Holding

The landlord’s claim of bonafide personal need is a question of fact, and in this case it was genuine, so the eviction order stands.

Summary

The landlady, Maqsoodan, purchased a shop and filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, claiming a bonafide need to set up a firearms‑repair business for her son. The prescribed authority allowed eviction in 1986; the appellate authority reversed the order, and the High Court remanded the matter. On remand the appellate authority again affirmed eviction, noting that the landlady had offered an alternate shop which the tenant refused. The tenant died and his heirs continued the suit. The Supreme Court held that the landlord’s personal need is a factual question, and in the present case the need was genuine because the son was still unemployed, a licence could be obtained only with a vacant shop, and no suitable alternative was available. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the eviction order, granting the tenant time until 31 December 2007 to vacate.

Issues considered

The validity of the landlord’s claim of bonafide personal need under Section 21(1)(a) of the UP Urban Buildings Act, 1972 for a commercial premises.
Whether the factors prescribed in Rule 16 of the 1972 Rules, especially concerning length of tenancy and availability of alternative premises, should lead to denial of eviction.
Whether the appellate and High Court findings on the landlord’s need can be interfered with by the Supreme Court.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 16, s. 21(1)(a)

Subjects

rent controlevictionbonafide needcommercial premisesSection 21Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings ActRule 16landlord-tenantfirearms repair business

Judgment

RISHI KUMAR GOVIL A
v.
MAQSOODAN AND ORS.

MARCH 28, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ .] B

Rent Control and Eviction:

Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972; Ss. 16 and 21(/)(a): C
Eviction-Shop in occupation of tenant-Landlady filing refoase
application for vacating the shop on ground that it was required for her son
to start fire arms repairing business-Allowed by prescribed authority-
Ajjirmed by appellate Authority-Challenge to-High Court remanding the D
matter to the appellate authority-Order of the prescribed authority affirmed
by the appellate authority-Challenged by the tenant-Dismissed by High
" Court-On appeal, Held: Bonafide need of the landlord is a question offact
and should not normally be interfered with-In the instant case, more than
20 years has elapsed since filing of release application by the landlady to
settle his son in business-Licence for repairing fire arms could be obtuined E
where vacant shop available-Under the circumstances, the prescribed
authority, appellate authority and the High Court rightly came to the
conclusion that the need of the landlady is bonafide and genuine-Hence
there is no scope for any interference.

Father of the appellant was tenant of the disputed premises in question, F
a shop. Respondent No.I-landlady purchased the said shop on 11.12.1979 from
the erstwhile landlord. She moved release application under Section 21(1)(a)
of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 on the ground of bonafide need of her son. In the release
application, the landlady prayed that the shop was urgently required as her G
husband intended to start business of repairing fire arms in the disputed shop
for her son. The prescribed authority vide judgment and order dated
08.05.1986 allowed the release application and directed for eviction of the
tenant. However, in appeal, the order was upset by the appellate authority.
The landlady challenged the order of appellate authority before the High
483 II
-+
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A Court. The High Court remanded the case to the appellate authority with the ~
observation that the appellate authority shall decide the appeal afresh on merits
after taking into consideration the subsequent material events. During the
pendency of the appeal, the appellant-tenant died and was substituted by the
legal heirs. On remand, the appellate authority affirmed the order of the
prescribed authority holding that the landlady herself had offered a shop to
B the tenant in the alternative, but he refused to t~ke possession of the same.
Aggrieved, the appellant-son of the tenant filed a writ petition which was
dismissed by the High. Hence the present appeal.
,_
.....,
Appellant-tenant contended that in terms of s.16 of the Act, so far as
the commercial premises are concerned the parameters have to be different.
c
Respondent-landlady submitted that the premises was required for
starting the business of repairing of guns for her son; and that her need is
more hard pressing in comparison to the appellant-tenant.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact and normally
should not be interfered with. The High Court noted that when the Prescribed "' .,_
Authority passed the order, son of the respondent-landlady was 20 years old
and the shop was sought to be released for the purpose of settling him in ~

