Holding

The Gujarat Legislature was competent to enact the provisions under Entry 8 of List II and the restrictions on possession and manufacture of rotten gur are reasonable, non‑arbitrary, and do not violate Articles 19(1)(g) or 14.

Summary

The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of amendments to the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 made by the Gujarat Legislature that required a permit for possession of "rotten gur" in excess of a prescribed limit and regulated its manufacture. They argued that the provisions exceeded the State's legislative competence, violated Articles 19(1)(g), 14 and 301 of the Constitution, and were arbitrary due to a vague definition of "rotten gur". The Court examined the scope of Entry 8 of List II, which authorises State regulation of intoxicating liquors, and held that "rotten gur" could be used to produce illicit liquor, bringing it within that entry. Applying the reasonableness test, the Court found the permit requirement a reasonable restriction in the public interest and not arbitrary. Consequently, the amendments were upheld and the petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The Gujarat Legislature’s competence to enact provisions regulating "rotten gur" under Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.
Whether the provisions infringe Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by unduly restricting trade and business.
Whether the provisions violate Article 14 by granting arbitrary power to authorities.
Whether the restriction is a reasonable limitation under Article 19(6) in the interest of public health and prohibition policy.

Legislation cited

Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949s. 2(39A), s. 64, s. 64A, s. 70A
Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Subjects

legislative competenceBombay Prohibition Actrotten gurArticle 19Article 14public interestreasonableness testprohibition policy

Judgment

RAZAKBHAI ISSAKBHAI MANSUR! AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

DECEMBER 4, 1992

[L.M. SHARMA, CJ., S. MOHAN AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.J B

Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949: Sections 2(39A) and 64, 64A....J'Rotten
gur''-Prohibition of possession in excess of prescribed limit without pennit
and regulating manufacture-Legislative competence and Constitutional
validity of. .C

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19(l)(g)-Bombay Prohibition
Act, 1949-Sections 2(39A), 64, 64A-Whether violative of. ·

In the present Appeals, Writ Petitions and Special Leave Petitions,
the constitutional validity of the amendments made to the Bombay D
Prohibition Act, 1949 by which the possession of rotten gur in excess of the
prescribed limit without permit and regulating the manufacture etc. of
rotten gur, have been challenged.

On behalf of the appellants/petitioners, it was contended that gur
and jaggery being popular commodities were being consumed by humans E
and cattle and used in the preparation of sweets and Ayurvedic medicines
as also in certain industries; and the provisions under challenge were
causing serious difficulties in carrying on the business not only in "rotten
gur", but also in jaggery and gur, which were not "rotten" and therefore
they are violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 of Constitution of India. It F
was further contended that the amendments were ultra vires the Cons.titu-
tion on the ground of lack of legislative competence; that the amendments
were also violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as the Police and other
authorities were vested with arbitrary and uncontrolled power.

Dismissing the appeals/petitions, this Court G

HELD: 1.1. Section 64 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 prohibits
possession by a person of "rotten gur" in excess of the prescribed quantity
without a valid permit. Similar is the provision in section 64A regulating
the manufacture etc. of "rotten gur". It is only the regulatory power which H
369
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A has enabled the State Legislature to make the impugned provisions requir-, -
ing the person concerned to take a permit. There is no grievance that the
fee payable for such a permit is in any way excessive. In the circumstances,
the Legislature of the Respondent-State was_ fully competent to enact the
Amendment Act. [374-F, G]
B 1.2. The Respondent-State is i~plementing the policy of prohibition
of intoxicating liquor, as envisaged in the Directive Principles contained
in Article 47 .of the Constitution. It is this policy which has led to the
enactment of the provisions under challenge. So far as the Gur (Regulation
of use) orders 1968 is concerned, it was a measure adopted to eliminate
C covert trade practices which cause artificial scarcity of essential -com-
modities or pushes their prices to an unjustifiably ·high level to the
prejudice of the general public. It has, therefore, to be noticed that the
1968 Order is m~de applicable to only gur. It do_es not extend to "rotten
gur" as defined and dealt with by the amended provisions of the_ principal
D Act in that it has the potentiality of being used for manufacture of
intoxicating liquor. Therefore, in pith and substance it is a law relating to
intoxicating liquor providing for regulatory measure and squarely falls
under Entry 8, List II of Seventh Schedule. If the manufacture of liquor
could be prohibited, certainly its manufacture with rotten gur could be
regulated; Entry 8 confers the necessary competence on the State Legisla-
E lure to enact laws for such regulation. Also the 1968 Order excludes
alcohol from its purview because it is covered by Entry 8 of List It It is,
therefore, incorrect to state that the State legislature was lacking in
legislative competence in passing the Amendment Act. [376-D-HJ

p Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Others v. State_ of U.P. and Others,
[1990) 1 S.C.C. 109, distinguished.

