Holding

The Board of Revenue may revise the Collector's order under Section 31 irrespective of a Section 32 endorsement, and the legal fiction in Section 32(3) is confined to evidentiary effect and does not render the endorsement final or binding.

Summary

Raymond Ltd. sought to sell its cement division and applied to the Collector under Section 31 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for pre‑assessment of stamp duty. The Collector, after valuation, assessed duty and, under Section 32, endorsed the deed of conveyance, after which the instrument was stamped and registered. The State of Chhattisgarh filed a revision before the Board of Revenue under Section 56(4) challenging the Collector's order. The Board issued a notice, which Raymond contested, leading to a writ petition that was dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the revisional power under Section 56(4) extends to orders made under Section 31 even after a Section 32 endorsement, the scope of the legal fiction in Section 32(3), and the meaning of "any party" in Section 56(4). The Court held that the Board may revise the Collector's order under Section 31 irrespective of any endorsement, that the legal fiction in Section 32(3) is limited to evidentiary effect and does not confer finality, and that "any party" includes both parties to the instrument. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under Section 56(4) of the Stamp Act with respect to an order passed by the Collector under Section 31 after a Section 32 endorsement.
The extent and effect of the legal fiction created by Section 32(3) of the Stamp Act.
The interpretation of the term "any party" in Section 56(4) – whether it includes both parties to the instrument.

Legislation cited

Indian Stamp Act, 1899s. 31, s. 32(3), s. 56(4)

Subjects

Stamp dutyRevisionLegal fictionSection 31Section 32Section 56Board of Revenue jurisdictionIndian Stamp ActAppellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A RAYMOND LTD. AND ANR.
v.
STA TE OF CHHA ITISGARH AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 20, 2007

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Stamps Act, 1899:

ss. 31 and 32(3) and 56(4) as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh
C and applicable in State of Chattisgarh-Assessment of stamp duty and
certificate by Collector u/s 32(3) endorsed on deed of conveyance-Revision
filed by State before Board of Revenue-Maintainability-Held, revisional
power contemplates a power to give final determination over order of
Collector passed in terms of s.31 irrespective of the fact as to whether an
D endorsement had been made thereupon or not.

s.32(3)-Legal fiction-Held is confined only in regard to receivability
of i11Strument · in evidence-It does not state that endorsement by way of
certificate would be final or binding on parties-Interpretation of statutes.

E s.56(4)-Revision-Scope of-Held, revisional power is to be exercised
by Board of Revenue either on its on motion or on an application by any
party-The term "any party" implies both the parties to the /is and not the
party filing an application u/s 3I alone.

Words and Phrases:
F )
· 'any party" occurring in s.56(4) of Stamps Act as amended by State of
Madhya Pradesh-Meaning of

Appellant no. I-Company intended to sell its cement division situate in
the State of Madhya Pradesh which on division of the State came under the
G State of Chattisgarh. With a view to preassess the stamp duty payable on the
instrument of sale, the appellant filed an application for adjudication of the
Collect.or in terms ofs.31 of the Stamp Act, 1899. The Collector formed a ..,...
valuation committee and on its report assessed u/s 31 of the Act the stamp
duty chargeable on the instrument and the registration charges. An

H 990
~-

RAYMOND LTD. v. STATEOFCHHATTISGARH 991
endorsement on the deed of conveyance was made by respondent no. 1 on A
-) 16.1.2001 by way of certificate in terms of s.32 of the Act. The instrument
was accordingly stamped and registered on 21.1.2001. However, the State
Government filed a revision application before the Board of Revenue seeking
revision of the order dated 16.1.2001 passed by respondent no. 2. The Board
of Revenue served a notice on appellant no. 1, which challenged the notice in
a writ petition before the High Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Board
B
of Revenue entertaining the revision application. After dismissal of the writ
petition, the present appeal was filed.
~
-+
It was contended for the appellant, inter alia, that question of
chargeability of an instrument would arise only at the stage of the proceedings
u/s 31 ofthe Act and not under s.32, and thus the Board of Revenue would
c
have no jurisdiction in the matter; that s.56(4) would not apply to s.32 of the
Act; and that legal fiction created u/s 32(3) must be given its full effect.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD:l. Section 31 of the Stamps Act, 1899 provides for the power of
the Collector to determine the duty with which the instrument would be
·I
chargeable, if an application in this behalf is made. The power to determine
the amount of stamp duty chargeable for the instrument is, thus, contained in
Section 31. If the applicant intends to challenge the said order before the
revisional authority, evidently it would not deposit the amount However, only E
because the determination by the Collector has been accepted pursuant
whereto a certificate has been issued, that by itself cannot be held to be binding
upon the State. Section 32 merely provides for the consequences flowing from
such determination. (Para 13 and 19) (996-H; 998-B)

\ 2. The legal fiction created in sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act F
._
is confined only to the effect that an endorsement when made, the document
shall be receivable in evidence and may be acted upon and registered as if it
had been originally duly stamped. The legal fiction does not state that the
endorsement by way of a certificate would be final or binding on the parties.
(Para 14 15) [997-B-CI G
Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 638 1 and
lshikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. Director ofIncome Tax, Mumbai,
(2007) 1SCALE140, relied on.

