Holding

A purposive interpretation of "landlord" is required and, in the absence of written authority from the Trust, the plaintiff cannot be deemed a landlord; the appeal is allowed and the matter remitted to the trial court.

Summary

The plaintiff, National Engineering Industry Ltd., sued the defendants for eviction and arrears of rent, claiming it was authorized by the Sitaram Bhandar Trust, the owner of the premises, to act as landlord under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. The defendants contended that rent was being paid to an employee of the Trust and that the plaintiff was not the rightful landlord. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "landlord" in Section 3(iii) of the Act and held that a purposive, not literal, construction is required to avoid absurd results. It found that the plaintiff had not produced any written authority (e.g., power of attorney) from the Trust to act on its behalf, and therefore could not be deemed a landlord for the purpose of the suit. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court orders, and remitted the matter to the trial court with directions to implead the Trust and permit the plaintiff to produce documentary evidence of authority. The trial court is to decide the suit without being bound by the Supreme Court’s observations.

Issues considered

Whether the plaintiff qualifies as a "landlord" under Section 3(iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 for the purpose of filing an eviction suit.
Whether the definition of "landlord" should be interpreted purposively rather than literally to avoid absurd consequences.
Whether the absence of written authority from the Trust precludes the plaintiff from exercising the rights of a landlord.

Subjects

landlord definitionpurposive statutory interpretationrent controlevictionagencytruststatutory construction

Judgment

[2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 662

A RISHAB CHAND BHANDARI (D) BY LRS. & ANR. ~
V.
NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 1320 of 2005)

SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
B
[MARKANDEY KATJU AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]

R~jasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction). Act, +
c 1950
s.3(iii) - 'Landlord' - Plaintiff filing suit for eviction of tenant
from premises belonging to Trust claiming that it was
authorized by Trost to do so - Defendant's plea that he was
paying rent to employee of the Trost and did not commit any
D
default in payment of re.-:t - Suit decreed by trial court - Held: -.;-
A purposive, and not literal, interpretation hP-s io be given to
the definition of 'land/ore/' In the Act - It is well settled, if a literal
interpretation leads to absurd consequences, it should be
avoided, and a purposive interpretation be given - In the
E instant case, plaintiff has not been able to show that it was
authorized in writing to act on behalf of the Trost either by a
power of attorney or any other written document- Unless there i>

is some documentary proof that the Trost had authorized its ./#-
agent to file a suit for eviction on its behalf, it cannot be said
F that plaintiff had any right to file such a suit, even though it ,.....

had actually Jet out the premises to tenant and collected rent
- Plaintiff is admittedly not the owner of the premises, and only
claims to be the agent of the Trust - On the facts and
circumstances of the case, this aspect of the matter needs to
G be gone into by trial court - Accordingly, judgments and
. ,..
order of Division Bench and Single Judge of High Court are )--
set aside and the matter is remitted to trial court - Before the
trial court, plaintiff shall also implead the Trost as proforma-
defendant and will have liberty to produce any documentary
H 662
RISHAB CHAND BHANDARI (D) BY LRS. & ANR. v. 663
NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY LTD.
evidence to show that the Trust had authorized it in writing to A
receive rent and file suit for eviction on behalf of the Trust-
Interpretation of statutes - Purposive construction - Party.

Words and Phrases

,'Landlord' - Connotation of in the context of rent control B
and eviction matters.

Shri Madan Lal vs. Shri Bazara Singh 1977 (2) RLR, 641
- Approved
Case Law Reference:·
c
1977 (2) RLR, 641 approved Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1320 of 2005. ' ·
D
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.1.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Rajasthan in D.B. Civil Special No. 172
of 2001.
Pallav Shishodia, S. Sukumaran, Rajesh Khaware and E
D.N. Mishra for the Appellants.

J.C. Gupta, Nalin Sangal, Deba Prasad Mohanaty and
Anil Kumar Sangal for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered by F

ORDER

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and G
order dated 17.01.2005 of the Division Bench of the High Court
of Judicature at Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur whereby the learned
Division Bench has set aside the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 23.08.2001 and restored that of the Trial Court,
i.e., the Addi. District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur dated H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 31.07.1993.
+-
. 3. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction against
the appellants-defendants and for deposit of arrears of rent. The
. said suit was decreed by the Trial Court. In appeal the said
decree was set aside by the learned Single Judge of the High
B
Court, which order has been set aside by the learned Division
Bench by the impugned order. Hence, this appeal by special
leave.

