Holding

The prosecution did not establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, so the convictions were set aside.

Summary

The appellants were convicted of murder under IPC s.302 read with s.34 based largely on circumstantial evidence, an eye‑witness statement recorded three days after the incident, and a recovered knife. The defence argued that the witness statements were inconsistent, the time of death could not be precisely determined from the post‑mortem, and motive alone was insufficient. The Supreme Court reiterated that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain of reliable facts and that suspicion cannot replace proof. It held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, noting gaps in the timeline, unreliable witness testimony, and lack of corroboration. Consequently, the convictions were set aside and the appellants were ordered to be released.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain a murder conviction
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt
Reliability of the post‑mortem determination of time of death
Whether motive alone can establish criminal liability
The evidentiary value of the recovered knife and the eye‑witness statement

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

circumstantial evidencemurderIPC 302IPC 34time of deathpost‑mortemrigor mortismotivebenefit of doubt

Judgment

A RAMREDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDY AND ANR.
v.
ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

MARCH 24, 2006

B [S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]
-
Criminal Trial:

Circumstantial evidence-Conviction based upon-Held, the prosecution
C must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and
clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain
of events as wpuld permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the
accused.

Appellant No. I along with one Shaik Abdul Rahman, accused No.
D 3 was prosecuted for committing murder of one Mohammad Rafiq Khan
and, on trial, was convicted for commission of an offence under Section
302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Appellant
No. 2 was convicted under Section 302 IPC. The trial court, relying on
the evidence of eye witness and whose statement before the police was
E recorded three days after the incident, in its judgment held him to be a
reliable witness and passed a judgment of conviction. The High Court did
not agree with the said views of the Sessions Judge, however, it upheld
the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge
holding that the Appellants quarrelled with the deceased and thus, motive
F is proved.

It was contended by the appellant that having regard to the
discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses, it cannot be said that guilt
of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubts. It was also
contended that recovery of the knife purported to be on the basis of the
G confession made by the Appellant No. 2 could not have led to conviction
of the other Appellants; and a part of the motive, i.e. dispute as regard a
woman having been disbelieved even by the trial court, as she, despite
having been cited as a witness in the charge sheet, was not examined, the
link in the chain to point to the guilt of the Appellants cannot be said to have
been established.
H 348
RAMREDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDYv. STA TE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 349
Allowing the appeals, the Court A
HELD: I.I. The time of actual offence having regard to the different
statements made by different witnesses may assume some importance as one
of the grounds whereupon the High Court has based its judgment of conviction
is the time of death of the deceased on the,basis of the opinion rendered by
the Doctor (P. W. 13). For the purpose of time of actual offence, taking into B
consideration the duration of rigor mortis, it was, therefore, extremely difficult
to purport the exact time of death of the deceased, more so when no sufficient
reason was assigned in the port-mortem report. (357-D; 358-D)

Pattipati Venkaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [19851 4 SCC 80 and C
Ram Udgar Singh v. State of Bihar, [2004] 10 SCC 443, relied upon.

State of Punjab v. Daljit Singh and Anr., (2004110 SCC 141, referred
to.

Modi's Medical Jurisprudence 22nd Edn. referred to. D
. 2.1. To base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and
clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain
of events as would permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused.
The circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well-settled E
that suspicion, however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for proof and
the couryXts shall take utmost caution in finding an accused guilty only on the
basis of the circumstantial evidence. [358-G; 359-A)

A nil Kumar Singh v. State ofBihar, [2003) 9 SCC 67 and Reddy Sampath
Kumar v. State of A.P., [20051 7 sec603, referred to. F
3.1. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap between
the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and
the deceased is found is so small that possibility of any person other than the
accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a G
case courts should look for some corroboration. [359-D, Cl

State of U.P. v. Satish, [2005) 3 SCC 114, relied upon.

