     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2014] 1 S.C.R.


A   be scuttled at this stage on this ground. [para 21, 26 and
    27) [1123-8-C; 1126-8-E]

       Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, 1972 (3) SCR
        =
  329 (1972) 1 SCC 639; Saketh India Ltd. V. India Securities
B Ltd. 1999 (1) SCR 963 = (1999) 3 SCC 1; Sivakumar vs.
  Natarajan 2009 (9) SCR 386 = (2009) 13 SCC 623; Econ
  Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Anr. AIR 2013 SC 3283
  - relied on.

        K. V. Muhammed Kunhi vs. P. Janardhanan [1998
c CRL.L.J. 4330) - held in applicable.
        Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 37, 3rd Edn.,
    Paragraph 143 at Pages 83-84 - referred to.

                        Case Law Reference:
D
        [1998 CRL.L.J. 4330)    held in applicable para 9

           2009 (9) SCR 386     relied on            para 10

           1999 (1) SCR 963     relied on            para 23
E
           AIR 2013 SC 3283     relied on            para 24

        1972 (3) SCR 329        relied on            para 27

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
F   No. 434 of 2014.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 20.08.2010 of the
    High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Application
    No. 2226 of 2009.

G       V. Giri (A.C.), Huzefa Ahmadi, Anunaya Mehta, Mohd.
    Sadique T.A., Ejaz Maqbool, Tanima Kishore, Mrigank
    Prabhakar, Rohan Sharma, Hemantika Wahi. Parul Kumari for
    the Appearing Parties.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1115
               GUJARAT
     CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. According to the                 A
complainant-respondent No. 2, the accused-petitioner,
Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi was his friend, who had taken
a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only) from the
complainant :The petitioner issued a cheque dated 31st of
Decemb.er; 2005 towards repayment of the loan. The cheque            B
presented for payment by the complainant on 30th of June, 2006
was dishonour~d on the ground of insufficiency of funds on the
same dciy. A registered notice dated 25th of July, 2006 was
then sent by the complainant to which the petitioner replied. The
complainant then filed Criminal Case No. 2146 of 2006 on 5th         c
of-September, 2006 alleging commission of offence under
Section 138 ,of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Borsad, who took cognizance of the
o~ence and.,issued.summons to the petitioner.
                                                                     0
 v    '2. An application for discharge was filed by the petitioner
before the trial court inter alia contending that as a period of
six months had lapsed between the date of drawl of the cheque
on 31st of December, 2005 and its presentation by the
complainant on 30th of June, 2006 for payment, the petitioner        E
cannot be prosecuted. The prayer of the petitioner was rejected
by the trial court on its finding that the provisions of discharge
were not applicable to the' present proceeding, they being in
the'nature of summons trial.
                                                                         '
                                                                     F
     3. ·A criminal revision application against the aforesaid
order, filed by the petitioner before the Court of Sessions,
Anand was rejected by an order dated 5th of May, 2009, which
the petitioner assailed in a petition filed under Section 482 of
t~e Code of Crim.inal Procedure before the High Court. The           G
High Court by its ordefdated 20th of August, 2010 rejected the
application of the petitioner, observing as under:
 I   ~ -     ,   S1 b ~ .• ~   ,j;..~f·


           "7.··Though the submission has been made by the learned
                   . .,
                                                                     H
    1116     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A       counsel, Mr. Hakim raising the contention with regard to
        the limitation, bare perusal of the provisions of Section 138
        of the Negotiable Instrument Act, would make it clear that
        what law provides is presentation within a period of six
        months, meaning thereby, the Legislature has provided the
B       period of six months by way of limitation. It is also clear
        that each month may not have same number of days and,
        therefore, wisely what has been provided in terms of
        months and not exact date or days, meaning thereby, 180
        days. Therefore, cheque drawn on the last date of month
c       of December would remain valid for a period of six months
        and the period of six months would expire after the last
        date of June i.e. 30th June, 2006. Therefore, in the facts
        and circumstances of the case, as the cheque has already
        been presented on 30th June, 2006, it cannot be said that
        it is barred by limitation. Therefore, the submission made
D
        by the learned counsel, Hakim cannot be readily
        accepted."

         4. It is against this order that the petitioner has preferred
    this special leave petition.
E
         5. Leave granted.

