Holding

The Supreme Court held that the eviction petition was not substantively defective, amendment was not required, and that a Section 21 sanction obtained by fraud or collusion is void, requiring the Controller to examine its validity.

Summary

A landlady repeatedly let her premises to a tenant for residential purposes under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, obtaining the Controller's sanction each time. When the lease expired, she sought summary eviction via an execution petition, which the Controller rejected on the ground that the petition omitted the phrase "in writing". The appellate tribunal and the Delhi High Court allowed amendment of the petition and upheld the eviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined two main questions: whether the omission was a fatal defect and whether the limitation period barred amendment, and the proper scope and conditions of Section 21, especially the requirement of a limited period and residential use, and the effect of fraud or collusion on the sanction. The Court held that the petition was not deficient, amendment was unnecessary, and that the Controller must scrutinise the validity of the Section 21 sanction, which can be set aside if obtained by fraud or collusion. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the Controller was directed to examine the sanction's validity.

Issues considered

The omission of the words 'in writing' in the eviction petition – whether it renders the petition defective and bars relief.
Whether the limitation period precludes amendment of the petition after the six‑month period.
The scope, conditions and mandatory requirements of Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, particularly the need for a limited period and residential purpose.
Whether a sanction under Section 21 obtained by fraud or collusion is void and can be challenged.
The applicability of the doctrine of estoppel to a proceeding based on a statutory sanction.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21

Subjects

rent controlevictionSection 21Delhi Rent Control Actfraudcollusionestoppellimitation periodpleading deficiencyresidential lease

Judgment

S. B. NORONAH
.... v.
• PREM KUMAR! KHANNA
August 16, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA lYER AND P. N. SmNGHAL, JJ.] B

• Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 21 scope of-Duty oj the Court in
dealing witli applications 1111der Section 21, expfai11ed.

Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court

HELD: Section 21 of the: Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 carves out a
category for special treatment. While no landlord can evict without compliance
c
\vith sections 14, 19 and 20 of the Act, a. liberal eviction policy cannot be
said to under-lie in section 21. Parliament was presumably keen on maximising
accommodation available for letting, realising the scarcity crisis. One source of
such spare accommodation which is usually shy is potentially vacant building
or part thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period
provided he has some credible assurance that when he needs he \vill get it back. n
The law seeks to persuade the o\vner of the premises available for letting for a
particular period by giving him a special assurance that at the expiry of that
period the appointed agency wil1 place the landlord in vacaint possession. And·,..
Section 21 confines the special remedy to letting for residential uses only. Parlia-
n1cnt had the wholesome fear that if the section were not controlled by 1nany
conditions it n1ight open the floodgates for wholesale circun1vention of the rent
control legislations by ingenious landlords exploiting the agonising ne'ed of E
houseless denirens. [285B-D, G-H, 286A]

2.. Section 21 over-rides se~ion 14 precisely because it is otherwise hedged
in with dra-stic lin1itations and safeguards itself against landlords' abuses. The
first condition is that the landlord docs not require the demised pren1ises "for
a particular period" only. This means that he n1ust indicate to the authority
before \\'hich sanction is sought for letting what is the particular prriod for
\vhich he can spare the accommodation. The Controller exercises an important F
regtrla·tory function on behalf of the community. The fact that a landlord
and a potential tenant together apply, setting out the formal ingrcdi~nts of
Section 21, does not relie,·e the Controller from being vigilant to inquire and
--io satisfy himscJf about the requisites of the landlord's non-requirement "for a
particular period" and the letting itself being "as a resident". A fraud on the
statute cr111not he permitted especin·lly hecause of the grave niischief that n1ay
be perpt:trated in such event, [286E, H, 287 A-DJ
G
' •~ 3. There would be a terrible blow to the rent control law if section 21
\\'ere freely permitted to subvert the scheme of Section 14. Every 13.ndlord will
insist on a tenant going through the formal exercise of Section 21, making
·~ •, ideal averments in ferm.s of that Set'.tion. The con~quence will be that both
the Civil Procedure Code \Vhich prescribes suits for recovery of possession and
the Delhi Rent ·control Act 'vhich prescribes grounds for eviction will be eclipsed H
by the pervasive operation of Section 21. Neither grounds for eviction nor
suits for eviction wilt thereafter be needed, and if the la-ndlord moves the Court
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l s.c.R.

