S.C.R.COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1versusM/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD.

618                       [2019]
               SUPREME COURT     12 S.C.R. 618
                              REPORTS                      [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A            COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1
                                        v.
                        M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD.
                        (Civil Appeal No. 10083 of 2011)
B                            SEPTEMBER 05, 2019
          [ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
            Customs Act, 1962:
             ss. 130 and 130E - Appeal against orders passed by Customs,
C     Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) - Whether
      appeal would lie u/s. 130 before High Court or u/s. 130E before
      Supreme Court, in the facts of the present case - Held: Appeal to
      Supreme Court against the order of CESTAT would lie only if any
      question having relation to the rate of duty is involved in the appeal
      or if it relates to value of goods for the purpose of assessment or
D
      classification of goods or whether the goods were covered by
      exemption notification - In all other cases appeal would lie before
      High Court - The question to be determined in the present appeal
      was neither related to rate of duty nor to valuation of goods nor
      classification of goods nor coverage under the exemption
E     notification - The appeals also did not involve any question of law
      of general public importance applicable to a class or category of
      assesses as a whole - Therefore, in the present case, the appeals
      were maintainable u/s. 130 before High Court and would not lie
      u/s. 130E to Supreme Court.
F           Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. Upon a conjoint reading of ss. 130 and 130E of
      Customs Act, 1962, it could be seen that an appeal shall lie to
      the High Court u/s. 130 against every order passed in appeal
      by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the
G     case involves a substantial question of law. The only exception
      carved out is that an appeal shall lie before this Court u/s. 130E
      and shall not lie before the High Court against the order relating,
      amongst other things, to the determination of any question
      having relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of
      goods for the purposes of assessment. Thus, only if any question
H
                                       618
      COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                           619
              M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD.

having relation to the rate of duty is involved in an appeal or if      A
it relates to value of goods for the purpose of assessment, the
appeal would lie to this Court and in all other cases it would lie
before the High Court. [Para 9 and 10] [625-A-C]
       2. The Legislature has carved out only following
categories of cases to which it has intended to give a special          B
treatment of providing an appeal directly to this court. “(i)
determination of a question relating to a rate of duty; (ii)
determination of a question relating to the valuation of goods
for the purpose of assessment; (iii) determination of a question
relating to the classification of goods under the Tariff and whether
or not they are covered by an exemption notification; and (iv)          C
whether the value of goods for purposes of assessment should
be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters that
the said Act provides for.” [Para 16] [629-D-F]
       3. In the present case, it could clearly be seen that the only
question that is involved is whether the assessee had violated          D
the conditions of the exemption notification by not utilizing the
imported materials for manufacturing of the declared final product
and was, therefore, liable for payment of duty, interest and
penalty. Neither any question with regard to determination of rate
of duty arises nor a question relating to valuation of goods for
                                                                        E
the purposes of assessment arises in the present case. The
appeals also do not involve determination of any question
relating to the classification of goods, nor do they involve the
question as to whether they are covered by the exemption
notification or not. Undisputedly, the goods are covered by the
said notification. The only question is as to whether the assessee      F
has breached the conditions which are imposed by the
notification for getting exemption from payment of the customs
duty or not. The appeals do not involve any question of law of
general public importance which would be applicable to a class
or category of assessees as a whole. The question is purely
inter-se between the parties and is required to be adjudicated          G
upon the facts available. Therefore, the High Court was not
justified in holding that the appeals are not maintainable under
Section 130 of the Customs Act but are tenable before this Court
under Section 130E of the Customs Act. [Paras 17 and 18] [629-
G-H; 630-A-C]                                                           H
620             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A             Navin Chemicals Manufacturing & Trading Company
              Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1993) 4 SCC 320 : [1993]
              2 Suppl. SCR 326 ; Steel Authority of India Ltd. v.
              Designated Authority, Directorate General of Anti-
              Dumping & Allied Duties (2017) 13 SCC 1 : [2017]
              6 SCR 598 - relied on.
B
                              Case Law Reference
      [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 326             relied on              Para 11
      [2017] 6 SCR 598                    relied on              Para 13
C           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10083
      of 2011.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2011 of the High
      Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in CSTA No. 2 of 2007.
              With
D
              Civil Appeal Nos. 7021, 7022 of 2019, 7524 of 2014, 9245 of
      2015.
            Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG, Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv., Rajesh Rawal,
      Ms. Iti Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Ashwani Kumar, Dhruv Agarwal,
E     Ms. Shirin Khajuria, Shekhar Vyas, Ms. Sunita Rani Singh, Ms. Kirti
      Dua, Chakitan V. S. Papta, M. Khairati, B. Krishna Prasad, Nikhil Goel,
      Joseph Pookkatt, D. Pahuja (for M/S. Ap & J Chambers), Nishant Joshi,
      Nikhil Varshney, S. S. Shroff, Kumar Visalaksh, Udit Jain, Archit Gupta,
      Harish Pandey, Mahfooz A. Nazki, V. Lakshmikumaran, Ms. Charamya
      Lakshmikumaran., Aditya Bhattacharya, Hemant Bajaj, Ms. Ishita
F     Mathur, Ms Apeksha Mahta, Ms. Monica Kasturi, R. Parthasarathy,
      Advs. for the appearing parties.
              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
              B. R. GAVAI, J.
G           1. Leave granted in S.L.P.(C) No. 29444/2012 and S.L.P.(C) No.
      12755/2015.
             2. A short question that arises for consideration in these appeals
      is, as to whether an appeal from the order of Customs, Excise and
      Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the
H     "CESTAT"), involving an issue regarding violation of conditions contained
       COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                                 621
        M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

in customs exemption notification, would lie before the High Court under       A
the provisions of Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Customs Act") or to this Court under the provisions
of Section 130E of the Customs Act.
      3. The facts in the present matter are not in dispute. For the sake
of convenience, we would refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 10083/         B
2011, inasmuch as the impugned judgment and order(s) in all other
connected appeals are passed following the judgment and order passed
by the Karnataka High Court in CS TA No. 2/2007.
       4. The assessee is a leading manufacturer of pagers. The
assessee is entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 30/1997-Customs        C
dated 01.04.1997 (hereinafter referred as the said “notification”) by
which the materials imported into India for the manufacturing of the
pagers were exempted from whole of the customs duty leviable in the
First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and further whole of
the additional duty leviable thereon under Section 3 of Customs Tariff
Act, 1975. As per the scheme framed under the said notification, the           D
goods imported under the actual user condition were required to be used
only for the manufacture of the declared final product. A specific
intelligence was received by the Director of Revenue Intelligence to
the effect that the assessee had stopped manufacturing of pagers and
hence a certain portion of the duty free material imported under the           E
Scheme had been written off in their books of accounts. The officers
of the DRI, therefore, took up further investigation in the matter. The
assessee was called upon to submit the list of such unutilized items,
which are imported under the said notification and lying unutilized. The
assessee submitted a list of such unutilized items with requisite details
and sought for further time to link unutilized items to the bill of entry at   F
the relevant assessable value. It was further informed by the assessee
that they have ceased to manufacture pagers and as such materials
have become obsolete insofar as they are concerned.
       5. Not satisfied with the contention of the assessee, the
Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore, issued a Notice to the assessee,           G
calling upon it to show cause as to why the customs duty amounting to
Rs. 96,17,498/- along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum and
the penalty should not be recovered from it. After following the
procedure prescribed, the Commissioner of Customs passed an Order
in Original on 30.04.2002 thereby, holding that the assessee was liable        H
622            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     to pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. 96,17,498/- along with interest and
      penalty. Being aggrieved thereby, the assessee preferred an appeal
      before the CESTAT. The CESTAT allowed the appeal. Being aggrieved
      thereby, the Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore preferred an appeal
      before the Karnataka High Court under the provisions of Section 130
      of the Customs Act. At the stage of final hearing of the appeal, the
B
      assessee raised a preliminary objection contending therein, that the order
      impugned before the High Court amongst other things, also relates to
      the rate of duty of customs and as such the appeal under Section 130
      of the Customs Act was not tenable before the High Court and the
      appeal will have to be preferred before this Court under the provisions
C     of Section 130E of the Customs Act.
             6. The Division Bench of the High Court held that it was called
      upon to decide whether the terms and conditions of the said notification
      have been complied with by the assessee or not and whether the levy
      of duty, interest and penalty were legal or not and whether the CESTAT
D     was justified in setting aside the levy of duty, interest and penalty and
      all these questions were related to determination of the rate of duty.