Bodh Raj @Bodha and Ors. v. State ofJammu and Kashmir, AIR (2002)
SC 3164, referred to. H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A 4. I. Motive by itself is not sufficient to prove the guilt. [359-G I

State of MP. through CBI and Ors. v. Pa/tan Mal/ah and Ors., [2005] 3
sec 169, referred to.
4.2. The solitary witness, to prove the alleged motive, was examined by
B the police after two days. No reliance, thus, can be placed on his evidence.
[359-G]

5.1. Prosecution cannot be said to have established the guilt of the
Appellants herein beyond all shadow of doubt. The prosecution story has a
large number of loopholes and, thus the Appellants are entitled to benefit of
C doubt. [360-B-CJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 997 of
2005.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 17.2.2004 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 196/2002.
D
WITH
Criminal Appeal No. 291 of2006.

RP. Gupta, Jamshed Bey and Parmanand Gaur for the Appellant.

E Vinay Kumar, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy and Ms. Sneha Bhaskaran for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. lbe Appellant No. I herein along with one Shaik Abdul
F Rahman, accused No.3 were convicted for commission of an offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Appellant
No.2 herein was convicted under Section 302 IPC. They were prosecuted for
committing murder of one Mohammad Rafiq Khan on 14.6.1998. The said
offence was said to have been committed during the period between I0.30
G p.m. of 14.6.1998 to 5.00 a.m. on 15.6.1998. The deceased was a motor mechanic.
He and the Appellant No. I herein were friends. The Appellant No.2 and two
other accused were said to be his followers. A quarrel allegedly took place
between the deceased on the one side and the Appellants on the other at
about 9 p.m. on the said date near a theatre known as Durga Talkies in the
town of Kothagudem. The quarrel, according to P. W.8-Routu Narender, who
H was himself a jeep driver and parked his vehicle near the afore-mentioned
RAMREDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDY"· STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA, J.] J 5 J

theatre, was on two counts: (I) the jeep of the Appellant No. I had not been A
satisfactorily repaired by the deceased, although he had taken repair charges
in respect thereof; and (2) the deceased was yisiting a woman called Gugloth
Dasli, who was said to be his concubine, upon being questioned in that
behalf by the first appellant, the deceased, allegedly, retorted that he had been
paying money to the said Dasli and, therefore, no one could stop him from B
visiting her, whereupon he was allegedly threatened. The parties exchanged
hot words but P. W.8-Routu Narender and others are said to have intervened.
The deceased thereafter left for his residence in an auto. According to the
prosecution, at about I 0.30 p.m. on the same night, the Appellant No. I went
to the house of the deceased and called him on the ground that his jeep
required some repairs. P.W.1-Md. Anwar Khan, the elder brother of the C
deceased was said to be present. He came out with him from the residence
and allegedly saw the Appellant No. I on the road. He stated that on the body
of auto the word 'Swathi' was inscribed. He furthermore, is said to have
1 noticed the other two Appellants, i.e., Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 standing by its
· side. The deceased and the Appellants herein are said to have walked away.
At about 5.00 a.m. in the next morning, P.W.2-Mohd. Mohamood Khan, D
another brother of the dec~ased returned home from his workshop. Upon an
inquiry having been made as to whether the deceased had visited the workshop
on the previous night along with the Appellant, he answered in the negative.
The dead body was noticed by P.W.4-A. Venkateswarlu in the morning in
front of his house. As the deceased was known to P.W.4, he went to P.W.1 E
and informed thereabout. They came to the spot whereafter P.W.I rushed to
the town police station of Kothagudem Town. He, however, did not enter the
police station. He was standing on the road before the police station. P. W.5-
J. Srinivas, at about 6.00 a.m., was passing by the said police station for
shopping, P.W. l requested him to scribe a report on his behalf describing the
incident. P. W.5 accordingly scribed a report, which reads as under: F
"Yesterday i.e. on 14.6.1998 at about 10.30 Night time while I was
at my residence along with my brother by name Rafeek Khan. On
Ramreddi Rajesh Khanna came to my residence and called my brother
then my brother came outside I had also followed him and questioned G
my brother as to where you are going for which my brother told me
that Rajesh Khanna wanted to get his Jeep urgently repair by that
time one Auto was standing at a distance to my house. On the top of
the auto there was a name "Swathi" written in Telugu, by the side of
auto one Bankur Ravi, Machaboina Ramesh, S.K. Abdul Rahman @
Nathi Babu were standing; after some time the above said four persons H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A and my brother left the place in auto towards coolie line main road.
My brother did'nt return back on that night. Today i.e. on 15.06.1998
early in the morning at about 5.00 a.m. l asked my third brother by
name Mohd. Khan about Rafeek Khan whether he was at the shed on
the night for which he replied that he did'nt came to shed on the
night. At about 5.30 am one coolie line native by name Aguila
B Venkateswarlu came to me and said that my brother was found dead
in front of his house and said that there was a bleeding injury on the
neck. Then I along with Venkateswariu went and found the dead
body of my brother in front of Venkateswarlu's house. Neck of my
brother was cutted half. Causing death of my brother is that there was
c some galata taken place in between my brother ;and with Ramreddy
Rajesh Khana; Bankur Ravi; Manchaboina Ramesh; SK Abdul Rahman
@ Nathi Babu which taken place to Durga Talkies Centre of previous
night and the said incident took place regarding repair of jeep, bearing
the same in mind on the point of jeep repair taking my brother out
side the house and killed him."
D
The said Abdul Rahman was said to have been arrested from the house
of Appellant No.2 on 1.7.1998. P.W.5-J. Srinivas, however, states that when
he was scribing the First Information Report (FIR), the Appellants were
already in the lockup. The FIR was said to have been despatched immediately.
E Post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased started from ~
11.00 a.m. and was completed at about 1.30 p.m. In the post-mortem report
it was opined that rigor mortis was confined to upper and lower limbs and
presumably on the basis thereof the death was found to have taken place
between 1200 to 1500 hours.