E business. More than 20 years have elapsed and the son has become more
than 40 years of age but she has not been able to establish him as she has
still to get the possession of the shop and the litigation of the dispute is still
subsisting. (Para 19) [491-E-G]

1.2. The licence for repairing fire arms can only be obtained when there
F is a vacant shop available and in the absence of any vacant shop, licence cannot )...
be obtained by an applicant. Therefore, the High Court came to the conclusion
-{
concurring with that of the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Authority that
the need of the landlady is bona fide and genuine. Considering the factual
findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority, Appellate Authority and
analysed by the High Court, there is no scope for any interference in this
G appeal. However, considering the period for which the premises in question
are in the occupation of the appellant, time is granted till 31st December, .
"
2007 to vacate the premises subject to filing of an undertaking before the
Prescribed Authority within a period of 2 weeks to deliver the vacant 'v
-,
possession on or before the stipulated date. [Para 19] (491-G-H; 492-A-B}
H
RI SHI KUMAR GO VIL v. MAQSOODAN [P ASAY AT, J.] 485
Sushi/a v. Ilnd Addi. District Judge, Banda and Ors., (2003) 2 SC 28; A
Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., AIR (2000) SC 534;
Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava, AIR (2001) SC 803 and Prativa Devi
(Smt.) v. T. V. Krishnan, [1996) 5 SCC 353, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1601 of2007.
B
From the Final Judgment and Order dated OI.09.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature of Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16447 of2001.
_,
t Ashok Mathur for the Appellant.

R.P. Singh, Vipin K. Saxena, Jyoti Saxena and Dr. Kailash Chand for the c
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
D
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the
<if
appellant. Challenge in the writ petition was to the order passed by the
Prescribed Authority as affirmed by the Appellate Authority allowing the
release application of the respondent No. I-landlady.
E
Sans unnecessary details factual position is as follows:

Late Ram Govil was tenant of a shop situated at Ansari Road, Bulandshahr
since I941. Smt. Maqsoodan purchased the aforesaid shop on I l.12.I979 from
Sri Ganesh Datt, the erstwhile landlord. She moved release application No.R.C.
.,J 3I of I984 under Section 2I(l)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buil~ings ·p
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, I972 (in short the 'Act') for
,..
the need of her son-Shamshad Ahmad. In the release application, the
respondent No. I-landlady prayed that the shop was urgently required as her
husband intended to start business of repairing fire arms from the disputed
shop for her son- Shamshad Ahmed.
G
The release application was contested by the appellant - tenant by filing
written statement and denying the stand. She took the stand that the claim
was not bona fide and genuine and the release application has been moved
y:
with the mal-intention of harassing him. It was also alleged that the landlady
was in possession of two other shops, having basement as well situated at H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS c20011 4 s:c.R.

A Ansari Road, Near Chowk Bazar which were in the use and occupation of Sri
Imtiaz Ahmad, husband of the landlady. The appellant further alleged that the
purpose of getting release of disputed shop was need for starting business
of repair of fire arms whereas the same business is being run by the husband
of the landlady from the aforesaid two shops. The case of the landlady was
that the disputed shop was not suitable for the purpose of carrying on
B business of repair of fire arms and that earlier the licence of the shop-Mis
B.A. Shastra Bhandar was in the name of one Shamshuddin, sister's son of
the husband of the landlady, on whose death, Sri Shamshad Ahmad, for
whose need the release application had been moved, was carrying on the
business of repair of fire arms with his father, i.e., husband of the landlady
C from the· aforesaid two shops.

The appellant claimed that he being a medical practitioner, he has his
chamber in the disputed shop wherefrom his son Kumar Govil was carrying
on the business as optician and that the situation of the disputed shop was
perfect for his above business as there was no other shop of opticians in the
D vicinity.

In support of his case, the appellant filed his own affidavit stating
therein that son of the landlady was carrying on the business of repair of fire
arms with his father i.e. husband of the landlady in two shops along with first
basement in Chowk Bazar near Ansari Road, Bulandshahr. He alleged that the
E family of the landlady was very rich as her husband was in possession of a
big shopping complex at Kala Aam Ka Churaha, Bulandshahr near D.M.
Colony Road. That apart, the husband of the landlady had constructed large
motor Workshop having plinth area of 1717 sq. yards.

