Holding

The term "immediately" under Order XXI Rule 84 means deposit within a reasonable time considering the circumstances, and a sale is not void solely because it was confirmed before the 30‑day period.

Summary

The appellant, RosaliV, challenged the setting aside of an auction sale of immovable property by the executing court, which had held the sale void because the purchaser did not deposit the statutory 25% deposit on the same day and because the sale was confirmed before the 30‑day period expired. The Supreme Court examined whether the term "immediately" in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure required literal same‑day payment, and whether a sale could be invalidated solely on the basis of early confirmation. Relying on principles of statutory construction, the Court held that "immediately" must be read as "within a reasonable time" given the circumstances, and that directing the purchaser to pay the deposit the next day satisfied the requirement. Consequently, the earlier confirmation of the sale within 30 days did not render it void. The Court set aside the lower courts' orders and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

What is the meaning of the term "immediately" in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the facts of this case?
Whether an auction sale is void merely because it was confirmed before the expiry of the 30‑day period prescribed under the Code?

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 21 Rule 100, s. Order 21 Rule 101, s. Order 21 Rule 84, s. Order 21 Rule 85, s. Order 21 Rule 97, s. Order 21 Rule 98

Subjects

auction saleimmediate depositOrder XXI Rule 84statutory interpretationreasonable time30‑day confirmation rulecivil procedurelex non cogit ad impossibiliaactus curiae neminem gravabit

Judgment

>
ROSALIV. A
-. v.
TAICO BANK AND ORS.

JANUARY 23, 2007

[S.B.SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.] B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Order 21 Rule 84-Deposit by purchaser-Immovable property-
Auction sale of-Immediate deposit of 25% of purchase money-
Consequences on default-Immovable property sold in auction sale to the c
highest bidder-As the said sale was conducted at about 4.00 p.m. and
keeping in view of the fact that the banks at that time were closed, the
Court directed the auction purchaser to deposit 25% of the sale amount
by the next day-Auction purchaser deposited the said amount on the next
day and also deposited the full purchase money within the stipulated time D
in terms of 0. 21 R. 85-However, the Executing Court set aside the
)
auction sale on the grounds that 25% of the purchase money was not
deposited on the day of the auction sale and also the auction sale was
confirmed before the expiry of 30 days-High Court affirmed the said
decision-Correctness of-Held: In a given situation, the term "immediately"
may mean "within a reasonable time"-Where an act is to be done within E
a reasonable time, it must be done immediately-The auction purchaser
could not deposit 25% of _the purchase amount on the same day of auction
sale as the banks were closed at that point of time-Hence, deposit of 25%
: of the purchase money on the next day did not render the auction sale
)
void-The auction sale cannot be set aside merely because it was confirmed F
within a period of 30 days from the date of acceptance of the bid

Interpretation of Statutes:

Principles ofconstruction-Literal Rule-Held: Where literal meaning
leads to anomaly and absurdity, it should be avoided-Common sense Q,
construction should be taken recourse to in certain cases.

Words & Phrases:
)'-

"Immediately"-Meaning of-In the context of Order 21 Rule 84 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. H
1169
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 1 S.C.R

A Maxims:

"Actus Curiae neminem gravabit" and "Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia "-Meaning of-Explained.

One 'M' filed a suit against respondent No. 2 for realization of some
B amount owing and due to it. The suit was decreed and the decree was
transferred for execution. A proclamation of the sale of the suit property
was issued whereupon an auction sale was held. In the said auction sale one
'MH' was the highest bidder. As the said sale was conducted at about 4.00
p.m. and keeping in view of the fact that the banks at that time were closed,
c the Court directed the auction purchaser to deposit 25% of the sale amount
by the next day. The auction purchaser deposited 25% of the sale amount
the next day and deposited the balance amount subsequently.

Respondent No. 3, in the meanwhile, had instituted a suit for specific
performance of contract against respondent No. 2 against the self·same
D property for which a certain sum was said to have been paid by way of
advance. The suit was decreed and the appeal preferred thereagainst was
dismissed.

