REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER AND ORS.versusA. ARUNA AND ORS.

A                 REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER AND ORS.
                                           V.

                              A. ARUNA AND ORS.

                                  AUGUST 5, I 998

B           [S.B. MAJUMDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]


          A.P. Land Grabbing [Prohibition} Act, 1982:

           Section 17A: Review Jurisdiction applicable to the Special Court
C   constituted under the Act-Power of-Held, can be invoked if the order
    sought to be reviewed must appear to have resulted into miscarriage of
    justice-There are only two grounds for review under Section 17-A-Hence,
    it is not a full-fledged power of reconsideration of the entire case as if it was
    a second innings on facts and law permitted by the legislature.

D          Power of review- "Mistake offact"-Element of-Held, it must be such
    that it goes to the root of the matter and must be so patent that but for such
    mistake the final judgment would not have been rendered-Mere mistake in
    appreciation of evidence or in inference drawn from facts such as inference
    drawn on conjectures would not amount to 'mistake of fact' under Section
E   17-A-Thus, where decision was taken by Special Court on appreciation of
    oral and documentary evidence, review jurisdiction under this Section cannot
    be invoked on ground of mistake of fact.

          Review jurisdiction of the Special Court-Review and appellate power-
    Distinction between-A review can never be said to be an appeal in disguise.
F
         Grounds of review-Grounds are wider under this Section than the
    grounds available under Order 47 Rule I of the CPC-Civil Procedure
    Code, 1908, Order 47 Rule 1.

          Words and phrases-"Mistake of facts "-Meaning of- In the context
G   of Section 17-A of A.P. Land Grabbing [Prohibition] Act, 1982.

           The Appellants functioning under the A.P. Land Grabbing [Prohibition)
    Act, had moved the Special Court on the grounds that the respondents were
    in illegal possession of and that they were land-grabbers of a plot of land. Full
    Bench of the Special Court decided the said application after hearing the
H   parties and after considering the evidence led by them. She came to the
                                           1020
                 REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER v. A. ARUNA                  1021
conclusion that though the appellants had established their title to the land     A
in question, it was adversely possessed by the respondents and therefore, no
relief could be granted to the appellants. An application for review under
Section 17-A of the Act was moved by the appellants before the Special Court
on two grounds that the document Ex. B-12 relied on by the Special Court was
not legally admissible on the record and that the decision rendered by theCourt   B
suffered from an error of fact. Ex. B-1 which was earlier relied upon by the
Special Court in coming to the conclusion that it had reference to Plot No.
9 (in dispute), in fact did not refer to Plot No. 9 at all but it was concerned
with Plot No. 10. Special Court, by majority, allowed the review petition. This
order in review was challenged by the respondent before the High Court in
a writ petition. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition     c
by holding that review jurisdiction was wrongly sought to be invoked by the
appellants and review proceedings were not maintainable. Hence this appeal.

       It was contended by the appellants that the earlier order of the Special
Court suffered from a clear error of fact which was a glaring one and could D
be said to be an apparent or patent error. It was contended by the respondents
that review jurisdiction was a by no means an appellate jurisdiction; and that
jurisprudentially a review jurisdiction would be invoked by the same authority
only on patent error of law and if power of review took in its fold errors of
fact, the errors of fact must be such that it would go to the root of the matter.
                                                                                  E
      Dismissing the appeal, this Court

       HELD: 1.1. Review jurisdiction under Section 17-A of the A.P. Land
Grabbing [Prohibition] Act, 1982 can be inrnked by the Special Court mainly
with a view to prevent miscarriage of justice. Consequently the order sought p
to be reviewed must appear to have resulted into miscarriage of justice and
not merely that it might have occasioned dissatisfaction to the party that
loses before the Special Court in the first instance. But even apart from that,
as Section 17-A clearly lays down, reviews shall be entertained only on the
grounds mentioned therein, meaning thereby it is not a full-fledged power G
of reconsideration of the entire case as if it was a second innings on facts
and law permitted by the legislature to the Special Court once it decided a
lis between the parties earlier. The grounds of review are limited as mentioned
in the said section. It is, of course, true that these grounds are wider than
the grounds on which review is allowed under Order XL VII Rule 1 CPC,
because even on mistake of fact or even on ignorance of material facts, a H
    1022                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A   rev;ew is permitted. It is also true that an error apparent on the face of the
    record is a separate ground for reviewing the order of the Special Court as
    laid down under Section 17-A. However, there is a clear distinction between
    review power and appellate power. A review can never be said to be an appeal
    in disguise. Therefore, in order to effectively invoke the jurisdiction of
    Special Court in review proceedings, it has to be shown that the mistake of
B
    fact which is alleged by the review petitioner should be such that it gets
    directly embedded in the final order, in the sense it goes to the root of the
    matter. (1026-G-H; 1027-A-C)

