Holding

An order of eviction under Section 77(3) of the Punjab Tenancy Act does not operate as res judicata for a subsequent suit that challenges the nature of the landlord‑tenant relationship or title, as the revenue court lacked jurisdiction to decide such issues.

Summary

The appellants, landlords, obtained an ejectment decree against the respondent under Section 77(3) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 for non‑payment of rent, and the decree was executed without any appeal. The respondent then filed a civil suit claiming he was a mortgagee in possession, not a tenant, and contended that the revenue court lacked jurisdiction, seeking restoration of possession. The subordinate court upheld the decree, but the Additional District Judge reversed that decision. The Punjab and Haryana High Court Full Bench held that the revenue court's decree does not operate as res judicata for a suit that questions the landlord‑tenant relationship or title. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, holding that the revenue court could not determine whether the respondent was a tenant or mortgagee and therefore its decree could not bar the later civil suit. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether an eviction order passed by a revenue court under Section 77(3) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 operates as res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for a subsequent civil suit concerning title.
Whether the revenue court had jurisdiction to decide the nature of the landlord‑tenant relationship or the respondent's claim of being a mortgagee in possession.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 11
Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948s. 17(1)
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887s. 77(3), s. 98, s. 99

Subjects

res judicataPunjab Tenancy Actevictionlandlord‑tenant relationshipjurisdictioncivil suittitle disputerevenue court

Judgment

RICHPAL SINGH AND OTHERS ETC.
A
v.
DALIP

SEPTEMBER 9, 1987

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.] B

'!-· Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887: Section 77(3)-Decree for ejectment
passed by Revenue Court-Whether bar to subsequent suit in Civil
Court for determining title.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 11-Res judicata-
c
Applicability'of-Decree for ejectment passed by Revenue Court under
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887-Whether applicable to subsequent suit in a
Civil Court for determining relationship between landlord and the
tenant.
D
A suit was filed by the appellants in the Court of the Assistant
Collector seeking ejectment of the respondent-tenant from his lands,
under s. 77(3) proviso 2(e) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 on the
ground that he had defaulted in the payment of rent, and it was
decreed. In execution of the decree, the respondent was ejected from
E
the suit land. No appeal was filed from the said decree but the respon-
dent filed a suit in the Civil Court against the appellants alleging that he
was iu fact a mortgagee in possession of the suit land and not a tenant
and that the decree of ejectment passed by the Revenue Court was
without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity, and claimed restoration
of the possession of the suit land from which he had been wrongly F
ousted by the Revenue Court. The suit was dismissed by the Subordi-
nate Judge holding that the claim of the respondent to be a mortgagee In
possession of the suit land was wrong and that the order of the Revenue
Court was perfectly In order and within that court'sjurisdictional com-
petence and that it was of a binding nature on the respondent and was
not open to challenge in subsequent proceedings. The appellant asserted G
that the claim by the respondent in the subsequent suit was barred by
the principles of res judicata. The suit was dismissed.

·-"I Jn appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed the findings of
the trial court and decreed the suit of the respondent. The appellants
H
filed r~ second appeals before the High Court.
93
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

A A Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that, in view of
the conflicting judgments on the points for determination in the case,
the matter required to be referred to a larger bench. The Full Bench, by
a majority view, held that the decision ofthe Revenue Court under s. 77
of the Punjab Tenancy Act upon the relationship oflandlord and tenant
between the parties would not operate as res judicata and it would be
B open to challenge in a subsequent suit or in other collateral proceedings
between the parties, and remitted the matter back to the Single Judge
for disposal in accordance with the above decision.

The question for consideration in the appeals by Special Leave
before this Court was: as to how far an order of eviction of a person by
the Revenue Court un(ler s. 77(3) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887
c operated as res judicata for a title suit filed by a person claiming to be a
mortgagee and not a tenant of the alleged landlord.

