REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTYversusRENI C. KOTTARAM & ANOTHER

                        [2012] 9 S.C.R. 530


A                  REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY
                                 v.
                 RENI C. KOTTARAM & ANOTHER
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2012)

                        OCTOBER 12, 2012
B
         [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                   IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

         Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - ss.138, 139 and 142
C   - Dishonour of cheque - Presumption to be drawn - Standard
    of proof - Preponderance of probabilities - Complaint by
    respondent alleging that appellant had entrusted it with some
    construction work and in that regard issued a cheque in his
    favour for Rs. 25 lakhs but the cheque was dishonoured -
o   Acquittal of accused-appellant by trial court - Reversed by
    High Court - Justification - Held: Elaborate consideration was
    made by the trial Court for acquitting the appellant - The
    conclusions of the trial court were drawn by adducing cogent
    and convincing reasoning - Taking into account various
E   reasons inter alia including a) that the final payment was to
    be settled only after completion of the work and that the
    respondent did not complete the work; b) that there was no
    evidence to conclude that any measurement of the work was
    done and the accounts were settled; c) that the cheque was
F   not in the handwriting of the appellant which strengthened the
    defence version that it was not executed in favour of the
    respondent; d) that there was no reliable documentary
    evidence adduced by the respondent to hold that a sum of
    Rs. 25 lakhs was due to him warranting execution of the
    cheque and e) that there was no amount legally due to the
G   respondent to hold that the cheque was as a matter of fact
    issued by the appellant in favour of the respondent in order
    to hold that he was a holder of the cheque, the trial Court
    ultimately concluded that no offence was made out as against

H                                530
 REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 531


the appellant under s.138 in order to convict her under s.142       A
- Appellant sufficiently rebutted the initial presumption as
regards the issuance of the cheque under ss. 138 and 139 -
The preponderance of probabilities also fully supported the
stand of the appellant - Judgment of the High Court in having
interfered with the order of acquittal by the trial court without   B
proper reasoning, thus, liable to be set aside.

    The respondent filed a complaint against the
appellant under Section 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 for offence punishable under                  C
Section 138 thereof. According to respondent, the
appellant-accused had entrusted it with some
construction work and had issued a post dated cheque
for Rs.25 lakhs in his favour towards the outstanding
amount due to him for the work done by him. It was
claimed that when the cheque was presented by the                   D
respondent with his bankers, the same was dishonoured
due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the
appellant. It was further claimed that though the
respondent intimated about the dishonour of the cheque
by a lawyer's notice served on the appellant, she came              E
forward with a reply taking the stand that no amount was
due and that the respondent stealthily removed two
cheques from the custody of the appellant of which the
present one was forged and presented for clearance.
                                                                    F
     The trial Court held that the appellant was able to
rebut the presumption and that there was no
circumstance warranting the execution of the cheque
issued in favour of the respondent and so holding, found
the appellant not guilty of the offence under Section 138           G
of the Act and acquitted her under Section 255(1) of
CrPC. In appeal, the High Court while reversing the
judgment of the trial Court found the appellant guilty of
the offence and sentenced her to pay a fine of Rs.30 lakhs
and in default to pay the fine amount directed her to
                                                                    H
    532      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A undergo simple imprisonment for 1 1h years. It was
  further directed that on realization of the fine amount, the
  same should be paid to the complainant-respondent
  under Section 357(1) CrPC.

      In the instant appeal, the appellant raised various
8
  contentions, viz. 1) that she had discharged her burden
  by rebutting the initial presumption contemplated under
  Section 118 read along with Section 139 of the Act and
  having regard to the overwhelming preponderance of
C probabilities existing in her favour, the trial Court rightly
  concluded that she was entitled for acquittal; 2) that the
  overwhelming evidence available on record as
  considered by the trial Court, though referred to by the
  High Court in the impugned judgment was completely
  omitted to be considered by it while reversing the order
D of acquittal of the trial Court and 3) that the specific
  expression "holder" and "holder in due course" having
  been used in Sections 8, 9, 138, 139 and 142 of the Act,
  the respondent cannot be said to have fulfilled the
  requirement of the said provisions in order to avail the
E benefits under the provisions of the Act.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. While the trial Court made every effort to
  examine the claim of the respondent as regards the
F issuance of the cheque by the appellant in his favour and
  the stand of the appellant by referring to the respective
  documentary evidence as well as the version of P.W.1
  before reaching the conclusion about the guilt of the
  appellant, the High Court completely failed to consider
G and appreciate the documents marked on the side of the
  appellant. The High Court failed to discharge its onerous
  responsibility of considering the material evidence
  available on record brought to its notice and for the
  reasons best known, the High Court blatantly declined to
H
 REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 533

examirie those materials by simply stating that the same      A
was not warranted. [Para 8] [538-C-E-H; 539-A-B]