State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, [1951) S.C.R. 682, referred to.
)-

2.1. The test of reasonableness shoul_d be applied to each individual
G, statute which is challenged. No abstract standard, or general pattern of
rea~onableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of
the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,
the disproportion of the imposition, the. relevant prevailing conditions,
H should all enter into the judicial verdict. The limitations in enjoyment of
R.I. MANS URI v. STATE OF GUJARAT 371

the right should not, however, be arbitrary or of an excessive natu~. It A
should not be more than what is essential in the interests of the public. ·
.
(379-G, H & 380-A]
2.2. The problem faced by the Respondent-State was that un-
scrupulous pei-sons while pretending to be engaged in business of "rotten
gur" or for that matter, 'gur' were aiding and abetting ·bootlegging on large B
scale. For checking effectively this illegal activity it was considered neces-
sary to require a person in possession of ~rotten gur" in excess of the
prescribed quantity to obtain a permit. This would help the administration
in keeping a vigilant eye on the violaters of the law. On the basis of the
materials on record it is evident that such steps were taken after a detailed, . C
careful and deep deliberation of the problem and its solution and that the
amendments fully satisfy the public interest test. [382-C-E] ·

2.3. By whatever reason it may be, the article viz. gur which harmless .
is converted quickly into the form in which it acquires the potentiality of
being misused for the purpose of preparing· intoxicating liquor. If this D
mischief is not taken care of, it will become difficult to effectively imple- ·
ment the policy of prohibition. For the purpose of Prohibition Act, it can
define rotten gur even if it is fit for human consumption in such a way to
eliminate the mischief. The restriction, therefore, is fully justified and
cannot be condemned as excessive or unreasonable. [383-A-C] E
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Write Petition (Civil) No. 12532 of
1995.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
F
WITH

(Civil Appeals Nos. 4407/85, 4408/85, 4406/85, 1863/86, 1864/86,
1865/86 and 1866/86, Special Leave Petitions (c) Nos. 9501-02/80 ~nd
2493-97/81 and Writ Petitions (c) Nos. 1536-69/82, 6917-43/82, 8485/82,
12669/85, 596/86, 605/86, 533/87, 718/87, 1547/87, 114/88; 554/88, 638/88, G
730/88; 747/88, 1025/88, 1162/88, 77/89, 591/89, 736/89, 881/89, 548/90,.
12714/85, 12716/85, 12717/85, 12718/85, 76/89, 1090/91, 1130/89 and
12715/85.)

Ashok Desai, S. Ganesh, P.H. Parekh J Sagar and J.M. Khanna for H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the Appellant/Petitioners in CA 4407/85, 4406/85 SLP Nos. 9501- 02/80,
2493-97/81, W.P. Nos. 1536-69/82, 6917-43/82, 8485/82, 12532, 12669/85,
596/86, 605/86, 533/87, 718/87, 114/88, 544/88, 638, 730, 1162/88, 77, 591,
881/89, 548/90, 12714, 12716, 12717, 12718/85 and 12532/85.

P.S. Poti, R. Karatijawala; Ms. Nandini Gore, Rajiv Nayyar, Ms. M.
B Karanjawala, Ajay Malviya and· Rajesh Kumar for the Respondent. ~ .....
r

M.N. Shroff for the Respondent in C.A. Nos. 4407/85, W.P. Nos. 554,
638, 730, 747, 1025/88, 77, 591, 736/89, 12714, 12716, 12717, 12718/85 and
76/89.
c S.C. Patel for Respondent in C.A. No. 4407/85 and Petitioners in
W.P. No. 1547/87.

Ram Avtar Gupta for the Respondent in C.A. No. 4407/85.

S.S. Khanduja, Yashpal Dhingra, Baldev Krishan Satija for the
D
Respondent in C.A.. Nos. 4407/85 and Appellant.in C.A. No. 4408/85,
1863-66/85.