After the auction sale was confirmed, respondent No. 3 filed an
E application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The auction sale was confirmed and the sale certificate was directed to be
issued to the auction purchaser. Sale certificate on a stamp paper, which
had been furnished in the meanwhile, was issued by the Court.

p The husband of the auction purchaser transferred his right, title and
interest in the said property in favour of the appellant in terms of a
registered deed of sale. But the appellant was not impleaded as a party in
the said execution proceedings. Respondent No. 3, however, obtained a
warrant of delivery of possession of the said property in her favour.

G The appellant obstructed in taking possession pursuant to the said
warrant of delivery of possession and eventually filed an application under
Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 100 and 101 of the Code. From the objection filed
by respondent No. 3, it transpired that the auction sale had allegedly been
set aside at the instance of the decree holder on the premise that the sale
H was void as it was confirmed before expiry of 30 days from the date of
y
I

ROSALIV. v. TAICOBANK 1171

acceptance of the bid and other litigations. A
The High Court dismissed the revision application filed by the appellant
on the ground that the 25% of the bid amount was not deposited immediately
as mandated in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code and, therefore, the auction
sale was bad in law. Hence the appeal.
B
The following questions arose before the Court:-

1. What would be the meaning of the term "immediately" occurring
in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case? c
2. Whether the sale was void only because it was confirmed before
expiry of the period of 30 days?

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
)
HELD: 1. Having regard to the fact that the appellant had explained
that it was not possible for his predecessor-in-interest to deposit 25% of
the amount immediately after declaring his predecessor-in-interest as the
purchaser, as the banks, at that point of time, were closed and furthermore
having regard to .the fact that presumably the court in that view of the E
matter had directed the auction purchaser to deposit the amount on the next
day, the requirements of law are satisfied. [Para 22) (1179-C-D]

2.1. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of a statute that
where literal meaning leads to anomaly and absurdity, it should be avoided. F
[Para 23) [1179-D-E]

Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank, [2006) 13 SCALE
511, relied on.

2.2. It is equally well-settled that the Parliament must be held to have G
intended to lay down a reasonable statute unless a plain meaning of the Act
leads to a different conclusion. It is trite that the statute must be read
reasonably. {Para 24) [1179-E-F]

Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, [2005) 5 SCC 698; La/it Mohan Pandey, H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] l S.C.R

A (2004) 6 SCC 626 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surinder Singh
Banolta, [2006) 12 SCALE 571, relied on.

3. It is the duty of the court to accept a construction which promotes
the object of legislation. [Para 27) (1180-A]

B Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, [1994) 5 SCC 410, relied on.
i
4. It is also a well-settled principle oftaw that common sense construction
should be taken recourse to in certain cases. [Para 28) [1180-B]

C Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (3) v. Bombay Environmental Action
Group, l2006] 3 SCC 434, referred to.

Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn., Vol. 44(1) (Reissue), Paras
1392, 1377 and 1480, referred to.

D 5. While applying the principles of interpretation, the courts are also
required to keep in mind the following two well-settled principles oflaw:-
[Para 31) (1181-D]

(a) Actus Curiae nemim gravabit (an act of Court shall prejudice no
E man).

Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku, [1994] 2 SCC 266, Ram
Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, [2003) 8 SCC 319, Board of Control for
Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741 and Union of
F India v. Pramod Gupta, [2005[ 12 sec 1, relied on. r

(b) Lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to
do that what he cannot possibly perform).

Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319, Board of
G Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, [2005) 4 SCC 741,
relied on.

6.1. The term "immediately" occurring in Order XXI Rule 84 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, therefore, must be construed having regard
H to the aforementioned principles. The term has two meanings. One, indicating
ROSALI V. v. TAICO BANK 1173

the relation of cause and effect and the other, the absence of time between A
' j
two events. In the former sense, it means proximately, without intervention
of anything, as opposed to "mediately". In the latter sense, it means
instantaneously. [Para 32) [1181-G-H)

6.2. The term "immediately", is thus, required to be construed as
meaning with all reasonable speed, considering the circumstances of the B

- case. [Para 33) [1182-A)

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 23, Paras 1618, p.
1178, referred to.