F Before the learned Sessions Judge several witnesses were examined to
prove the prosecution case.

P.W.9-Dronapalli Chiranjeevi was said to be an eye witness. His
statement before the police was recorded three days after the incident. The
trial court in its judgment held him to be a reliable witness and passed a
G judgment of conviction, inrer alia, relying on his evidence holding:

"PW9 is also found to be a natural witness and he is returning to his
house after attending Annadanam Karyakram on 14.6.199& which
had taken place at Seven Hills Hotal Area, Kothagudem. This is
deposed that himself and one M.A. Isas Assha (DWI 8) were returning
H with a torch light as there was no electricity. It is also deposed that
RAMREDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDYv. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA, J.] J 53
it was a rainy night and there was drizziling. The natural sequence of A
the events deposed by PW9 cannot be over looked for the reason that
he is a planted witness. When he is returning from Annadana
Karyakram in Coolie Line, hearing cries in the street is a natural event.
On hearing cry there is every possibility of focusing the light towards
that side, which is in the natural fashion. PW9 focused a torch light B

-
and identified the deceased Mohd. Rafiq Khan and three others. In
all together he deposed four persons were present. He also specifically
·deposed that A-2 used a knife and cut the throat of the deceased and
the overt acts of A 1, A2 and A4 were stated before the court."

The High Court, however, did not agree with the said views of the c·
learned Sessions Judge opining:

"At the outset, we must make it clear that we are not inclined to
believe the evidence of PW9, the alleged eye-witnesses to the
occurrence who was examined by the police two days after the
registration of the crime though he was present at the scene of the D
offence at the time of the inquest, he never choose to infonn the
police about the fact that he had witnessed the murder."

Having gone through the testimony of the said P.W.9, we are also of
the opinion that the High Court was right in discarding his statement. The
High Court, however, upheld the judgment of conviction and sentence passed E
by the learned Sessions Judge holding that the Appellants quarrelled with the
deceased and thus, motive is proved which was witnessed by P. W.8.

According to P.W.8, the Appellants came to the house of the deceased
in an auto driven by P.W.6-Boosa Samba. They were allegedly seen together
by the first infonnant P.W.1-Md. Anwar Khan, the brother ofthe deceased, F
as also P.W.3-Rehmana Begum, wife of the deceased. In view of the opinion
of P.W.13-Dr. P. Venkateshwarlu, the death took place 12 to 15 hours prior
to the conduct of the post-mortem examination. The time of the death of the
deceased, thus relates back from 10.30 p.m. to 1.30 p.m. on 14.6.1998.

