RAMJI RAI AND ANR.versusJAGDISH MALLAH (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. AND ANR.

A                        RAMJI RAI AND ANR.
                                 v.
             JAGDISH MALLAH (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. AND ANR.

                                   DECEMBER 4, 2006

B                 [DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]


          Suit:

          Suit for permanent injunction-Restraining the defendants from
C interfering in possession of suit property-Duty of Court-Held: Court has
    to merely decide whether plaintiff is in possession or not and not ownership
    of title to the suit property-Specific Relief Act, 1963-s.38.

           Appellants filed a suit for a permanent injunction restraining the
D   respondents from interfering in the possession of the land in dispute as also
    from interfering in the construction of the boundary wall, on the ground that
    the disputed land was in their possession since long and utilized by them for
    different household purpose. Trial Court decreed the suit. Appellate Court
    set aside the decree holding that the appellants had failed to prove that disputed
    land was owned by him and that the boundary wall was constructed by them.
E   High Court upheld the same.

           In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that the suit was only for
    permanent injunction and not for declaration of ownership and, therefore, lower
    appellate court had erred in holding that the appellants had failed to prove
    their title to the disputed land.
F
          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

           Held: 1. The lower appellate court should have dismissed the suit filed
    by the appellants only on the ground that the appellants had failed to prove
     that they were in possession of the disputed lands. Under Section 38 of the
G   Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction restraining disturbance of possession
    will not be granted in favour of the plaintiff who is not found to be in possession.
    In the case of a permanent injunction based on protection of possessory title
    in which the plaintiff alleges that he is in possession, and that his possession
    is being threatened by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to sue for mere
H                                           28
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          RAMJI RAJ v. JAGDISH MALLAH (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. [KAPADIA, J.]29

        injunction without adding a prayer for declaration of his rights. (32-B-C)        A
              Mu/la's Indian Comract and Specific ReliefActs, 12th Edn., page 2815,
        relied on.

              2. The present suit is only for permanent injunction and, therefore, the
        lower appellate court should have, on the facts and circumstances of this case,   B
        confined itself to its dismissal only on the ground that the appellants have
        failed to show that they were in possession. This has been done but the
        declaration that the appellants are not the owners, was not necessary. (32-E)

             A.L. V.R. Ct. Veerappa Chettiar v. Arunachalam Chetti and Ors., AIR
        (1936) Madras 200, referred to.                                                   C
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5353 of2006.

              From the Judgment and final Order dated 2.4.2004 of the High Court of
        Judicature at Allahabad in S.A. No. 2839/198 I.
                                                                                          D
             Dr. R.G. Padia, Sushil Mishra, Tushar Bakshi and Naresh Bakshi for the
        Appellants.

              P.K. Jain for the Respondents.

             The judgment of the Court was delivered by                                   E
             KAPADIA, J. Leave granted.

               Plaintiff (appellant no. I herein) instituted Civil Suit No.202/77 for
        permanent injunction in the court of Additional MunsifMagistrate-VII, Ballia,
        against defendants-respondents. In the said suit appellant sought permanent F
        injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the
        land in dispute or from raising boundary wall. In the suit it was alleged that
        the appellants owned a house from the time of their ancestors; that their
        sehan was towards the south of the said house; that the said sehan was in
....    their possession even prior to the enactment of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and G
        Land Reforms Act, 1950; and that their cattle, palanis and troughs etc. existed

   ..   on the said land which was utilized by the appellants for different household
        purposes. The appellants further alleged that the disputed land was unbounded
        and that they had started construction of the boundary wall after leaving a
        sma\\ passage between their house and the sehan. The appellants further
        stated that they could not complete the boundary wall as they had to go to H
    30                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A Bombay where they were employed; that when they came back from Bombay
    to the village they started the work of reconstruction which was obstructed
    by the respondents and, therefore, they were compelled to file the suit for a
    permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in the
    possession of the land in dispute as also from interfering in the construction
B   of the boundary wall.

           The respondents denied the above allegations. They contended that
    the disputed land belonged to them; that the disputed land was used by them
    for different household purposes; that they had been in possession of the
    land in dispute for several years; that there was a passage between the house
C   of the appellants and the disputed iand in question; that the respondents had
    constructed a wall which could not be completed on account of the temporary
    injunction order obtained by the appellants in the present suit. The respondents
    further contended that the appellants were not tilling their agricultural land;
    that the appellants had let out their agricultural land to others and, therefore,
    there was no need of keeping any cattle or agricultural equipment on the
D   disputed land as claimed by the appellants.

          After framing the issues the trial court decreed the suit. The trial court
    held that the appellants were the owners and they were in possession of the
    disputed land.