7. In a given situation, the term "immediately" may mean "within a
c
reasonable time". Where an act is to be done within a reasonable time, it
must be done immediately. [Para 34) [H82-B)

Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (3) v. Bombay Environmental Action
Group, [2006) 3 SCC 434, KS. Muthu v. T. Govindarajulu, (2000) 4 D
SCALE 175 and Dove Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Inv.
) Corporation Ltd, [2006) 2 SCC 619, relied on.

Mis. Gangavishan Heeralal v. Mis. Gopal Digambar Jain, AIR (1980)
MP 119, Keshava S. Jamkhandi v. Ramachandra S. Jamkhandi, AIR (1981)
Kar. 97, Ramnarayan v. State of MP., AIR (1962) M.P. 93, reffered to.
E

R. v. Inspector of Taxes, [1971) 3 All ER 394 and R. v. HU Inspector
of Taxes, (1972) 1 All ER 545, referred to.

Crawford on Statutory Construction Para 271, p. 539, referred to. F

7.2. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in holding that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Order XXI Rule 84
had not been complied with. [Para 39) (1183-C]

Dakshyani v. Branch Manager H.R., 1997 Kar. 1940, referred to. G
8. With a view to considering the question as to whether he intended
to abide by the provisions of a statute or the order of a court, his conduct
is relevant. If one intended to comply with the order of a court but by reason
of fortuitous circumstances, he is not in a position to do so, the statute H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A would not be held to be operating harshly in such a case.
(Para 41] (1183-G-H]

9.1. Having regard to the order of the court and the other circumstances
stated by the appellant, his predecessor-in-interest not being able to deposit
the 25% of the bid amount upon acceptance of bid did not render the
B auction sale void, as was opined by the High Court. [Para 42] (1184-A]

9.2. The auction purchaser had deposited the full purchase money
within the time stipulated in terms of Order XXI Rule 85 of the Code.
[Para 43) (1184-B]
c 10. Under what circumstances the decree holder himself filed an
application for setting aside the sale is not known. Only because the sale
was confirmed within a period of 30 days from the date of acceptance of the
bid, the same by itself, was not decisive to set aside the sale after 8 years.
(Para 44) [1184-C]
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6129 of2000.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 8.1.1999 of the High Court
ofKamataka at Bangalore in C.R.P. No. 3528/1998.
E
T.L. Viswanath Iyer, Sr. Adv., S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar and D.P.
Chaturvedi for the Appellant.

S.S. Javali, Sr. Adv., P.R. Ramasesh for the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
f
S.B. SINHA, J.: 1. A judgment and order dated 8.01.1999 passed by
the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore in CRP No. 3528 of 1998 is in
question before us, which arises in the following factual matrix.
G
2. Mis. Nellai Small Match Producers Service Industrial Co-op. Society
Ltd. filed a suit against N. Dharmaraj, Respondent No. 2 herein in the Court
of Principal Subordiante Judge in the State of Tamil Nadu for realization of
some amount owing and due to it. The said suit was decreed. The said
decree was transferred for .execution to the Court of City Civil Judge,
H
ROSALIV. v. TAICOBANK [SINHA,J.] 1175

Bangalore. The matter ultimately was transferred to the Court of the 17th A
Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore.

3. A proclamation of sale of immovable property bearing No.· 1138/8,
II Main Road, Vijaynagar, Bangalore was issued on 21.l 0.1988 whereupon
the auction sale was held. In the said auction sale Smt. Mahadevi S.
Havannavar became the highest bidder having given a bid for a sum of Rs.
B
3,25,000. The said deal was accepted by the learned Executing Court on
26.10.1988. It is stated that the said sale was conducted at about 4.00 p.m.
on the said date and keeping in view of the fact that the banks at that time
were closed, the court directed the auction purchaser to deposit the amount
by the next day in the following terms: C

"Sale oroclamation and warrant not served at spot, TRD files
vakalath for the bidder did accepted (sic), permitted to deposit 25%
of the sale amount by tomorrow. Property is free from encumbrances
as it stands for balance of consideration by 11.11." D
4. It is not in dispute that pursuant to or in furtherance of the said
direction, the auction purchaser deposited the amount of 25% of the sale
amount on 27.10.1988 and deposited the balance amount on 11.I l.1988.