      1.2. The impugned judgment discloses that the
attention of the High Court was drawn to specific
Exhibits relied upon by the appellant and referred to by      8
the trial Judge to reach a conclusion about the guilt or
otherwise of the appellant, however, after referring to
those Exhibits, in the very next sentence the High Court
proceeded to state that the appellant failed to produce
any material which was in her possession to show that         C
no amount was due from the appellant to the respondent.
Such an approach of the High Court displayed the total
perversity in its approach while reversing the order of the
trial Judge. [Para 11] [543-D-F]

     2. Elaborate consideration was made by the trial         D
Court for acquitting the appellant. The conclusions of the
trial Judge were drawn by adducing cogent and
convincing reasoning and no fault is found in the said
conclusions drawn by the trial Judge. Taking into
account various reasons inter alia including a) that the      E
final payment was to be settled only after completion of
the work and that the respondent did not complete the
work; b) that there was no evidence to conclude that any
measurement of the work was done and the accounts
were settled; c) that the fact that the cheque was not in     F
the handwriting of the appellant strengthens the defence
version that it was not executed in favour of the
respondent; d) that there was no reliable documentary
evidence adduced by the respondent to hold that a sum
of Rs.25 lakhs was due to him warranting execution of         G
the cheque and e) that there was no amount legally due
to the respondent to hold that the cheque was as a matter
of fact issued by the appellant in favour of the
respondent in order to hold that he was a holder of the
cheque, the trial Court ultimately concluded that no
                                                              H
    534     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A offence was made out as against the appellant under
  Section 138 of the Act in order to convict her under
  Section 142 of the Act. In the circumstance, the principles
  set out in the decision in M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani
  as regards the presumption to be drawn and the
B preponderance of probabilities to be inferred are fully
  satisfied. In the said case, it was clearly opined that it is
  not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence
  of consideration by way of direct evidence. The standard
  of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities.
c Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn
  not only from the materials on record but also by
  reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
  Presumption drawn under a statute has only an
  evidentiary value. The judgment of the trial Court in
  having drawn the conclusions to the effect that the
0
  appellant sufficiently rebutted the initial presumption as
  regards the issuance of the cheque under Sections 138
  and 139 of the Act, was perfectly justified. The
  preponderance of probabilities also fully support the
  stand of the appellant as held by the trial Judge. The
E judgment of the High Court in having interfered with the
  order of acquittal by the trial Judge without proper
  reasoning is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
  Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed in
  the judgment impugned is also set aside. [Paras 9, 10, 12
F and 13] [542-G-H; 543-A-B; 544-D-F]

        M. S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kera/a and
    another (2006) 6 sec 39 - held applicable.
                        Case Law Reference:
G
          (2006) 6 sec 39       held applicable      Para 6
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1594 of 2012.
H
  REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 535


    From the Judgment & Order dated 17.3.2010 of the High         A
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. A.No. 1707 of 2007.

    Basava Prabhu Patil, Romy Chacko, Varun Mudgal for the
Appellant.

   V. Giri, M.Sadique, Nishe Rajen Shonker for the                8
Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. The C
 appellant/accused is aggrieved by the judgment dated
 17.03.2010 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1707/2007 of the
 High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The respondent herein
 preferred a complaint against the appellant under Section 142
 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter called 'the Act')
                                                                   0
 for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
 According to the complainant, the appellanUaccused entrusted
 the work of construction of an Old Age Home and a Chapel at
 Punnaveli, Pathanamthitta District based on an agreement
 between the appellant and the respondent. According to the
 respondent, the appellant issued a post dated cheque for E
 Rs.25 lakhs in favour of the respondent towards the outstanding
amount due to him for the work done by him. The cheque was
dated 21.03.2005. It was claimed that when the cheque was
 presented by the respondent with his bankers, the same was
dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the F
appellant. It was further claimed that though the respondent
intimated about the dishonour of the cheq!Je by a lawyer's
notice dated 30.03.2005 served on the appellant on
31.03.2005, she came forward with a reply taking the stand that
no amount was due and that the respondent stealthily removed G
two cheques from the custody of the appellant of which the
present one was forged and presented for clearance. Before
the trial Court the appellant pleaded not guilty. On behalf of the
respondent Exhibits P-1 to P-20 were marked and the
respondent examined himself as P.W.1. On behalf of the H
    536     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C R.