Dismissing the appeals by special leave, this Court, •

D HELD: 1. The High Court was right in holding that there was no
res judicata so far as the second suit based on the assertion of the title of
the respondent was concerned. [105C-D]

2.1 The overall scheme of the Act is to provide speedy remedies
with regard to disputes between the landlords and tenants and also
E under what circumstances that relationship came to an end. Sections 98
and 99 do not in any way affect the question whether the decision of the
Revenue Court under the Revenue Act can operate as res judicata in
certain cases. The limits of the jurisdiction would be apparent by the
fact that all suits by a landlord to eject a tenant do not encompass suits
to decide whether a person was a tenant or not or whether the plaintiff
F was a landlord or not. [98C; 99F-G]

2.2 Ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Courts should not be inferred
easily. It must be clearly provided for and established. If the dispute
was as to the nature of the relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties, the Revenue Court under the Punjab Tenancy Act had no
G jurisdiction; when there was admitted position, the relationship of land-
lord and tenant was accepted, the remedies and rights of the parties
should be worked out under the scheme of the Act. [103C-D I

2.3 A salutory and simple test to apply in determining whether
the previous decision operated as res judicata or on principles analogous
H thereto was to find out whether the first court could go into the question
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP [MUKHARJI, J.] 95

whether the respondent was a tenant in possession or mortgagee in A
possession. In view of the language of section 77 it is clear that it could
not and, therefore, there was no res judicata. The subsequent civil suit
was, therefore, not barred by res judicata. [105B-C)

Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali Sen and others, [1953]
4 SCR 154; Om Prakash Gupta v. Rattan Singh and another, [1964) 1 B
SCR 259; Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solan v. Tholu, [1963) 2 SCR 693;
'f Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, [1962) 3 SCR 673; Lal Chand (dead)
by Lrs. and others v. Radha Kishan, [1977] 2 SCR 522 and State of
Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, AIR 1986 S.C. 794, refer-
red to. -

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CivilAppeals Nos. 1741 C
and 1742 of 1981.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.3.1981 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1822 of 1978.
D
Harbans Lal and Balmukand Goel for the Appellants.

Anil Dev Singh, N.D. Garg and Rajiv Garg for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
SABYASA CHI MUKHARJI, J. How far an order directing evic-
tion of a person by the Revenue Court under section 77(3) of the
Punjab Tenancy Act, 18&_7 (hereinafter called 'the Act') operates as
res judicata for a title suit filed by a person claiming to be a mortgagee
and not a tenant of the alleged landlord, is the question that arises in
this appeal by special leave from the Full Bench decision of the High F

\ Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 12th March, 1981 in second
appeal. By the impugned order and judgment the High Court has
dismissed the appeal of the appellants and affirmed the judgment and
order dated 7th September, 1978 of the Additional District Judge,
Gurgaon reversing the judgment and order of Sub Judge 1st Class,
Ballabgarh dated 4th of November, 1977 dismissing the suit of the G
respondent.

It appears that the appellants filed proceedings in the Court of
Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Ballabgarh seeking ejectment of the
respondent from his lands on 29th July, 1975 under section 77(3) pro-
viso 2(e) of the Act on the ground that the respondent-tenant had H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A defaulted in the payment ·of rent. The suit was decreed on 29th
October, 1976. In execution of the decree the respondent was ejected
froni the suit land. No appeal though provided under the said Act was
filed by the respondent from the said decree. The resondent, how-
ever, filed a suit in the civil court against the appellants alleging that he
in fact was a mortgagee in possession of the suit land and not a tenant
B and that the decree of ejectment dated 29th of October, 1976 by the
Revenue Court was without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity. The.
respondent claimed to be restored the possession of the suit land from
which he had been wrongly ousted by the Revenue Court. The suit was
dismissed. by the learned Subordinate Judge on 4th November, 1977
holding that the claim of the respondent to be a mortgagee in po, es- 0