           1.2. The phrase, "judgement or order passed on a mistake of fact"
C   shows that the mistake of fact must be so patent that it directly results in
    an erro~ous order sought to be reviewed. In other words, the mistake of
    facts must have a direct nexus with the ultimate order which but for such
    a patent mistake, would not have been so rendered. It has to be shown that
    but for such a mistake of a contrary result might have followed. Therefore,
    before a review petitioner can invoke Section 17-A, it should be shown that
D   the mistake of fact is a patent mistake and not a latent one. Mere mistakes
    in appreciation of evidence or in any inferences drawn from facts could be
    corrected only in the proceedings before a higher forum and not in review          f'
    proceedings. It is, therefore, not possible to agri;_e with the view that once a
    mistake of fact is pointed out and once it is shown that the inference of fact
E   is drawn is conjectural, that by itself would be a ground for review under
    Section 17-A. As a court of first instance even if inference is drawn from
    available facts and if that inference is found fault with, unless that inference
    is of such a nature that but for that inference the ultimate result would have
    been different, it would not amount to any glaring mistake of fact on which
    such judgement can be sought to be reviewed under Section 17-A.
F                                                                        [1027-C-G)

          1.3. Since in the present case the earlier decision was arrived at by the
    Special Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and the
    conclusion was reached on facts that the respondents were in adverse
G   possession of plot in question even though the title of the appellants was held
    proved, it could not be said that there was any such mistake of fact which was
    so patent that but for such mistake, the final conclusion about adverse
    possession of the respondents would have been different. Under these
    circumstances, one cannot find fault with the High Court even it took the
    view that the majority of the Members were not justified in reopening the
H   earlier decision of the Special Court. (1028-A-B)
   REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER v. A. ARUNA [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]                 1023

        2. Even if the High Court wrongly assumed that the Special Court had           A
not only reopened the earlier matter but had already decided it in the review
proceedings, the ultimate decision rendered by the High Court on the facts
of the present case cannot be said to be in any way erroneous. (1028-C)

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3641 of                        B
1998.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11. 96 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.P (c) No. 23128 of 1996.

        A. Raghuvir, C. Balasubramani, Ms. Santhi Narayanan, Asha G. Nair and          C
K. Ram Kumar for the Appellants.

        P.P. Rao, D. Ramakrishna Reddy and Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy for the
Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                     D

        S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.

      We have heard learned counsel for the parties finally. This appeal arises
out of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra           E
Pradesh upsetting the majority view arrived at by two members of the Special
Court functioning under the provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appellants are the authorities
functioning under the said Act. They had moved the Special Court on the
ground that the respondents were in illegal possession and were land grabbers
of a plot of land being plot no.9 situated at Jubilee Hills in Hyderabad city.         F
That application was moved in 1991. The Full Bench of the Special Court
consisting of the Chairman and the two Members decided the said application
after hearing the parties and after considering the evidence led by them and
came to the conclusion that though the appellants had es tab Iished their title
to plot no.9 it was adversely possessed by the respondents and, therefore,             G
no relief could be granted to the appellants in the said proceedings. That
decision was rendered on 31st October 1995. An application for review under
Section 17A of the Act was moved by the appellants before the Special Court.
In the said application two grounds were sought to be relied upon - (i) that
the Special Court had relied upon Ex. B-12 which was not legally admissible            H
                                                                                        _J
    1024                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A   on the record of the case; and (ii) that the decision rendered by the Court
    suffered from an error of fact. The said Review Petition was heard by the Full
    Bench of the Special Court. The learned Chairman who presided over the
    Bench, took the view that there was no question of invoking the review
    jurisdiction and, therefore, he was inclined to dismiss the said proceedings.
B   However the other two Members took a contrary view and held that the order
    sought to be reviewed required re-consideration and, therefore, they were
    inclined to re-hear the matter by granting the review application. Accordingly
    by majority Review Petition was allowed. That resulted in a writ petition on
    behalf of the respondents before the High Court.