A appellant Exhibits D-1 to D-4 series were marked, in the course
  of cross-examination of P .W.1. No oral evidence was adduced
  on behalf of the appellant. When the incriminating
  circumstances were put against the appellant under Section
  313 of Cr.P.C. she denied the same and filed a written
B statement.

       2. The trial Court on a detailed analysis of the evidence,
  placed before it, ultimately held that the appellant was able to
  rebut the presumption and that there was no circumstance
C warranting the execution of Exhibit P-1 cheque in favour of the
  respondent. So holding, the trial Court found the appellant not
  guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act and acquitted
  her under Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the acquittal
  of the appellant, the respondent preferred an appeal before the
  High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam wherein the impugned
D judgment came to be rendered.

       3. The High Court while reversing the judgment of the trial
  Court found the appellant guilty of the offence and sentenced
  her to pay a fine of Rs.30 lakhs and in default to pay the fine
E amount directed her to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 Y2
  years. It was further directed that on realization of the fine
  amount, the same should be paid to the complainant under
  Section 357(1) of Cr.P .C. Appellant was also directed to
  appear before the trial Court on 17.07.2010 to make the
F payment of the fine amount. It was further directed that in default
  of appearance before the trial Court, the trial Court would be
  free to proceed against the appellant for taking coercive steps
  for executing the sentence.

       4 .. At the time when special leave petition was moved,
G based ori the undertaking of the appellant, she was directed
  to deposit a sum of Rs.25 lakhs in the trial Court within two
  weeks. Subject to the said condition notice was issued and
  interim stay was also granted subject to fulfillment of the said
  condition. Subsequently, it was reported on 10.11.2010 that the
H amount directed to be deposited was also deposited.
 REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 537
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
     5. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, Senior               A
Counsel for the appellant and Shri V. Giri, Senior Counsel for
the respondent. We have also perused the material papers
placed before us, the judgment of the trial Court as well as that
of the High Court.
                                                                    B
     6. Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, Senior Counsel for the
appellant in his submissions primarily contended that the
appellant discharged her burden by rebutting the initial
presumption contemplated under Section 118 read along with
Section 139 of the Act and that having regard to the                C
overwhelming preponderance of probabilities existing in favour
of the appellant, the trial Court rightly concluded that the
appellant was entitled for the acquittal. The learned Senior
Counsel further contended that the overwhelming evidence
available on record which was considered by the trial Court,
though was referred to by the High Court in the impugned            D
judgment has been completely omitted to be considered while
reversing the order of acquittal of the trial Court. The learned
Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the impugned
judgment of the High Court was liable to be set aside. Apart
from the above submission, the learned Senior Counsel by            E
referring to Sections 8, 9, 138, 139 and 142 of the Act sought
to raise a contention based on the specific expression "Holder''
and "Holder in due course" used in those provisions to contend
that the respondent cannot be said to have fulfilled the
requirement of the said provisions in order to avail the benefits   F
under the provisions of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel relied
upon the decision of this Court, M. S. Narayana Menon alias
Mani Vs. State of Kera/a and another reported in (2006) 6
sec 39, in support of his submissions.
                                                                    G
     7. As against the above submissions Mr. V. Giri, Learned
Senior Counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant
was prevaricating in her stand as regards the issuance of the
cheque, namely, the one in her reply to the lawyer's notice and
the other before the Court, in her written statement. The learned   H
    538     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A Senior Counsel by referring to Annexure R-3 and R-4
  contended that the contents of the said documents proved
  appellant's liability to the respondent and that the appellant
  miserably failed to rebut the initial presumption relating to the
  issuance of the cheque in favour of the respondent. As regards
B the submission based on Sections 8, 9, 138, 139 and 142 of
  the Act, made by the learned counsel for the appellant it was
  contended that the said contention has been raised for the first
  time in this Court and that in any event the status of the
  respondent as payee/holder of the cheque was duly proved.
c        8. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties
    and having bestowed our serious consideration to the
    contentions raised, at the very outset, we wish to state that
    while the trial Court made every effort to examine the claim of
    the respondent as regards the issuance of the cheque by the
D   appellant in his favour and the stand of the appellant by referring
    to the respective documentary evidence as well as the version
    of P.W.1 before reaching the conclusion about the guilt of the
    appellant, we find that the High Court completely failed to
    consider and appreciate the documents marked on the side
E   of the appellant. We find that though the High Court made a
    reference to those specific Exhibits, the attention to which was
    drawn by the learned counsel, namely, Exhibit D-3, Exhibits P-
    6 to P-8, Exhibits D-4(A) to D-4(F) series vouchers as well as
    Exhibit D-4(J) voucher unhesitatingly stated that he did not
F   propose to enter into any finding on merit as the same was
    unwarranted in the case on hand considering the nature of
    allegations and claim contained in the case. It also went on to
    state that in spite of those materials, in its conclusion, the
    appellant failed to produce whatever records available in her
G   possession to show that no amount was due from her to the
    respondent. When we made a comparative consideration of the
    analysis made by the trial Court while holding that no offence
    was made out as against the appellant, as against the above
    reasoning of the learned Judge, in the order impugned in this
H   appeal, we are convinced that the High Court has failed to
REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 539
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
discharge its onerous responsibility of considering the material      A
evidence available on record which were brought to its notice
and for the reasons best known, the High Court blatantly
declined to examine those materials by simply stating that the
same was not warranted.

