REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR.versusMALLIKARJUN AND ORS.

•                        [2011] 4 S.C.R. 675


                   REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR.
                                   v.
                     MALLIKARJUN AND ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 2011

                          MARCH 31, 2011
                                                                        B
       [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

        Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:

          s.16(3) - Right of illegitimate children in the coparcenary   c
    property of their parents - Whether illegitimate children are
    entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their
    share is limited only to the self-acquired property of their
    parents uls.16(3) - Held: s.16(3) makes it clear that a child of
    a void or voidable marriage can only claim rights to the            0
    property of his parents, and no one else - The legislature has
    advisedly used the word "property" and has not qualified it with
    either self-acquired property or ancestral property - It has
    been kept broad and general - The issues relating to the
    extent of property rights conferred on such children u/s. 16(3)     E
    of the amended Act were discussed in detail in the case of
    Jinia Keotin case wherein it was held that in the light of
    express mandate of the legislature itself, there is no room for
    according upon such children, who but for s. 16 would have·
    been branded as illegitimate, any further rights than envisaged     F
    therein by resorting to any presumptive or inferential process
    of reasoning, having recourse to the mere object or purpose
    of enacting s. 16 - Article 39 (f) must be kept in mind by the
    Court while interpreting the provision of' s. 16(3) of the Act -
    Apart from Article 39(f), Article 300A a/so comes into play while
    interpreting the concept of property rights - Supreme Court         G
    in the case of *Jinia Keotin and Bharatha Matha took narrow
    view of s. 16(3) of the Act - Therefore, matter needs
    reconsideration and is referred to larger bench - Reference

                                  675                                   H
    676      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 4 S.C.R.

A   to larger bench - Hindu Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
    Articles 300A, 39(f).

       s. 16 - Status of illegitimate children and their right in
  property of their parents - Effect of amendment of s.16 -
  Held: The amendment to s. 16 of the Act was introduced by
8
  Act 60 of 76 - With the amendment of s.16(3), the common
  law view that the offsprings of marriage which is void and
  voidable are illegitimate 'ipso-Jure' has changed completely
  - The status of such children which has been legislatively
  declared legitimate must be recognised and simultaneously
C law recognises the rights of such children in the property of
  their parents - This is a law to advance the socially beneficial
  purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such
  children who are as innocent as any other children.

D        Interpretation of statutes: Purposive interpretation - Held:
    Courts cannot interpret a socially beneficial legislation on the
    basis as if the words therein are cast in stone - Such
    legislation must be given a purposive interpretation to further
    and not to frustrate the eminently desirable social purpose -
E   Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.16(3).

        Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 300A, 39(f) - Held:
    Right to property is no longer fundamental but it is a
    Constitutional right and Article 300A contains a guarantee
    against deprivation of property right save by authority of law.
F
         The question which arose for consideration in the
    instant appeal was whether illegitimate children are
    entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether
    their share is limited only to the self-acquired property of
G   their parents under Section 16(3) of the Hinau Marriage
    Act, 1955.

          Referring the matter to Larger Bench, the Court
        HELD: 1.1. Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
H   1955 makes it very clear that a child of a void or voidable
•     REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJ.UN
                    AND ORS.
                                                          677