4. The facts in brief are that the suit premises admittedly -+-
c belonged to Sitaram Bhandar Trust (hereinafter for short 'the
Trust') and the Trust is the owner of the suit premises. The
respondent, claiming that it was authorized by the Trust to do
so, alleged that it had let out the premises in dispute to appellant
No.2 (defendant No. 1 in the suit) and was collecting rent from ),

D it. However, thereafter, the def~ndant No. 1 started paying rent
to one Ram Das ~odani who claimed to be an employee of -+-
the Trust. The respondent then filed a suit for eviction and
arrears of rent against the appellants alleging that the
-appellants had committed default in payment of rent.
E
5. Under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent_ &
Eviction) Act, 1950, under Section 3(iii) the word 'landlord' has
been defined as under:-
•
"landlord" means any person who for the time being ,...,
F !s receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any
premises, whether on his own account or as an agent,
trustee, guardian or receiver or any other person or who
would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the
premises were let to a tenant; it includes a tenant in relation
G to a sub-tenant".
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there ).-J'-
were no arrears of rent as rent was being paid to Ram Das
Modani, who was collecting rent oh behalf of the Trust. Hence,
he submitted that there was no default in payment of rent. -
H
RISHAB CHAND BHANDARI (D) BY LRS. & ANR. v. 665
NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY LTD.

7. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent A
submitted that the respondent company was the landlord and
hence rent should have been paid to it and thus there was
default in payment of rent. He further submitted that it was the
respondent who had let out the premises and accordingly in
terms of the Act it was entitled to receive rent. B

8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We are
required to interpret the word 'landlord' as provided under the
Act.
+- 9. In our opinion a purposive, and not literal interpretation c
has to be given to the definition of 'landlord' in the Act.

10. The natural landlord of a premises is ordinarily the
owner. However, an expanded definition has been given in
various rent statutes of many States for the reason that D
sometimes the owner may not himself be in a position to collect
+ the rent and may hence appoint an agent or authorize any
person to collect rent on his behalf because he may be abroad
or is unable to do so for any other reason. This does not mean
that the natural meaning of the word 'landlord', who is the owner E,
of the premises, would disappear and that the owner goes out
of the picture altogether. This is the view taken by the Delhi High
Court in the case of Shri Madan Lal vs. Shri Hazara Singh
... 1977 (2) RLR, 641. We approve of the view taken in the said
~ decision. If we interpret the definition of 'landlord' in the Act
literally it will result in strange consequences. It will mean that
F.
even if t~ owner, who is the natural landlord, does not want to
evict a tenant, his agent may do so. Surely this is an absurd
situation. It is well settled that if a literal interpretation leads to
absurd consequences, it should be avoided, and a purposive
interpretation be given. G

..... -4 11. In the present case the respondent has not been able
to show that it was authorized in writing to act on behalf of the
Trust either by a power of attorney or any other written
document. Unless there is some documentary proof that the H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
·-
'

A Trust had authorized its agent to file a suit for eviction on its
behalf, it cannot be said that the respondent had any right to
file such a suit, even though it had actually let out the premises
to the appellant and collected rent. The respondent is admittedly
not the owner of the premises, and only claims to be the agent
B of the Trust.

12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the opinion that this aspect of the matter needs to be gone into
by the Trial Court. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set
aside the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench -+
c and that of the learned Single Judge and re~and the matter to
the Trial Court. Before the Trial Court, the respondent will have
liberty to produce any documentary evidence to· show that the
Trust had· authorized it in writing to receive rent and file suit fo1
eviction on behaif of the Trust. The respondent-plaintiff shall also
D implead the Trust as proforma-defend1;mt before the Trial Court. -·
13. ·The Trial Court shall decide the suit uninfluenced by
+
any observations·made by us in our order or the observations . ~· '

made by the Division Bench and learned Single Judge of the
E High Court.or the earlier decree of the Trial Court. All
contentions are left open to the parties to be urged before the
Trial Court.
14. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs. •
-""
F R.P. App~al allowed. • " J j ..