The son of the tenant - Sri Rishi Kumar Govil also filed his affidavit
F
stating therein that his father was a medical practitioner and he was carrying
on the business as optician from the disputed shop. In another affidavit, the
·-<
appellant stated that he was running the disputed shop and that he had no
other source of livelihood and in case he was evicted froin the shop, he would
have to suffer greater hardship than the landlady. The appellant also filed an
G affidavit of one Sri Narendra Kumar Upadhyay in his support who stated that
the tenant was in medical profession and running his business whereas from·
the disputed shop his son was carrying on the business as optician.

The prescribed authority vide judgment and order dated 08.05.1986
allowed the release application of the landlady and directed for eviction of the
H tenant - appellant. However, in appeal, the order was upset.
RISHI KUMAR GO VIL v. MAQSOODAN [PASA YAT, J.] 487

Against the order in appeal, aforesaid, the landlady preferred Civil Misc. A
Writ No. 9858 of 1998 before the Allahabad High Court, which was disposed
of vi de judgment and order dated 13 .10 .1998 and the matter was remanded to
the appellate court with the observation that the appellate court shall decide
the appeal afresh on merits after taking into consi_deration the material
subsequent events.
B
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant-tenant died and was
substituted by the legal heirs.

On remand, the appellate authority reheard the appeal and decided the
same vi de judgment and order dated 21.04.200 l holding that the landlady
herself had offered an alternate shop to the tenant but the appellant refused C
to take possession of the alternative shop offered by her with a view to
remain in possession over the disputed shop. Accordingly, he dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the prescribed authority
declaring vacancy.
D
Aggrieved by the above-mentioned orders of the prescribed Authority
..; and the Appellate Court, the appellant filed a writ petition.

The High Court concluded that the conclusions of the Prescritfed
Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any
infirmity to warrant interference. E
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the relevant factors as detailed in Rule 16 of the Rules have not been
kept in view. The Prescribed Authority, the Appellate Authority and the High
Court failed to consider the fact that even partial eviction would suffice. It
is submitted that in terms of Rule 16 so far as the commercial premises are F
concerned the parameters have to be different.

Learned counsel for the respondent no. I supported the judgment of the
High Court.

It is stated by learned counsel for the respondents the premises in G
respect of repair of guns have to be the separate premises. The appellant has
13 shops available and in this context it is submitted that the tenant-appellant
had got vacated a shop out of 13 shops situated at Khurja Bus stand from
one Sri Om Prakash in a rent control case. The tenant is also carrying on
business in one of these 13 shops in the name and style of Govil Optician. H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 4 S.C.R.

A Therefore, the need of the landlady is more hard pressing in comparison to
the appellant-tenant. By way of reply, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that it is not a fact that there are 13 shops available, the number
is much less.

Rule 16 on which reliance has been placed by both the sides reads
B as follows:

"16. Application for release on the ground of personal
requirement: In considering the requirements of personal occupation ,.....
for purposes ofresidence by the landlord or any member of his family, l
the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the
c following-
(a) where the landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable
accommodation having regard to the number of members of his
family and their respective ages and his means and social status;
his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly;
D
(b) where a residential building was let out at a time when the sons
of the landlord were minors and subsequently one or more of ...
,'r
them has married, the additional requirement of accommodation
for the landlord's sons shall be given due consideration;

E (c) where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy
other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held
as tenant of any public premises, having regard to the number
of members of his family and their respective ages and his social
status, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be
construed liberally;
F ,\..
(d) where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving
.,,..
with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's
needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed
authority shall release only the latter part of the building;
(e) where there are a number of tenants separately occupying a
G
block of tenements and the landlord desires their eviction on
ground of his personal need the prescribed authority shall,
consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to
be available to such tenants; y