    marriage can only claim rights to the property of his A
    parents, and no one else. However, the legislature has
    advisedly used the word "property" and has not qualified
    it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property.
    It has been kept broad and general. The issues relating
    to the extent of property rights conferred on such B
    children under Section 16(3) of the amended Act were
    discussed in detail in the case of Jinia Keotin case. It was
    held in that case that in the light of an express mandate
    of the legislature itself, there is no room for according
    upon such children, who but for Section 16 would have c
    been branded as illegitimate, any further rights than
    envisaged therein by resorting to any presumptive or
    inferential process of reasoning, having recourse to the
    mere object or purpose of enacting Section 16 of the Act.
    Any attempt to do so would amount to doing not only 0
    violence to the provision specifically engrafted in sub-
    section (3) of Section 16 of the Act but also would attempt
    to court relegislating on the subject under the guise of
    interpretation, against even the will expressed in the
    enactment itself. This Court in *Jinia Keotin case took
    narrow view of Section 16(3) of the Act. [Paras 13, 21, 22] E
    [685-F; 688-8-G]
        *Jinia Keotin & Ors. v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors.
    (2003) 1 sec 730 - referred to.
                                                                  F
         1.2. The legislature has used the word "property" in
    Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property is
    meant to be ancestral or self-acquired. A careful reading
    of Section 16(3) of the Act would show that the amended
    Section postulates that such children would not be
    entitled to any rights in the property of any person who      G
    is not his parent if he was not entitled to them, by virtue
    of his illegitimacy, before the passing of the amendment.
    However, the said prohibition does not apply to the
    property of his parents. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16
    expressly declare that such children shall be legitimate.     H
   678      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                  •
A If they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot
  be discriminated against and they will be at par with other
  legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the
  property of their parents, both self-acquired and
  ancestral. The prohibition contained in Section 16(3)
B would apply to such children with respect to property of
  any person other than their parents. [Paras 25, 26) [689-
  C-F]

       2. With changing secial norms of legitimacy in every
  society, what was illegitimate in the past may be
C legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from
  social consensus, in the shaping of which various social
  groups play a vital role. Very often a dominant group
  loses its primacy over other groups in view of ever
  changing socio-economic scenario and the
D consequential vicissitudes in human relationship. Law
  takes its own time to articulate such social changes
  through a process of amendment. That is why in a
  changing society, law cannot afford to remain static. If one
  looks at the history of development of Hindu Law, it will
E be clear that it was never static and has changed from
  time to time to meet the challenges of the changing social
  pattern in different time. [Para 27] [689-G-H; 690-A-B]

       Smt. Sarojamma & Ors. v. Smt. Nee/amma & Ors., ILR
F 2005 Kar 3293; Sri Kenchegowda v. K.B. Krishnappa & Ors.,
  ILR 2008 Kar 3453; Kamulammal (deceased} represented
  by Kattari Nagaya Kamarajendra Ramasami Pandiya
  Naicker v. T.B.K. Visvanathaswami Naicker (deceased) &
  Ors., AIR 1923 PC 8; P.M.A.M. Vel/aiyappa Chetty & Ors. v.
G Natarajan & Anr., AIR 1931 PC 294; Raja Jogendra Bhupati
  Hurri Chundun Mahapatra v. Nityanund Mansingh & Anr.,
  1889-90 Indian Appeals 128; Gur Narain Das & Anr. v. Gur
  Taha/ Das & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 225; Singhai Ajit Kumar &
  Anr. v. Ujayar Singh & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1334; Neelamma
H & Ors. v. Sarojamma & Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 612; Bharatha
•     REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN               679
                    AND ORS.
    Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors. AIR 2010 SC     A
    2685 - referred to.

         3. The amendment to Section 16 of the Hindu
    Marriage Act was introduced by Act 60 of 76. This
    amendment virtually substituted the previous Section 16
                                                                   8
    of the Act with the present Section. From the relevant
    notes appended in the clause relating to this amendment,
    it appears that the same was done to remove difficulties
    in the interpretation of Section 16. With the amendment
    of Section 16(3), the common law view that the offsprings
    of marriage which is void and voidable are illegitimate C
    'ipso-jure' has to change completely. The status of such
    children which has been legislatively declared legitimate
    must be recognised and simultaneously law recognises
    the rights of such children in the property of their parents.
    This is a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose D
    of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children
    who are as innocent as any other children. However, one
    thing must be made clear that benefit given under the
    amended Section 16 is available only in cases where
    there is a marriage but such marriage is void or voidable E
    in view of the provisions of the Act. In the case of joint
    family property such children will be entitled only to a
    share in their parents' property but they cannot claim it
    on their own right. Logically, on the partition of an
    ancestral property, the property falling in the share of the F
    parents of such children is regarded as their self
    acquired and absolute property. In view of the
    amendment, there is no reason why such children will
    have no share in such property since such children are
    equated under the amended law with legitimate offspring G
    of valid marriage. The only limitation even after the
    amendment seems to be that during the life time of their
    parents such children cannot ask for partition but they
    can exercise this right only after the death of their parents.
    [Paras 29, 33-35] [690-D-E; 691-D-H; 692-A]                    H
     680    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2011] 4 S.C.R.