Vimal Dave and Krishan Kumar for the Respondent in C.A: Nos.
4407/85 and for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 747/88.
E
C.V.S. Rao for the Respondent in W.P. No. 12669/85.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHARMA, CJ. The petitioners in all these cases (including the
F appellants in the civil appeals) have challenged the constitutional validity
of the amendments made to the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (for short
"the principal Act") by the Gujarat Legislature prohibiting possession of
rotten gur in excess of the prescribed limit without a permit and regulating
r
manufacture etc. of rotten gur. The provisions which have been challenged
are those of section 2 (39A) defining "rotten. gur", section 64 imposing
G restriction on possessi'on of "rotten gur", section 64A regulating manufac,
ture etc. of "rotten gur" and s.70A providing for imposition of punishment
for contravention of the relevant statutory provisions. It has .been con- .
tended on behalf of the petitioners that gur and jaggery are popular
commodities, consumed by humans and cattle and used in the preparation
H of sweets and Ayurvedic medicines as also in certain industries; and,
R.I.MANSURI v. STATEOFGUJARAT[SHARMA,CJ.] 373

consequently the proVisions under challenge are causing serious difficulties A
in carrying on the business. not only in "rotten gur'; but also in jaggery and
gur, which are not "rotten". ·

2. The main points raised in support of the present petitions (includ-
ing the civil appeals) are mentioned below:- .
B
(i) The impugned amendments are ultra 'Vires on the
ground of lack of legislative competence. Entry 8, List II
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, under which
the State legislature has purported to act, does not cover
the subject matter; and Entries 26 and 27 of List II of the
Constitution being subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of
c
List III are not available as the legislative field referable
to Entry 33 of List III is occupied by the· Gur Control
Order, 1968 read with Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

(ii) As a result of the impugned amendments, the police D
and the other authorities of the State have been vested
with arbitrary and uncontrolled power. The same is viola-
tive of Article 14 of the Constitution.

(iii) Even otherwise also the impugned provisions arc.
violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 301. E
3. Mr~ Ashok Desai, appearing i,n writ petition No. 12532 of 1985,
arguing on the question of legislative competence, contended that none of
the entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Cop.stitution authorises
the Gujarat Legislature to incorporate the impugned provisions in the
principal Act. Referring to the entries in the List the learned counsel
F
proceeded to say that at the most, it is only three entries, i.e., 8, 26 and 27,
which can be said to have some relevance in the present context. Yet, none
of them can cover the present case.

4. Entry 8 reads thus:- G
"8. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production,
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of
intoxicating liquors."

· · The learned counsel challenged the correctness of the judgment impugned H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A in the civil appeals and the special leave petitions. According to him, the
High Court had since relied on the observations of this Court in the State
of Bombay v. F.N: Balsara, [1951] S.C.R. 682,· for holding that the amplitude
of Entry 8 was wide enough to cover the present legislation, such con-
clusion cannot. be sustained as the observations in Balsara's case are no
longer good law after the decision in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and
B others v. Stqte of U.P. and others, [1990] 1 S.C.C. 109. The judgment in . ·-
Synthetics and Chemical's· case was placed before us at some length, and
L
reliance was placed on paragraphs 27 and 29, where Balsara's case is
discussed and on paragraphs 41, 50-52 and 54, where the scope of Entry 8
is indicated. The argument is that in view of this lates.t Constitution Bench
c decision, Entry 8 cannot be construed as widely as it was done earlier.

5. We have examined the contentions very closely but·do not find any
merit in them. The argument overlooks the fact· that the observations in
Synthetics and Chemical's judgment, relied upon on behalf of the
. .n petitioners, were made in the context of power to levy 'vend fee' on
industrial alcohol. That very decision upholds the State's authority to
regulate the use of alcohol, which necessarily includes the power to make
provisions for preventing circumvention of the law. Paragraph 63 of the
main judgment positively recognised this power and then proceeded to
examine whether the provision which was under consideration in that case,
E ·was in substance regulatory or not. In his concurring judgment Mr. Justice
Oza also reiterated this aspect. In the cases before us we are concerned
only with the scope of regulatory power of the State. Section 64 prohibits
possession by a person of "rotten gur" in excess of the prescribed quantity
without a valid permit. Similar is the provision in section 64A regulating
the manufacture etc. of "rotten gur''. It is only the regulatory power which
F
has enabled the State Legislature to make the impugned provisions requir-
ing the person concerned to take a permit. There is no grievance that the
fee payable for such a permit is in any way excessive. We, in the circumstan-
ces, hold that Gujarat Legislature was fully competent to enact the Amend-
ment Act.
G
6. We also do not find any merit in the argument based on Entries
26 and 27 of List II. It has been urged that they deal with production,
supply, distribution, track and commerce, and are subject to the provisions
of Entry 33 of List III. The State legislature could not have, therefore, made
H the impugned amendments as the field was already occupied by Gur
.
R.I. MANSUR! v. STATE OFGUJARAT[SHARMA, CJ.] 375