C sion of the suit land was wrong and that the order of the Revenue
Court was perfectly in order and was within that court's jurisdictional
competence. It was alleged that it was of binding nature on the respon-
dent and was.not capable to challenge the same in subsequent proceed-
ings. The claim, it was asserted, by ihe respondent in the subsequent
suit, was barred by the principles of res judicata; The respondent lost.
D He filed an appeal against the said order of the learned Subordinate
Judge. The learned Additional District Judge, Gm:gaon vide his order
dated 7th September, 1978 reversed the findings of the trial court and
decreed the suit of the respondent. Against the said order of the
learned Additional District Judge the appellants filed Regular Second
Appeals which ·were placed for disposal before one of the learned
E Judges of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. After
hearing counsel for the parties the learned Judge was of the view that
there were conflicting judgments on the points for determination in
the case which were of importance and the matter was referred to the
Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the said High Court for the constitution of
a larger bench for the determination of the points in controversy. The
·F. question referred to a larger bench was whether, the decision of Rent
Controller under the Rent Control Laws or a Revenue Court under
section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act upon the relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties operates as res judicata and is not open
to challenge in a subsequent suit or in other collateral proceedings
between the ·parties. The learned Chief Justice constituted a Full
G Bench of three learned Judges for resolving the conflict pointed out in
the referring order. The. three learned Judges of the Full Bench have
given .three separate judgment and ultimately the case came to be
decided in accordance with the majority view.

· The order of the Full Bench was that in accordance with the
H majority view it was held that the decision of the Revenue Court under
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP [MUKHARJI, J.) 97

Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act upon the relationship of land-
" lord and tenant between the parties would not operate as res judicata
and it would be open to challenge in a subsequent suit or any other
A

collateral proceedings between the parties. The Full Bench thereafter
directed the matter to go back to the learned single Judge for disposal
in accordance with the decision of the Full Bench. Aggrieved by the
aforesaid order and decision the. appellants have come up in appeal B
before this Court.
y
It may be mentioned that of the three learned Judges, Sandha-
walia, CJ. was.of the view that it was to operate as res judicata, but the
other two learned judges, namely, J.V. Gupta, J. and S.P. Goyal, J.
held contrary views. It is the propriety and the validity of the majority
'' c
,( view of the Full Bench which calls for an examination in this appeal.

· In order to appreciate the controversy in appeal it is necessary to
refer to the relevant provisions of the said Act. The preamble of the
Act states that it was an Act to amend the law relating to the tenancy
of land in Punjab. These provinces of Punjab had the distinction bet- D
ween the occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will with the rest of its
early revenue Code from the United Provinces. The possession of a
right to fixity of tenure by many cultivators in northern India was early
recognised. Indeed the fact that in Lower Bengal the connection of
persons whom were recognised as proprietors with the land was often
-+ far more recent than that of the cultivators inevitably suggested that E
the latter had rights in the soil that required protection. Fixity of
tenure of resident cultivators at rents determined by authority was
prominent feature of the Bengal settlement as originally planned.
Regulation XXVIII of 1803 professed to extend the Bengal system to
the North Western Provinces, but it left the subject of tenant right in a
vague and uncertain condition. The provisions of Regulation VII of F
I
1922 were more definite. By its 9th section Settlement Officers were
~' required not only to prepare a record of "persons enjoying the posses-
sion and property of the soil, or vested with any heritable or transfer-
able interest" in it, that is to say, of proprietors, but also of "the rates
per bigha ...... demandable from the resident cultivators not claim-
ing any transferable property in the soil whether possessing the right of G
hereditary occupancy or not". It is 11.ot necessary to trace the history of
these settlement laws which can be found in Douie's Settlement
Manual, 4th Edition. Twelve years' uninterrupted possession of a
+ holding at the same rate of rent was considered as a sufficient proof of
occupancy right in the United Provinces. The twelve years' rule was
very generally adopted in early Punjab settlements, though the best H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

A revenue officers held that it should not be regarded as the sole crite- _i
rion, and that the quality, as well as the length of occupation should be ''-
considered. The Act in question was passed to amend the law of
tenancy in Punjab which was later the object of the Act to protect the
tenants from the exactions of the landlords. The tenants as usual in
other parts of the world were in many cases peculiarly liable to oppres-
B sion or duress from their landlords and in order to protect them quite
effectively from the possibility of any such oppression or duress the
Act was passed.