I. (2005] I SCR 790. H
992 SUP.REME
., '
COURT REPORTS [2007] 2 S.C.R .

A The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue, MadrC!s v.
Dr. K. Manjunatha Rai, AIR (1977) Madras 10, distinguished. ,\-

Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2004) 3 SCC 12; Consolidated
Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board, (1995] 1 SCC 3123; Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose, (1953) SCR 1 and State of WB. v. Union of India, [1964) 1
B SCR 371, referred to.
3. Sub-section (4) of Section 56 was inserted by way of a State
Amendment. The intention of the legislature in inserting the said provision
is clear and explicit as by reason thereof a power of revision has been conferred 'r ..._
upon lhe highest authority of Revenue in the State, viz., Board of Revenue.
C The n:visional power is to be exercised by the Board of Revenue either <in its
own miotion or on an application by any party. The term "any party" used in
the said provision implies both the parties to the tis and not the party filing
an application under Section 31 of the Act alone; The revisional power is to
be exercised by the Board so as to enable it to satisfy itself in regard to the
D amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty. The revisional
proceeding has a direct nexus with determination of an instrument being
charg7d with duty and not the endorsement made thereupon at a subsequent
stage. The revisional power contemplates a power to give final determination
over.the order of the Collector, i.e., an order passed in terms of Section 31 of
the Act irrespective of the fact as to whether an endorsement had been made
E thereupon or not. Section 32 does not provide for a finality clause and,
therefore, it is difficult to comprehend that the right of the parties to approach
the revisional authority in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act
shall _stand denuded. The said provision aiso must be given full effect to.
[Para 16, 22 and 23) [997-D-F; 998-E-F]
F •. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8167 of2003.

From the Judgment and final Order dated 10.9.2003 of the High Court
of Judicature, Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in W.P. No. 2451/2003.
I
Ashok H. Desai, Indu Malhotra, Vikas Mehta, Rajendra Barot, Shilpa
G Gupta and Shilpi Kaushik for the Appellants .

. Ravi Shankar Prasad, Suparna Srivastava, Pooja Matlani and Rajesh
Srivastava for the Respondents.
2. (2004) I SCR 306

H 3. (1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 632
RAYMOND LTD. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 993
The Judgment of the court was delivered by A
S.B. SINHA, J. I. Interpretation and application of Sections 31, 32 and
56 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short "the Act"), as amended by the
State of Madhya Pradesh, and are applicable in the State of Chhattsigarh is
in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated
10.09.2003 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Chhatisgarh High Court B
in Writ Petition No. 2451 of2003.

2. Appellant No. I herein is a public limited company incorporated
under the Companies Act, 1956. It had its cement division in the State of
Madhya Pradesh in the year 1982. It intended to sell the same in favour of
one Lafarge India Ltd. on "slump-sale" basis. The State of Chhatisgarh was C
carved out of the State of Madhya Pradesh in November, 2000. With a view
to pre-assess the stamp duty payable on the instrument of sale and the impact
thereof, an application was filed by the appellants for adjudication of the
Collector in terms of Section 31 of the Act which occurs in Chapter III thereof.
A report of a chartered designated valuer was enclosed with the said D
application.
+ 3. The Collector of Janjgir District, on receipt of the said application,
formed a Valuation Committee comprising of Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)
as Chairman, Sub-Divisional Officer (Building & Roads) PWD, Sub-Divisional
Officer (Forest) Champa, Assistant Mining Officer, Janjgir Champa and District E
Registrar, Janjgir Champa as members to inspect the properties and submit an
independent report in regard to the va!Uation of the properties sought to be
transferred. The Valuation Committee assessed the same at
Rs. 42, I 8,3 I,288/-. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said report, the stamp
duty chargeable on the instrument under Section 3 I of the Act was assessed F
by the Collector at Rs. 3,74,90,300/- and registration charges of Rs. 33,75,601/
-. The said order was accepted by the appellants and the amount of stamp
duty and the registration charges was deposited. An endorsement on the
deed of conveyance was made by Respondent No. 2 on 16.01.2001 by way
of a certificate in terms of Section 32 of the Act whereupon the instrument
was duly stamped. G
4. A deed of conveyance was executed by Appellant No. I in favour
of the said Lafarge India Ltd. on 19.01.2001 which was registered on 21.01.200 I.