5. Smt. Leelavathi, Respondent No. 3 herein, in the meanwhile, had E
instituted a suit in the Court of Addl. City Civil Judge Bangalore being O.S.
No. 2493of1981on17.08.1981 for specific performance of contract against
Respondent No. 2 in respect of the self-same property wherefor a sum of
Rs. 1,05,000 said to have been paid by way of advance. The said suit was
decreed by the said Civil Judge by a judgment and order dated 20.04.1985. F
An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the High Court which was
dismissed by an order dated 6/8.03.1996.

6. After the auction sale was confirmed, Respondent No. 3 appears to
have filed an application purported to be under Order XXI Rule 97 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). It is not in dispute that by an G
order dated 11.11.1988 as no objection was filed and the entire amount had
been deposited, the sale was confirmed and the sale certificate was directed
to be issued to the auction purchaser. Sale certificate on a stamp paper,
which had been furnished in the meanwhile, was issued by the Court on
17.11.1988. H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R

A 7. It is also stated that the property in question had been allotted by
the Bangalore Development Authority to the original owner. The Bangalore
Development Authority by a registered deed of sale dated 16.01.1990
transferred the property in favour of Shri Sangamesh G. Havannavar,
husband of the auction purchaser Smt. Mahadevi S. Havannavar as in the
meantime she had died.
B
8. On or about 5.02.1992, the said Shri Sangamesh G. Havannavar
transferred his right, title and interest in the said property in favour of the ~
appellant herein in terms of a registered deed of sale dated 5.02.1992.

c 9. It is contended that the appellant obtained licence from the appropriate
authority for renovation of the existing ground floor and for construction of
the first floor and pursuant to grant of sanction in this behalf had made
constructions upon incurring a cost of Rs. 8,00,000 therefor. He is ·said to
have been residing therein.

D 10. Appellant herein was not impleaded as a party in the said execution
proceedings. Respondent No. 3, however, obtained warrant of delivery of
possession of the said property in execution of the decree of specific
performance passed in her favour. On or about 01.08.1998, the appellant
obstructed in taking possession pursuant to the said warrant of delivery of
E possession and eventually filed an application under Order XX.I Rules 97,
98, 100 and 10 I of the Code. From the objection filed by Respondent No.
3, it transpired that the auction sale had allegedly been set aside at the
instance of the decree holder on the premise that the sale was void as it was
confmned before expiry of 30 days from the date of acceptance of the bid
and other litigations by an order dated 27.09.1996 which is to the following
F
effect:
r
"Ohr. KAB
Jdr. SGK
To hear Ohr. and to produce copy of orders in
G RFA.
Sri MRG for Ohr submits that the sale is void in view of the
confirmation before 30 days and other litigations. Hence sale is
set aside for these reasons."

H 11. The said order appears to be vague. No reason has been assigned
ROSAL.IV. v. TAICOBANK [SINHA,J.] 1177

in support thereof. On what ground the decree holder was pennitted to raise A
the said contention was not disclosed.

12. A revision application was filed by the appellant herein before the
High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.
It appears that the vendor of the appellant had also filed a revision
application and the same was also disposed of by reason of the said B
judgment.
-...
)
13. The High Court in its impugned judgment, however, opined that in
view of the fact that the 25% of the bid amount was not ·deposited on
26.l 0.1988 and was deposited on 27.10.1988, the provision of Order XXI Rule
84 was not complied with and in that view of the matter the auction sale was
c
bad in law. For arriving at the said finding, reliance was placed upon a
decision of this Court in Manila! Mohan/al Shah and Ors. v. Sardar Sayed
Ahmed Sayed Mahamad and Anr., AIR (1954) SC 349.

14. Mr. T.L. Viswanath Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf D
of the appellant, would submit that the the predecessor of the appellant
having deposited the 25% amount on 27.10.1988 pursuant to or in furtherance
of the order passed by the learned Judge himself, the same cannot be said
to be in contravention of the provisions of Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code.