A        Parayankandiya/ Eravath Kanapravan Kal/iani Amma
     (Smt.) & Ors. v. K. Devi and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 76 - referred
     to.

      4. The Court has to remember that relationship
  between the parents may not be sanctioned by law but
8
  the birth of a child in such relationship has to be viewed
  independently of the relationship of the parents. A child
  born in such relationship is innocent and is entitled to all
  the rights which are given to other children born in valid
  marriage. This is the crux of the amendment in Section
C 16(3). However, some limitation on the property rights of
  such children is still there in the sense their right is
  confined to the property of their parents. Such rights
  cannot be further restricted in view. [Para 36] [692-C-D]

·D     5. It is well known that this Court cannot interpret a
  socially beneficial legislation on the basis as if the words
  therein are cast in stone. Such legislation must be given
  a purposive interpretation to further and not to frustrate
  the eminently desirable social purpose of removing the
E stigma on such children. In doing so, the Court must
  have regard to the equity of the Statute and the principles
  voiced under Part IV of the Constitution, namely, the
  Directive Principles of State Policy. This flows from the
  mandate of Article 37 which provides that it is the duty
F of the State to apply the principles enshrined in Chapter
  IV in making laws. It is no longer in dispute that today
  State would include the higher judiciary in this country.
  Article 39 (f) must be kept in mind by the Court while
  interpreting the provision of Section 16(3) of Hindu
G Marriage Act. Apart from Article 39(f), Article 300A also
  comes into play while interpreting the concept of property
  rights. Right to property is no longer fundamental but it
  is a Constitutional right and Article 300A contains a
  guarantee against deprivation of property right save by
  authority of law. In the instant case, Section 16(3) as
H
•     REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN
                    AND ORS.
    amended, does not impose any restriction on the property
                                                            681


                                                                   A
    right of such children except limiting it to the property of
    their parents. Therefore, such children will have a right
    to whatever becomes the property of their parents
    whether self acquired or ancestral. For the said reasons,
    this Court is constrained to take view different from the      B
    one taken in Jinia Keotin and Bhartha Matha on Section
    16(3) of the Act. [Para 37 to 42] [692-E-H; 693-8, G-H; 694-
    A·C]

        Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a      C
    and another (1973) 4 sec 225 - referred to.

                         Case Law Reference:
     ILR 2005 Kar 3293 referred to        Para 6, 24, 32, 42
      ILR 2008 Kar 3453 referred to       Para 9                   D

     AIR 1923 PC 8         referred to    Para 15
      AIR 1931 PC 294      referred to    Para 16, 18, 19
      1889-90 I A 128      referred to    Para 17, 19              E
      AIR 1952 SC 225      referred to    Para 18
      AIR 1961 SC 1334 referred to        Para 19
      [(2003) 1 sec 730 referred to       Para 21,
                                                                   F
                                          22,23,24,32,36,42
      (2006) 9 sec 612     referred to    Para 22
      AIR 2010 SC 2685 referred to        Para 23, 24,32,36,42
      (1996) 4 sec 76      referred to    ·Para 29                 G

      (1973) 4 sec 22s     referred to    Para 37
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    2844 of 2011.
                                                                   H
    682       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011]- 4 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment & Order dated 07.11.2008 of the High
    Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Gulbarga in R.S.A. No.
    550 of 2006.

          Kiran Suri, S.J. Smith for the Appellants.

B       Basava Prabhu S. Patil, V.N. Raghupathy for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
        2. The first defendant had two wives- the third plaintiff (the
  first wife) and the fourth defendant (the second wife). The first
  defendant had two children from the first wife, the third plaintiff,
  namely, the first and second plaintiffs; and another two children
D from his second wife, the fourth defendant namely, the second
  and third defendant.