      The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, held that the appeal
      under Section 130 of the Customs Act was not tenable before the High
      Court but would be tenable under Section 130E of the Customs Act
      before this Court. Being aggrieved thereby, the Revenue is in appeal
E
      before this Court.
            7. We have heard Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor
      General appearing on behalf of the appellant-Revenue and Mr. Balbir
      Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-
      assessee.
F
             8. For appraising the rival contentions, it would be apposite to
      refer to Section 130 and Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962 (as it
      existed prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2018). They read
      as follows:
G           “130. Appeal to High Court-
            (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed
            in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of
            July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to
            the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of
H           duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                                623
 M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves     A
a substantial question of law.
(2) The Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of
Customs or the other party aggrieved by any order passed by
the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and
such appeal under this sub-section shall be -                          B
 (a) Filed within one hundred and eighty days from the date on
     which the order appealed against is received by the
     Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of
     Customs or the other party;
 (b) Accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees where such             C
     appeal is filed by the other party;
 (c) In the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating
     therein the substantial question of law involved.
(2A) The High Court may admit an appeal after the expiry of            D
the period of one hundred and eighty days referred to in clause
(a) of sub-section (2), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient
cause for not filing the same within that period.
(3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question
of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.      E
(4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated,
and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed
to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
                                                                       F
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to
be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law
not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such
question.
(5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated
                                                                       G
and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on
which such decision is founded and may award such cost as it
deems fit.
(6) The High Court may determine any issue which-
 (a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or             H
624      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     (b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by
          reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred
          to in sub-section(1).
      (7) When an appeal has been filed before the High Court, it shall
      be heard by a bench of not less than two Judges of the High
B     Court, and shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of
      such Judges or of the majority, if any, of such Judges.
      (8) Where there is no such majority, the Judges shall state the
      point of law upon which they differ and the case shall, then, be
      heard upon that point only by one or more of the other Judges
C     of the High Court and such point shall be decided according to
      the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard the
      case including those who first heard it.
      (9) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) relating to appeals to
D     the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of
      appeals under this section.
      Xxx
      130E. Appeal to the Supreme Court-An appeal shall lie to the
E     Supreme Court from-
      (a) Any judgment of the High Court delivered-
         (i) In an appeal made under Section 130; or
         (ii) On a reference made under Section 130 by the Appellate
              Tribunal before the 1st day of July, 2003;
F
        (iii) On a reference made under Section 130A,
      in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application
      made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after
      the passing of the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit
G     one for appeal to the Supreme Court; or
      (b) Any order passed [before the establishment of the National
      Tax Tribunal] by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other
      things, to the determination of any question having a relation to
      the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for the
H     purposes of assessment.”
      COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                                625
       M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       9. Upon a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it could      A
thus be seen that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against every
order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is
satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The only
exception carved out is that an appeal shall lie before this Court and
shall not lie before the High Court against the order relating, amongst
other things, to the determination of any question having relation to the    B
rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for the purposes of
assessment.
       10. It could thus clearly be seen that, only if any question having
relation to the rate of duty is involved in an appeal or if it relates to
value of goods for the purpose of assessment, the appeal would lie to        C
this Court and in all other cases it would lie before the High Court.
       11. However, the issue is no more res integra. In a catena of
the judgments, right from the judgment of this Court in the case of Navin
Chemicals Manufacturing & Trading Company Ltd. vs. Collector of
Customs, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 320, the position has been clarified.      D
We may gainfully refer to paragraphs 6, 7 and 11 of the said judgment
wherein, this Court considered the provisions of Section 130 and Section
130E of the Customs Act. They read thus:
      “6. It is, upon a plain reading of the section, clear that appeals
      against orders which involve ‘determination of any question            E
      having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value
      of goods for purposes of assessment’ are specially treated and
      are required to be heard by a Special Bench. This is what sub-
      section (3) of Section 129-C provides. Appeals in other matters
      are to be heard by a Bench consisting of one judicial member
      and one technical member, subject to the provisions of sub-section     F
      (4). Sub-section (4) carves out an exception to the general
      provisions of sub-section (2) and provides that a member of
      CEGAT sitting singly can hear appeals in the matters enumerated
      therein provided that they are not cases where the ‘determination
      of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs
      or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment’ is in             G
      question.