A for a mere warrant to place the landlord, through the Court process, in vacant
possession of the premises, he gets it. No courtwfee, no decree, no execution
petition, no termination of tenancy-wish for possession and the court is at
...
your command. Such a horrendous situation will be the negation of the ruie
of Jaw in this area. [287 D-F]

4. When an application under Section 21 is filed by the landlord and/or
B tenant the Controller must satisfy himself by such inquiry as he may inake,
about the compulsive requirements of that provision. If he makes a mindless
order, the Court, when challenged at the time of execution \Vill go into the
question as to whether the twin conditions for saaiction hav11 really been fulfilled.
Of course, there will be a presumption in favour of the sanction being regular,
but it \vill still be open to a pa.rty to make out his ca<;e that in fa<:t and
in tn1th the conditions which make for a valid sanction were not present.
c [287 G-H, 288A]

5. The sanction granted under section 21, if it has been procured by fraiud
and collusion cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy
will be given as hostage to successful collusion. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
be invoked to render valid a proceeding which the legislature has. on grounds
of public policy subjected to mandatory conditions ·which are shown to be
D absent. As between unequals th'e law steps in and as agains-t statutes there is
no estoppeJ, especially where collusion and fraud are made out and high
purpose is involved. [288D-E, G-H]

6. Law that non-performs stultifies the rule of law and hence the need for
strict compliance. Or else, the sanction is non-est.. . Collusion between the
strong and the weak cannot confer validity where the niandatory prescriptions
E of the Jaw are breached or betrayed. [289A]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 290 of 1979.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25th
January 1979 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 73/78.
F
Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Appellant.
Y. S. Chitaley and K. C. D11a for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court wa·s delivered by
,,,
"" KRISHNA IYER, J. ThiB appeal is symptomatic of a social patho-
logy which afflicts the Justice System at every level with none concern-
ed to cure it.

The extraordinary scarcity of accommodation in our country
H has produced the legislative and legislative phenomena of tenants'
protection laws and interminable 'eviction' cases. The situation cries
for a social audit of the explosive expansion of minous and pathetic
s. B. NORONAH v. PREM KUMARI (Krishna Iyer, J.) 283

'rent control litigation' and an urgent yet dynamic policy of promoting A
house construction for the lower brackets of Indian humanity

A landlady let out her premises to another day several years
ago ( 1968) for a term and, thereafter, from time to time, continued
the possession of the tenant on fresh lease and increase in rent.
B
Every time there was homage to the law by grant of sanction by
the Rent Controller under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. (the Act, for short), as if the letting were of a residential ac-
commodation. It is apparent that all these· years an elitist 'residen"
tial school' is being run in the premises and that is the purpose
expressly recited in all but the last lease deed of December 1975. c
This lease recites blandly that 'the lessee requires a suitable accom-
modation for residential purposes'. The period of the lease having
expired the landlady applied for summary eviction by application
for execution-a novel procedure enjoyed by the landlords of this
capital city which ~~ ~erii ot ~c need even to file a suit for
eviction. The tenant, whose expensive and lucrative school was D
about to be uprooted for want of habitation, hunted for a legal plea
to resist the threat of dispossession. Technicality is the unfailing re-
source of an Indian litigant and the ingenious defence, among others,
was set up that because the application for eviction did not mention
that the letting was 'in writing' it was fatally fiawsome. Better pleas
which merited serious consideration were over-ruled but this little E
infirmity in the pleading loomed large in the eyes of the Rent Controller
who, for that reason alone, rejected the relief.

The inevitable appeal to the Tribunal followed. An applica-
tion for amendment of the pleading, by way of abundant caution, to
make good the verbal deficiency was also made. Furious forensic F
battles raged and the appellate tribunal as well as the High Court
allowed the appeals and the amendments, over-ruling the further plea
of limitation for the application as on the date of the amendment.
The worsted tenant has secured leave to appeal and there is an
application for revocation of leave.
G

We have been addressed two main arguments plus other points
of lesser moment. The first is that the application for execution is
defecitve because in the narration of facts the lease is mentioned
but the words 'in writing' are not stated. It is further contended
that by the time these words were supplied by amendment of the R
application, the period of limitation (six months) had elapsed and
that bar prevented entertainment of the proceedings.
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] J S.C.R.