The overall scheme of the Act is to provide speedy remedies with
regard to disputes between the landlords and tenants and also under
C what circumstances that relationship comes to an end. It is appropriate
to bear in mind the whole basic question involved in this appeal is )
whether the courts created by this Act have limited power and jurisdic-
tion or plenary powers and jurisdiction. In this appeal we are
concerned with the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the courts under
section 77 of the Act which deals with Courts and suits cognizable by
D them. Relevant portion of section 77 of the Act provides as follows:

"77. Revenue Courts and suits cognizable by
them.-(!) When a Revenue officer is exercising jurisdic-
tion with respect to any such suit as is described in sub-
section (3), or with respect to an appeal or other proceed-
E ing arising out of any such suit, he shall be called a
Revenue Court.

(2)

(3) The following suits shall be instituted in, and heard and
F determined by, Revenue Courts, and no other Court shall
take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to
which any such suit might be instituted:-
Provided that-
( 1)
G (2)
FIRST GROUP

SECOND GROUP
H
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP [MUKHARJI. J.] 99

( e) suit.by a landlord to eject a tenant;"
f A
The controversy with which we are concerned in this appeal is a
type of suits indicated in second group under clause (e), namely, suits
by a landlord to eject a tenant.

The question of res judicata was analysed in the background of B
land acquisition proceedings by this Court in Raj Lakshmi Dasi and
others v. Banamali Sen and others, [1953] '1 S.C.R. 154. There this
'r
Court observed that the right to receive compensation for property
acquired in land acquisition proceedings as between rival claimants

~
depended on the title to the property acquired and the dispute as to
title was raised by the parties and had to be decided by the Land
Acquisition Judge after contest, so this decision as to title operates as
c
res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the ques-
) tion of title. The binding force of a judgment delivered under the Land
Acquisition Act depended on general principles of law and not on
section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the decision of a Land
Acquisition Judge would operate as res judicata even though he was D
not competent to try the subsequent suit. It has to be emphasised,
however, that the right to compensation depended upon the title, but
here in the instant case the right to ejectment existed only if the
relationship of landlord and tenant existed. The Revenue Court did
not have jurisdiction whether the claimant was the landlord to be
.+ entitled to eject the tenant . E

Our attention was drawn by Sree Harbans Lal, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants to section 98 of the Act, as to the power of
the Revenue Court to refer to the Civil Court a decision by the
Revenue Court if it thought proper and also to section 99, where there
is power to refer to High Court question as to jurisdiction. These F
{ provisions, in our opinion, do not in any way affect the question
whether the decision of the Revenue Court under the Revenue Act
can operate as res judicata in certain cases like the present. The limits
of the jurisdiction would be apparent by the fact that in all suits by a
landlord to reject a tenant, do not encompass suits to decide whether a
person is a tenant or not or whether the plaintiff is a landlord or not. G
The question was answered by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v.
Rattan Singh and another, [1964] 1 S.C.R. 259 where Sinha, C.J. deal-
~ ing with the Delhi Rent Control Act observed at pages 264 and 265 as
follows:

"The most important question that arises for determination H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [ 1988] I S.C.R.

in this case is whether or not the Rent Control authorities
A
had jurisdiction in the matter in controversy in this case.
Ordinarily it is for the Civil Courts to determine whether
and, if so, what jural relationship exists between the litigat-
ing parties. But the Act has been enacted to provide for the
control of rents and evictions of tenants, avowedly for their
B benefit and protection. The Act postulates the relationship
of landlord and tenant which must be a pre-existing rela-
tionship. The Act is directed to control some of the terms
and incidents of'that relationship. Hence, there is no express
provision in the Act empowering the Controller, or the Tri-
bunal, to determine whether or not there is a relationship of
landlord and tenant. In most cases such a question would
c not arise for determination by the authorities under the
Act. A landlord must be very ill-advised to start proceed-
ings under the Act, if there is no such relationship of land-
lord and tenant. If a person in possession of the premises is
not a tenant, the owner of the premises would be entitled to
D institute a suit for ejectment in the Civil Courts, untram-
melled by the provisions of the Act. It is only when he
happens to be the tenant of premises in an urban area that
the provisions of the Act are attracted." (Emphasis
supplied.)