15. It was submitted that had an opportunity of hearing been given to E
the appellant, he could have shown that the bid having been accepted at
4 O'Clock, there was no other way to deposit the 25% of the bid amount
in the bank and only with a view to obviate the same, the learned Judge
directed the auction purchaser to deposit the said amount on the next day.
F
16. Mr. Iyer would urge that, in any event, non-compliance of Order
1
XXI Rule 84 of the Code having not been raised by the decree holder, the
High Court committed a manifest error in relying thereupon as also the
decision of this Court in Manila! Mohan/al Shah (supra).

17. Mr. S.S. Javali, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the G
respondents, however, would submit that the judgment debtor and
Respondent No. 2 herein had colluded with the auction purchaser with a
. )o
view to defeat the decree of specific perfonnance of contract. The learned
counsel argued that in the first appeal preferred by Respondent No. 2
against the judgment and decree dated 20.04.1985 passed in favour of
H
;>
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A Respondent No. 3, Respondent No. 2 had undertaken not to sell or transfer ·\

the said property. The learned counsel contended that the auction sale
being mala fide, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgment.

18. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as noticed
hereinbefore, the questions which would arise for our consideration are:
B
(i) What would be the meaning of the term "immediately" occurring
in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code, in view of the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case?
·( -
c (ii) Whether the sale was void only because it was confirmed before
.
expiry of.the period of 30 days.

19. Order XXI Rule 84(1) of the Code reads as under:

"84. Deposit by purchaser and re-sale on default.-(1) On every
D sale of immovable properly the person declared to be the purchaser
shall pay immediately after such declaration a deposit of twenty-
five per cent on the amount of his purchase-money to the officer
or other person conducting the sale, and. in default of such deposit,
the property shall forthwith be re-sold."
E
20. What would be the meaning of the term "immediately" came up for
consideration before this Court, as noticed herein before, in Manila/ Mohan/al
Shah (supra) wherein it was held:

"Having examined the language of the relevant rules and the
F
judicial decisions bearing upon the subject we are of opinion that
the provisions of the rules requiring the deposit of 25 per cent of
the purchase-money immediately on the person being declared as
a purchaser and the payment of the balance within 15 days of the
sale are mandatory and upon non-compliance with these provisions
G there is no sale at all. The rules do not contemplate that there can
be any sale in favour of a purchaser without depositing 25 per cent
of the purchase-money in the first instance and the balance within
15 days. When there is no sale within the contemplation of these .{ ...
rules, there can be no question of material irregularity in the
H conduct of the sale. Non-payment ~the price on the part of the
'r

ROSALI V. v. TAICO BANK [SINHA, J.] 1179

defaulting purchaser ren~ers the sale proceedings as a complete A
nullity. The very fact that the Court is bound to re-sell the property
in the event of a default shows that the previous proceedings for
sale are completely wiped out as if they do not exist in the eye of
law. We hold, therefore, that in the circumstances of the present
case there was no sale and the purchasers acquired no rights at
B
all."
. )' 21. We are, however, in this case, faced with a different situation.

22. Having regard to the fact that the appellant had explained that it
was not possible for his predecessor in interest to deposit the 25% of the c
amount immediately after such declaration, as the banks, at that point of
time, were closed and furthermore having regard to the fact that presumably
the court in that view of the matter had directed the auction purchaser to
deposit the amount on the next day, we are of the opinion that it satisfies
the requirements of law. D
) 23. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of a statute that where
literal meaning leads to anomaly and absurdity, it should be avoided. [See
Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another v. Punjab National Bank and Others
(2006) 13 SCALE 511]
E
24. It is equally well-settled that the Parliament must be held to have
intended to lay down a reasonable statute unless a plain meaning of the Act
leads to different conclusion. It is trite that a statute must be read reasonably.
[See Ashok Lanka and Another v. Rishi Dixit and Others, [2005) 5 SCC 598)

- y 25. In La/it Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh and Ors., [2004] 6 SCC
626, this Court opined:
F