A Pleadings are not statutes and legalism is not verbalism. Com-
mon sense should not be kept in cold storage when pleadings are con-
strued. It is too plain for words that the petition for eviction re-
ferred to the lease between the parties which undoubtedly was in
writing . The application, read as a whole, did imply that and we
are clear that Jaw should not be stultified by courts by saqctifying
B little omissions as fatal flaws. The application for vacant possession
suffered from no verbal lacunae and there was no need to amend
at all. Parties win or lose on substantial questions, not 'technical
tortures' and courts cannot be 'abettors'.
The further arguments on limitation when a vital fact creath·e
C of a cause of action is brought in by amendment after expiry of limi-
tation is an important question which need not be considered in the
view we have taken on the adequacy of the pleading.
The next issue is of importance not merely for this lis but also
for the sensitive application of Sec. 21 in its social perspective. The
notorious rack-renting and impotence of legislation against unreason-
D
able eviction in the capital city of Delhi (and elsewhere) compels
us to take a close look at the facile provision in Sec. 21, its social
purpose and functional distortion. its potential for subversion of the
statutory scheme unless, by interpretation, it is canalised and the
'mischief rule' in Hydcn"s case applied. After all, for the common
E man, law-in-action is what the court says it is.
To maintain the integrity of the law the court must 'suit the
action to the word, the world to the action, and so, we have to
fathom, from the language employed and the economic, milieu, what
the meaning of Sec. 21 is and save it from possible exploitation by
unscrupulous landlords for whom 'fair is foul, and foul is fair',
Rent control legislation in Delhi, as elsewhere in the country, is
broadly intended 'tol provide for the control of rents and evictions and
of rates of hotels and lodging houses and for the lease of vacant
premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union Territory
of Delhi.
G This is understandable where the city population swells and the !l
•
city accommodation stagnates, the people suffocate for space and
landlords 'make hay' playing the game of 'each according to his
abiLty to grab'.
Parliament has built into the Act restriction on evictiqp. Sec.
B 14 (1) starts off :
''Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other
law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of posses-
s. B. NORONAH v. PREM KUMAR! (Krishna Iyer,!.) 285

sion of any premises shall be made by any court or Con- A
troller in favour of the landlord against a tenant :
Provided that the Controller may, on an application
made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for
the recovery of possession of the premises on one or
more of the following grounds only, namely : -
B
The schen1c of cn1bargo on eviction makes a pragn1atic swerve
by the time we reach Sec. 21. We can correctly visualise the scope
and sweep of this provision only in its proper social setting. It
carves out a category for special treatment. While no landlord can
evict without compliance with Sections 14, 19 and 20; docs a liberal c
eviction policy underlie Sec. 21 ? Apparently contrary but actually
not once we understand the raison d'etre of the section. Parlia-
ment was presumably keen on maximising accommodation avail-
ble for letting, realising the scarcity crises. One source of such
spare accommodation which is usually shy is potentially vacant
building or part thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a D
strictly limited period provided he has some credible assurance that
when he needs he will get it back. If an oflicer is going on other
assignment for a particular period, or the owner has -official quarters
so that he can let out if he i~ confident that on his retirement he will
be able to re-occupy, such accommodation may add to the totnl
lease-worthy houses. The problem is felt most for residential uses. E
But no one will part with possession because the lessee will become a
statutory tenant and, even if bona fide requirement is made out. the
litigative tiers are so many and the law's delays so tantalising that
no realist in his sense will trust the sweet promises of a tenant that
he will return the building after the stipulated period. So the Jaw
has to make itself credit-worthy. The long distance between institu- F
tion of recovery proceednigs and actual dispossession runs often in-
to a decade or more-a factor of despair which can be obviated
only by a special procedure.
Section 21 is the answer. The law seeks to persuade the owner
of premises available for Jetting for a particular or limited period by G
giving him the special assurance that at the expiry of that period
the appointed agency will place the landlord in vacant possession.
As stated earlier, the critical need was for residential, not non-
residential housing. Therefore, Section 21 confines this special re-
medy to letting for residential uses only. Parliament had the
wholsome fear that if the section were not controlled by many con- H
ditions it might open the flood gates for wholesale circumvention of
the rent control legislation by ingenious landlords exploiting the
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R.

