Holding

The amendment of the plaint was not permissible as it introduced a new cause of action, altered the nature of the suit and would prejudice the respondents; the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Summary

The appellant, RevaJetu Builders & Developers, filed a suit for recovery of sale consideration and possession of a property, later seeking to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC to declare the respondents as trespassers and obtain injunctions. The trial court allowed the amendment, but the Karnataka High Court set it aside, holding that the amendment introduced a new cause of action, altered the nature of the suit and would prejudice the respondents after four years of litigation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, emphasizing that amendments must be necessary for determining the real controversy and must not cause injustice or prejudice that cannot be compensated. The Court reiterated the principles governing Order VI Rule 17, including the need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to award costs where an amendment causes unnecessary delay. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay Rs. 1,00,000 costs to the respondents.

Issues considered

The propriety of allowing an amendment to the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 when it introduces a new cause of action and changes the character of the suit.
Whether the amendment, sought four years after the suit was instituted, would cause prejudice to the respondents that cannot be compensated.
Whether costs should be awarded to the respondents for having to oppose the amendment in multiple courts.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VI Rule 17

Subjects

Amendment of plaintOrder VI Rule 17Civil ProcedureCause of actionPrejudiceCostsLimitationLegal discretion

Judgment

[2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 103

REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS A
v.
NARAYANASWAMY & SONS & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 6921 of 2009)
OCTOBER 9, 2009
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Or. 6 r. 17 - Amendment of plaint - Execution of sale c
deed by respondents in favour of appellant - Suit by
appellant seeking refund of sale consideration and
alternatively for possession of property - Amendment
application by appellant that respondents be declared as
trespassers and unauthorized occupant of the building which D
was permitted to be used as licence area; and direction to
respondents to vacate and deliver the possession - Allowed
by trial court - Set aside by High Court - Interference with -
Held: Does not call for interference - High Court rightly held
that amendment cannot be permitted since it would introduce E
a new case which was not in the original plaint and would
adversely affect rights of respondents, and that too four years
after the institution of suit - Appellant to pay respondents Rs.
one lakh as costs since respondents were compelled to
oppose amendment application before different courts.
F
Or. 6 r. 17 - Application under, for amendment of plaint
- Factors to be considered - Held: Amendment should be
allowed if it is necessary for determining real question in

• controversy between parties - Amendment should not cause
injustice to the other side. G

Costs - Matters seeking amendment - Factors to be
considered while awarding costs - Stated.

103 H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Respondents executed sale deed with regard to
scheduled property in favour of the appellant. The said
transfer of land was challenged. This Court held that ttie
sale deed executed by respondents in favour of appellant
was invalid and inoperative. Appellant filed suit against
s the respondents for recovery of certain amount-sale
consideration amount and alternatively for declaration as
absolute owner, of the scheduled property on the basis
of the sale deed and direction to respondents to deliver
vacant possession of the property. Thereafter, appeHant
c filed an application under Or. 6 r. 17 CPC. It prayed that
the respondents be declared as trespassers and or in
~nauthoriz.ed occupation of the building which was
permitted to be used as licence area; land sought
issuance· of direction to respondents to vacate -and
deliver peaceful possession of the building to them. Trial
0
court allowed application for amendment. High Court set
aside the same. Hence the present appeal.

Dismis$ing the appeal, the Court

E HELD: 1. While deciding applications for
amendments, the courts must not refuse bona fide,
legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and
should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or
dishonest amendments. On applying these parameters to
F the instant case, the application for amendment is to be
dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh)
because the respondents were compelled to oppose the
amendment application before different Courts. [Paras 70
and 71] [134-0-F] · ....'
G 2.1. The general principle that amendment of
pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or
substitute the cause ·of action or the nature of claim
applies to amendments to plaint. It has no counterpart in
the principles relating to amendment of the written
H statement. Therefore, addition of a new ground of
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 105
SONS & ORS.

defence or substituting or altering a defence or taking A
f inconsistent pleas in the written statement would not be
objectionable while adding, altering or substituting a new
cause of action in the plaint may be objectionable. All
rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to
secure the proper administration of justice, and it is B
therefore essential that they should be made to serve and
be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of
amendment must be enjoyed and should always be
-.<.
liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet
been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be c
substituted for another, nor to change, by means of
amendment, the subject-matter of the suit. When the said
principle is applied to the instant case, the view taken by
the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be said
to be unjustified. [Paras 24, 25 and 26] [118-A-F] D
_,
Usha Balashaheb Swami and Ors. v. Kiran Appaso
Swami and Ors. 2007 (5) SCC 602; Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal
and Ors. 1998 (1) SCC 278; Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jelley
and Ors. 2008 (7) SCC 85; Mis Modi Spinning & Weaving
Mills Co. Ltd. And Anr. v. Ladha Ram and Co. (1976) 4 SCC E
320, relied on.