Mr. R.P. Gupta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the G
Appellants took us through the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and

- submitted that having regard to the discrepancies in the statements of the
witnesses, it cannot be said that guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
all reasonable doubts. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to Modi's
Medical Jurisprudence G11d Toxicology, 22nd Edition page 235 for the H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A proposition that it is difficult to determine exact time of the death and as no
reason has been assigned by the autopsy surgeon as to on what basis he
had fonned his opinion as regards the time of death, the same was not reliable.
The learned counsel urged that although as stated in the First Information
Report the auto in which the Appellants are said to have come to the
residence of the deceased, bore the inscription ''Swathi'', it was found that
B the same contained the inscription "Suverna".

It was submitted that the judgments of conviction and sentence passed -
by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court cannot be sustained as:

(i) P.W.l having not met P.W.8 before lodging the FIR, there was no
C way he could learn about the purported quarrel between the Appellants and
the deceased near the said Durga Talkies;

(ii) Recovery of the knife purported to be on the basis of the confession
made by the Appellant No.2 could not have led to conviction of the other
D Appellants; and

(iii) A part of the motive, i.e., dispute as regard a woman having been
disbelieved even by the trial court, as she, despite having been cited as a
witness in the charge sheet, was not examined, the link in the chain to point
to the guilt of the Appellants ca,nnot be said to have been established.
E
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other
hand, supported the impugned judgements stating that in the instant case, the
prosecution evidence must be held to have been proved as:

(i) The quarrel was witnessed by P.W.8;
F (ii) Thereafter the Appellants went to the house of the deceased, as
stated by P.W.6:
(iii) The deceased was last seen in the company of the Appellants
as was testified by P.W.1 and P.W.3:
G (iv) Recovery of knife from the accused No.2: and
(v) The approximate time during which, in view of the post-mortem
report, the offence was committed.

Indisputably, there is no eyewitness to the occurrence. Although the
deceased is said to be known to the Appellant No. I and they were on good
-
H tenns, but on what basis the Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 were said to be his
RAMREDDY RAJESHKllANNA REDDYv. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SB SINHA,J.] 355

associates is not known. In the FIR another accused, Appellant No.4 was also A
named. He, however, has been acquitted as none of the witnesses named in
their deposition or identified in the court. I4.6. I998 was a dark rainy night.
The quarrel was alleged to have taken place in a hotel. It was, however, stated
that the same took place on a road near Lakshmi theatre.

P. W.2, the brother of the deceased states that the deceased had come B
to the mechanic shed at 8 p.m. and left after one hour, i.e., at about 9 p.m.
He allegedly told him about the quarrel with the Appellants near Durga
Talkies. P. W.8 in his deposition however, stated that the incident took place
at 9.30 p.m. He, along with Bandaru Satvam Pendya Venkateshwarlu,
intervened in the matter. He came to know about the death of deceased Rafiq C
Khan at about 8 a.m. on the next day. He knew even the names of the
Appellants. He could also come to know how the deceased was done to
death. Although he claimed that he could identify the Appellants, no test
identification parade was held. He, however, did not volunteer to get his
statement recorded on I4th. He was examined by the police on 16.6. I998.
P.W.6, in whose auto the Appellants were stated to have gone to the house D
of the deceased, in his evidence said that the Appellants boarded his auto at
9 p.m. They went to a wine shop and took drinks. The auto stopped there for
about 20 minutes. He knew the Appellant No.2. Apparently, he did not know
the names of other Appellants. He stated that only one of the persons got
down from his auto and went into a lane, whereas others remained in the E
auto. After the deceased came, the other two persons also got down from the
auto and thereafter all of them walked towards Coolie line. According to him,
Appellant No. I refused to pay the fare. No test identification parade was also
held for him. He identified the Appellant No. I as the person who got down
from the auto only in the court. He was examined on 27.9.2001, i.e., after a
period of three years three months. He did not disclose as to how he F
remembered accused Nos. I and 4. According to him, the word written in his_
auto was "Suvema" and not "Swathi", as disclosed in the First Information
Report. The identity of the auto by the first informant, thus, became doubtful.
He allegedly informed the fact of non-payment of fare by the Appellant No.2
to one Bala Krishana at about I 0.30 in the night, i.e., after the Appellants left G

.. the house of the deceased. The said Bala Krishana had not been examined.
In his cross-examination, he stated that he had no acquaintance with Appellant
No.2. Jdentification of Appellant No.2 is, thus, rendered doubtful. He admitted·
that P. W. l accompanied with him to the Court. He allegedly came to know
about the death of the deceased at 7.30 a.m. next day.
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006 J 3 S.C.R.