         6. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel draws our
    attention to proviso (a) of Section 138 of the Negotiable
F   Instruments Act and contends that to attract its mischief the
    cheque is required to be presented in the Bank within six
    months from the date of its drawl. Otherwise, Section 138 of
    the Act would not apply. Section 138 of the Act, which is relevant
    for our purpose reads as follows:

G        "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
         funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a
         person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
         payment of any amount of money to another person from
         out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part,
H
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1117
   GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

    of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid,   A
    either because of the amount of money standing to the
    credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque
    or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
    account by an agreement made with that bank, such person
    shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,           B
    without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be
    punished with imprisonment for a term which may be
    extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to
    twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

     Provided that nothing containe~ in this section shall apply
                                                                      c
     unless-

      (a)   the cheque has been presented to the bank within
            a period of six months from the date on which it is
            drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever     D
            is earlier;

            xxx             xxx
    7. We are in agreement with Mr. Ahmadi and, in fact, it is
apparent from a plain reading of proviso (a) aforesaid that           E
Section 138 of the Act would apply only when the cheque is
presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the
date on which it is drawn or within period of its validity,
whichever is earlier.
                                                                      F
      8. Mr. Ahmadi then points out that the cheque is valid from
the date it is drawn and hence period of six months has to be
calculated from the said date. On facts, he points out that the
cheque was drawn on 31st of December, 2005 and presented
on 30th of June, 2006, which is beyond the period of six              G
months. He submits that cheque is valid from the date shown
in it and therefore for calculation of six months, the date on
which the cheque is drawn has to be included. He has
suggested the following two modes of calculation:
                                                                      H
    1118      SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A   "CALCULATION OF THE PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS AS
    PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 138 OF THE
    NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881.

       DATE OF DRAWL OF CHEQUE - 31.12.2005
B      DATE _OF PRESENTATION OF CHEQUE - 30.06.2006

           No. of days in the        Month-wise calculation
           relevant months

           January - 31 days         1st Month
c                                    31st December to 30th
                                     January
           February - 28 days        2nd Month
                                     30th January to 27th
D                                    February
           March - 31 days           3rd Month
                                     27th February to 30th
                                     March

E          April - 30 days           4th Month
                                     30th March to 29th April
           May - 31 days             5th Month
                                     29th April to 30th May

F          June - 30 days            6th Month
                                     30th May to 29th June
                                OR

           No. of days in the        Month-wise calculation
G          relevant months

           January - 31 days         1st Month
                                     31st December to 30th
                                     January
H
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1119
  . GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

     February - 28 days               2nd Month                     A
       .                              31 ST January to 27th
                                      February
                                                            .
     March - 31 days                  3rd Month
                                      28th February to 27th          B
                                      March

     April - 30 days                  4th Month
                                      28th March to 27th April
                                                                    c
     May - 31 days                    5th Month
                                      28th April to 27th May

     June - 30 days                   6th Month
                                      28th May to 27th June
                                                                     D
     9. To put the record straight, the modes suggested, in fact,
do not reflect his submission. He, however, submits that
whichever mode is adopted, the cheque was not presented
within the period of six months. In support of the submission,
he has placed reliance on a decision of the Kerala High Court        E
in the case of K. V. Muhammed Kunhi vs. P. Janardhanan
[1998 CRL.L.J. 4330] and our attention has been drawn to the
following passage from the said judgment:

     "3 ............ A comparative study of both the Sections in the· F
     ~ct and the General Clauses Act significantly indicate that
     the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date
     on which the cheque or instrument was drawn. The words
   . 'from' and 'to' employed in Section 9 of the General
     Clauses Act are evidently clear that in cases where there
     is an ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of G
     commencement of period of limitation in any Act or special
     enactment, the words 'from' and 'to' employed in Section
     9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service.
     But in the instant case before me, Section 138 proviso (a)
    ,.is involved which is so clear (as extracted above) that the H
    1120    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A       date of limitation will commence only from the date found
        in the cheque or the instrument."

      10. Mr Ahmadi submits that the aforesaid view has been
  approved by this Court in the case of Sivakumar vs. Natarajan
B (2009) 13 SCC 623 in the following words:

        "14 ............A comparative study of both the Sections in
        the Act and the General Clauses Act significantly indicate
        that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the
        date on which the cheque or instrument was drawn. The
C       words 'from' and 'to' employed in Section 9 of the General
        Clauses Act are evidently clear that in cases where there
        is an ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of
        commencement of period of limitation in any Act or special
        enactment. the words 'from and 'to' employed in Section
o       9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service.

        We are in agreement with the aforementioned view."

       11 . It may look like a repetition of the judgment but its
  relevance would be apparent from what we have observed in
E the subsequent paragraphs of this judgement.