      9. In order to appreciate the correctness of the impugned
                                                                      B
judgment of the High Court, as well as, that of the trial Court, it
will be worthwhile to refer to certain conclusions drawn by the
learned trial Judge by making specific reference to the various
documentary evidence placed before it vis-a-vis the oral
version of the complainant himself. The significant admission         C
of the respondent as P.W.1 was noted by the trial Court as
under:

      (a)   The construction work entrusted with the respondent
            had to be completed for a total sum of                    0
            Rs.78,70,678/- as stated in Exhibit D-3.

      (b)   Respondent admitted that he had not completed
            the work and that he would have got payment only
            after the measurement of the quantity of the work
            done.                                                     E

      (c)   All the amounts received from the accused were
            noted in Exhibit P-9.

      (d)   It was admitted that a sum of Rs.12,60, 100/-
            mentioned in Exhibit D-4 series voucher was not           F
            noted in Exhibit P-9.

      (e)   The amount received by him from the accused for
            conducting earth work was also not included in
            Exhibit P-9.
                                                                      G
      (f)   The respondent received various amounts by
            cheques and cash. He, however, denied the
            suggestion that the accused gave two cheques to
            one Joychen Manthurthy by way of security on
            23.10.2001 while borrowing Rs.5 lakhs from the            H
    540         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A                 said person.
          (g)    It was admitted by the respondent that flooring of
                 the building was done by the appellant herself and
                 the expenses were not included in the bill.
B         (h)    The respondent admitted that he had received
                 Rs.77,31,500/- as per Exhibit P-9 statement while
                 the total amount of work as per Exhibit D-3
                 agreement was Rs.78,70,678/-.
          (i)    The respondent, however, denied the suggestion
c                that excess payments were made by the appellant
                 to him.
          0)     Respondent also admitted that he did not complete
                 the work and the flooring was ultimately done by the
D                appellant herself.
          (k)    It was not in dispute that the final payment was to
                 be settled only after completion of the work and that
                 the respondent did not complete the work.
E         (I)    There was no evidence to conclude that any
                 measurement of the work was done and the
                 accounts were settled.
          (m)    As regards the variation in the stand of the
                 appellant, namely, the one in the reply notice and
F                the other in the written statement the same did not
                 materially affect the stand of the appellant in the
                 light of the overwhelming evidence in support of her
                 stand.

G
          (n)    The fact that the cheque was not in the handwriting
                 of the appellant strengthens the defence version that
                 it was not executed in favour of the respondent.
          (o)    There was no reliable documentary evidence
                 adduced by the complainant to hold that a sum of
H                Rs.25 lakhs was due to him warranting execution
 REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 541
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