~
"A statute must be construed having regard to tbe legislative
intent. It has to be meaningful. A construction which leads to G
manifest absurdity must not be preferred to a construction which
would fulfill the object and purport of the legislative intent."
~
r
)_
26. [See also State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Surinder Singh
Banolta, 2006 (12) SCALE 571]
H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R

A,, 27. It is the duty of the court to accept a construction which promotes
the object of a legislation. [Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI Bombay (JI)
(1994)5 SCC410]

28. It is also a well-settled principle of law that common sense
construction rule should be taken recourse to in certain cases.
B
29. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 44(1)
(Reissue), it is stated:

"1392. Commonsense Construction Rule. It is a rule of the common
c law, which may be referred to as the commonsense construction
rule, that when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant
case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would
give effect to the legislative intention, the court should presume
that the legislator intended common sense to be used in construing
the enactment.
D
1477.Nature of presumption against absurdity. It is presumed that
Parliament intend that the court, when considering, in relation to
,
the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions
of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find
E against a construction which produces an absurd result, .since this
is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Here 'absurd'
means contrary to sense and reason, so in this' context the term
'absurd' is used to include a result which is unworkable or
impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless,
artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief.
F
1480.Presumption against anomalous or illogical result. It is presumed r
.
that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation
to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions
of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find
G against a construction that creates an anomaly ·or otherwise
produces an irrational or illogical result. The presumption may be
applicable where on one construction a benefit is not available in
like cases, or a detriment is not imposed in like cases, or the "'-
.(
decision would tum on an immaterial distinction or an anomaly
H would be created in legal doctrine. Where each of the constructions
)

ROSAL! V. v. TAICO BANK [SINHA, J.] 1181

contended for involves some anomaly then, in so far as the court A
uses anomaly as a test, it has to balance the effect of each
construction and determine which anomaly is greater. It may be
possible to avoid the anomaly by the exercise of a discretion. It may
be, however, that the anomaly is clearly intended, when effect must
be given to the intention. The court will pay little attention to a
proclaimed anomaly if it is purely hypothetical, and unlikely to arise
B
in practice."

30. In Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (3) v. Bombay Environmental
Action Group and Others, [2006] 3 SCC 434, this Court observed:
c
"It is also a fundamental proposition of construction that the effect
of deletion of words must receive serious consideration while
interpreting a statute as this has been repeatedly affirmed by this
·- Court in a series of judgments"

31. While applying the principles of interpretation, the courts are also
D
)
required to keep in mind the following two well-settled principles of law:

(i) Actus Curiae neminem gravabit (an act of Court shall prejudice
no man) [See Satyabrata Biswas and Others v. Kalyan
Kumar Kisku and Others (1994) 2 SCC 266 Ram Chandra E
Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319, Board of
Control For Cricket in India and Another v. Netaji Cricket
Club and Others, [2005] 4 SCC 741 and Union of India v.
Pramod Gupta (D) By LRs. !Ind Ors., [2005] 12 SCC 1; and
F
(it) lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man
to do that what he cannot possibly perform) [See Ram
Chandra Singh (supra) and Board of Control For Cricket in
India (supra)]

32. The term "immediately", therefore, must be construed having regard G
to the aforementioned principles. The term has two meanings. One, indicating
the relation of cause and effect and the other, the absence of time between
two events. In the former sense, it means proximately, without intervention
of anything, as opposed to "mediately". In the latter sense, it means
instantaneously. H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A 33. The term "immediately", is, thus, required to be construed as meaning
with all reasonable speed, considering the circumstances of the case. [See
Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, 4th Edition, Vol. 23, para 1618, p. 1178]

34. In a given situation, the term "immediately" may mean "within
reasonable time. Where an act is to be done within reasonable time, it must
B be done immediately. [See Mis. Gangavishan Heeralal v. Mis. Gopal
Digambar Jain and Others, AIR 1980 MP I 19 at 123, Keshava S. Jamkhandi
v. Ramachandra S. Jamkhandi, AIR 1981 Kar 97 at 101, Ramnarayan v.
State ?f MP., AIR 1962 MP 93 at 98, R. v. Inspector of Taxes, [1971] 3 All
ER 394 at 398 and R. v. HU Inspector a/Taxes, [1972] l All ER 545 at 555]
c
35. In Bombay Dyeing (supra), this Court observed:

"In 'The Interpretation and Application of Statutes', Reed Dickerson,
at p.135 discussed the subject while dealing with the importance of
context of the statute in the following terms:
D
" ... The essence of the language is to reflect, express,
and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established
ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs.
For this reason, language has been called "conceptual map of
E human experience"."