5. The State appears to have filed a revision application before the
Board of Revenue seeking revision of the order dated 16.01.2001 passed by H
r
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 2 S.C.R.

A Respondent No. 2.
}._
6. On or about 26.12.200 I, however, the Board of Revenue served a
notice upon the appellants. Appellant No. I filed its objections in regard to
the jurir.diction of the Board of Revenue to entertain the revisional application
filed by the State. Questioning the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to
B issue the aforementioned notice, a writ petition was filed by the appellant,
which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.

7. Contentions of the appellants before us are:
+ .,._
(i) There exists a clear distinction between Sections 31 and 32 of the
c Act. Whereas a revision application shall be maintainable as against
an order under Section 31 of the Act, viz., at a stage where the
parties were yet to ascertain the impact of the duty whereafter
only the stamp duty which would be payable is to be determined,
the stage under Section 32 of the Act is reached, where the parties
accept the adjudication, pay the money and the document is
D certified with an endorsement that the full duty has been paid in
terms whereof a legal fiction is created under Sub-section (3) of
Section 32 of the Act.
(ii) The legal fiction created under Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the
Act must be given its full effect.
E
(iii) Section 56(4) of the Act would not apply to Section 32 thereof.
If Section 56(4) of the Act, which is a residuary clause, is otherwise
construe.d, Section 32(3) of the Act would be rendered meaningless.
(iv) If the intention of the legislature was to confer a power of revision
F against a decision of a Collector despite an endorsement made in
).
this behalf in terms of Section 32 of the Act, the same could have
been made subject to Section 56 as was done by the State of
Maharashtra while amending Bombay Stamp Act by inserting
Section 53A therein.

G (v) The High Court misdirected itself in referring to the statements of
Objects and Reasons which cannot be resorted to to interpret the
plain meaning of a statute.
,...
8. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents, would, on the other hand, support the judgment contending
H that Section 56 of the Act covers all situations and it is in fact a stand alone
-~

-
RAYMOND LTD. v. STATE OF CHHA TTISGARH [S.B. SINHA,].] 995
clause. A
-)
9. Before embarking on the rival contentions of the parties, we may
notice the relevant provisions of the Act.

10. Sections 31 and 32 of the Act read as under:
B
"31. Adjudication as to proper stamp. (I) When any instrument, whether
executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought
to the Collector, and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion
J, + of that officer as to the duty (if any) with which it is chargeable, and
pays a fee of such amount (not exceeding five rupees and not less
than fifty naye paise) as the Collector may in each case direct, the c
Collector shall determine the duty (if any) with which, in his judgment,
the instrument is chargeable.

(2) For this purpose the Collector may require to be furnished with
an abstract of the instrument, and also with such affidavit or other
evidence as he may deem necessary to prove that all the facts and D
circumstances affecting the chargeability of the instrument with duty,
or the amount of the duty with which it is chargeable, are fully and
truly set forth therein, and may refuse to proceed upon any such
application until such abstract and evidence have been furnished
accordingly:
E
32. Certificate by Collector. (1) When an instrument brought to the
Collector under section 31, is, in his opinion, one of a description
chargeable with duty, and-

(a) the Collector determines that it is already fully stamped, or
"\ F
(b) the duty determined by the Collector under section 31, or such a
sum !15, with the duty already paid in respect of the instrument, is
equal to the duty so determined, has been paid,

the Collector shall certify by endorsement on such instrument that the
full duty (stating the amount) with which it is chargeable has been G
paid.
-.{
(2) When such instrument is, in his opinion, not chargeable with duty,
the Collector shall certify in manner aforesaid that such instrument is
not so chargeable. ".
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 2 S.C.R.

A (3) Any instrument upon which an endorsement has been made under
this section, shall be deemed to be duly stamped or not chargeable >._ ..

with duty as the case may be; and, if chargeable with duty, shall be
receivable in evidence or otherwise, and may be acted upon and
registered as if it had been originally duly stamped"

B 11. Section 56 of the Act, as amended by the Indian Stamp (Madhya
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990, reads as under:
'
"56. Control of, and statement of case to, Chief Controlling Revenue-
authority. (I) The powers exercisable by a Collector under Chapter IV
and Chapter V and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 26
c shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling
Revenue-authority.