           of Exhibit P-1 cheque.                                   A

     (p)   There was no amount legally due to the respondent
           to hold that Exhibit P-1 cheque was as a matter of
           fact issued by the appellant in favour of the
           respondent in order to hold that he was a holder of
                                                                    8
           the cheque.
     10. It was based on the above reasoning, the trial Court
ultimately concluded that no offence was made out as against
the appellant under Section 138 of the Act in order to convict
her under Section 142 of the Act. While such an elaborate           c
consideration was made by the trial Court for acquitting the
appellant, it will be appropriate to refer to the nature of
consideration made by the High Court which has been stated
in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, which is to the
following effect:                                                   o
    "13. Another point vehemently raised by the counsel for the
    respondent/accused is that no amount is due from the
    accused to the complainant so as to issue Ext.P1 cheque.
    In order to substantiate the above submission, the learned
    counsel has taken me through the documents namely,              E
    Ext.03, Exts.P6 to P8 final bills and Ext.D4(A) to D4(F)
    series vouchers and also Ext.D4(J) voucher. Regarding this
    submission, I am not proposed to enter into any finding on
    merit as the same is unwarranted in the present case
    considering the nature of allegations and claim contained       F
    in this case. But from the materials and evidence on
    record, it is crystal clear that the accused miserably failed
    to produce whatever records which she was in possession
    to show that no amount is due from the accused to the
    complainant. On the other hand, the attempt was to              G
    interpret and explain the documents produced by the
    complainant. Admittedly, no payment was made to the
    complainant otherwise than through the vouchers and
    cheques. If that be so, by producing those documents, the
    defence plea can be established. But there was no               H
    542      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A         attempt in this regard. When the accused has admitted the
          transaction claimed by the complainant and the
          complainant has established his claim that there was
          outstanding amounts due from the accused to the
          complainant out of the contract work undertaken by him
B         under Ext.03 agreement, it is for the accused to establish
          that no amount is due to the complainant by producing
          cogent and concrete evidence if they are sticking on their
          stand.

                                                (underlining is ours)
c
       11. We can understand if the High Court had considered
  those Exhibits, the attention of which was drawn to it and stated
  as to how it was not in a position to agree with the conclusions
  drawn by the learned trial Judge. The above statement
D contained in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment discloses
  that the attention of the High Court was drawn to the specific
  Exhibits which were relied upon by the appellant and referred
  to by the learned trial Judge to reach a conclusion about the
  guilt or otherwise of the appellant. After referring to those
E Exhibits, unfortunately, we find that in the very next sentence the
  High Court proceeded to state that the appellant failed to
  produce any material which was in her possession to show that
  no amount was due from the appellant to the respondent. Such
  an approach of the High Court, in our considered opinion, has
  displayed the total perversity in its approach while reversing the
F order of the trial Judge. Even, Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior
  Counsel for the respondent in spite of his best efforts was
  unable to convince us to support the above conclusion found
  in the judgment of the High Court.
G       12. That apart having considered the conclusions of the
  learned trial Judge, we find that those conclusions were drawn
  by adducing cogent and convincing reasoning and we do not
  find any fault in the said conclusions drawn by the learned trial
  Judge. In the circumstance, the principles set out in the decision
H relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in M.S.
 REV. MOTHER MARYKUTTY v. RENI C. KOTTARAM 543
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
Narayana Menon alias Mani (supra) as regards the                    A
presumption to be drawn and the preponderance of
probabilities to be inferred, as set out in paragraphs 31 to 33,
are fully satisfied. Those principles, set out in paragraphs 31
to 33, can be usefully referred to which are as under:
                                                                    8
    "31. A Division Bench of this Court in Bharat Barrel &
    Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal albeit in a civil
    case laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC pp.
    50-51, para 12)

    "12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted           c
    hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that
    once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the
    presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is
    supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is
    rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of        D
    a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the
    defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of
    proof showing that the existence of consideration was
    improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus
    would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it    E
    as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would
    disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the
    negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of
    proving the non-existence of the consideration can be
    either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance·       F
    of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon
    which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
    under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case
    including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the
    defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by
    showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff   G
    would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of
    presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The
    court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the
    existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as
                                                                    H
      544       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A           the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor
            contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt."
            This Court, therefore, clearly opined that it is not necessary
            for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration
            by way of direct evidence.
B
            32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of
            probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities
            can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also
            by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
c           33. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an
            evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the
            Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact
            may be an evidence even for the purpose of drawing
            presumption under another."
D
       13. Applying the abovesaid principles to the case on hand,
  we find that the judgment of the trial Court in having drawn the
  conclusions to the effect that the appellant sufficiently rebutted
  the initial presumption as regards the issuance of the cheque
E under Sections 138 and 139 of the Act, was perfectly justified.
  We also find that the preponderance of probabilities also fully
  support the stand of the appellant as held by the learned trial
  Judge. The judgment of the High Court in having interfered with
  the order of acquittal by the learned trial Judge without proper
F reasoning is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is accordingly
  set aside. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed
  in the judgment impugned is also set aside.
       14. Having regard to our above conclusions, the amount
  deposited by the appellant with the trial Court in a sum of Rs.25
G lakhs with accrued interest, if any, shall be refunded to her
  forthwith on production of a copy of this judgment. The appeal
  stands allowed with the above directions .
    . B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.