Code of Civil Procedure by Justice C.K. Thakkar (2005
Edition}; Justice, Courts and Delays by Arun Mohan,
referred to. F
2.2. The courts at any stage of the proceedings may
allow either party to alter or amend the pleadings in such
manner and on such terms as may be -just and all those
'· amendments must be allowed which are imperative for
G
determining the real question in controversy between the
t parties. The first condition which must be satisfied before
the amendment can be allowed by the court is whether
such amendment is necessary for the determination of
the real question in controversy. If that condition is not
satisfied, the amendment cannot be allowed. This is the H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20.09) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A basic test which should govern the courts' discretion in )-
grant or refusal of the amendment. The other important
condition wfaich should govern the discretion of the
Court is the potentiality of prejudice or injustice which is
likely to be caused to other side. Ordinarily, if other side
B is compensated by costs, then there is no injustice but
in practice hardly any court grants actual costs to the
opposite side. The Courts have very wide discretion in
the· matter of amendment of pleadings but court's powers
must be exercised judiciously and with great care. [Paras
c 33, 61, 62 and 63) [121-A-B; 131-C-G]
Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung AIR 1922 PC 249;
Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey (1994) 2 SCC
29; Kisandas v. Rachappa Vithoba (1909) 33 Born 644;
Amulakchand Mewaram and Ors. v. Babula/ Kana/al Taliwala
D (1933) 35 Bom. LR. 569; L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. And Anr. v.
Jardine, Skinner & Co. AIR 1957 SC 357; P.H. Patil v. KS.
Patil AIR 1957 SC 363; Pursuhottam Umedbhai & Co. v.
Manila/ & Sons AIR 1961 SC 325; Ganesh Trading Co. v.
Moji Ram (1978) 2 SCC 91; Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawa/a
E v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 11;
Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material
Supply (1969) 1 SCC 869; Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (1974) +.
2 SCC 393; Haridas Aildas Thadani & Others v. Godraj
Rustom Kermani (1984) 1 SCC 668; B. K. Narayana Pillai
F v. Parameshwaram Pillai and Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 712; Suraj
Prakash Bhasin v. Raj Rani Bhasin and Ors. (1981) 3 SCC
652, referred to.

Cropper v. Smith (1884) 29 Ch D 700; Tildersley v. ....

Harper (1878) 10 Ch. D 393; Weldon v. Neal (1880) 19 QBD
G
394: 56 LJ QB 621; Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways t
Co. 1886 (16) 16 QB 178, referred to.

2.3. Some basic principles under Or. 6 r. 17 CPC
which oughrto be taken into consideration while allowing
H or rejecting the application for amendment are whether
REVAJEETU BUILD€-RS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 107
SONS & ORS.

1 the amendment sought is imperative for proper and A
·;
... effective adjudication of the case; whether the application
for amendment is bona fide or ma/a fide; the amendment
should not cause such prejudice to the other side which
cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money;
refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead B
to multiple litigation; whether the proposed amendment
constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and
~ character of the case; and the court should decline
amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would
be barred by limitation on the date of application. These
are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The decision on
c
an application made under Order VI Rule 17 is a very
serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should
never be undertaken in a casual manner. [Paras 67, 68
~
-1
and 69] [133-E-H; 134-A-D]
\ D
3.1. For unnecessary delay and inconvenience, the
opposite party must be compensated with costs. The
imposition of costs is an important judicial exercise
particularly when the courts deal with the cases of
amendment. The costs cannot and should not be E
imposed arbitrarily. The following parameters must be
~
taken into consideration while imposing the costs - At
what stage the amendment was sought; while imposing
the costs, it should be taken into consideration whether
....... the amendment has been sought at a pre-trial or post-trial F
stage; the financial benefit derived by one party at the
• cost of other party should be properly calculated in terms
of money and the costs be awarded accordingly; the
...... imposition of costs should not be symbolic but realistic;
the delay and inconvenience caused to the opposite side G
must be clearly evaluated in terms of additional and extra
court hearings compelling the opposite party to bear the
extra costs; and in case of appeal to higher courts, the
victim of amendment is compelled to bear considerable
additional costs. These factors are illustrative in nature
H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A and not exhaustive. All these aspects must be carefully
taken into consideration while awarding the costs. [Para ,.'
65) [132.-C-H]
'
3.2. The purpose of imposing costs is to: discourage
malafide amendments designed to delay the legal
8 proceedings; compensate the other party for the delay
and the inconvenience caused; compensate the other
party for avoidable expenses on the litigation which had
to be incurred by opposite party for opposing the '>-
amendment; and to send a clear message thatthe parties
c have to be careful while drafting the original pleadings.
[Para 66) [133-B-D]
Case Law Reference:
2001 (5) sec 602 Relied on. Para 19
Q, r
1998 (1) sec 218 Relied on. Para 20
2008 (7) sec 85 Relied on. Para 21
(1976) 4 sec 32.o Relied on. Para 22
E AIR 1922 PC 249 Relied on. Para 25
(1884) 29 Ch D 700 Referred to. Para 34
(1878) 10 Ch. D 393 Referred to. Para 35
F (1880) 19 QBD 394 . Referred to. Para 37 ...
",
1886 16 QB 178 Referred to. Para 39
(1909) 33 Born 644 Referred to. Para 41
~
(1933) 35 Born. LR. 569 Referred to. Para 43
G
AIR 1957 SC 357 Referred to. Para 45
AIR 1957 SC 363 Referred to. Para 46
AIR 1961 SC 325 Referred to. Para 48
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 109
SONS & ORS.

..,' (1978) 2 sec 91 Referred to. Para 49 A
1 AIR 1964 SC 11 Referred to. Para 50

~
(1969) 1 sec 869 Referred to. Para 53

(1974) 2 sec 393 Referred to. Para 55, B
38

(1984) 1 sec 668 Referred to. Para 57

(2000) 1 sec 112 Referred to. Para 58
1
\.

-1 (1981) 3 sec 652 Referred to. Para 60 c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6921 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 16.9.2006 of the High
D
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 36550 of
~
2003.