(2) If any Collector, acting under section 31, section 40 or section
41, feels doubt as to the amount of duty with which any instrument
is chargeable, he may draw up a statement of the case, and refer it,
D with his own opinion thereon, for the decision of the Chief Controlling
Revenue-authority.

(3) Such authority shall, after giving a reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the parties concerned, consider the case and send a
copy of its decision to the Collector, who shall proceed to assess and
E charge the duty (if any) in conformity with such decision.

(4) The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may, on its own
motion or on the application by any party, at any time for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the amount with which the instrument is
chargeable with duty, call for and examine the record of any case
F
disposed of by the Collector and may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit."

12. It is not in dispute that Sub-section (4) of Section 56 was inserted
by the Indiari Stamp (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 in the year
G 1990.
13. Section 31 of the Act provides for a power of the Collector to
determine the duty with which the instrument would be chargeable, if an .,._
application in this behalf is made. The power to determine the amount of
stamp duty chargeable for the instrument is, thus, contained in Section 31.
H Section 32 .merely provides for the consequences flowing from such
~·

RAYMOND LTD. v. STATEOFCHHATTISGARH [S.B. SINHA,J.] 997
-.""!""
determination. The Collector, in the event of fulfilling either of the conditions A
-) specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 32, is mandated
to certify by endorsement on such instrument that the full duty, which is
chargeable, has been paid.

14. Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act raises a legal fiction.
However, the said legal fiction is confined only to the effect that an B
endorsement when made, the document shall be receivable in evidence and
may be acted upon and registered as if it had been originally duty stamped.

~
' ~ 15. Legal fiction created under Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act,
therefore, does not state that the endorsement by way of a certificate would
be final or binding on the parties. c
16. It is true that Sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the Act does not refer
to Section 32 but the same, in our opinion, was not necessary. Sub-section
(4) of Section 56 was inserted by way of a State Amendment. The intention
of the legislature in inserting the said provision is clear and explicit as by
D
reason thereof a power of revision has been conferred upon the highest
authority of Revenue in the State, viz., Board of Revenue. The revisional
power is to be exercised by the Board of Revenue either on its own motion
or on an application by any party. The term "any party" used in the said
provision is of some significance. By reason of the said provision, not only
the State but also the person who had filed an application under Section 31 E
of the Act, thus, may file a revision application before the Board of Revenue.
The terms "any party", therefore, implies both the parties to the !is and not
the party filing an application under Section 31 of the Act alone. The revisional
power is to be exercised by the Board so as to enable it to satisfy itself in
regard to the amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty. The
~
F
revisional proceeding has a direct nexus with determination of an instrument
being charged with duty and not the endorsement made thereupon at a
subsequent stage.

17. Submission of Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellants, that the question of chargeability of an instrument G
with duty arises only at the stage of Section 31 of the Act and not under
Section 32 thereof, and thus, the Board of Revenue would have no jurisdiction
~
in the matter, cannot be accepted. Determination by the Collector is under
Section 31 of the Act. Thus, it is only that order which can be the subject
matter of revisional application.
H
t·
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 2 S.CR.
.....
A 18. Section 31 of the Act contemplates two situations viz. where the
)_ ..
Collector determines that the instrument brought before him was already fully
stamped or an additional amount of stamp duty is required to be paid. The
question of issuance of a certificate by way of an endorsement in either of
the cases would arise when the additional stamp duty, if any, is paid.

B 19. If the applicant intends to challenge the said order before the
revisional authority, evidently it would not deposit the amount. However, only
because the determination by the Collector has been accepted pursuant
whereto a certificate has been issued, by itself cannot be held to be binding
~
upon the State. ""
c 20. The Act deals with a fiscal matter. It was indisputably enacted
keeping in mind the revenue of the State, The amendment has been carried
out to see that no evasion in regard to collection of actual stamp duty payable
--.
on instruments takes place. The Act provides for determination of such
amount at different stages.
D
21. If an application under Section 31 of the Act is not filed, it would
be for the Registrar to do so at the time when the document is presented for
registration in which event the matter would be referred to the Collector.

22. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 32 does not provide for
E a finality clause.

23. In absence of any finality clause, it is difficult to comprehend that
the right oft.he parties to approach the revisional authority in terms of Sub-
section (4) of Section 56 of the Act shall stand denuded. The said provision
also must be given full effect to. It cannot be said that the revisional authority
F although is conferred with a power to satisfy itself as to the correctness or ,.
otherwise of the order of the Collector determining the quantum of stamp duty
payable to an instrument, it would not have any jurisdiction to do so only
because the order was accepted by one party to the dispute.

