Holding

The cause of action for a civil suit accrues on the date the higher authority disposes of the statutory appeal, or, if no order is made, six months after the appeal is filed; thus the original dismissal merges into the appellate order for limitation purposes.

Summary

The appellant, a government servant, was dismissed by the Collector on 13 January 1966 and his appeal to the Divisional Commissioner was dismissed on 31 August 1966. He filed a suit on 30 September 1969 seeking a declaration that the dismissal was inoperative, but the trial court and the High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by the three‑year limitation period under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court was asked to determine when the cause of action for a civil suit accrues – whether from the date of the original adverse order or from the date the higher authority disposes of the statutory appeal, or after six months if no order is made. The Court held that the cause of action arises when the higher authority’s order disposing of the appeal is made, and if no order is made, six months from filing the appeal, thereby overruling the earlier Sita Ram Goel decision. Applying this principle, the Court found the suit to be within the limitation period and allowed the appeal, remanding the matter to the trial court for disposal. The judgment also emphasized the need for expeditious disposal of departmental appeals and referenced the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Issues considered

When does the right to sue (cause of action) first accrue for purposes of Article 58 of the Limitation Act in cases involving departmental/statutory appeals?
Whether the original order of dismissal merges into the order of the higher authority disposing of the appeal for limitation purposes?
Whether the three‑year limitation period should be measured from the date of the original dismissal or from the date of the appellate order (or six months after filing the appeal).

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. Section 20(1), s. Section 20(2), s. Section 20(3)
Code of Civil Procedures. Section 80
Limitation Act, 1963s. First Schedule Article 113, s. First Schedule Article 58

Subjects

LimitationCause of actionMerger doctrineDepartmental appealGovernment servantAdministrative Tribunals ActArticle 58Statutory appealRight to sue

Judgment

S.S. RA1HORE A
v.
STAIB OF MADHYA PRADESH

SEPlEMBER 6, 1989

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, CJ, SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, B
RANGANATH MISRA, G.L. OZA, B.C. RAY, K.N. SINGH
ANDS. NATARAJAN, JJ.)

) Limitation Act, 1963-First Schedule-Articles 58 and 113-
'When the right to sue or cause of action first accrues'-Jnterpretation
of-Held to be not from the date of original adverse order but from the C
date when the order on the statutory appeal is made or six months from
the date of preferring statutory appeal-Statutory appeals to be disposed
of expeditiously-Ordinarily a period of three to six months to be the
outer limit.

The plaintiff-appellant was dismissed from service by the Collec- D
tor on 13.1.1966. His departmental appeal was dismissed by the Divi-
sional Commissioner on 31.8.1966. Thereupon the appellant instituted
a suit on 30.1.1969 asking for a declaration that the order of dismissal
was inoperative and that he continued to be in service. The suit was
dismissed by the trial court and that order was upheld by the appellate
courts. In dismissing the suit the courts below accepted the defence plea E
that it had been filed beypnd the period of limitation prescribed there-
for under Article 58 of the first Schedule of the Limitation Act. Hence
this appeal. This appeal initially came up for hearing before a Division
Bench of this Court. At the hearing reliance was placed before a deci-
sion of this Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur &
Ors., ll959) SCR 1148 in support of the contention that the suit was F
barred by limitation. The Division Bench took the view that the decision
of this Court rendered by five Judge Bench in Sita Ram Gael's aforesaid
required reconsideration. This is how the appeal has come up before a
Seven Judge Bench. The question that fell for determination by the
Court was 'When was the right to sue first accrued' to the appellant i.e.
whether from the date when the original adverse order of dismissal was G
passed against him or when the departmental/statutory appeal was
finally disposed of. The appellant's contention is that the original order
having merged in the final order whereby his departmental appeal was
disposed of, the right to sue ace.rued from that date and on this reckon-
ing, the suit filed by him was within time.
_.J H
43
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

, Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to trial Court, this
A Court,

HELD: Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are
being exercised under the law by tribunals and other constituted
authorities. [SlH]
B
I. In respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the court is now
barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in tribunals and auth-
orities. That being the position, there is no justification for the
distinctiJ)n between courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of t
·~erger. [SlH; 52A]

c It must be held in the instant case, that the order of dismissal
made b:t the Collector did merge into the order of the Divisional Com-
missioner when the appellant's appeal was dismissed on 31.8.1966. [528]

The cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the
D public servant under the relevant service Rules as to redressal are dis-
posed of. [53B l

The cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the
original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher
authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal
E or representation is made. Where no such order is made, though
the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date
of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall
be taken_ to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first
arisen. [53H; 54A]
I·

p In every such case until the appeal or representatimf provided by
a law is disposed of, accrual of the cause of action shall first arise only
when the higher authority makes its order on appeal or representation
and where such order is not made on the expiry of six mo11ths from the
date when the appeal was filed or representation was made. [54D I

G Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authori-
ties taken an unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no
attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not
considered to be governmental business of substance. This approach
has to be deprecated and authorities on whom power is vested to dispose
of appeals and revisions under the service Rules must dispose of such
H matters as expeditiously as possible. [52G-H]
S.S. RATHORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [MISRA, J.] 45

Ordinarily, a period of three to six months shouid ·be the outer
limit. That would discipline the system and keep the public servant A
away from a protracted period of litigation. [53A)

Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur & Ors., [1959)
SCR 1148, overruled.
B
Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Government of Onssa,
[1962] Supp. 3 SCR 906, followed.

Pierce Leslie Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare & Ors.,
and vice verse, {1969) 3 SCR 203; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Muhammad
Nooh, [1958) SCR 595; Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India
Commercial Co. Ltd., [1963) 2 SCR 563; Somnath Sahu v. State of C
Orissa & Ors., [1969) 3 SCC 384; C.I. T. v. Amrit Lal Bhagilal & Co.,
[1959] SCR 713 and Raghuvir Jha v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1986)
Suppl. SCC 372, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 207 D
of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.3.1982 of the Madhya
_Pradesh High Court in Misc Civil Case No. 539 of 1981.

Ranjit Kumar and Subhash Sharma for the Appellant. E

Prithvi Raj and S.K. Agnihotri for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal is by special leave and is F
directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
by which the High Court has in second appeal upheld the dismissal of
the plaintiff's suit on the plea of limitation.

The plaintiff, a Government servant of Madhya Pradesh, was
dismissed from service by the Collector on 13th of January, 1966. He G
preferred an appeal to the Divisional Commissioner and that appeal
was dismissed on 3 LS. i966. The order of dismissal of the appeal was
communicated to the plaintiff on 19.9. 1966. The plaintiff gave notice
under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on l7 .0-.1969 and filed his
suit on 30th of September, 1969, asking for a declaration that the order
..O..~ of dismissal was inoperative and he continued to be i_n service. This H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A suit has been dismissed in the Courts below on acceptance of the
defence plea that it had not been filed within three years from the date
when the cause of action first arose, as required under Article 58 of the
First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.

When this appeal came Up for hearing before a Division Bench,
B reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sita Ram Goel v.
The Municipal Board, Kanpur & Ors., [1959] SCR 1148 in support of
the contention that the suit was barred by limitation. The Division
Bench extracted a passage from Gael's judgment where it said:

'The result is no doubt unfortunate for the appellant,
because the trial court found in his favour in regard to his
c plea of wrongful dismissal. If he had only brought the suit
within the period prescribed by section 326 of the Act, he
might possibly have got some relief from the Court. He,
however, chose to. wait till the decision of the State
Government on hts appeal and overstepped the limit of
D time to his own detriment. We are unable to come to any
other conclusion than the one reached above and the
appeal must, therefore, stand dismissed; but in the peculiar
circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs',

and observed:
E
"Such unfortunate results should be avoided, if it is possi-
ble to do so. We are of the view that the decision in Sita
Ram Gael's case which has been decided by a Bench of five
Judges requires to be reconsidered ..... "
(See 1988 Suppl. SCC 522)
F
That is how this appeal has come before the Seven Judge Bench.

The plaintiff's suit was one to obtain a declaration that the order
of dismissal was bad and he continued to be in service. To such a suit
the Courts below have rightly applied Article 58 of the First Schedule
G of the Limitation Act. That Article runs thus:

"58. To obtain any Three When the right to
other declaration. years sue first accrues."