Mukul Rohtagi, Navkesh Batra, Sandeep Narain, Shri
Narain (for S. Narain & Co.) for the Appellant.
E
K. Parasaran, V. Balachandran, G.V. Chandrashekhar,
N.K. Verma, Anjana Chandrashekar, Ajay Pal (NP) for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 16.9.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bangalore in Writ Petition No.36550 of 2003.
G
3. Brief facts in nutshell are as under:

The appellant (original plaintiff) filed an Original Suit no.
2265 of 1996 before the XXXI Additional City Civil Judge,
Bangalore against the respondents (defendant nos. 1to10) for H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A recovery of Rs.52,97, 111/- with interest at the rate of 18% per t
annum from the date of filing of suit till payment. The appellant )-

alternatively had taken the plea that if the court for any reason
comes to the conclusion that a decree for a sum of ....~
Rs.52,97, 111/- cannot be passed as prayed by the appellant
8 against respondents (original defendant nos. 1 and 2), then the
court may at least pass a decree for Rs.19, 12,500/- with
interest at the rate of 18% from the date of suit till the date of
realization against the respondents.
)--
- '

c owner4. ofThetheappellant also claimed that it be declared absolute
scheduled property on the basis of the sale deed
•'
""....
dated 30.9.1987. The sale deed was executed by the
respondents in favour of the appellant after obtaining permission
from the State of Karnataka under the provisions of the Urban
Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976.
D
.~·
5. A petition in public interest was filed by one S.
Vasudeva which ultimately came up before thi~ Court in Civil
Appeal Nos.1454-56 of 1993 challenging the aforementioned
transfer of land. This court in those proceedings held that the
E sale deed executed by the respondent in favour of the appellant
on 30.9.1987 is held to be invalid and inoperative. It may be
pertinent to mention that after the institution of the suit, the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has been
repealed.
F 6. After the Act has been repealed, the appellant filed an
application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC') seeking leave of the trial
court to add two additional paragraphs as 2(A) and (8) anrf ~dW
prayers and to delete certain paragraphs in the plaint and also
G to delete the prayer (a), (b) and (c).

Paragraphs 2(A) and (8) are set out as under:

"2(A). With the enactment of the Urban Land (~eiling &
Regulation) Act, 1976, the first defendant firm w~s
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY.& 111
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

-1 prohibited from holding vacant land in excess of ceiling A
limits. As provided by the said Act, such vacant land, in
excess of ceiling limits, was liable to be acquired by the
,
. State Government. Therefore, the first defendant firm
applied to the State Government for exemption, under
_,,_ section 20(1) of the said Act, and sought permission to 8
~ hold excess vacant land to an extent admeasuring 16194
square metres. Vide Government Order dated 17 .07 .85,
~ in exercise of its power under section 20(1) of the said Act,
~ the state government permitted the first defendant firm to
hold the excess vacant land. Subsequently, as stated in c
para 4 hereinafter, the first defendant firm made another
application to the state government to exempt the balance
excess vacant land admeasuring 3444 square metres and
--,I' the same was permitted by the state government vide its
order dated 18.04.87. Thus, the entire extent of vacant land
-I D
in excess of ceiling limits admeasuring a total aggregate
extent of 19638 square metres was exempted, by the state
government, under section 20(1) of the said Act.

2(8). Thereafter, the defendant firm approached the
plaintiff and offered to sell, to the plaintiff, an extent of 5 E
acres 24 guntas in survey nos.6/1 and 6/2, Dasarahalli, VI
Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore, together with building
thereon. This extent of 5 acres 24 guntas comprised of
19638 square feet of excess vacant land, in addition to the
land with buildings and vacant land within ceiling limits. The F
first defendant firm, therefore, obtained permission from
the state government under orders dated 06.03.87 and
18.04.87 to sell to the plaintiffs, the excess vacant land
admeasuring 19638 square metres, as set out in paras 3
and 4 hereinafter. Pursuant thereto, the first defendant firm G
executed a registered Sale Deed dated 30.09.87 in
respect of the total aggregate extent of 5 acres 24 guntas
i.e. including the excess vacant land admeasuring 19638
square metres as aforesaid (19638 sq. metres)."
H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 7. The appellant sought to add the following prayers in the
plaint by an amendment in the plaint:- t-

(a) to declare that from 1.4.1988, the defendants are
trespassers and or in unauthorized occupation of
"·
~-

}

-
the building which they were permitted, under the
B
Sale Deed dated 30.9.1987 to use as a licensee >-
till 31.3.1988;

(b) to issue a mandatory injunction directing the
~
defendants to vacate and deliver to the plaintiff,
t~
c vacant and peaceful possession of the building
within 30 days; and

(c) to issue a permanent injunction restraining the
defendants or any of them, or their agents,
D representatives, servants or any other persons
claiming through, under or on behalf of any of them Jo-
from interfering with or in any manner disturbing,
hindering, obstructing, the plaintiffs enjoyment and
possession of the entire suit schedule property
including the building portion ordered to be evicted
E
in terms of prayer (b) hereinabove.

8. The trial court vide order dated 5.4.2003 allowed
application for amendment filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. ~

The respondents aggrieved by the said order of the trial court
I
F preferred a writ petition No.36550 of 2003 under Article 227
of the Constitution before the High Court of Karnataka on the
ground that the amendment as sought and granted ha:.
changed the entire nature of the suit and cause of action. ::1e
, respondents also submitted that the fact of aliuwing amendment
G would be taking away admissions in the plaint oy the appellant
and such an amendment cannot be permitted by any court of
~
law. It was further submitted by the respondents that by the order
of the trial court the rights accrued to the respondents have
been taken away.
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 113
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

9. The respondents submitted that the original suit was A
instituted for recovery of Rs.52,97, 111/-. Alternatively, the
appellant requested the court to declare it as the absolute owner
based on the basis of sale deed dated 30.9.1987 and direct
the respondents to deliver vacant possession of the plaint
schedule property. The respondents also submitted that the B
appellant relying upon the sale deed dated 30.9.1987
requested the court to declare it as the absolute owner and
since it sought possession of the property from the respondents
meaning thereby that the respondents are in possession of the
entire suit property. If the appellant are in possession of only a c
portion of the suit property, the same ought to have been
mentioned in the plaint and the prayer in respect of the same
would be limited and not seeking relief of possession in respect
of the entire suit property. Now by virtue of the amendment, the
appellant is trying to contend that the respondents are to be
0
treated as trespassers and unauthorized occupants of the
building in question.

10. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
when the appellant had original:y sought possession of the entire
property from the respondents, by giving up such a claim, now E
the appellant is trying to introduce a new case which would
~ certainly affect the rights of the respondents when the appellant
had earlier requested the court to pass a decree for possession
of the entire property. Learned counsel for the appellant also
submitted that the trial court without considering or properly F
comprehending implications of all these aspects has allowed
the amendment application.

11. In the impugned judgment, the High Court after
considering the rival contentions came to the definite conclusion G
1 that the appellant while seeking permission to amend the plaint
is trying to introduce a new case which was not his case in the
original plaint and proposed amendment if allowed would
certainly affect the rights of the respondents adversely. In the
impugned judgment, the High Court also held that the appellant H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A cannot be permitted to withdraw the admissions made in the
~
plaint as it would affect the rights of the respondents. "

12. The High Court in the impugned judgment also held
that any such amendment which changes the entire character
of the plaint cannot be permitted and that too after a lapse of
B "
four years after the institution of the suit. The High Court has
set aside the order of the trial court which allowed the
amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
~
13. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the
c appellant has preferred this appeal.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have also perused the written submissions filed by the parties.

15. It is submitted by ttie learned counsel for the appellant
D that the suit, as originally framed, was only for refund of sale
consideration and alternatively for possession. The appellant
also submitted that the relief for possession was always there,
although it was in respect of the entire land which is sought to
be amended and reduced to the licensed area only. According
E to the appellant, the amendment under Order VI Rule 17 is
consequent to the subsequent Urban Land (Ceiling &
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 which validated all exemption
ordern notwithstanding any court orders, judgments or decrees +
to the contrary. The appellant also submitted that the
F amendment is necessary to elucidate the real points in
controversy. It was also submitted by the appellant that the
amendment will not cause any prejudice to the respondents. It
was also submitted that the stand taken up by the respondents ·~

is totally dishonest, wrong and not bona fide. The appellant
G submitted that the court should be liberal in allowing
amendments and the respondents be compensated by costs.
1

16. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
in the original plaint, the appellant rightly sought only for
recovery of sale price relying on section 65 of the Contract Act. ,
H
REVAJEEIU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 115
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

Section 65 of the Contract Act is as follows:- A

"When an agreement is discovered to be void, or
when a contract becomes void, any person who has
received any advantage under such agreement or contract
is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to
8
the person from whom he received it."

17. The original plaint expressly so avers and relies on
section 65 of the Contract Act clearly admitting that the sale
deed has become void. This admission is now sought to be
got rid off and the sale deed is sought to be asserted as valid. C
It was submitted that the appellant cannot, therefore, seek any
amendment of the plaint relying on the circumstances as to the
earlier decision having been overruled by seeking amendment
of the plaint. This has the effect of changing the character of
the suit and also omitting an admission made. D

18. Respondents (Defendant nos.1, 2, 4 and 7) filed written
statement to the original plaint. They prayed the court to pass
a decree in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs.27,30,339.45/
. This is an admission of the respondents in favour of the E
appellant to an extent of Rs.27,30,339.45/-. The appellant now
cannot be permitted to take a complete somersault.

19. The respondents also submitted that the appellant
cannot now seek recovery of possession of the property. To
grant amendment at this stage would not only have the effect F
of appellant getting rid of the admissions made in the original
plaint but defeating the provisions of Order XI I Rule 6 of the CPC
by changing the cause of action and entire character of the suit
and causing serious prejudice to the respondents. The
respondents relied on the decision of this court in Usha G
, Balashaheb Swami & Others v. Kiran Appaso Swami &
Others 1 wherein the court has held that by way of amendment,
admission made in pleadings and particularly in the plaint
1. (2007) s sec 602
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A cannot be sought to be omitted or got rid of. The Court further t-
observed that a prayer for amendment of the plaint stand on
different footing. The relevant observations of the Court are set
out as under:

"19 ... a prayer for amendment of the plaint and a prayer
8
for amendment of the written statement stand on different
footings. The general principle that amendment of
pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or
substitute cause of action or the nature of claim applies
to amendments to plaint. It has no counterpart in the
c principles relating to amendment of the written statement.
Therefore, addition of a new ground of defence or
substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent
pleas in the written statement would not be objectionable
while adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action
D in the plaint may be objectionable.

20. Such being the settled law, we must hold that in the
case of amendment of a written statement, the courts are
more liberal in allowing an amendment than that of a plaint
E as a question of prejudice would be far less in the former
than in the latter case ....... "

20. The learned counsel for the respondents further relied
on the deci.:;ion in Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal & Others2 wherein
the court proceeded on the basis that the earlier admissions
F of the defendant cannot be allowed to be withdrawn. The Court
examined the facts and held that the defendant cannot be
permitted to withdraw any admission already made.

21. The re~ pendents have also relied on the decision in
G Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetley & Others 3 • In the said case, it
was held that by amendment the admission in the original
pleadings cannot be sought to be got rid off.

2. (1998) 1 sec 218
H 3. (2008) 1 sec as
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 117
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

i 22. In Mis Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & A
Another v. Ladha Ram & Co., 4 the trial court while rejecting
an application under Order VI Rule 17 said that the repudiation
of clear admission is motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the
valuable right accrued to him and it is against law. The High
... Court on revision affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
held that by means of amendment the defendant wanted to
B

introduce an entirely different case and if such amendments
were permitted it would prejudice the other side.

23. In the said case, a three-Judge bench of this court
observed:
c

"10. It is true that inconsistent pleas can be made in

- ~
pleadings but the effect of substitution of paragraphs 25
and 26 is not making inconsistent and alternative pleadings
but it is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from D
the admissions made by the defendants in the written
statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will
be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity
of extracting the admission from the defendants. The High
Court rightly rejected the application for amendment and E
agreed with the trial Court."