c         The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated
    25th November 1996 held that the review jurisdiction was wrongly sought to
    be invoked by the appellants and review proceedings were not maintainable.
    It was held that the first ground, namely, Ex.B-12 was inadmissible in evidence,
    could not be sustained for supporting the review petition as it was admitted
    in the evidence earlier without any objection. On the second ground it was
D   held by the High Court that the earlier judgment on 31st October 1995 was
    based on the relevant facts, both oral and documentary, namely Ex.B-12 and
    B-13 and B-15 which were earlier judgements of the Special Court wherein it
    was held that for plot no. 9 situated at Jubilee Hills the State authorities had
    no title and the plot was a fully paid up plot belonging to the erstwhile
E   occupants and consequently the earlier proceedings filed under the very
    same Act by the same appellants seeking eviction of alleged unauthorised
    occupants of this very plot were dismissed. It is also pertinent to note that
    nothing was brought out on the record of these proceedings to show that
    the earlier decisions of the very same Court at Ex.B-13 and B-15 which were
    relied upon by it while passing the order dated 31st October 1995, were ever
F   carried higher up or were sub judice before any other higher authority. In fact
    such was not even the ground on which review was sought by the appellants.
    The High Court, therefore, took the view that when the earlier decision was
    rendered on consideration of all relevant facts and on appreciation of evidence,
    both oral and documentary, it could not be said that the said decision suffered
G   from any patent error of fact which could have enabled the appellants to seek
    review of the said order under Section 17A of the Act. Consequently the writ
    petition was allowed and the majority decision of the Special Court seeking
    to review its earlier order was set aside.

          Learned senior counsel Shri A. Raghuvir for the appellants fairly stated
H   that he was pressing the case for review of the earlier order of the Special
 REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER v. A. ARUNA [S.B. MAJMUDAR, L)               1025
Court not on the ground that Ex.B-12 was wrongly held admissible in evidence A
but he strongly relied upon second ground for review, namely, that the earlier
decision suffered from a clear error of fact which in his view was a glaring
one and could be said to be an apparent or a patent error. He submitted that
Ex.B-12 which was earlier relied upon by the Special Court in coming to the
conclusion lttat it had reference to plot no.9 in fact did not refer to plot no.9 B
at all which was the disputed plot but it was concerned with plot no. I 0 which
was an adjoining plot. That is one patent error of fact which had crept in the
earlier decision of the Special Court dated 31st October 1995. It was next
contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that even that
apart, the decision sought to be got reviewed relied upon two earlier judgments
of the Special Court Ex.B-13 and B-15, which might have referred to plot no.9 C
but those decisions had held that plot no.9 did not belong to the Government
but was a fully paid up plot which had passed on to the then occupant of
the plot and did not remain in the ownership of the erstwhile municipality and
consequently could not have been available to the State to claim its title
thereon through the said erstwhile defunct municipality. Therefore, the finding
reached by the Special Court in the present case on 31st October 1995 when D
it decided that the said plot belonged to the Government could not have been
based on the earlier judgments Ex.B-13 and B-15 which clearly held to the
contrary. This was another patent error of fact. It was next submitted that the
High Court wrongly assumed that the Special Court while passing the
impugned judgment seeking to review the earlier decision had already set it E
aside on merits and that while granting the review petition the entire matter
was finally disposed of by the Court. On all these grounds it was vehemently
contended that the review proceedings which were at the stage of hearing
before the Special Court r.ould not have b0en intercepted by the High Court,
in exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
                                                                                 F
       On the other hand learned senior counsel Shri P.P. Rao for the
respondents submitted that review jurisdiction is by no means an appellate
jurisdiction. That jurisprudentially speaking, a review lies to the same authority
only on patent errors of law and if the power of review can also take in its
fold errors of fact the errors of fact must be such that they would go to the
root of the matter, otherwise the reviewing authority would almost be able to G
exercise full appellate powers which would be completely contrary to the well
settled connotation ofreview jurisdiction. It was also submitted that the High
Court was justified in taking the view that earlier decision was rendered on
appreciation of evidence on record then led by both the parties and even if
there was any error in coming to any final conclusion it could be corrected H
    1026                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A only by an appellate or higher authority in the hierarchy of proceedings and
    could not be corrected by the same authority by invoking the review
    jurisdiction. That mere error of appreciation of evidence cannot be equated
    with a patent error of fact even on the ground that under Section 17 A of the
    Act on an error of fact review powers could be invoked. It was, therefore,
    contended that the impugned order of the High Court suffers- from no error
B   and calls for no interference under. Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

          Having given our anxious and careful consideration to these rival
    contentions we have come to the conclusion that on the peculiar facts of this
    case it could not be said that the High Court had committed any error in
C   interfering with the order of the majority of the Members of the Special Court
    and in quashing the review proceedings.

          In order to resolve the controversy between the parties, it will be
    necessary to have a look at the review jurisdiction conferred on the Special
    Court under Section 17A of the Act. It reads as under:
D
               "17 A. Review - The Special Court may in order to prevent the
            miscarriage of justice review its judgment or order passed under
            Section 8 but no such review shall be entertained except on the             r'
            ground that it was passed under a mistake of fact, ignorance of any
            material fact or an error apparent on the face of the record;
E
                Provided that it shall be lawful for the Special Court to admit or
            reject review petitions in circulation without hearing the petitioner;

                Provided further that the Special Court shall not allow any review
            petitions and set aside its previous order or judgment without hearing
F           the parties affected."