       3. The plaintiffs (first wife and her two children) had filed a
  suit for partition and separate possession against the
E defendants for their 1/4th share each with respect to ancestral
  property which had been given to the first defendant by way of
  grant. The plaintiffs contended that the first defendant had
  married the fourth defendant while his first marriage was
  subsisting and, therefore, the children born in the said second
F marriage would not be entitled to any share in the ancestral
  property of the first defendant as they were not coparceners.

       4. However, the defendants contended that the properties
  were not ancestral properties at all but were self-acquired
  properties, except for one property which was ancestral.
G Further, the first defendant also contended that it was the fourth
  defendant who was his legally wedded wife, and not the third
  plaintiff and that the plaintiffs had no right to claim partition.
  Further, the first defendant also alleged that an oral partition had
  already taken place earlier.
H
•       REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN
           AND ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY. J.]
                                                                     683


          5. The Triai Court, by its judgment and order dated                A
    28.7.2005, held that the first defendant had not been able to
    prove oral partition nor that he had divorced the third plaintiff.
    The second marriage of the first defendant with the fourth
    defendant was found to be void. as it had been conducted while
    his first marriage was still legally subsisting. Thus, the Trial Court   B
    held that the third plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of the
    first defendant and thus was entitled to claim partition. Further,
    the properties were not self-acquired but ancestral properties
    and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim partition of
    the suit properties. The plaintiffs and the first defendant were         c
    held entitled to 1/4th share each in all the suit properties.

            6. Aggrieved, the defendants filed an appeal against the
      judgment of the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court, vide order
      dated 23.11.2005, re-appreciated the entire evidence on
    . record and affirmed the findings of the Trial Court that the suit      D
    · properties were ancestral properties and that the third plaintiff
      was the legally wedded wife of the first defendant, whose
      marriage with the fourth defendant was void and thus children
      from such marriage were illegitimate. However, the Appellate
      Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court that illegitimate       E
      children had no right to a share in the coparcenary property by
      relying on a judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka
      High Court in Smt. Sarojamma & Ors. v. Smt. Neelamma &
       Ors., [ILR 2.005 Kar 3293]. ·
                                                                             F
           7. The Appellate Court held that children born from a void
     marriage were to be treated at par with coparceners and they
     were also entitled to the joint family properties of the first
     defendant. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that the
     plaintiffs, along with the first, second and third defendants were      G
     entitled to equal share of 1/6th each in the ancestral properties.

          8. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the said judgment of
     the Appellate Court, preferred a second appeal before the High
     Court of Karnataka. The substantial questions of law before the
     High Court were:                                                        H
    684         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 4 S.C.R.


A         "a)     Whether the illegitimate children born out of void
                  marriage are regarded as coparceners by virtue of
                  the amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956?

          b)      At a partition between the coparceners whether
                  they are entitled to a share in the said properties?"
B
           9. The High Court stated that the said questions were no
    more res integra and had been considered in the judgment of
    Sri Kenchegowda v. K.B. Krishnappa & Ors., [ILR 2008 Kar
    3453]. It observed that both the lower courts had concurrently
C   concluded that the fourth defendant was the second wife of the
    first defendant. Therefore, the second and third defendants
    were illegitimate children from a void marriage. Section 16(3)
    of the Hindu Marriage Act makes it clear that illegitimate
    children only had the right to the property of their parents and
D   no one else. As the first and second plaintiffs were the
    legitimate children of the first defendant they constituted a
    coparcenary and were entitled to the suit properties, which were
    coparcenary properties. They also had a right to claim partition
    against the other coparcener and thus their suit for partition
E   against the first defendant was maintainable. However, the
    second and third defendants were not entitled to a share of the
    coparcenary property by birth but were only entitled to the
    separate property of their father, the first defendant. The High
    Court observed that upon partition, when the first defendant got
F   his share on partition, then the second and third defendants
    would be entitled to such share on his dying intestate, but during
    his lifetime they would have no right to the said property. Hence,
    the High Court allowed the appeal and held th.at the first plaintiff,
    second plaintiff and the first defendant would be entitled to 1/
    3rd share each in the suit properties. The claim of the third
G   plaintiff and the second, third and fourth defendants in the suit
    property was rejected.