(Regulation of Use) Order, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as '1968 Order'), A
made under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Entry 33 of
the concurrent list is in the following terms:-

"33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply
and distribution of, -
B
(a) the products of any industry where the control of such
industry by the Union is .declared by Parliament by law to
be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods
of the same kind as such products;

(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; c
(c) cattie fodder, including oilcakes and other con-
centrates;

(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton
seed; and D

(e) raw jute."

Mr. Desai contended that clauses (b) and (c) of Entry 33 covered posses-
sion etc. of gur and since 1968 when the aforesaid Order was made, the E
field became occupied and, therefore, not available for the exercise of
State's legislative power. Reference was made to clause 3 of 1968 Order,
which reads as follows:-

"3. Regulation of use of gur.
F
No person shall use gur for any purpose other than for
the purpose of -

(a) consumption in the form of gur; or

(b) preparation of any article (not being alcoholic liquor) G
used as food or drink [or medicine) for human consump-
tion; or

(c) cattlefeed:

[Provided that the Central Government or any officer H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A authorised by it in this behalf, may, by order in writing,
permit the u,se of gur for the following purposes, namely:-

(i) use in tobacco industry;

(ii) use in leather tanning industry;
B
(iii) use in chemical industry;

(iv) any other industrial use.]"

It is significant to note that clause 3(b) above, of the Order excluded from
C its scope the regulation of gur in relation to its use for preparing alcoholic
liquor by the use of words "not being alcoholic liquor", within brackets, in
the sub-clause. The field for the State Legislature to enact the impugned
provisions and incorporate them in the principal Act is thus, left un-
touched. There is another relevant aspect which needs consideration.
D Section 64 prohibits the possession of "rotten gur" in excess of the
prescribed quantity without a permit and section 64A deals with regulation
of manufacture, use or consumption of "rotten gur". The State: of Gujarat
is implementing the policy of prohibition of intoxicating liquor, as en- .·
visaged in the Directive Principles contained in Article 47 of the Constitu-
tion. It is ·this policy which has led to the enactment of the impugned
E provisions .. So far as the 1968 Order is concerned, it was a measure adopted
to eliminate covert trade practices which cause artificial scarcity of essen-
tial commodities or pushes their prices to an unjustifiable high level to the
prejudice of the general public. It has, therefore, to be noticed that the
1968 Order is made applicable to only gur. It does not extend to "rotten
F gur" as defined and dealt with by the amended provisions of the principal
Act in that it has the potentiality of being used for nia.nufacture of intoxicat-
ing liquor. We are, therefore, of the considered view that in pith and
substance it is a law relating to intoxicating liquor providing for regulatory
f·
measure and squarely falls under Entry 8, List II of Seventh Schedule. As
\
rightly urged by Mr. Subramania Poti, learned counsel for the respondent,
G if the manufacture of liquor could be prohibited, certainly its manufacture
with rotten gur could be regulated. Entry 8 confers ·the necessary com-
I
{
)
petence on the State Legislature to enact laws for such regulation. We may ....
also add that 1968 Order excludes alcohol from its perview because it is
covered by Entry 8 of List II. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the
H State legislature was lacking in legislative competence in passing the
R.I. MANS URI v. STATE OF GUJARAT (SHARMA, CJ.] 377