(f) where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation
H
RISHIKUMARGOVILv. MAQSOODAN[PASAYAT,J.] 489
reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the A
landlord's claim for release of the building under tenancy shall be
construed liberally;
(g) where the landlord was engaged in any employment in the same
city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building
is situate and was in occupation of other accommodation by B
reason of such employment or where the landlord is the wife or
minor son or unmarried daughter of a person who was engaged
in any profession, trade, calling or employment away from the
city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the
building is situate and was living with such person, and by
reason of the cessation of such engagement, the landlord needs C
the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes,
such need shall ordinarily be deemed sufficient.
(2) While considering an application for release under (a) of sub-
section ( 1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes
of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to D
such facts as the following:

(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the
original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on
his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the
application; E
(b) where the tenant.has available with him suitable accommodation
to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall
be greater justification for allowing the application;

(c) the greater the existing business of the landlord's own, apart from F
the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less
the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application
is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the
application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has
available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act G
or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may
serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that
accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed
authority;

(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially H
-+-
\

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the 'X
landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his
or her technical education and is not employed in Government service,
~

and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be
given due consideration. '
B (3) Where the tenant being servant of Government or of any local
authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the
application, then a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be )'..
given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the. right to oppose ~
I

the application."
c The parameters relating to Rule 16 of the Rules have been dealt with
by this Court in Sushi/a v. Ilnd Addi. District Judge, Banda and Ors., [2003]
2 SC 28. In the said judgment it was inter-alia noted as foIJows:

"10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation
D of Letting, Rent and Evic,tion) Rules, 1972 makes it clear that the Rule
only prescribes certain factors 'Yhich have also to be taken into
account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on • lb.
the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier
relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for business
use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) provides, greater the period of tenancy
E less the justification for allowing the application; whereas according
to clause (b) in case the tenant has a suitable accommodation available
to him to shift his business, greater the justification to aIJow the
application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the
tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of
F tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of ~.
sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases
be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the ·--\
landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed
business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the
application. The idea behind Sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the
G landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for
expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant
having a small business for a very long pe,riod of time. In such a
situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater
~
hardship to the tenant.
H I 1. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy
RISH! KUMAR GOVIL v. MAQSOODAN [PASA YAT, J.] 491

~ of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop A
to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the
Prescribed Authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the
accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no
other shop where she can establish her son who is married and
unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the
business of father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very
B
flourishing business so as to attract application of Clause (c) of Rule
16(2). As observed earlier it is clear that length of period of tenancy
, as provided under Clause (a) of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules,
1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with
other facts and circumstance of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion c
or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering
the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the
~.-
respondent, we find that according to the guidelines rrovided therein
balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose
need is certainly bonafide and has also been so accepted by the
respondent before us." D
...,
-.J
In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., AIR (2000)
SC 534 it was held that it is the choice of the landlord to choose the pla~e
for the business which is most suitable for him. He has complete freedom .
in the matter. In Gaya Prasadv. Pradeep Shrivastava, AIR (2001) SC 803 it
was held that the need of the landlord is to be seen on the date of application
E
for release. In Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T. V Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353 it was
held that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and Courts have
no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should
live. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact and should not be
4 normally interfered with. The High Court noted that when the Prescribed F
Authority passed the order son of the respondent-landlady was 20 years old
>
and the shop was sought to be released for the purpose of settling him in
business. More than 20 years have elapsed and the son has become more
than 40 years of age and she has not been able to establish him as she has
still to get the possession of the shop and the litigation of the dispute is still
subsisting. The licence for repairing fire arms can only be obtained when G
. there is a vacant shop available and in the absence of any vacant shop,
'' licence cannot be obtained by him. Therefore, the High Court came to the
i conclusion concurring with that of the Prescribed Authority and Appellate
Authority that the need of the landlady is bona fide and genuine. Considering
the factual findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority, Appellate Authority H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A and analysed by the High Court, there is no scope for any interference in this
appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the period for
which the premises in question are in the occupation of the appellant time is
granted till 31st December, 2007 to vacate the premises subject to filing of an
undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of 2 weeks to
B deliver the vacant possession on or before the stipulated date. There will be
no order as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

_,.__