Appellant's counsel placed before us the residuary Article 113
H and has referred to a few decisions of some High Courts where in a
_... S,S, RATHORE v.;>TATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [MISRA, J.) 47

situation as here reliance was placed on that Article. It is unnecessary
A
to refer to those decisions as on the authority of the judgment of this
Court in the case of Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony
Wapshare & Ors. vice versa, [1969] 3 SCR 203, it must be held that
Article 113 of the Act of 1963, corresponding to Article 120 of the old
Act, is a general one and would apply to sui.ts to which no other Article
in the schedule applies. B

The fate of this appeal, therefore, rests upon th.e finding as to
when the right to sue first accrued ..All the three Courts have accepted
the position that on 13. 1. 1966 when the order of dismissal was made by
the Collector, the right to sue first accrued. Admittedly, the suit was
not filed within a period of three years from that date. The appeal was
dismissed on 31.8.1966. The sixty days' time spent for complying with c
the requirement of notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was available to the plaintiff in addition to the period of three years. If
the date, therefore, counts from the date of the appellate order, the
suit would be within time.
D
In Gael's case the question of merger of the order of the lower
authority in the order of the higher authority was considered. Advert-
ing to this aspect, Bhagwati, J. who spoke for the Court, said:

"The initial difficulty in the way of the appellant,
however, is that departmental enquiries even though they E
culminate in decisions on appeals or revision cannot be
equated with proceedings before the regular courts of
law.<'

Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Noah,' [1958) SCR 595, where it has F
( been said:

an order of dismissal passed on a departmental
enquiry by an officer in the department and an order pas-
sed by another officer next higher in rank dismiSsing an
appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for G
revision by the head of the department can hardly be
equated with any propriety with decrees made in a civil suit
under the Code of Civil Procedure by the Court of first
instance and the decree dismissing the appeal therefrom by
an appeal court and the order dismissing the revision peti-
.
_,,-,._., tion by a yet higher court, ..... because the departmental H
--
-
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
·-
tribunals of the first instance or. on appeal or revision are
A
not regular courts manned by persons trained in law
although they may have the trapping of the courts of law,'

and the Court proceeded to say:

B "The analogy of the decisions of the courts of law would,
therefore, be hardly available to the appellant."

Alternately, the Court also examined the question as to whether
when the appeal of the appellate court affirming the decree of the trial
court was made, the original decree had ceased to be operative.
Bhagwati, J. quoted with approval another part of the judgment in
c Mohammad Noah's case, where it was said:

"In the next place, while it is true that a decree of a court of
first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on
appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision, it
D does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purposes
of computing the period of limitation for execution of the
decree as in Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei, 41 Indian Appeals
104, or for computing the period of limitation for an appli-
cation for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jawad
Hussain v. Cendan Singh, 53 Indian Appeals 197. But as
E pointed out by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the judg-
ment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Said v. Pirthichand
Lal, 46 Indian Appeals 52, whatever be the theory under
other systems of law, under the Indian law and procedure
an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of
an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree
F on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is nothing in
the Indian law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or
order of the court or tribunal of the first instance becomes
final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of
appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may
put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed
G or modified it remains effective.'

Bhagwati, J. then said:

"The original decree being thus operative what we are
really concerned with is the commencement of the period
._,
H of limitation as prescribed in the relevant statute and if the
S.S. RATHORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [MISRA, J.l 49

statute prescribes that it commences from the date of the
A
acrrual of the cause of action there is no getting behind
these words in spite of the apparent inequity of applying
the same."

In Mohammad Noah's case the question for consideration was
whether the impugned order in the proceedings under Article 226 of B
the Constitution before the High Court was an order prior to the
Constitution and, therefore, the High Court could not exercise its
jurisdiction or was it one pending at the commencement of the Con-
stitution and the revisional order being after the Constitution came
into force, the writ petition would be maintainable. The majority, as
also Bose, J. who otherwise differed, agreed that jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution was not retrospective. The majority c
opinion, however, was that it would not be correct to say that the order
of dismissal made on April 20, 1948, merged in the appellate order
dated May 7, 1949, and both the orders in due course merged in the
revisional order of April 22, 1950. The original of dismissal was opera-
tive on its own strength. Bose, J. however, observed: D

''I see no reason why any narrow or ultra technical
restrictions should be placed on them. Justice should, in my
opinion, be administered in our Courts in a common-sense
liberal way and be broad-based on human values rather
than on narrow and restricted consideratioins hedged E
round with hairsplitting technicalities ..... The final order
was passed after the Consiitution on April 22, 1950. It is
true that if it had been passed before the Constitution came
into force on January 26, 1950, the petitioner would have
had no remedy in the. Courts. But the Constitution brea-
thed fresh life into this land and conferred precious rights F
and privileges that were not there before. Why should they
be viewed narrowly? Why should not that which would
have been regarded as still pending for present purposes, if
all had been done after the Constitution, be construed in
any different way when the final act, which is the decisive
one for these purposes, was done after it?" G

The problem in Mohammad Nooh's case, therefore, was different
from what was for consideration in Goel's case.

In Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Government of
Orissa, [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 906, a Constitution bench of this Court was H
'50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
,,._,--
'·examining the correctness of the finding of the High Court that it had
A no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Con-
stitution as· the revisional order was that of Government of India
located outside its .territorial jurisdiction. Rungta's case took into con-
sideration the judgment in Mohammad Nooh's case and stated:

B "We are of opinion that the principle of Mohammad
Nooh's case cannot apply in the circumstances of the pre-
sent case. The question there was whether the High Court
could issue a writ under Art. 226 in respect of a· dismissal
which was effective from 1948, simply because the revision
against the order of dismissal was dismissed by the State
Government in April, 1950 after the Constitution came
into force. It was in these circumstances that this Court
held that the dismissal having taken place in 1948 could not
be the subject-matter of an application under Art. 226 of
the Constitution for that would be giving retrospective
effect to that Article. The argument that the order of dis-
missal merged in the order passed in appeal therefrom and
in the final order of revision was repelled by this Court on
two grounds. It was held, firstly, that the principle of
merger applicable to decrees of courts would not apply to
orders of departmental tribunals, and, secondly, that the
original order of dismissal would be operative on its own
strength and did not gain greater efficacy by the subsequent
order of dismissal of the appeal or revision, and therefore,
I. the order of dismissal having been passed before the Con-
stitution would not be open to attack under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. We are of opinion that the facts in Mohd.
Nooh's case were of a special kind and the reasoning in that
f. case would not apply to the facts of the present case."

The view expressed by Wanchoo, J. in Rungta's case meets with our
approval. In Rungta's case this Court ultimately held that the order of
the State Government had merged into the order of the Central
· Government and the High Court was, therefore, right in its view that it
<IJ, had no jurisdiction.
'. The next Constitution Bench decision of this Court is that of
Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd.,
I 1963] 2· SCR 563 where this Court observed:
,
>
"The question, therefore, turns on whether the order of
- S.S. RATHORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [MISRA, J.}

the original authority becomes merged in the order of the
51

A
appellate authority even where the appellate authority
merely dismisses the appeal without any modification of
the order of the original authority. It is obvious that when
an appeal is made, the appellate authority can do one of
three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order. under
appeal, (ii) it may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely B
dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the order without any
modification. It is not disputed that in the first two cases
where the order of the original authority is either reversed
or modified it is the order of the appellate authority which
is the operative order and if the High Court has no jurisdic-
tion to issue a writ to the appellate authority it cannot issue
a writ to the original authority. The question therefore is
c
wht;ther there is any difference between these two cases
and the third case where the appellate authority dismisses
the appeal and thus confirms the order of the original
authority. It seems to. us that on principle it is difficult to
draw a distinction between the first two kinds of orders D
passed by the appellate authority and the third kind of
order passed by it. In all these three cases after the appel-
late authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative
order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has
reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it.
In law; the appellate order of confirmation is quite as E
efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of
reversal or modification." ·

A 3-Judge Bench decision in the case of Somnath Sahu v. The
State of Orissa & Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 384 is an authority in support of
the position as accepted by the two Constitution Bench judgments F
referred to above. There, it was held in the case of a service dispute
that the original order merged in. the appellate order of the State
Government and it is the appellate decision which subsisted and
became operative in law and was capable of enforcement. That judg-
meni relied upon another decision of this Court in support of its view
being C./. T. v. Amrit Lal Bhagilal & Co., [1959] SCR 713. G

The distinction adopted in Mohammad Noah's case between a
court and a tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is
one without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily
vested in courts are being exercised under the law by tribm1als and
other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes the H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1989] Supp. I S.C.R.