24. The' revisional power contemplates a power to give final determination
G over the order of the Collector, i.e., an order passed in terms of Section 31
of the Act irrespective of the fact as to whether an endorsement had been
made thereupon or not. ~

25. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Desai on The Chief
Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Dr. K.
H
"-1·
RAYMOND LTD. v. STATE OF CHHA TTISGARH [S.B. SJNHA,J.] 999
Manjunatha Rai AIR (1977) Madras I0, wherein a Special Bench of the A
-J Madras High Court has read finality and conclusiveness in an order passed
under Section 32 of the Act. In absence of power of revision, the detennination
made under Section 31 of the Act and consequent certificate granted in terms
of Section 32 of the Act was to be final. But, when a judicial or quasi judicial
order is subject to revision, the same cannot be said to be final.
B
26. Strong reliance has also been placed by Mr. Desai on a decision of
this Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State o/T.N. [2004) 3 SCC I, wherein inter
alia it was noticed:
! ~

"69. The Court went further to quote the position taken in St. Aubyn
v. Attorney General, [1951] 2 All ER 473 wherein Lord Radcliffe c
observed thus, "The word 'deemed' is used a great deal in modem
legislation. Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a
statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not
otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular
construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used D
to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious,
what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense impossible."

70. In Bhavnagar University v. Pc.litana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. it was
stated that the purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the
statute is well known. But when a legal fiction is created it must be E
given its full effect. It was held in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v.
Finsbury Borough Council (1951) 2 All ER 587:

"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you
must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the
consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had F
in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.
One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level ofrents.
The statute says that you must. imagine a certain state of affairs; it
does not say that having done so, you must cause or pennit your
imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of
that state of affairs." G

,, 27. It must, however, be noticed that therein the court has also noticed
a decision of this Court in Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board [1995J
I SCC 312 wherein it has been held that mere use of the word "deemed" is
itself not sufficient to set up a legal fiction.
H
f'
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 2 S.C.R.
~:

A 28. Furthermore, it is not the law that the court, irrespective of the )_..
nature, purp'ort and object of the statute, shall assign a meaning which was
not intended to be given by the Legislature. Legal fiction created in terms of
Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act was only in regard to the receivability
of instrument in evidence. The legal fiction for the aforementioned purpose
is raised only to the extent that for the said purposes it shall be deemed to
B have been originally duly stamped, viz., the determination of chargeability of
additional duty would be no significance ifthe additional duty determined by
the Collector, if any, has been deposited.
-I ..,__
29. In Maruti Udyog Ltd v. Ram Lal and Ors, [2005) 2 SCC 638, this
c Court held: <

"35. In construing a legal fiction the purpose for which it is created
should be kept in mind and should not be extended beyond the scope
thereof or beyond the language by which it is created. Furthermore,
it is well-known that a deeming provision cannot be pushed too tar
D so as to result in an anomalous or absurd position. The Court must
remind itself that the expressions like "as if is adopted in law for a
limited purpose and there cannot be any justification to extend the
same beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted. it."

[See·also lshikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd v. Director of
E Income Tax, Mumbai, (2007) I SCALE 140.

30. We, however, accept that ifthe meaning of the provision of a statute
is clear and explicit, it is not necessary to advert to the objects and reasons
thereof in view of the decisions of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose (1953) SCR I and State ofW.B. v. Union of India (1964) I SCR
F 371, as by taking recourse to the statements of Objects and Reasons, the
generality of the words used in the statute cannot be cut down. It is axiomatic
that an extended meaning thereof also cannot be given. If the contention of
Mr. Desai is 'accepted, an extended meaning will have to be assigned to Sub-
section (3) of Section 32 of the Act which is not contemplated under the
statute.
G
31. Reliance placed by Mr. Desai on Section 53A of the Act, as amended
by the Bombay Stamp Act, is again of no assistance inasmuch as an object \-'
can be achieved by different legislature by using different terms. Section 53A
of the Bombay Stamp Act makes Section 32 subject to Section 53A. It was
H probably done.by way of abundant caution. If a higher forum is provided, an
RAYMOND LTD. v. STATEOFCHHATTISGARH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 1001
order passed by a lower authority, whether the tenn "subject to" is used or A
not, shall be subservient thereto. When determination made by a statutory
authority is capable of being challenged by way of revision, it is axiomatic
that only the revisional order shall be final and not the order of the original
authority.

32. It is trite that no court can direct a matter to be governed by .a B
statute other than that which is really applicable. [See Neeraj Munjal and Ors
(Ill) v. Atul Grover and Anr., [2005) 5 SCC 404.

33. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this
appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at C
Rs. 50,00G/-.

RP. Appeal dismissed