Amendment Act. A

7. The arguments pressed on behalf of the petitioners based on
Articles 19(1)(g), 301 and 14 are 'over-lapping and the learned counsel
referred to the common materials and circumstances, in their support. It
has been contended that the definition of "rotten gur" is imprecise and
capable of being understood w}dely and in different senses. The enforcing B
authorities are thus armed with wide discretion to act on their individual
whims. This gives a handle to police officers to misuse their power to
serious prejudice of persons who are genuinely interested in doing business
in gur alone and who are not interested at all in "rotten gur". On the pretext
of examining whether 'gur' is so much deteriorated in quality as would C
bring it within the term "rotten gur" the police officers take unfair steps so
as to cause great hardship to the genuine traders dealing in 'gur' al6ne.
The concentration of arbitrary power in the enforcement machinery in the
absence of a scientific basis for determination whether 'gur' has
deteriorated to such an extent that it can be called "rotten gur" violates
Article 14 of the Constitution.'"The inevitable result is the closure of all D
business in 'gur' which robs the people of their right to carry on the
business of their choice guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). The restrictions
imposed under the impugned Amendments have been described as too
remote from the object sought fo l)e achieved by the law and, therefore,
cannot justify their constitutional validity. E

8. The learned counsel has, in support of the above argument,
referred ·to a publication under the name of Monograph on the Gur
Industry of India (referred to by the learned counsel as the 'Monograpp')
brought out in 1951 by the Indian Central Sugarcane Committee of the F
Indian Institute of Sugar Technology, Kanpur. The expression "rotten gur"
has been defined by section 2 (39A) as mentioned below:-

"2(39A) "rotten gur" means the article known as gut, gul,
jaggery, palmyra jaggery or rab and other intermediary
product prepared by boiling or processing juice pressed G
out of sugar cane or e?Ctracted from palmyra palm, date
palm, sogo palm, prabpalm or coconut palm, with or
without admixture of molasses, and which is in a liquid
form of a semi-liquid or viscous form and which has a
dark brown or a black colour or which, inspite of being H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A in ·a solid liquid, semi-liquid or viscous form, is unfit for
human consumption owing to it becoming filthy, putried,
disguesting or decomposed."

The above definition, according to the learned counse~ is wide enough to
include even 'gur' of good quality before its deterioration. It is suggested
B that the definition should have been in more precise terms. If a challenge
is made to the view taken by the enforcement authority about the article
being "rotten gur" ·it could be done by relying on some scientific method.
A comparison has been made with the definition of "rotten gur" in the
Order dated 3.5.1950 issued by the State of Maharashtra under the Bombay
c Prohibition Act as:

"gur containing less than ~0% sucrose and more than 20%
sugar."

to the definition of the term under the subsequent Order dated 6.11.1958
D in section 2 ·.as mentioned below:

"2.(b) "rotten gur" means gur which is unfit for human
consumption or the consumption .of which is injurious to
health

E Explanation: (1) 'Gur' shall be deemed· to be unfit for
human consumption or the consumption of it shall be
deemed to be injurious to health if it is of dark brown
,·colour, with strong smell or if, on chemical analysis it is
found to contain more than 15% of reducing sugars or
less than 70% of total sugars."
F
(omitting the other sub-sections)

Similar extracts from the Prevention of Food and Adulteration Act and
Rules thereunder are also placed before us. The Monograph has been
G relied upon for showing that the physical features of 'gur' in different parts
of the country are not .th~ same and that gur is actually transported from
long distances to Gujarat. The·transportation takes time and deterioration
sets in, on the way. It is, therefore, contended that a wider definition as
mentioned in section 2(39A) is too misleading for judging whether gur
transported from different parts of the country has become rotten or not.
H Mr. Ganesh, who appeared for the petitioners in Special Leave Petition
R.I. MANSUR! v. S1:"ATE OF GUJARAT (SHARMA, CJ.] 379 ,

No. 8501 of 1980, emphasised the fact that at the time the 'gur' from Bihar A
or Tamil Nadu is loaded on vehicles for transport it is in perfectly good
condition but when the same arrives on the borders of Gujarat, some
portion of it deteriorates to such an extent as to answer the description of
"rotten gur" in section 2(39A). The result is that a bonafide trader in 'gur"
suddenly lands into the hands of the unscrupulous police officers armed
B
with the vague defini_tion of "rotton gur" inserted into the principal Act by
the Amendment Act. The learned counsel also made a grievance against
the fixation of the quantity of "rotten gur" exempted from the requirement
of a permit under the Rules as unreasonably small.