        10. As a result, the second and third defendants (present
    appellants) filed the present appeal.
H
•     . REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR ' v. MALLIKARJUN
          '
         1;. AND ORS. [ASOK KUMAR;GANGULY, J.]
                                                                     685


         11. The question which crops up .in the facts of this case         A
    is whether illegitimate children are entitled to a share in the
    coparcenary property or whether th~ir share is limited only to
    the self-acquired property of their parents under Section 16(3)
    of the Hindu Marriage Act?
                                                                            8
         12. Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads
    as follows:

               "16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable
               marriages-
                                                                            c
               (1)      )()()(

               (2)      )()()(

               (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
               shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a D
               marriage which is null and void or which is annulled by a
               decree of nullity under section 12, any rights in or to the
               property of any person, other than the parents, in any case
               where, but, for the passing of this Act, such child would have
               been inc9pable of possessing or acquiring any such rights E
               by r.eason of his not !being the legitimate child of his
               parent~. , ; .
                     ; ..       .       ·
                                         I.I
                                            ·
                                             •  j:
                                                · I   ~ • , ..   •
                                                 ~entloned
                                            1

          13. Thus'. the ab ov               section makes .it very clear
    that a child of a void or Joidatile marriage can only claim rights      F
    to the property of his parents, and no one else. However, we
    find it interesting to note that the legislature has advisedly used
    the word "property" and has not qualified it with either self-
    acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad
    and general.
                                                                            G
        · 14. Prior to enactment of Section 16(3) of the Act, the
    question whether child of a void or voidable marriage is entitled
    to self-acquired property or ancestral property of his parents
    Was discussed in a icatena of cases. The property rights of
       '  ....
           '
                 \
                   ,.      _; ..
                            }       '                                       H
    686      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                          •
A   illegitimate children to their father's property were recognized
    in the cases of Sudras to some extent.

          15. In Kamulamma/ (deceased) represented by Kattari
    Nagaya Kamarajendra Ramasami Pandiya Naicker v. T.B.K.
    Visvanathaswami Naicker (deceased) & Ors., [AIR 1923 PC
8
    8], the Privy Council held when a Sudra had died leaving behind
    an illegitimate son, a daughter, his w11'e and certain collateral
    agnates, both the illegitimate son and his wife would be entitled
    to an equal share in his property. The illegitimate son would be
    entitled to one-half of what he would be entitled had he been a
C   legitimate issue. An illegitimate child of a Sudra born from a
    slave or a permanently kept concubine is entitled to share in
    his father's property, along with the legitimate children.

        16. In P.M.A.M. Ve!laiyappa Chetty & Ors. v. Natarajan
D   & Anr., [AIR 1931 PC 294], it was held that the illegitimate son
    of a Sudra from a permanent concubine has the status of a son
    and a member of the family and share of inheritance given to
    him is not merely in lieu of maintenance, but as a recognition
    of his status as a son; that where the father had left no separate
E   property and no legitimate son, but was joint with his collaterals,
    the illegitimate son was not entitled to demand a partition of
    the joint family property, but was entitled to maintenance out of
    that property. Sir Dinshaw Mulla, speaking for the Bench,
    observed that though such illegitimate son was a member of
F   the family, yet he had limited rights compared to a son born in
    a wedlock, and he had no right by birth. During the lifetime of
    the father, he could take only suc_h share as his father may give
    him, but after his death he could claim his father's self-acquired
    property along with the legitimate sons.

G         17. In Raja Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra
    v. Nityanund Mansingh & Anr., [1889-90 Indian Appeals 128],
    the facts were that the Raja was a Sudra and died leaving
    behind a legitimate son, an illegitimate son and a legitimate
    daughter and three widows. The legitimate son had died and
H   the issue was whether the illegitimate son could succeed to the
•      REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN
        '" AND ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
                                                                         687

    propefty of the Raja. The Privy Council held that the illegitimate           A
    son was entitled to succeed to the Raja by virtue of
    survivorship.