36. In K.S. Muthu v. T. Govindaraju/u and Anr., [2000] 4 SCALE 175,
this Court opined:

" .. .In the circumstances when the Appellant was not in a position
F
to perform the direction given by the Court in view of the holiday,
the Court cannot expect the Appellant to perform what is
impossible... "

37. In Crawford on Statutory Construction at. page 539, it is stated :
G
"271. Miscellaneous Implied Exceptions from the Requirements of
Mandatory Statutes, In General.-Even where a statute is clearly
mandatory or prohibitory, yet, in many instances, the courts will
regard certain conduct beyond the prohibition of the statute through
H the use of various devices or principles. Most, if not all of these
ROSALIV. v. TAICOBANK [SINHA,J.] 1183

devices find their jurisdiction in considerations of justice. It is a A
well known fact that often to enforce the law to its letter produces
manifest injustice, for frequently equitable and humane
considerations, and other considerations of a closely related nature,
would seem to be of a sufficient caliber to excuse or justify a
technical violation of the law."
B
38. [See also Dove Investments Pvt. Ltd and Ors. v. Gujarat Industrial
Inv. Corporation Ltd and Anr., [2006] 2 SCC 619].

39. We, therefore, are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was
not correct in holding that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the c
provisions of Order XXI Rule 84 had not been complied with.

40. It is interesting to note that in Dakshayani v. Branch Manager &
Others, [ILR 1997 Kar. 1940], interpreting Order XXI, Rule 84, the Kamataka
High Court itself held
D
)
"4. On that basis if we interpret the law though there is no power
in the Court to extend the time fixed by the statute still the
expression immediately is capable of taking within its sweep a
situation where an act is impossible of performance on the day on
which the auction is held as it happened in Savithramma's case E
when the bank itself w<Js on strike and no deposit could have been
made iii the bank or in the event the auction sale is held after Court
hours, a receipt order in that regard cannot be obtained for deposit
of such an amount. Such amount could be deposited only after
obtaining a receipt Order. If next day also happens to be a holiday, F
the day immediately thereafter coming up which is a working day
will be the day on which such act will have to be performed. If any
other interpretation is given it would stultify the very object of
law..... "

41. We may consider another aspect of the matter. With a view to G
consider the question as to whether he intended to abide by the provisions

... )
of a statute or the order of a court, his conduct is relevant. If one intended
to comply with order of a court but by reason of fortuitous circumstances,
he is not in a position to do so, the statute would not be held to be operating
harshly in such a case. H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A 42. We, therefore, are of the opinion that having regard to the order
of the court and the other circumstances stated by the appellant, his
predecessor-in-interest not being able to deposit the 25% of the bid amount
upon acceptance of bid did not render the auction sale void, as was opined
by the High Court.

B 43. We may also notice that the auction purchaser had deposited the
full purchase money within the time stipulated in tenns of Order XXI Rule
85 of the Code.

44. We do not know under what circumstances the decree holder
c himself filed an application for setting aside the sale. Only because the sale
was confirmed within a period of 30 days from the date of acceptance of the
bid, the same by itself, in our opinion, was not decisive to set aside the sale
after 8 years. We, therefore, are unable to agree with the findings of the
Executing Court or the High Court.

D 45. The impugned orders are set aside. However, we make it clear that
l
we have not· gone into the other contentions raised by the respondents
herein. All other contentions, therefore, may be determined by the Executing "
Court, if raised, in accordan<;e with law.

E 46. The appeal is allowed. We, however, make no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.