9. While considering the argument, addressed on behalf of the C
petitioners, it should be kept in mind that the impugned provisions do not
place absolute restriction or prohibition either against the possession of
"rotten gur" or the manufacture, use or consumption thereof. The law
requires only a permit to be taken in advance and admittedly there is no
hurdle in obtaining such a permit which is readily available on the payment D
of a nominal fee. The purpose of the permit is to make available informa-
tion to the authorities concerned as to the persons dealing in "rotten gur"
to facilitate vigilance against misuse of "rotten gur" for preparation of
intoxicating liquors. There is absolutely no difficulty in obtaining such a
permit in advance which will be a complete remedy for all the hardships
highlighted on behalf of the petitioners. The grievance of the petitiqner is E
that the requirement to obtain permit is violative of the freedom to carry
on any trade and business of one's choice guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g).
We do not find any substance in the argument that the restriction com-
plained against, can be considered to be such a hindrance as to infringe
Sub-clause (g). The freedom is not uncontrolled and Clause 6 of Article F
19 authorises legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this right
in the interests of the general public. The question, therefore, is whether
the restriction placed by the impugned amendment is in the interests of the
general public and can be considered reasonable.

10. It has been repeatedly observed by this Court that the test of G
reasonableness should be applied to each individual statute impugned. No
abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down
as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent of
the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the relevant prevailing conditions, should all enter into the judicial verdict.
The limitations in enjoyment of the right should not, however, be arbitrary
or of an excessive nature. In other words it should not be more than what
is essential in the interests of the public.

. 11. Although the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in
B Part IV of the Constitution are not enforc~able by Courts, nonetheless it
is the duty of the State to give effect to those principles by making
appropriate laws. It has been described as matters of constitutional obliga-
tion of the State to do so in the public interest. A large body of legislation
under Article 19(1)(g) when challenged, has been upheld by Courts, as
c being in furtherance of such policy, as valid on the gr"ound of the Directive
Principle. So far the intoxicating drinks are concerned their evil effects are
well established specially for the Indian society. This was why the framers
of the Constitution considered it fit to include it, in expressed terms, in
Article 47 while indicating the duty of the State to raise the standard of
D living a~d to improve the public health. It is, therefore, within the authority
of the State to prohibit consumption of intoxicating liquor and the State of
Gujarat was .fully justified when it adopted the policy of prohibition. In
order that this policy may succeed, it is not sufficient to merely ban
manufacture and consumption of alcoholic drinks. To render it really
effective further measures became essential in order to defeat the illegal
E activities of the anti-social elements engaged in illicit manufacture and
illegal distribution of the liquor in. the market. It, therefore, became
obligatory for the State to take all such steps as found necessary for
implementing the prohibition policy, by not only placing restrictions on the
manufacture, sale and consumption of liquors but also by adopting such
F other regulatory measures, essential to achieve the objective. In this con-
nection we may usefully quote the following extract from Ba/sara's case
(supra) at page 707:-

"Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of
public order, safety, or morals and which subject those
G who contravene them to criminal procedure· and punish-
ment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than
to that of civil rights. They are of a nature which falls
within the general authority of Parliament to make laws
for the order and good government of Canada .... "(7 A.C.
H 829 at p. 839)
R.I.MANSURI v. STATEOFGUJARAT[SHARMA,CJ.) 381

Again, referring to liquor laws and liquor control, a A
learned British author (The Encyclopaedia Britannica,
14th Edition, Volume 14, page 191) says as follows:

"The dominant motive everywhere, however, has been
a social one, to combat a menace to public order and the
B
in.creasing evils of alcoholism in the interests of health and
social welfare. The evils vary greatly from one country to
another according to differences in climate, diet,
economic conditions and even within the same country
according to differences in habits, social, customs and
standards of public morality. A new factor of growing c
importance since the middle of the 19th century has been
the rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and mechaniza-
tion of our modern every day life in the leading nations
of the world, and the consequent wider recognition of the
advantages of sobriety in safeguarding public order and
D
physical efficiency."