           18. In Gur Narain Das & Anr. v. Gur Taha/ Das & Ors.,
     [AIR 1952 SC 225), a Bench comprising Justice Fazl Ali and                  B·
     Justice Bose agreed with the principle laid down in the case
    'of Vel/aiyappa Chetty (supra) and supplemented the same by
     stating certain well-settled principles to the effect that "firstly, that
     the illegitimate son does not acquire by birth any interest in his
     father's estate and he cannot therefore demand partition
     against his father during the latter's lifetime. But on his father's        C
     death, the illegitimate son succeeds as a coparcener to the
     separate estate of the father along with the legitimate son(s)
     with a right of survivorship and is entitled to enforce partition
     against the legitimate son(s) and that on a partition between a
     legitimate and an illegitimate son, the illegitimate son takes              D
     only one-half of what he would have taken if he was a legitimate
     son." However, the Bench was referring to those cases where
     the illegitimate son was of a Sudra from a continuous
     concubine.
                                                                            P"   E
          19. In the case of Singhai Ajit Kumar & Anr. v. Ujayar
    Singh & Ors., [AIR 1961 SC 1334), the main question was
    whether an illegitimate son of a Sudra vis-a-vis his self-acquired
    property, after having succeeded to half-share of his putative
    father's estate, would be entitled to succeed to the other half              F
    share got by the widow. The Bench referred to Chapter 1,
    Section 12 of the Yajnavalkya and the cases of Raja Jogendra
    Bhupati (supra) and Vellaiyappa Chetty (supra) and concluded
    that "once it is established that for the purpose of succes~ion
    an illegitimate son of a Sudra has the status of a son and that              G
    he is entitled to succeed to his putative father's entire self-
    acquired property in the absence of a son, widow, daughter or
    daughter's son and to share along with them, we cannot see
    any escape from the consequential and logical position that he
    shall be entitled to succeed to the other half share when
    succession opens after the widow's death."                                   H
    688     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                      •
A        20. The amendment to Section 16 has been introduced
    and was brought about with the obvious purpose of removing
    the stigma of illegitimacy on children born in void or voidable
    marriage (hereinafter, "such children").

        21. However, the issues relating to the extent of property
8
  rights conferred on such children under Section 16(3) of the
  amended Act were discussed in detail in the case of Jinia
  Keotin & Ors. v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors. [(2003) 1 SCC
  730]. It was contended that by virtue of Section 16(3) of the Act,
  which entitled such children's rights to the property of their
C parents, such property rights included nght to both self-acquired
  as well as ancestral property of the parent. This Court, repelling
  such contentions held that "in the light of such an express
  mandate of the legislature itself, there is no room for according
  upon such children who but for Section 16 would have been
D branded as illegitimate any further rights than envisaged therein
  by resorting to any presumptive or inferential process of
  reasoning, having recourse to the mere object or purpose of
  enacting Section 16 of the Act. Any attempt to do so would
  amount to doing not only violence to the provision specifically
E engrafted in sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the Act but also
  would attempt to court relegislating on the subject under the
  guise of interpretation, against even the will expressed in the
  enactment itself." Thus, the submissions of the appellants were
  rejected.
F
        22. In our humble opinion this Court in Jinia Keotin (supra)
  took a narrow view of Section 16(3) of the Act. The same issue
  was again raised in Neelamma & Ors. v. Sarojamma & Ors.
  ((2006) 9 sec 612], wherein the court referred to the decision
G in Jinia Keotin (supra) and held that illegitimate children would
  only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the
  parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

       23. Same position was again reiterated in a recent
  decision of this court in Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya
H Renganathan & Ors. [AIR 2010 SC 2685], wherein this Court
•   REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN
       AND ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
                                                             689


held that a child born in a void or voidable marriage was not       A··
entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property
but was entitled to claim only share in self-acquired properties.

    24. We cannot accept the aforesaid interpretation of
Section 16(3) given in Jinia Keotin (supra), Nee/amma (supra)       8
and Bharatha Matha (supra) for the reasons discussed
hereunder:

     25. The legislature has used the word "property" in Section
16(3) and is silent on whether such property is meant to be
ancestral or self-acquired. Section 16 contains an express          C
mandate that such children are only entitled to the property of
their parents, and not of any other relation.