A agonising need of houseless denizens. Against this back-drop, Jet
us read Section 21 and highlight the essential conditions written into
the provision :
"21. Where a landlord does not require the whole or
any part of any premises for a particular period, and the
B landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller
in the prescribed mimner, lets the whole of the premises or
part thereof as resident for such period as may be agreed
to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the
tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate
such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in
c Section 14 or in any other Jaw, the Controller may, on an
application made to him in this behalf by the landlord
within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord
in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evict-
ing the tenant and every other person who may be in occu-
pation of such premises."
D
We must notice that Section 21 runs counter to the general
scheme and, therefore, must be restricted severely to its narrow sphere.
Secondly, we must place accent on evey condition which attracts the
Section and if any one of them is absent the Section cannot apply
and, therefore,, cannot arm the landlord with ~ resistless eviction
E
process. Thirdly, we must realise that the whole effect of Section 14
can be subverted by ritualistic enforcement of the conditions of
sanction under Sec. 21 or mechanical grant of sanction therein. Sec-
tion 21 overrides Section 14 precisely because it is otherwise hedged
in with drastic limitations and safeguards itself against landlords'
F abuses.
What, then, are those conditions and safeguards? The first con-
dition is that the landlord docs not require the demised premises "for
a purticular period" only. This means that he must indicate to the
authority before which sanction is sought for letting what is the parti-
G cular period for which he can spare the accommodation. The Con- ~
!roller must be satisfied that the landlord means what he says and it '-
is not a case of his not requiring the property indefinitely as distin-
guished from a specific or particular limited period of say one year, "
two years or five years. If a ll)lln has a house available for letting ~
for an indefinite period and he so lets it, even if he specifies as a pre-
11 tense, a period or term in the lease, Section 21 cannot be attracted.
On the other hand, if he gives, a special reason why he can let out only
for a limited period and requires the building at the end of that period,
s. B. NORONAH v. PREM KUMAR! (Krishna Iyer,!.) 287

such as that he expects to retire by then or that he is going on a A
• short assignment or on deputation and needs the house when be returns
home it is good compliance. The second condition is that the letting
'(
must be made for a residential purpose. The house must be made
' over "as a residence''. If it is let out for a commercial purpose,
Section 21 will not apply, whether the ritual of a sanction under
B
that provision has been gone through or not. Thirdly, the Controller's
f· permission is obligatory where he specifies the particular period for
which he gives permission and further qualifies the permission for use
a.s a residence. The Controller exercises an important regulatory
function on behalf of the community. The fact that a landlord and
a potential tenant together apply, setting out the formal ingredients c
of Section 21, does not relieve the Controller from being vigilant to
inquire and satisfy himself about the requisites of the landlord's non-
requirement "for a particular period" and the letting itself being "as a
residence''. A fraud on the statute cannot be permitted especially
because of the grave mischief that may be perpetrated in such event.
D
It is easy to envisage the terrible blow to the rent control law if
Section 21 were freely permitted to subvert the scheme of Section 14.
Every landlord will insist on a tenant going through the formal exer-
cise of Section 21, making ideal averments in terms of that Section.
The consequence will be that both the Civil Procedure Code which
prescribes suits for recovery of possession and the Delhi Rent Con- E
trol Act which prescribes grounds for eviction will be eclipsed by the
permsive operation of Section 21. Neither grounds for eviction nor
suits for eviction will thereafter be need~d, and if the landlord moves
the court for a mere warrant to place the landlord, through the court
process, in vacant possession of the premises, he gets it. No court-
fee, no decree, no execution petition, no termination of tenancy-wish F
for possession and the court is at your command. Such a horrendous
situation will he the negation of the rule of law in this area. So it
is that we deem it necessary to lay down the law as implied in Section
21.
G
When an application under Section 21 is filed by the landlord and/
or tenant, the Controller must satisfy himself by such inquiry as he
may make, about the compulsive requirements of that provision. If
he makes a mindless order, the Court, when challenged at the time of
execution, will go into the question as to whether the twin conditions
for sanction have really been fulfilled. Of course, there will be a H
presumption in favour of the sanction being regular, but it will still
be open to a party to make out his case that in fact and in truth the
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ ! 930] l S.C.R.