E In Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solan v. Tholu, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 693, i'·
this Court had occasion to consider the question of res judicata in the
background of the jurisdiction of the Court. That was a case under
section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. In that case the appellant had
filed a suit before the Civil Court for the ejectment of the respondent
therein on the ground that they were licensees. The respondents
F claimed that they were occupancy tenants and contended that under
section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, the suit was triable by a
revenue court only and not by the civil court. The trial court and the
first appellate court decreed the suit holding that the respondents were
not tenants. On second appeal the Judicial Commissioner held that the
respondents were occupancy tenants and that the civil court had no
G jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was held by this Court that the civil
court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and section 77 of the Punjab
Tenancy Act was applicable "only to suits between landlord and ten-
ants where there was no dispute that the person cultivating the land >-
was a tenant". But where the status of the defendant as a tenant was
not admitted by the landlord, section 77 did not bar a suit in a civil
H court. This Court held that it would, therefore, be reasonable to infer
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP [MUKHARJI, J.] 101

that the legislature barred only those suits which form the cognizance
r of a civil court where there was no dispute between the parties that a
A
person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant.
This is precisely what has been held in the two decisions of the Lahore
High Court where there was reference at pages 698-699 of the report.
In the first of these two cases, Tek Chand J. had observed:
B
"It is obvious that the bar under clause (4) is applicable to
those cases only in which the relationship of landlord and
tenant is admitted and the object of the suit is to determine

-- I
the nature of the tenancy i.e. whether the status of the
tenant falls under section 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act.

In that case the suit was instituted by someone claiming to
c
succeed to the tenancy of certain land on the death of the
occupancy tenant. The learned Judge observed:

'In a suit like the one before us the point for decision
is not the nature of the tenancy, but whether the D
defendant is related to the deceased tenant and if so
whether their common ancestor had occupied the
land. If these facts are established, the claimant, ipso
facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. But if they
are found against him, he is not a tenant at all.'
~1-
E
As these facts were not established the High Court held
that the landlotd was entitled to sue the defendant who had
entered on the land asserting a claim to be a collateral of
the deceased tenant but who failed to substantiate his
claim. This view was affirmed by a Full Bench consisting of
five Judges in the other Lahore case. In Daya Ram v. Jagir F
( Singh, A.LR. 1956 H.P. 61 the same Judicial Commis-
\ sioner who decided the appeal before us has expressed the
view that where in a suit for ejectment the existence of the
relationship of landlord and tenant is not admitted by the
parties the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and
:I
that such a suit did not fall under section 77(3) of the Act. G
In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, [ 1962) 3 S.C.R. 673
·this Court was considering the provisions of section 17( I)
of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (3 of 1948). The
provisions of that section run thus:

'Arty dispute between the tenant and the landlord as re- H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

gards, (a) tenant's possession of the land on the 1st day of
A
September, 1947 and his right to the benefits under this ~
Act, or (b) misuse of the land by tenant, or (c) failure of
the tenant to cultivate the land properly, or (d) failure of
the tenant to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due
within two months from the date on which it becomes pay-
B able, or (e) the quantity of the produce payable to the
landlord as rent, shall be decided by the Collector on the
application of either of the parties.' -.(

c
It was contended in that case on behalf of the respon-
dents who claimed to be tenants that suit for permanent
injunction instituted by the appellant landlord was barred
-
by the provisions of section 7( 1). Dealing with this conten-
tion this Court observed as follows: \
f
'In other words, s. 7(1) postulates the relationship of
tenant and landlord between the parties and proceeds to
D provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try
the five categories of disputes that may arise between the
landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the
subject-matter of section 7(1) must be in regard to the five
categories. That is the plain and obvious construction of
the words 'any dispute as regards'. On this construction it
E would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the 1~
status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said
section. The scheme of section 7(1) is unambiguous and
clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it
contemplates disputes of the specified character arising
between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal
F construction of section 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold
the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of ,_
relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined
by the Collector under section 7(1).' "