          A mere look at the said provision shows that review jurisdiction can be
  invoked by the Special Court mainly with a view to prevent miscarriage of
  justice. Consequently the order sought to be reviewed must appear to have
G resulted into miscarriage of justice and not merely might have occasioned
  dissatisfaction to the party that loses before the Special Court in the first
   instance. But even apart from that, as Section 17 A clearly lays down, review
  shall be entertained only on the grounds mentioned therein, meaning thereby
   it is not a full-fledged power of re-consideration of the entire case as if it was
  a second innings on farts and law permitted by the Legislature to the Special
H Court once it decided a lis between the parties earlier. The grounds of review
    REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER.v. A. ARUNA [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]           1027
 are limited as mentioned in the said Section. It is, of course, true that these A
 grounds are wider than the grounds on which review is allowed under Order
 XL VII Rule 1, CPC, because even on the mistake of fact or even on ignorance
 of material fact a review is permitted. It is also true that error apparent on the
 face of the record is a separate ground for reviewing the order of Special
 Court as laid down under Section 17A of the Act. However, it cannot be
 gainsaid that there is a clear distinction between review power and appellate B
 power. A review can never be said to be an appeal in disguise. Therefore, in
 order to effectively invoke the jurisdiction of Sp~cial Court in review
 proceedings it has to be shown that the mistake of fact which is alleged by
 the review petitioner should be such that it gets directly embedded in the final
 order, in the sense it goes to the root of the matter. The phrase, 'judgment C
 or order passed on a mistake of fact' shows that the mistake of fact must be
 so patent that it directly results in an erroneous order sought to be reviewed.
 In other words, the mistake of fact must have a direct nexus with the ultimate
 order which but for such a patent mistake would not have been so rendered.
 It has to be shown that but for such a mistake of fact a contrary result might
 have followed. It is, therefore, obvious that before a review petitioner can D
 invoke Section I 7A of the Act it should be shown that the mistake of fact
 is a patent mistake and not a latent one. Mere mistakes in appreciation of
 evidence or in any inferences drawn from facts col1ld be corrected only in
 proceedings before a higher forum and not in review proceedings. It is,
 therefore, not possible to agree with the learned senior counsel for the E
 appellants that once a mistake of fact is pointed out and once it is shown that
 the inference of fact is drawn which is conjectural, that by itself would be a
 ground for review under Section 17A of the Act. Shri Raghuvir, learned senior
 counsel for the appellants submitted that in the earlier judgment it was
 observed by the Chairman speaking for the Special Court that because plot
no.9 was adjoining plot no. I 0, the owner of plot no. I 0 might have encroached F
upon the adjoining plot no. 9 and even his vendee also would have accordingly
trespassed on this land. This was purely a conjecture. It must be kept in view
that as a court of first instance even if inference is drawn from available data
of facts and if that inference is fou!:!d fault with unless that inference is of
such a nature that but for that inference the ultimate result would have been G
different it would not amount to any glaring mistake of fact on which such
judgment can be sought to be reviewed under Section 17A of the Act. In our
view, the High Court was right when it held that on the facts of the present
case the earlier decision of 31st October 1995 was arrived at by the Court on
appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and the conclusion was reached
on facts that the respondents were in adverse possession of plot no.9 even H
    1028                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A though the title of the appellants was held proved. As this finding was
   reached on appreciation of number of documents on record and also on
   consideration of oral evidence it could not be said that there was any such
   mistake of fact which was so patent that but for such mistake the final
   conclusion about adverse possession of respondents would have been
  different. Under these circumstances, therefore, we cannot find fault with the
B High Court when it took the view that the majority of the Members were not
  justified in re-opening the earlier decision of the Special Court.

        We may, however, mention that learned senior counsel for the appellants,
  Shri Raghuvir was right when he contended that the High Court wrongly
C assumed that the Special Court had not only re-opened the earlier matter but
  had already decided it in review proceedings. Even if the learned senior
  counsel is right to that extent the ultimate decision rendered by the High
  Court on the facts of the present case cannot be said to be in any way
  erroneous.

D         We make it clear that as learned senior counsel Shri Raghuvir had not
    pressed review proceeding on the ground that there was a patent error also
    in connection with the admissibility of Ex.B-12 we are not expressing any
    opinion on this question.

           In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and
E circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
    R.K.S.                                                   Appeal dismissed.