This judgment has been referred in Usha Balashaheb Swami
(supra) and the court observed that Modi Spinning's case
(supra) was a clear authority for the proposition that once a
written statement contained an admission in favour of the
F
plaintiff, by amendment such an admission of the defendant,
cannot be withdrawn and if allowed, it would amount to totally
displacing the case of the plaintiff.

24. In the same judgment of Usha Balashaheb Swami G
(supra), the Court dealt with a number of judgments of this
Court and laid down that the prayer for amendment of the plaint
and a prayer for amendment of the written statement ·stand on

4. (1976) 4 sec 320 H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A different footings. The general principle that amendment of ~
pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or
substitute the cause of action or the nature of claim applies to
amendments to plaint. It has no counterpart in the principles
relating to amendment of the written statement. Therefore,
B addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering
a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement
would not be objectionable while adding, altering or substituting
a new cause of action in the plaint may be objectionable.

25. If we carefully examine all the cases, the statement of
c law declared by the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung
Mo Hnaung5 has been consistently accepted by the courts till
date as correct statement of law. The Privy Council observed:

D
"All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to
secure the proper administration of justice, and it is 'r
-
therefore essential that they should be made to serve and
be subordinate ·to that purpose, so that full powers of
amendment must be enjoyed and should always be
liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet
E been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be
substituted for another, nor to change, by means of
amendment, the subject-matter of the suit."

26. When we apply the principle laid down by the above
judgments, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the view
F taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be
said to be unjustified.

27. We are tracing the legislative history, objects and
reasons for incorporating Order VI Rule 17 not because it is ....:..
G necessary to dispose of this case, but a large number of
applications under Order VI Rule 17 are filed and our courts
are flooded with such cases. Indiscriminate filing of applications
of amendments is one of the main causes of delay in disposal

H 5. 1922 PC 249
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 119
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

o~ civil cases. In our view, clear guideline may help disposing A
~ off these applications satisfactorily.
.
28. We deem it appropriate to give historical background
of Rule 17 of Order VI corresponds to section 53 of the Old
Code of 1882. It is similar to Order 21 Rule 8 of the English 8
\ Law. Order VI Rule 17 CPC reads as under:

"Amendment. of Pleadings.- The Court may at any stage
-'( of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his
pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be
just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be c
necessary for the purpose of determining the real
questions in controversy between the parties:

Provided that no application for amendment shall be
... allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court D
·~
comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the
party could not have raised the matter before t~
commencement of trial."

29. ln our considered view, Order VI Rule 17 is one of the
important provisions of the CPC, but we have no hesitation in E
also observing that this is one of the most misused provision
of the Code for dragging the proceedings indefinitely,
particularly in the Indian courts which are otherwise heavily
overburdened with the pending cases. All Civil Courts ordinarily
.. have a long list of cases, therefore, the Courts are compelled
to grant long dates which causes delay in disposal of the cases.
F

The applications for amendment lead to further delay in disposal
of the cases.

30. It may be pertinent to mention that with a view to avoid G
delay and to ensure expeditious disposal of suits, Rule 17 was
deleted on the recommendation of Justice Malimath
Committee by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1999 but because of public uproar, it was revived. Justice C.K.
Thakker, an eminent former Judge of this Court in his book on
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Code of Civil Procedure (2005 Edition) incorporated this ,..
information while dealing with the object of amendment.
}-
'
31. In a recently published unique, unusual and extremely
informative book "Justice, Courts and Delays': the author Arun
Mohan, a Senior Advocate of the High Court of Delhi and of
B
this Court, from his vast experience as a Civil Lawyer observed
that 80% applications under Rule VI Order 17 are filed with the
sole objective of delaying the proceedings, whereas 15%
application are filed because of lackadaisical approach in the
first instance, and 5% applications are those where there is
c actual need of amendment. His experience further revealed that
out of these 100 applications, 95 applications are allowed and
only 5 (even may be less) are rejected. According to him, a
need for amendment of pleading should arise in a few cases,
and if proper rules with regard to pleadings are put into place,
D it would be only in rare cases. Therefore, for allowing 'r
amendment, it is not just costs, but the delays caused thereby,
benefit of such de:ay~. the additional costs which had to be
incurred by the victim of the amendment. The Court must
scientifically evaluate the reasons, purpose and effect of the
E amendment and all these factors must be taken into
consideration while awarding the costs.

32. To curtail delay in disposal of cases, in 1999 the
Legislation altogether deleted Rule 17 which meant that
F amendment of pleading would no longer have been
permissible. But immediately after the deletion there was
widespread uproar and in 2002 Rule 17 was restored, but
added a proviso. That proviso applies only after the trial has
commenced: Prior to that stage, the situation remains as it was.
According to the view of the learned author Arun Mohan as
G
observed in his book, although the proviso has improved the
position, the fact remairs that amendments should be
permissible, but only if a sufficient ground therefore is made
out, and further, only on stringent terms. To that end, the rule
needs to be further tightened.
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 121
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

33. The general principle is that courts at any stage of the A

7
• proceedings may allow either party to alter or amend the
pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just
and all those amendments must be allowed which are
imperative for determining the real question in controversy
between the parties. The basic principles of grant or refusal of B
amendment articulated almost 125 years ago are still
considered to be correct statement of law and our courts have
been following the basic principles laid down in those cases.