12. The question which arises here is as to whether restrictions, are
permissible only in relation to the alcoholic liquors directly or can be
extended to such articles which are not intoxicating by themselves but
which have the potentiality to defeat the policy. The stand of the petitioners E
is that the business in intoxicating liquor is altogether on a different level
when a question of right arises. But so far the business in 'gur' is concerned
it cannot be prohibited and for that rec.son the impugned provisions must
be struck down.
F
13. The unlawful activities of bootleggers are too well known. In this
country as also in several other countries of the world, where the policy of
prohibition was attempted, they have jeopardised its success. The p~oblem,
therefore, has been engaging the attention of the sodal reformers and other
experts on the subject. With that view in mind several committees have
been set up in this country from time to time, which after making extensive G
and thorough study of the malady and its cure have reported that it is
necessary to adopt further remedial measures by way of placing restrictions
on the business of such articles which aid the illegal manufacture of liquors.
Mr. Poti, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State,
has placed before us certain portions of the Prohibition Policy Inquiry H
382' SUPREME COU,RT REPORTS {1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Commission Report, 1983, dealing with the potentiality of "rotten gur"
being used for this purpose. This aspect has been dealt with in the affidavit
of Shri D.K. Mehta, Deputy Secretary, Labour Social Welfare and Tribal
Development Department, State of Gujarat. It is stated that after consider-
ing the matter thoroughly, the State Government came to the conclusion
that in Gujarat "rotten·gur" was being used for manufacture of illicit liquor.
B In paragraph 9 of the affidavit reference has been made to the report of
Tekchand Committee wherein attention of Government was drawn to the
misuse of "rotten gur" for this purpose. This was widely rampant specially
in the district of Broach, Bulsar and Surat. The exercise undertaken in this
regard, before the impugned provisions were enacted, is mentioned by the
c committees constituted by persons having expert knowledge which were
placed before us on behalf of the State. We do not consider it necessary
to discuss them in detail. The problem which faced the State was that
unscrupulous persons while pretending to be engaged in business of "rotten
gur" or'for that matter, 'gur' were aiding and abetting bootlegging on large
D scale. For 'checking effectively this illegal activity it was considered neces-
sary'· to require a person in possession of ,;rotten gur" in excess of the
prescribed quantity to obtain a permit. This would help the administration
in keeping a vigilant eye on the violaters of the law. We have examined the
materials placed before us by the parties. We are fully satisfied that the
impugned steps were taken after a detailed, careful and deep deliberation
E · of the problem and its solution and that the impugned amendments fully
satisfy the public interest test.

14. As has been mentioned earlier, there is no restriction whatsoever
on carrying on business in 'gur' or "rotten gur", and what is required by the
F law is merely to get a permit which is granted as a matter of course to
anyone making an application. The argument on behalf of the petitioners
is that although the law does not require the taking of a permit for business
in 'gur', it ·becomes necessary to do so also for a person engaged exclusively
in the business of 'gur' and not in "rotten gur", and that in view of the wide

-
G powers available to the enforcing machinery the restriction is arbitrary and
uncalled for. The basis of this argument is the assumed fact that it becomes
difficult to distinguish between 'gur' and "rotten gur" for the purposes of
Section 2 (39A). It has been stated that in the course of a few days while
'gur' of fairly good quality is being transported from the other States to
Gujarat it deteriorates in quality on the way and may be mistaken for
H "rotten gur". In other words the process of 'gur' being rendered "rotten gur"
R.I. MANSUR! v. STAIB OF GUJARAT (SHARMA, CJ.] 383

is not a long one and it·does not take much time for the article to reach A
from one stage to another. If we accept what is being asserted before us
on behalf of the petitioners as correct, it means that the chances of 'gur'
turning into "rotten gur" are inherent in the business. What follows from
this? By whatever reason it may be, the article which was hafmless is
converted quickly into the form in which it acquires the potentiality of
being misused for the purpose of preparing intoxicating li_quor. If this
B
mischief is not taken care of, it will become difficult to effectively imple-
ment the policy of prohibition. We are also of the opinion that for the
purpose of Prohibition Act, it can define rotten gur even if it is fit for
human consumption in such a way to eliminate the mischief. The question
is; is it capable of misuse? The impugned restriction, therefore, is fully C
justified and cannot be condemned as excessive or unreasonable.

15. We appreciate the difference between the power to control the
business in intoxicating liquor directly and the extent to which regulatory
measures can be taken in respect of other commodities. But so far these
cases are concerned, this aspect does not assume any significance, in view D
of our unhesitating conclusion that the restrictions imposed by the im-
pugned provisions are reasonable and in the public interest, and are,
therefore, fully protected by clause (6) of Article 19. We also hold that
there is no merit in the argument based on Article 14 in view of the
discussions made above. E
16. For the reasons indicated above, we do not find any merit in the
writ petitions, civil appeals and special leave petitions and they all are
dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.

G.N. Petitions and appeals dismissed.