A conditions which make for •a valid sanction were not present. We
do not agree with the statement of the law by the Delhi High Court
striking a contrary note. In this context, we may make special refe-
rence to Kasturi Lat's case, a decision of the Delhi High Court rcp<>rt-
ed in 1976 R.C.J.p. 582. It is true as Misra, J. in that C'ase, follow-
B ing earlier decisions has observed that the provisions of Section 21
are designed to meet the problem of shortage of housing in Delhi.
If the landlord does not need the premises for a, limited period, section
21 permits him to lease it out during that period. Without the faci-
lity of section 21 the landlord might have preferred to keep the pre-
mises vacant, but that does not mean that the law surrenders itself to
c this landlord and releases him from all conditions. That is why the
need for sanction and the mandatory conditions for such sanction are
specified in the section. It is altngether wrong to import the idea
that the tenant h·aving taken advantage of induction into the premises
pursuant to the permission, he cannot challenge the legality of the
perm1ss1on. As between unequals the law steps in and as against
D statutes there is no estoppel, especially where collusion and fraud are
made out and high purpose is involved.

The doctrine. of estoppel cannot be invoked t'o render 'alid a
proceeding which the legislature has, on grounds of public policy,
subjected to mandatory conditions which are shown to be absent :
E
"Where a statnte. enacted for the benefit of a section of
the public, imposes a duty of a positive kind the person
charged with the performance of the duty cannot by estoppel
be prevented from exercising his statutory powers. A peti-
F tioner in a divorce suit cannot obtain relief simply because
the respondent is estopped from denying the charges, as the
court has a statutory duty to inquire into the truth of a
petition".(')

It is an old maxim that estoppels are odious, although considerable
G inroad into this maxim has been made by modern law. Even so, "a
judgment obtained by fmud or collusion, even it seems a judgment of
the House of Lords, may be treated as a nullity."' (See Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. 16-fourth edition para 1553). The point is
that the sanction granted under section 21, if it has been procured by
fraud or collusion, cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high
H public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion.
(I) Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition p. 1019 Vol. 16.
s. B. NORONAH V, PREM KUMARI (Krishna Iyer, J.) 289

Law that non·pcr(orms stultifies the rule of law and so it is that A
• we stress the need for strict compliance. Or else, the sanction is 11011
est. Collusion between the strong and the weak cannot confer validity
where the nrnndatory prescriptions of the law are breached or betray-
ed. We have said enough to make the point that it is open to the
tenant in the present case to plead and prove that the s•anction under
Section 21 is invalid, and if it is void the executing court is not
B
debarred from holding so. -

We, therefore, hold on the first point that no question of amend-
ment arises in the present case and the application before the Control-
ler did not suficr from any deficiency. On the second point we hold
that it is perfectly open to the Controller to examine whether the C
sanction under Section 21 is a make-believe, vitiated by fraud and
collusion.

We make it clear that the Controller is concerned with delivery
of posession at the expiry of the lease of 1975 and he will, therefore,
examine the position with reference to that lease only. The appel- D
lant-tenant urged a further contention that because there was fraud
the court could not assist the party in fraud even if both sides were
involved in the fraud. He invoked the doctrine of inpari delicto potior
est conditio dejendantis. We are not inclined to examine these con-
tentions but leave it open to the executing court to go into such pleas
as are permissible at the execution stage. Beyond that he has no E
jurisdiction but within that he has a duty to decide. On these findings
we dismiss the appeal but direct the Controller to go into the ques-
tion of the validity of the sanction and such otl1er objections •as may
be awilable in the light of our observations recorded above. The first
point raised is untenable and we should have directed costs while
dismissing the appeal. The second point raised is of great public F
moment and the appellant has broadly succeeded on that question.
The result is that the community has benefited by our declaration
of the law and the parties must, therefore bear their respective costs
throughout'.
G
S.R. Appeal dismiised.