"" 34. In the leading English case of Cropper v. Smith6, the
object underlying amendment of pleadings has been laid down
c
by Browen, L.J. in the following words:

"It is a well established principle that the object of the courts
is to decide the rights of the parties and not punish them
for mistakes they make in the conduct in their cases by D
-'( deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights ...
I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent
or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct if
it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts
do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of E
deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such
amendment as a matter of favour or grace ... it seems to
me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party
"' has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real
matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his F
part to have it corrected if it can be done without injustice,

..
as anything else in the case is a matter of right."

.
' 35. In Ti/dersley v. Harpef which was decided by the
English Court even earlier than the Cropper's case (supra), in
an action against a lessee for setting aside a lease, in the G
statement of claim it was alleged that the power of attorney of

6. (1884) 29 Ch D 700
7. (1878) 10 Ch D 393
--I H
f

-..-
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A donee had received specified sum as a bribe. In the statement
of defence, each circumstance was denied but there was no >
general denial of a bribe having been given. A prayer for
amendment of the defence statement was refused ..

36. The Court of Appeal held that the amendment ought
B
to have been allowed. Bramwell, L.J. made the following
pertinent observations:

"I have had much to do in Chambers with applications for >
leave to amend, and I may perhaps be allowed to say that
c this humble branch of learning is very familiar to me. My
practice has always'been to give leave to amend unless I
have been satisfied that the party applying was acting ma/a
fide, or that, by his blunder he had done some injury to
his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs
D or otherwise." )'

(Emphasis added)

37. In another leading English case Weldon v. Nea/8, A
filed a suit against B for damages for slander. A thereafter
E applied for leave to amend the plaint by adding fresh claims in
respect of assault and false impriso_nment. On the date of the
application, those claims were barred by limitation though they
were within the period of limitation on the date of filing the suit.
•
The amendment was refused since the effect of granting it
F would be to take away from B the legal right (the defence under
the law of limitation) and thus would cause prejudice to him.

38. The rule, however, is not a universal one and under
certain circumstances, such an amendment may be allowed by ~

G the court notwithstanding the law of limitation. The fact that the
claim is barred by law of limitation is but one of the factors to
be taken into account by the court in exercising the discretion
as to whether the amendment should be allowed or refused,

H 8. (1880) 19 080394: 56LJ QB 621
IREVAJ~ETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 123
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

but it does not affect the power of the court if the amendment A
-f is required in the interests of justice 9 •
.
39. In Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co10 ., the
plaintiff filed a suit for damages against the tramways
Company for negligence of the company in allowing the B
tramways to be in a defective condition. The company denied
the allegation of negligence. It was not even contended that the
company was not the proper party to be sued. More than six
'i~ months after the written statement was filed, the company
applied for leave to amend the defence by adding the plea that
under the contract entered into between the company and the
c
local authority the liability to maintain tramways in proper
condition was of the latter and, therefore, the company was not
liable. On the date of the amendment application, the plaintiffs
remedy against the local authority was time barred. Had the
agreement been pleaded earlier, the plaintiff could have filed D
~
a suit even against the local authority. Under the circumstances,
the amendment was refused .
.....
40. In the said case, Pollock, J. quoting with approval the
observation of Bremwell, LJ. rightly observed: "The test as to E
whether the amendment should be allowed is, whether or not
the defendants can amend without placing the plaintiff in such
a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any
allowance of costs, or otherwise. According to him such an

...
....
amendment ought not be allowed."

41. Kisandas v. Rachappa Vithoba 11 is probably the first
F

leading case decided by the High Court of Bombay under the

... present Code of 1908. There, A, plaintiff, averred that in
pursuance of a partnership agreement, he delivered Rs.4001
G
worth of cloth to B, defendant, and sued for dissolution of

f 9. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (1974) 2 SCC 393; Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram
Charitra Pandey (1994) 2 SCC 29.
10. (1886) 16 QB 178
111. (1903) 33 Born 644 H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2~09) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. .. "fl

A partnership and accounts. The trial court found that A delivered
the cloth worth Rs.4001 but held that there was no partnership
)-
and the suit was not maintainable. In appeal, A sought ...
amendment of adding a prayer for the recovery of Rs.4001. On
that day, claim for recovery ofmoney was barred by limitation.
~·
B The amendment was allowed by the appellate court and the suit
was decreed. B challenged the decree. The High Court upheld
the order and dismissed the appeal. Referring to leading ~

English decisions on the point, Batchelor, J. stated:
~
c "From the imperative character of the last sentence of the ,-...
rule it seems to me clear that, at any stage of the
proceedings, all amendments ought to be allowed which
satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working in justice to
the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose
of determining the real questions in controversy between
D the parties." •
·~
42. In a concurring judgment, Beaman, J. observed that
"the practice is to allow all amendments, whether introducing
....·'
fresh claims or not, so long as they do not put the other party
E at a disadvantage for which he cannot be compensated by
costs."

His Lordship proceeded to state:
f
"In my opinion two simple tests, and two only, need to be
F applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within
the principle. First, could the party asking to amend obtain _,.
...
the same quantity of relief without the amendment? If not,
then it follows necessarily that the proposed amendment
places the other party at a disadvantage; it allows his
G opponent to obtain more from him than he would have been ""
able to obtain but for the amendment. Second, in those
circumstances, can the party thus placed at a disadvantage
l
be compensated for it by costs? wnot, then the amendment
ought not, unless the case is so peculiar as to be taken
H out of the scope of the rule, to be allowed."
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 125
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

43. In Amulakchand Mewaram & Others v. Babula/ A
Kana/al Taliwa/a 12 , the Bombay High Court again had an
occasion to decide a case under Order VI Rule 17. In that case,
the Court approved the following observations of Beaumont,
C.J. and observed:
B
" ... the question whether there should be an amendment
or not really turns upon whether the name in which the suit
is brought in the name of a non-existent person or whether
it is merely a misdescription of existing persons. If the
former is the case, the suit is a nullity and no amendment C
can cure it. If the latter is the case, prima facie, there ought
to be an amendment because the general rule, subject no
doubt to certain exceptions, is that the Court should always
allow an amendment where any loss to the opposing party
can be compensated for by costs."
....... 44. In LJ. Leach & Co. Ltd. & Another v. Jardine, Skinner
D

& Co 13 ., a suit for damages for 'conversion of goods' filed by
the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court but the decree was
set aside by the High Court. In an appeal before this Court, the
plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint by raising an E
alternative claim for damages for breach of contract for 'non-
delivery of goods'. The amendment was resisted by the
• defendant contending that it sought to introduce a new cause
of action which was barred by limitation on the day the
amendment was sought and, hence, it would seriously prejudice F
the defendant.