      7. The controversy, therefore, relates to the meaning to be given
      to the expression ‘determination of any question having a relation
      to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for
      purposes of assessment’. It seems to us that the key lies in the       H
626      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     words ‘for purposes of assessment’ therein. Where the appeal
      involves the determination of any question that has a relation to
      the rate of customs duty for the purposes of assessment that
      appeal must be heard by a Special Bench. Similarly, where the
      appeal involves the determination of any question that has a
      relation to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment,
B
      that appeal must be heard by a Special Bench. Cases that relate
      to the rate of customs duty for the purposes of assessment and
      which relate to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment
      are advisedly treated separately and placed before Special
      Benches for decision because they, more often than not, are of
C     importance not only to the importers who are parties thereto but
      also to many other importers who import or propose to import
      the same or similar goods. Since the decisions of CEGAT in such
      matters would have wide application they are, by the terms of
      the statute, to be rendered by Special Benches. The phrase
      “relation to” is, ordinarily, of wide import but, in the context of
D
      its use in the said expression in Section 129-C, it must be read
      as meaning a direct and proximate relationship to the rate of duty
      and to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment.
      11. It will be seen that sub-section (5) uses the said expression
      ‘determination of any question having a relation to the rate of
E
      duty or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment’
      and the Explanation thereto provides a definition of it ‘for the
      purposes of this sub-section’. The Explanation says that the
      expression includes the determination of a question relating to
      the rate of duty; to the valuation of goods for purposes of
F     assessment; to the classification of goods under the Tariff and
      whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification;
      and whether the value of goods for purposes of assessment
      should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters
      that the said Act provides for. Although this Explanation expressly
      confines the definition of the said expression to sub-section (5)
G     of Section 129-D, it is proper that the said expression used in
      the other parts of the said Act should be interpreted similarly.
      The statutory definition accords with the meaning we have given
      to the said expression above. Questions relating to the rate of
      duty and to the value of goods for purposes of assessment are
H     questions that squarely fall within the meaning of the said
       COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                                 627
        M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      expression. A dispute as to the classification of goods and as to        A
      whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification
      relates directly and proximately to the rate of duty applicable
      thereto for purposes of assessment. Whether the value of goods
      for purposes of assessment is required to be increased or
      decreased is a question that relates directly and proximately to
                                                                               B
      the value of goods for purposes of assessment. The statutory
      definition of the said expression indicates that it has to be read
      to limit its application to cases where, for the purposes of
      assessment, questions arise directly and proximately as to the rate
      of duty or the value of the goods.
                                                                               C
       12. It could thus clearly be seen that, this Court, while considering
the provisions of Section 130 and Section 130E of the Customs Act,
has held that where an appeal involves determination of any question
that has relation to customs duty for the purpose of assessment or where
an appeal involves determination of any question that has relation to
the value of goods for the purposes of assessment, such cases will have        D
to be treated separately and have to be given special treatment.
       13. Recently, again this Court, in a decision, in the case of Steel
Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Designated Authority, Directorate General
of Anti-Dumping & Allied Duties, reported in (2017) 13 SCC 1, has
reiterated the same position. It would be appropriate to refer to para         E
18 of the said judgment which reads as follows:
      “18. Section 130-E(b) of the Act provides for a direct appeal to
      the Supreme Court against an order of the Appellate Tribunal,
      broadly speaking, on a question involving government revenue.
      This seems to be in view of the fact that the order that would           F
      be under appeal i.e. (order of the Appellate Tribunal) may go
      beyond the inter se dispute between the parties and effect upon
      a large number of assessees. The issue, in such an event, surely
      will be one of general/public importance. Alternatively, the
      question raised or arising may require interpretation of the
                                                                               G
      provisions of the Constitution. Such interpretation may involve a
      fresh or a relook or even an attempt to understand the true and
      correct purport of a laid down meaning of the constitutional
      provisions that may come into focus in a given case. It is only
      such questions of importance, alone, that are required to be
      decided by the Supreme Court and by the very nature of the               H
628            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           questions raised or arising, the same necessarily have to involve
            issues of law going beyond the inter partes rights and extending
            to a class or category of assessees as a whole. This is the
            limitation that has to be understood to be inbuilt in Section 130-
            E(b) of the Act which, in our considered view, would also be
            consistent with the role and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
B
            India as envisaged under the Constitution. Viewed from the
            aforesaid perspective, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
            Section 130-E(b) of the Act or the pari materia provisions of any
            other statute would be in harmony with those contained in Chapter
            IV of Part V of the Constitution.”