As regards the said observations, in so far as the essential facts
G are concerned, precisely the same is the position in the instant appeal.
Here the respondent is claiming to be a mortgagee in possession and
not a tenant in possession. In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, [1962)
3 S.C.R. 673, the appellant had filed in the Civil Court a suit for ~
permanent in junction restraining the respondents from entering the
lands in suit on the allegation that the lands belonged to him and were
H in his cultivatory possession for many years and the respondents had
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP [MUKHARJI, J.] 103

no right or title and had never cultivated them. The respondents con-
)' tended that they were tenants of portions of the said lands and were in A
cultivating possession of the same as tenants. The question which
arose for decision was whether having regard to the provisions of
section 7( 1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, ' 1948, the Civil
Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit which involved a dispute as
to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was B
held that even on a liberal construction of section 7(1) of the Act, it
f cannot be held that disputes as regards the existence of the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant fall to be determined by the Collector
under that section. Disputes which are entrusted to the Collector
-: under section 7(1) are the simple disputes specified therein in the five
categories and do not include a serious dispute as to the relationship
between the parties as landlord and tenant. c

? It is well-settled that ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts should
not be inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established.

This question was again viewed in the background of the Slum D
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 in La./ Chand (dead)
by Lrs. and others v. Radha Kishan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 522, where this
Court reiterated that section 11 was not exhaustive and the principle
which motivates that section could be extended to cases which do not
fall strictly within the letter of the law. This Court further reiterated
-~
that the principle of res judicata was conceived in the larger public E
interest which required that all litigation must, sooner than later, come

--
to an end. This Court in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samiga/
Madam, A.LR. 1986 S.C. 794 has analysed the position in paragraph 8
as follows:

"The principles bearing on the question as to when exclu- F
sion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be inferred have
-\ been indicated in several judicial pronouncements but we
need refer to only two decisions. In Secretary of State v.
Mask and company, A.l.R. 1940 P.C. 105 at p. 110 the
Privy Council at page 236 of the Report has observed thus:
G
'It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but
that such exclusion must either be explicitly expres-
·f-.
sed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even
if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts hav~
jurisdiction to examine into cases where the prov1- H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A sions of the Act have not been complied with or the ,-\
statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.·

In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1968) 3 S.C.R.
662 Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, on the
B analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court ex-
pressing diverse views, called out as many as 7 proposi-
lions; out of them the first two which are material for our :{
purposes are these:
,..
'( 1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of
the special tribunal the civil Court's jurisdiction must
c be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to
do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit.
Such provision, however, does not exclude those
)
cases where the provisions of the particular Act have
not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has
D not acted in conformity with the fundamental princi-
pies of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the juris-
diction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of
the particular Act to find the adequacy or the suffi- ,;..
E ciency of the remedies provided may be relevant but '
is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil

f
Court.

Where there is no express exclusion the exami-
nation of the remedies and the scheme of the particu-
lar Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary
-
and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the >- '•
latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a
special right or a liability and provides for the
determination of the right or liability and further lays
down that all questions about the said right and liabi-
G lity shall be determined by the tribunals so consti-
tuted, and whether remedies normally associated
with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the.said
statute or not'. ,,,.
Applying the aforesaid principles, it appears to us that if the
H dispute was as to the nature of the relationship of landlord and tenant
RICHPAL SINGH v. DALIP (MUKHARJI, J.l 105

between the parties, the Revenue Court under the Punjab Tenancy A
Act had no jurisdiction when there was admitted position, the rela-
tionship of landlord and tenant was accepted, the remedies and rights
of the parties should be worked out under the scheme of the Act.

A salutary and simple test to apply in determining whether the
B
previous decision operated as res judicata or on principles analogous
thereto is to find out whether the first court, here the Revenue Court
could go into the question whether the respondent was a tenant in
possession or mortgagee in possession. It is clear in view of langugage
mentiond before that it could not. If that be so there was no res
judicata. The subsequent civil suit was not barred by res judicata.
c
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
! Court of Punjab and Haryana was right in holding that there was no res
\ judicata so far as the second suit based on the assertion of the title of
the respondent was concerned. The appeals must, therefore, fail and
are accordingly dismissed with costs.
D
N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.