A According to P.W.l, the Appellant No.I called the deceased at 10.30
p.m. He did not say that he had talks with P.W.6. When he went to the police
station, the Sub-Inspector of Police was present. He did not make any
complaint to him. According to the P. W.14-S.M. Surender Nath, the
Investigating Officer, P.W. l came to the police station at about 5.50 a.m. P.W. l
B accepted that he used to repair all the jeeps of deferent departments, including
the police department. One S.I. of Kothagudem JI town was also related to
him. Why. therefore, he did not go into the premises of the police station to
lodge the First Information Report and waited for someone to scribe the same
on the road makes his story doubtful.

C It remains a mystery as to how P. W. l could name all the accused
persons in the FIR. It is also surprising that although he reached the police
~tation at 5.50 a.m. and P.W.8 came to know about the death of the deceased
at about 8.00 a.m., how he could disclose in the FIR as regard the marner
in which the alleged quarrel between the Appellants and the deceased took
place near Durga Talkies. Shaik Abdul Rahman, who has since been acquitted,
D was not only named, but his alias name was also disclosed in the FIR. P.W. l
did not state either in the FIR or in his deposition in the court that he had
been knowing Appellant No. I and the other Appellants.

P. W.3 is the wife of the deceased. She is a pardanasheen lady. She had
not seen the accused persons. She was merely informed by P.W.I that the
E Appellants had taken her husband. P. W. l did not say so. Accused No.3 was,
however, not named, although, as noticed hen:inbefore, he was named in the
FIR. The accused Shaik Abdul Rahman, now acquitted, has not been named
-
as one of them, although, in the FIR his name has been disclosed.

F P. W.4 does not !hrow much light on the prosecution case. According
to P. W.5, he was going to shop at 6.00 a.m. in the morning. P. W.1, according
to him, was standing outside the police station. There was no reason for him
to do so. As noticed hereinbefore. according to him. even the Appellants
were in lock up of the said police station. P. Vv .1 is supposed to know the
officer of the police station but despite the same he did not go inside to lodge
G the FIR particularly when he was expected to rush there and inform the
officer in-charge about the dead body lying on the road.

The evidence of P.W.7 does not throw much light in this regard. P.W.1
.
does not state that he had met P. W.8. His name has not been taken by him.

H P. W.14, the Investigating Officer states that during his investigation he
-
RAM REDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDY"· STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA. J.] 357

examined one Kusapati Sreenivas. According to him, the Appellants were in A
his hotel at 9.00 P.M. on 14.6.1998. It is also accepted that on that day there
were rains and there was no electricity. He accepted that patrolling used to
be done in the area and the traffic constables remained posted from 8.30 p.m.
to 10.00 p.m. but no investigation appears to have been made as to why it
did not attract their attention.
B
The Appellant No. 2 is said to be a history-sheeter. His whereabouts
would be known to the police. Some of the prosecution witnesses are also
history-sheeters. Why the Appellants have been arrested after a fortnight has
not been explained. Although three police officers have been examined, none
of them stated as to why the Appellants could not be arrested prior to the said C
date. Why for writing the First Information Report, the assistance of P. W.5
was required to be taken by P.W. l, particularly, when one of their relatives
was a sub-inspector of Police in the said police station is left to imagination.
Although First Information Report is said to have been dispatched to the
. court at 0645 hours, nothing has been brought on record to show as to when D
it reached the court. The court being situated in the same town, it is difficult
to understand why it was sent at 0645 hours in the morning.

In this case, the time of actual offence having regard to the different
statements made by different witnesses may assume some importance as one
of the grounds whereupon the High Court has based its judgment of conviction E
is the time of death of the deceased on the basis of the opinion rendered by
Dr. P. Venkateshvarlu (P.W.13).

In Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, 22nd edition, as regard duration of
rigor mortis, it is stated:
F
"Average Minimum Maximum
Hours Minutes Hours Minutes Hours Minutes
Duration 19 12 '
.) 0 40 O"
of rigor
mo rt is
G
It was, therefore, extremely difficult to purport the exact time of death
of the deceased, more so when no sufficient reason was assigned in the post-
• mortem report.

In Pattipati Venkaiah V. State ofAndhra Pradesh, [1985] 4 sec 80, this H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A Court held:
"l 0. Another circumstance stressed by Mr Garg was that according
to the medical evidence the deceased must have died by about 5.30
a.m. on July 2, l 975 and no reasonable explanation has been given by
the prosecution as to why the dead body was taken to the hospital
B at about I 0.55 a.m. after about five hours when the hospital was quite
near. Hi:re, the learned counsel as also the trial court have committed
a serious error in the appreciation of evidence. A perusal of the
evidence of the doctor does not conclusively show that the deceased
must have died at about 5-6 a.m. Medical science is not yet so perfect
C as to determine the exact time of death nor can the same be determined
in a computerised or mathematical fashion so as to be accurate to
the last second." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ram Udgar Singh v. State of Bihar, [2004] 10 SCC 443, this Comt
held:
D
"I 0. Evidence of PWs I, 2, 3 and 5 clearly establishes the definite
role played by the accused-appellant. So far as the plea relating to the
time of death on the basis of medical evidence is concerned. emphasis
is laid on the fact that rigor mortis could not have set in, in the dead
body within two hours. The High Court has referred to several treatises
E on medical jurisprudence to conclude that the time which is usually
three to four hours may vary according to climatic conditions. We
find no infirmity in the conclusion. The courts were justified in holding
that the appellant was the assailant, and accordingly convicted him.
No exception could be taken to the well-merited reasoning squarely
F found supported by overwhelming, relevant. convincing and concrete
evidence placed on record by the prosecution in this case."

[See also State of Punjab v. Daljit Singh & Anr., [2004) IO SCC 141.)

In the Post-Mortem Report, apart from stating that rigor murtis were
G confined to both upper and lower limbs, no other reason has been disclosed.

Even the recovery of knife was said to have been made only from the
Appellant No. 2.

It is now well-settled that with a view to base a conv1ct1on on
H circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of
-
RAMREDDY RAJESHKHANNA REDDY 1·. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA,.I.) 359

incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the A
circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would permit
no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The circumstances
cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well-settled that suspicion,
however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts shall
take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of the
circumstantial evidence. [See Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, [2003] 9 B
SCC 67 and Reddy Sampath Kumar v. Stale of A.P., [2005] 7 SCC 603]

The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap
between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen
alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person C
other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.
Even in such a case courts should iook for some corroboration.

In State of U.P. v. Salish, [2005] 3 SCC 114, this Court observed:

"22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between D
the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen
alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility
of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime
becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively
establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there
is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between E
exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to cone lude that
the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be
hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case
there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were
seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence
of PW 2."
F

[See also Bodh Raj @ Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,
AIR (2002) SC 3164.]

It is, furthermore, well-known that motive by itself is not sufficient to G
prove the guilt. [See State of M. P. through CBI & Ors. v. Pa/tan Mallah &
Ors., (2005] 3 SCC 169, para 9.]

Furtht!rmore, the solitary witness, to prove the alleged motive, namely,
P.W.8 was examined by the police after two days. No reliance, thus, can be
placed on his evidence.
H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 3 S.C.R.

A It may be true that the Appellant No. 2 was a history-sheeter. It may
further be true that P. W. l instituted a case against the Appellant No. I for
threatening him when he was on bail. It may also be, that P. W. 7 did not
identify the Appellants as he was found shaking. If the Appellants are guilty
of other offences, they can be proceeded against appropriately and in
B accordance with law. We hope the authorities would do so.

But, keeping in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, we are of the opinion that the prosecution cannot be said to have
established the guilt of the Appellants herein beyond all shadow of doubt.
The prosecution story has a large number of loopholes and, thus, we have no
C other option but to hold that the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of
doubt. The impugned judgment is, therefore, set aside and the appeals are
allowed. The Appellants are directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in
connection with other case.

B.K. Appeals allowed.