E         Aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court, the respondents
    herein carried the matter in appeal vide Civil Appeal No.84 of 1979 in the court
    of Additional District Judge, Ballia.

           By judgment and order dated 21.9.1981, A.DJ. cam~ to the conclusion
    that the plaintiff-appellants had failed to prove that the disputed land was his
F sehan land; that appellant no. I had admitted in his statement that one
    Raghunath Rai was the real brother of his father; that separation had taken
    place in the family between the appellants and Raghunath Rai; that prior to
    the separation, the appellants and Raghunath Rai were joint; that at that time      ...
    they had a common sehan land and that the appellants sehan, at the time
G when the family was joint, was towards the east of his house. The lower
    appellate court further found that both the appellants and the respondents
    were claiming the disputed land as an area appurtenant to their building.             -'

    However, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the boundary
  · wall was constructed by the respondents and not by the appellants. The
    lower appellate court further found that the appellants had no direct access
H to the land in question; that there was a lane running between the appellants'
t-
       RAMJI RAI v. JAGDISH MALLAH (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. [KAPADIA, J.)31

     house and the disputed land in question; that the appellants were not using          A
     the disputed land as his sehan from the time of their ancestors; that the
     appellants had admitted that before the partition the present house of the
     appellants was used for keeping cattle and that the sehan of the appellants
     before the partition was towards the east and not towards the south of the
     house as claimed by the appellants. The lower appellate court further found          B
     that the respondents were using the land in dispute; they were keeping their
     cattle on the disputed land; they were keeping fodder and other agricultural
     equipments on the disputed land and in the circumstances the lower appellate
     court came to the conclusion that the suit land was being used by the
     respondents for their household purposes and they were in possession of the
     said land. In the circumstances, the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate       C
     court.

           Aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the lower appellate court, the
     appellants carried the matter in second appeal to the High Court. By the
     impugned judgment, Second Appeal No.2839 of 1981 was dismissed on
     2.4.2004. Hence this civil appeal.                                                   D
           As stated above, the lower appellate court vide judgment dated 21. 9. l 98 l
     dismissed the suit filed by the appellants. While dismissing the suit the lower
     appellate court held as follows:

                 "On consideration on the entire materials on record, as discussed        E
             above, I find that the plaintiff has totally failed to establish that the
             disputed land was ever possessed by him as his sahan land. He has
             also failed to establish that the construction upto the time of the filing
             of the suit was got raised by him. That bei1Jg so, the plaintiff is not
             proved to be the owner of the disputed land Therefore, he is not             F
             entitled to get any relief as claimed. In the result, the appeal succeeds
             and it must be allowed with costs." (underlined by us)

           Dr. R.G. Padia, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
     appellants, submitted that the lower appellate court and the High Court had
     erred in holding that the appellants were not in possession of the suit land         G
     as their sehan land. It was further argued that the boundary wall was under
     construction by the appellants and not by the respondents. Learned counsel
     submitted that in any event the lower appellate court had erred in stating that
     the appeilants have failed to prove that they were the owners of the disputed
     land. It was urged that the present suit was only for permanent injunction.
     It was urged that the appellants had never sought a declaration of ownership         H
    32                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A and, therefore, lower appellate court had erred in holding that the appellants
    had failed to prove their title to the disputed land.

          On the finding of facts, we do not wish to interfere. There is no reason
    to reverse the concurring findings. However, suffice it to state that the lower
    appellate court should have dismissed the suit filed by the appellants only
B   on the ground that the appellants had failed to prove that they were in
    possession of the disputed lands. Under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act,
    1963 an injunction restraining disturbance of possession will not be granted
    in favour of the plaintiff who is not found to be in possession. In the case
    of a permanent injunction based on protection of possessory title in which
C   the plaintiff alleges that he is in possession, and that his possession is being
    threatened by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to sue for mere injunction
    without adding a prayer for declaration of his rights [See: Mulla 's Indian
    Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 12th Edn., page 2815]

          In the case of A.L. V.R. Ct. Veerappa Chettiar v. Arunachalam Chetti
D   and Ors., AIR (1936) Madras 200, it has been held that mere fact that the
    question of title may have to be gone into in deciding whether an injunction
    can be given or not is not any justification for holding that the suit is for a
    declaration of title and for injunction. There can be a suit only for an injunction.
    The present suit is only for permanent injunction and, therefore, the lower
    appellate court should have,. on the facts and circumstances of this case,
E   confined itself to its dismissal only on the ground that the appellants have
    failed to show that they were in possession. This has been done but the
    declaration that the appellants are not the owners, was not necessary.

         Subject to above clarification, the appeal stands dismissed with no
F   order as to costs.

    D.G.                                                          Appeal dismissed.