        12. Given the general importance of the question involved,
    we had requested Mr. V.Giri, learned Senior Counsel, to assist
    us as amicus curiae and he very generously agreed to do so.
F   We have also heard Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel
    appearing on behalf of the respondents.

       13. They contend that the period of six months had expired
  on 30th of June, 2C06 i.e. the date on which the cheque was
  presented. which is within six months from the date it was
G drawn. They submit that as a general rule, in case of any
  amonguity. Section 9 of the Ger.era! Clauses Act, 1897 provides
  for exdusion of the first day and inclusion of the last day for the
  purpose of calculating commencement or termination of time.
  They submit that the date of issue of cheque, i.e. 31st of
H December,2005 is to be excluded and the last day. i.e 30th
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1121
   GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
of June, 2006 is to be included for the purpose of calculating      A
the period of six months under proviso (a) of Section 138 of
the Act. According to the learned counsel, since the last day of
the six months' period was 3oth of June,_2006 and the cheque
was presented on that very same day, the complaint under
Section 138 of the Act is not time barred.                          B

     14. We have given our most anxious consideration to the
submissions advanced and we do not find any substance in the
submission of Mr. Ahmadi that the cheque was not presented
to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which    C
it was drawn and the judgments relied on go against him
instead of supporting his contention.

     15. The first question which calls for our answer is the
meaning of the expression "month": whether it would mean only
a period of 30 days and, consequently, whether six months           D
would mean a period of 180 days. The word "month" has been
defined under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act to
mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.
Therefore we cannot ignore or eschew the word 'British
calendar' while construing "month" under the Act. Accordingly,      E
we are of the opinion that the period of six months cannot be
calculated on 30 days in a month basis. Therefore, both the
modes of calculation suggested by Mr.Ahmadi do not deserve
acceptance and are rejected accordingly.

     16. The next question which calls for our answer is the date
                                                                    F
from which six months' period would commence. In case of
ambiguity with reference to the date of commencement, Section
9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service and
the same reads as follows:
                                                                    G
     "9. Commencement and termination of time.-(1) In any
     Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement
     of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of
     excluding the first in a series of days or any other period
     of time, to use the word "from'', and, for the purpose of      H
    1122    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2014] 1 S.C.R.


A       including the last in a series of days or any other period
        of time, to use the word "to".

       17. From the judgment of this Court in the case of
  Sivakaumar (supra) and as quoted in the preceding paragraph
B of this judgment, it is evident that this Court recorded its
  agreement to a limited extent that "in cases where there is an
  ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of
  commencement of period of limitation" "Section 9 of the
  General Clauses Act can be pressed into service." We would
  hasten to add that this Court in Sivakumar (supra) did not give
C nod to the following proposition enunciated by the Kerala High
  Court in K. V.Muhammed Kunhi (supra).

        "3 ............. But in the instant case before me, Section 138
        proviso (a) is involved which is so clear (as extracted
D       above) that the date of limitation will commence only from
        the date found in the cheque or the instrument."

        18. In the case of K. V. Muhammed Kunhi (supra) the
  cheque was dated 17.11.1994 and that was presented on
E 17.5.1995, and in this background the Court observed as
  follows:

        "5 ..... When on the footing of the days covered by the
        British calendar month the period of limitation in the case
        on hand is calculated, the cheque ought to have been
F       presented in the Bani< for collection on or before 16-5-
        1995. But in this case, as pointed out above the cheque
        had been presented for collection only on 17-5-1995, which
        is clearly barred by limitation."

G        19. In this case, six months' period expired a day prior to
    the corresponding month. In the case in hand, no such day falls
    in the corresponding month and therefore the last day would
    be last date of the immediate previous month.

       20. Mr. Ahmadi appeals to us that if we take the view that
H the cheque was presented to the Bank before the expiry of six
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1123
   GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
months, it would be in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in    A
the case of Sivakumar (supra) and therefore the matter shall
be required to be referred to a larger Bench. From what we
have observed above, we have not taken a view different than
what has been held in Sivakumar (supra) and therefore we do
not find any necessity to refer the case to a larger Bench.          B

    . 21. Proviso (a) to Section 138 of the Act uses the
expression "six months from the date on which it is drawn".
Once the word 'from' is used for the purpose of commencement
of time, in view of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the
day on which the cheque is drawn has to be excluded.                 C

     22. This Court, relying on several English decisions, dealt
with the issue of computation of time for the purpose of
limitation extensively in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West
Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein Paragraph 5 states as               D
follows:

    "5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a
    distinction bet.ween a term created within which an act may
    be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The          E
    rule is well established that where a particular time is given
    from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the
    day on that date is to be excluded, (see Goldsmiths
    Company v. The West Metropolitan Railway Co. (1904
    KB 1 at 5). This rule.was followed in Cartwright v.
    Maccormack (1963) 1 All E.R. 11, where the expression
                                                                     F
    "fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy"
    in a cover note issued by an insurance company was
    construed as excluding the first date and the cover note
    to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren
    v. Dawson Bentley and Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135, a case          G
    for compensation for injuries received in the course of
    employment, where for purposes of computing the period
    of limitation the date of the accident, being the· date of the
    cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v.
     Chadman [1951] 2 KB 792 and In re North, Ex parte               H
    1124      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A       Wasluck [1895] 2 QB 264.) Thus. as a general rule the
        effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day
        within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day
        and to include the last day. [See Halsbury's Laws of
        England (3rd ed.) Vol.37, pp.92 and 95.] There is no
B       reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed
        consistently and for so long should not also be applied
        here."

                                                  (underlining ours)

c        23. This decision was quoted with approval in Saketh India
    Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1 in the following
    words:

        "7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which
D       the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section
        12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1)
        specifically provides that in computing the period of
        limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from
        which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
        Similar provision is made in sub-section (2) for appeal,
E
        revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated
        in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter
        alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the
        commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be
        sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series
F       of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from"
        and for the purpose of including the last in a S€ries of days
         or any other period of time, to use the word "to".

           8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule
G          enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently
           followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act
           and the Limitation Act.. ............. "

      24. The correctness of this judgment came up for
H consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Econ
 RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1125
   GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
Antri Ltd. vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 3283         A
which approved the reasoning of this Court given in Saketh
(supra) and Haru Das Gupta (supra) and held as under:

    "16. We have extensively referred to Saketh. The
    reasoning of this Court in Saketh based on the above
                                                                    B
    English decisions and decision of this Court in Haru Das
    Gupta which aptly lay down and explain the principle that
    where a particular time is given from a certain date within
    which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be
    excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning
    of this Court in SIL Import USA where there is no reference     C
    to the said decisions.

          xxx                    xxx               xxx
    22. In view of the above, it is not possible to hold that the   D
    word 'of occurring in Section 138(a) and 142(b) of the
    N.l.Act is to be interpreted differently as against the word
    'from' occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.l.Act; and that
    for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that
    the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on
                                                                    E
    which the cause of action arises, the starting day on which
    the cause of action arises should be included for
    computing the period of 30 days. As held in Ex parte Fallon
    (1793) 5 Term Rep 283 the words 'of, 'from' and 'after'
    may, in a given case, mean really the same thing. As
    stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3 1953 Edition,    F
    Note (5), the word 'of is sometimes equivalent of 'after'.

    25. At this stage, we would also like to refer to Halsbury's
Law of England, Vol. 37, 3rd Edn., Paragraph 143 at Pages
83-84 which provides for calculation of a calendar month:           G

    "143. Calendar month running from arbitrary date. When
    the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any
    arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the
    succeeding month immediately preceding the day
                                                                    H
    1126       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A          corresponding to the date upon which the period starts;
           save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar
           month which contains more days than the next succeeding
           month, the period expires at the end of the latter month."

       26. Drawing a conclusion from the above mentioned
8
  authorities, we are of the opinion that the use of word "from" in
  Section 138(a) requires exclusion of the first day on which the
  cheque was drawn and inclusion of the last day within which
  such act needs to be done. In other words, six months would
  expire one day prior to the date in the corresponding month and
C in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous
  month. Hence, for all purposes, the date on which the cheque
  was drawn, i.e., 31.12.2005 will be excluded and the period of
  six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from
  1.1.2006; meaning thereby that according to the British
D calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the
  30th day of June, 2006. Since the cheque was presented on
  30.6.2006, we are of the view that it was presented within the
  period prescribed.

E      27. Viewed from any angle, the prosecution is not time
  barred and therefore, cannot be scuttled at this stage on this
  ground. As the matter is pending since long, the learned
  Magistrate in seisin of the trial shall make endeavour to
  conclude it within six months from the date the appellant next
F appears in the case. We direct the appellant to appear before
  the trial Judge on 3rd of March, 2014 and no notice is to be
  issued to him for his appearance.

          28. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and
    it is dismissed accordingly.
G
    R.P.                                          Appeal dismissed.