45. Though the Court noticed 'considerable force' in the
objection, keeping in view the prayer in the amendment which
was not 'foreign to the scope of the suit' and all necessary facts
were on record, it allowed the amendment. G

12. (1933) 35 Born. L.R. 569
13. AIR 1957 SC 357

H
126 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 46. In P.H. Patil v. K.S. Pati/14, A obtained a decree for 1
possession against B. He was, however, obstructed in
obtaining possession by C in execution. A then filed a
substantive suit against B and C. In the plaint, except saying
that he had obtained a decree against B, nothing more was
B stated by A. Hence, he filed an application for amendment
which was rejected by the trial court but allowed by the High
Court. C approached this Court.

47. Dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of the
C High Court, this Court observed that the discretionary power
of amendment was not exercised by the High Court on wrong .
principles. There was merely a defect in the pleading which was
removed by the amendment. The quality and quantity of the ~
reliefs sought remained the same. Since the amendment did
not introduce a new case, the defendant was not taken by
D surprise. ,Y

48. In Pursuhottam Umedbhai & Co. v. Manila/ & Sons15
a suit was instituted in the name of the firm by the partners doing
business outside India. It was held that there was only mis-
E description of the plaintiff. The plaint in the name of the firm was
not a nullity and could be amended by substituting the names
of partners.

49. In similar circumstances, in a subsequent case
F Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram16 , this Court reiterated the
law laid down in Purushottam Umedbhai & Co. (supra). The
Court observed:

"It is true that, if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of ar:!ion
itself and to introduce indirectly, through an amenament of
G his pleadings, an entirely .new or inconsistent cause of

14. AIR 1957 SC 363
15. AIR 1961 SC 325
H 16. (1978) 2 sec 91
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAM¥ & 127
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new A
plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was
originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it
amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is
pending of any right which may have accrued in its favour
due to lapse of time. But, mere failure to set out even an B
essential fact does not, by itself, constitute a new cause
of action. A cause of action is constituted by the whole
/
bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove
before he can succeed in his suit. It must be antecedent
to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking c
from averments in the plaint the cause of action will be
defective. In that case, an attempt to supply the omission
has been and could sometime be viewed as equivalent to
an introduction of a new cause of action which, cured of
its shortcomings, has really become a good cause of 0
action. This, however, is not the only possible
interpretation; to be put on every defective state of
pleadings. Defective pleadings are generally curable, if the
cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio
completely absent. Even very defective pleadings may be
E
permitted to be cured, so as to constitute cause of action
where there was none, provided necessary conditions,
such as payment of either any additional court fees, which
may be payable, or, of costs of the other side are complied
with. It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a
newly constituted cause of action that the Courts should, F
ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings."

- ..
I
50. In Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawa/a v. Nanabhai
Ch uni/al Kabrawala & Others 17 , the defendant's prayer· for
amendment by treating a counter claim as cross-suit was G
objected to by the plaintiff inter alia on the ground of limitation.
The amendment, however, was allowed.

51. When the matter reached this Court, while affirming the
17. AIR 1964 SC 11 H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A order of the High Court, the majority stated: , .......
" ..... It is, no doubt, true that, save in exceptional cases,
leave to amend under 0. 6, r. 17 of the Code will ordinarily
be refused when the effect of the amendment would be to
take away from a party a legal right which had accrued to
B
him by lapse of time. But this rule can apply only when
either fresh allegations are added or fresh reliefs sought
by way of amendment. Where, for instance, an amendment
~
is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and
does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been
c held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the
questions to be considered in allowing such clarification
of a matter already contained in the original pleadin~."

52. The Court further observed that since there was no
D addition to the averments or relief, it was not possible to uphold
the contention of the plaintiff that by conversion of written
statement into a plaint in a cross-suit, a fresh claim was made
or a new relief was sought. To the facts of the present case,
therefore, the decisions holding that amendments could not
E ordinarily be allowed beyond the period of limitation and the
limited exceptions to that rule have no application.

53. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building
Material Supply, 16 A sued B in his individual name but
afterward soughts leave to amend the plaint to sue as the
F
proprietor of a Hindu Joint Family business. The amendment
was granted and the suit was decreed. The High Court,
however, reversed the decree observing that the action was
brought by a 'non-existing person'.
",
J
G 54. Reversing the order of the High Court, tnis Court (per
Shah, J., as he then was) made the following oft-quoted _,
observations:
'

18. (1969) 1 sec 869
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 129
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

"Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the A
administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just
relief merely because of some mistake, negligence,
inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure.
The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a
party, unless it is satisfied that the party Applying, was B
acting ma/a fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused
injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for
by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may
..<
* have been the first omission, and, however late the
proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed c
if it can be made without injustice to the other side."
(Emphasis Added)

55. In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar19, an appeal was filed
... against a mere finding recorded by the trial court. After a lapse
of more than seven years, amendment was sought by which a D
preliminary decree was challenged which was granted by the
High Court by a laconic order.

56. Setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court
stated: E

"The preliminary decree had remained unchallenged since
September 1958 and by lapse of time a valuable right had
accrued in favour of the decree-holder. The power to allow
an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage
F
be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law
of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-
reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial
considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to
be the care and circumspection on the part of the court."
G
i..
57. In Haridas Aildas Thadani & Others v. Godraj Rustom
.. Kermani20 this Court said that "It is well settled that the court

19. (1974) 2 sec 393
20. (1984) 1 sec 668 H

=-
"""'
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A · should be extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment
of pleadirig unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is J '\
caused to the other side. It is also clear that a revisional court
ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in
allowing am.endment in absence of cogent reasons or
B compelling circumstances. •.,.
58. In B. K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameshwaram Pillai &
AnotheF1, a suit was filed by A for recovery of possession from
B alleging that B was a. licensee. In the written statement B \ )>

contended that he was a lessee. After the trial began, he
c applied for amendment of the written statement by adding an
alternative plea that in case B is held to be a licensee, the
licence was irrevocable. The amendment was refused.

59. Setting aside the orders refusing amendment, this .,.,
D Court stated:

"The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is
to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such
manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to
allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any
E
stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the
basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and
the Supreme Court. It is true that the amendment cannot
be claimed as a matter of right and under all
circumstances. But it is equally true that the courts while
F
decidiny such prayers should not adopt hypertechnical
approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule
particularly in cases where the other side can be
compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should
not be permittt d to hamper the courts in, the administration
G of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed
in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of
litigation." •l4
v'·
- ,
21. (2000) 1 sec 112
H

.
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 131
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

60. In Suraj Prakash Bhasin v. Raj Rani Bhasin & A
22
1 Others , this Court held that liberal principles which guide the

exercise of discretion in allowing amendment are that multiplicity
of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do
not totally alter the character of an action should be readily
granted while care should be taken to see that injustice and B
prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted on the
opposite party under pretence of amendment, that one distinct
cause of action should not be substituted for anther and that
1 the subject-matter of the s.uit should n·ot be changed by

amendment. c
WHETHER AMENDMENT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE
REAL CONTROVERSY:

61. The first condition which must be satisfied before the
amendment can be allowed by the court is whether such D
• amendment is necessary for the determination of the real
question in controversy. If that condition is not satisfied, the
amendment cannot be allowed. This is the basic test which
~ should govern the courts' discretion in grant or refusal of the
amendment. E
NO PREJUDICE OR INJUSTICE TO OTHER PARTY:

62. The other important condition which should govern the
discretion of the Court is the potentiality of prejudice or injustice
which is likely to be caused to other side. Ordinarily, if other F
side is compensated by costs, then there is no injustice but in
practice hardly any court grants actual costs to the opposite
side.

63. The Courts have very wide discretion in the matter of G
amendment of pleadings but court's powers must be exercised
~judiciously and with great care.

22. (1981) 3 sec as2
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S. C.R.

A 64. In Ganga Bai's case (supra), this Court has rightly
observed: "

"The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly
wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in
the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding.
B
But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers
is governed by judicial considerations and wider the
discretion, greater ought to be the care and
circumspection on the part of the court."

C COSTS:
65. The Courts have consistently laid down that for
.unnecessary delay and inconvenience, the opposite party must
be compensated with costs. The imposition of costs is an
0 important judicial exercise particularly when the courts deal with
the cases of amendment. The costs cannot and should not be
imposed arbitrarily. In our view, the following parameters must
be taken into consideration while imposing the costs. These
factors are illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.

E (i) At what stage the amendment was sought?

(ii) While imposing the costs, it should be taken into
consideration whether the amendment has been
sought at a pre-trial or post-trial stage;
F
(iii) The financial benefit derived by one party at the cost
of other party should be properly calculated in terms
of money and the costs be awarded accordingly.

(iv) Th& imposition of costs should not be symboltc, but
G realistic; ~}

(v) The delay and inconvenience caused to the
opposite side must be clearly evaluated in terms of
additional and extra court hearings compelling the
opposite party to bear the extra costs.
H
REVAJEETU BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY & 133
SONS & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

(vi) In case of appeal to higher courts, the victim of A
amendment is compelled to bear considerable
additional costs.

All these aspects must be carefully taken into consideration
--+ while awarding the costs.
.. B
.....
66. The purpose of imposing costs is to:
\
... (a) Discourage malafide amendments designed to
delay the legal proceedings;
c
(b) Compensate the other party for the delay and the
inconvenience caused;

(c) Compensate the other party for avoidable
expenses on the litigation which had to be incurred
by opposite party for opposing the amendment; D
and
(d) To send a clear message that the parties have to
be careful while drafting the original pleadings.
E
FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHILE
"' DEALING WITH APPLICATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS:

67. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian
cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken
~
into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for F
amendment.

.... (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for
proper and effective adjudication of the case?

(2) Whether the application for amendment is bona G
.. fide or ma/a fide?
•
(3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice
to the other side which cannot be compensated
adequately in terms of money; H
\.
.....,
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice
or lead to multiple litigation;

(5) Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally
or fundamentally changes the nature and character
of the case? and

-
~
B
(6) As a general rule, the court should decline
amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims
would be barred by limitation on the date of ~
application.
c
68. These are some of the important factors which may
be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order
VI Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

69. The decision on an application made under Order VI
D Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise
should never be undertaken in a casual manner.

70. We can conclude our discussion by observing that
while deciding applications for amendments the courts must not
E refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary
amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/
or dishonest ~mendments.

71. When we apply these parameters to the present case,
then the application for amendment deserves to be dismissed
F
with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) because the
respondents were compelled to oppose the amendment
application before different Courts. This appeal being devoid
of any merit is accordingly dismissed with costs.
,.
G N.J. Appeal dismissed.

.