A jurisdiction of the court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdic-
tion in tribunals and authorities. That being the position, we see no
justification for the distinction between courts and tribunals in regard
to the principle of merger. On the authority of the precedents indi-
cated, it must be held that the order of dismissal made by the Collector
did merge into the order of the Divisional Commissioner when the
B appellant's appeal was dismissed on 31.8.1966.

In several States the Conduct Rules for Government servants
require the administrative remedies to be exhausted before the disci-
. plinary orders can be challenged in court. Section 20(1) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides:
c . "20(1). A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application
unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of aII the
remedies available to him under the relevant sen/ice rules
as to redressal of grievances."

D The Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings do provide for an
appeal against the orders of punishment imposed on public servants.
Some Rules provide even a second appeal or a revision. The purport of
s. 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is to give effect to the Disci-
plinary Rules and the exhaustion of the remedies available thereunder
is a condition precedent to maintaining of claims under the Adminis-
E trative Tribunals Act. Administrative Tribunals have been set up for
Government servants of the Centre and several States have already set
up such Tribunals under the Act for the employees of the respective
States. The law is soon going to get crystaIIised on the line laid down
under s. 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

F In this background if the original order of punishment is taken as
the date when cause of action first accrues for purposes of Article 58 of
the Limitation Act, great hardship is bound to result. On one side, the
claim would not be maintainable if laid before exhaustion of the
remedies; on the other, if the departmental remedy though availed is
not finalised within the period of limitation, the cause of action would
G no more be justiciable having become barred by limitation. Redressal
of grievances in the hands of the departmental authorities take an
unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no attention is
ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not considered to
be governmental business of substance. This approach has to be depre-
cated and authorities on whom power is vested to dispose of appeals
H and revisions under the Service Rules must dispose of such matters as • -.l
S.S. RATHORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (MISRA, J.] 53

expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, a period of three to six months A
should be the outer limit. That would discipline the system and keep
the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation.

We are satisfied that to meet the situation as has arisen here, it
would be appropriate to hold that the cause of action first arises when
the remedies available to the public serVant under the relevant service B
Rules as to redressal are disposed of.

The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of
one appeal or ·the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been pro-
vided. Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-ss. (2)
and (3) of s. 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been
laid down:
c
"20(2). For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall
be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to
him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of
grievances, D

(a) if a final order has been made by the Government
or other authority or officer or other person competent to
pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal pre-
ferred or representation made by such person in connec-
tion with the grievances; or E

(b) where no final order has been made by the Gov-
ernment or other authority or officer or other person com-
petent to pass such order with regard to the appeal prefer-
red or representation made by such person, if a period of
six months from the date on which such appeal was prefer- F
red or representation was made has expired.

(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any
remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a
memorial to the President or the Governor of a State or to
any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the G
remedies which are available unless the applicani had
elected to submit such memorial."

We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise
not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when
the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided H
.....
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such
A
order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months'
period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the
representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall
: be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this
principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not
B been provided by law. Repeated 4nsuccessful representations not pro-
vided by law are not governed by this principle.

It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation
under s. 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-section (1) has
prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and
power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been
c vested under sub-section (3). The Civil Court's jurisdiction has been
taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as Government servants
are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special
limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tri-
bunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58.
D
It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform.
Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation
provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and
where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the
date when the appeal was.filed or representation was made, the right
E to sue shall first accrue.

Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the
establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of
fixing limitation.

F In view of what we have said above, Gael's case must be taken to
have not been correctly decided.

Reliance was placed by appellant's learned counsel on a recent
decision of a Two Judge Bench in the case of Raghubir Jha v. State of
Bihar & Ors., [1986] Suppl. SCC 372. The conclusion reached is in
G accord with what we have held but the legal position was not at all
referred to or examined. It is unnecessary to make any further refer-
ence to that judgment.

Now coming to the facts of the present appeal. Since the claim
has been dismissed on the plea of limitation and our conclusion is that
H the suit was within time, the judgments of the trial Court, the First
S.S. RATHORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [MISRA, J.] 55

Appellate Court and the High Court are set aside and the matter fs A
remitted to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. Too
long a period has now intervened between the dismissal of the suit ~nd
our order of remand. We, therefore, direct the learned trial Judge to
take all effective steps open to him in law to ensure that the suit is
disposed of finally before the 15th of December, 1989. Costs shall
abide the event. B

Y. Lal. Appeal allowed .
...,•

.'

I

•