C            14. It could thus be seen that, this Court has found that when
      an order of the Appellate Tribunal would go beyond inter se disputes
      between the parties and may affect a large number of cases, such an
      issue will be one of general public importance. It has further been found
      that certain questions raised or arising may require interpretation of the
D     Constitution. It is held that only such questions of general public
      importance alone are required to be decided by this Court. It has further
      been held that, by the very nature of a question raised or arising, the
      same necessarily has to involve issue of law going beyond the inter
      partes rights and extending to a class or category of assessees as a
      whole.
E
            15. This Court in the case of Steel Authority (supra), after
      considering the earlier judgments of this Court, carved out certain
      conditions which are required to be satisfied before admitting an appeal
      under Section 130E of the Customs Act. It will be apposite to refer to
      paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said judgment. Paragraphs 21 and 22 read
F     thus:
            “21. On the basis of the discussion that has preceded, it must
            therefore be held that before admitting an appeal under Section
            130-E(b) of the Customs Act, the following conditions must be
            satisfied:
G
              (i) The question raised or arising must have a direct and/or
                  proximate nexus to the question of determination of the
                  applicable rate of duty or to the determination of the value
                  of the goods for the purposes of assessment of duty. This
                  is a sine qua non for the admission of the appeal before this
H                 Court under Section 130-E(b) of the Act.
      COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE-1 v.                                 629
       M/S MOTOROLA INDIA LTD. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       (ii) The question raised must involve a substantial question of        A
            law which has not been answered or, on which, there is a
            conflict of decisions necessitating a resolution.
       (iii) If the Tribunal, on consideration of the material and relevant
             facts, had arrived at a conclusion which is a possible
             conclusion, the same must be allowed to rest even if this        B
             Court is inclined to take another view of the matter.
       (iv) The Tribunal had acted in gross violation of the procedure
            or principles of natural justice occasioning a failure of
            justice.
      22. The above parameters, which by no means should be                   C
      considered to be exhaustive, may now be applied to the case of
      the parties before us to decide the primary question indicated at
      the outset of the present order, namely, whether this appeal
      deserves to be admitted.”
       16. We are of the considered view that the Legislature has             D
carved out only following categories of cases to which it has intended
to give a special treatment of providing an appeal directly to this court.
       “(i) determination of a question relating to a rate of duty;
       (ii) determination of a question relating to the valuation of goods
            for the purpose of assessment;                                    E
       (iii) determination of a question relating to the classification of
             goods under the Tariff and whether or not they are covered
             by an exemption notification;
       (iv) whether the value of goods for purposes of assessment
                                                                              F
            should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain
            matters that the said Act provides for.”
       17. Reverting to the present case, it could clearly be seen that
the only question that is involved is whetsher the assessee had violated
the conditions of the exemption notification by not utilizing the imported
materials for manufacturing of the declared final product and was,            G
therefore, liable for payment of duty, interest and penalty. Neither any
question with regard to determination of rate of duty arises nor a question
relating to valuation of goods for the purposes of assessment arises in
the present case. The appeals also do not involve determination of any
question relating to the classification of goods, nor do they involve the     H
630             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     question as to whether they are covered by the exemption notification
      or not. Undisputedly, the goods are covered by the said notification.
      The only question is as to whether the assessee has breached the
      conditions which are imposed by the notification for getting exemption
      from payment of the customs duty or not. The appeals do not involve
      any question of law of general public importance which would be
B
      applicable to a class or category of assessees as a whole. The question
      is purely inter-se between the parties and is required to be adjudicated
      upon the facts available.
             18. In that view of the matter, we find that the High Court was
      not justified in holding that the appeals are not maintainable under Section
C     130 of the Customs Act but are tenable before this Court under Section
      130E of the Customs Act.
            19. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders
      passed by the High Court are set aside. The appeals are remitted back
      to the High Court for de novo consideration of the appeals on their
D     own merits.
            20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be
      no order as to costs.


E     Kalpana K. Tripathy                                          Appeals allowed.




F




G




H