       26. On a careful reading of Section 16 (3) of the Act we·
  are of the view that the amended Section postulates that such D
  children would not be entitled to any rights in the property of
  any person who is not his parent if he was not entitled to them,
  by virtue of his illegitimacy, before the passing of the
  amendment. However, the said prohibition does not apply to
  the property of his parents. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 E
· expressly declare that such children shall be legitimate. If they
  have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be
  discriminated against and they will be at par with other
  legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the
  property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The
                                                                     F
  prohibition contained in Section 16(3) will apply to such children
  with respect to property of any person other than their parents.

      27. With changing social norms of legitimacy in every
 society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the p~st may
 be legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from          G
 social consensus, in the shaping of which various social groups
 play a vital role. Very often a dominant group loses its primacy
 over other groups in view of ever changing socio-economic
 scenario and the consequential vicissitudes in human
 relationship. Law takes its own time to articulate such social     H
    690      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 4 S.C.R.


A changes through a process of amendment. That is why in a
  changing society law cannot afford to remain static. If one looks
  at the history of development of Hindu Law it will be clear that
  it was never static and has changed from time to time to meet
  the challenges of the changing social pattern in different time.
B
        28. The amendment to Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage
  Act was introduced by Act 60 of 76. This amendment virtually
  substituted the previous Section 16 of the Act with the present
  Section. From the relevant notes appended in the clause
  relating to this amendment, it appears that the same was done
C to remove difficulties in the interpretation of Section 16.

       29. The constitutional validity of Section 16(3) of Hindu
  Marriage Act was challenged before this Court and upholding
  the law, this Court in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan ·
D Kalliani Amma (Smt.) & Ors. v. K. Devi and Ors., ((1996) 4
  SCC 76], held that Hindu Marriage Act, a beneficial legislation,
  has to be interpreted in a manner which advances the object
  of the legislation. This Court also recognized that the said Act
  intends to bring about social reforms and further held that
E conferment of social status of legitimacy on innocent children
  is the obvious purpose of Section 16 (See para 68).

        30. In paragraph 75, page 101 of the report, the learned
  judges held that Section 16 was previously linked with Sections
  11 and 12 in view of the unamended language of Section 16.
F But after amendment, Section 16(1) stands de-linked from
  Section 11 and Section 16(1) which confers legitimacy on
  children born from void marriages operates with full vigour even
  though provisions of Section 11 nullify those marriages. Such
  legitimacy .has been conferred on the children whether they
G were/are born in void or voidable marriage before or after the
  date of amendment.

        31. In paragraph 82 at page 103 of the report, the learned
    Judges made the following observations:
H
  REVANASIDDAPPA AND ANR. v. MALLIKARJUN                      691
     AND ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

    "In view of the legal fiction contained in Section 16, the        A
    illegitimate children, for all practical purposes, including
    succession to the properties of their parents, have to be
    treated as legitimate. They cannot, however, succeed to
    the properties of any other relation on the basis of this rule,
    which in its operation, is limited to the properties of the       13
    parents."

     32. It has been held in Parayankandiyal (supra) that Hindu
Marriage Act is a beneficent legislation and intends to bring
about social reforms. Therefore, the interpretation given to
Section 16(3) by this Court in Jinia Keotin (supra), Neelamma         C
(supra) and Bharatha Matha (supra) needs to be reconsidered.

      33. With the amendment of Section 16(3), the common law
viE. N that the offsprings of marriage which is void and voidable
are illegitimate 'ipso-jure' has to change completely. We must        o
recognize the status of such children which has been
legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously law
recognises the rights of such children in the property of their
parents. This is a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose
of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who are       E
as innocent as any other children.

     34. However, one thing must be made clear that benefit
given under the amended Section 16 is available only in cases
where there is a marriage but such marriage is void or voidable
in view of the provisions of the Act.                                 F

      35. In our view, in the case of joint family property such
children will be entitled only to a share in their parents' property
but they cannot claim it on their own right. Logically, on the
partition of an ancestral property, the property falling in the share G
of the parents of such children is regarded as their self
acquired and absolute property. In view of the amendment, we
see no reason why such children will have no share in such
property since such children are equated under the amended
law with legitimate offspring of valid marriage. The only limitation . H
    692      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (20. J 4 S.C.R.

A even after the amendment seems to be that during the life time
  of their parents such children cannot ask for partition but they
  can exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

        36. We are constrained to differ from the interpretation of
  Section 16(3) rendered by this Court in Jinia Keotin (supra)
8 and, thereafter, in Nee/amma (supra) and Bharatha Matha
  (supra) in view of the constitutional values enshrined in the
  preamble of our Constitution which focuses on the concept of
  equality of status and opportunity and also on individual dignity.
  The Court has to remember that relationship between the
C parents may not be sanctioned by law but the birth of a child in
  such relationship has to be viewed independently of the
  relationship of the parents. A child born in such relationship is
  innocent and is entitled to all the rights which are given to other
  children born in valid marriage. This is the crux of the
D amendment in Section 16(3). However, some limitation on the
  property rights of such children is still there in the sense their
  right is confined to the property of their parents. Such rights
  cannot be further restricted in view of the pe-existing common
  law view discussed above.
E
        37. It is well known that this Court cannot .:iterpr0t a socially
  beneficial legislation on the basis as if the words therein are
  cast in stone. Such legislation must be given a purposive
  interpretation to further and not to frustrate the eminently
F desirable social purpose of removing the stigma on such
  children. In doing so, the Court must have regard to the equity
  of the Statute and the principles voiced under Part IV of the
  Constitution, namely, the Directive Principles of State Policy.
  In our view this flows from the mandate of Artiele 37 which
  provides that it is the duty of the State to apply the principles
G enshrined in Chapter IV in making laws. It is no longer in dispute
  that today State would include the higher judiciary in this country.
  Considering Article 37 in the context of the duty of judiciary,
  Justice Mathew in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadaga/varu v.
  State of Kera/a and another [(1973) 4 SCC 225] held:
H
•   REVANASiDDAPPA AND ANR. v MAL LIKARJUN
       AND ORS. [ 1),SOK KU'/,f'-1R GANGUl_Y, J.]
                                                                   693


      ·...... I can see no incongruity in holding. when Article 37         A
     says in its latter part "it shall be the duty of the State to apply
     these principles in making laws , that judicial process is
     'State action' and that the judiciary is bound to apply the
     Directive Principles in making its judgment."
                                                        .                  B.
     38. Going by this principle, we are of the opinion that
Article 39 (f) must be kept in mind by the Court while
interpreting the provision of Section 16(3) of Hindu Marriage
Act. Article 39(f) of the Constitution runs as follows:

     "39 Certain principles of policy to be followed by the                C
     State: The State shall, in particular, direct its policy
     towards sec,;ring-

      (a)    xxx ·

      (b)    xxx                                                           D

      (c)    xxx

      (d)    xxx
                                                                           E
      (e)    xxx

      (f)    that children are given opportunities and facilities
             to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of
             freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth
             are protected against exploitation and against                F
             moral and material abandonment."

     39. Apart from Article 39(f), Article 300A also comes into
play while interpreting the concept of property rights. Article
300A is as follows:
                                                                           G
     "300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save
     by authority of law: No person shall be deprived of his
     property save by authority of law."

     40. Right to property is no longer fundamental but it is a            H
    694      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 4 S.C.R.


A   Constitutional right and Article 300A contains a guarantee
    against deprivation of property right save by authority of law.

       41. In the instant case, Section 16(3) as amended, does
  not impose any restriction on the property right of such children
B except limiting it to the property of their parents. Therefore, such
  children will have a right to whatever becomes the property of
  their parents whether self acquired or ancestral.

       42. For the reasons discussed above, we are constrained
  to take a view different from the one taken by this Court in Jinia
C Keotin (supra), Neelamma (supra) and Bharatha Matha
  (supra) on Section 16(3) of the Act.

         43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should
    be reconsidered by a larger Bench and for that purpose the
o   records of the case be placed before the Hun'ble the Chief
    Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.

    D.G.                          Matter referred to Larger Bench.