Holding

The proviso to Section 8 of the 1962 Act does not divest the vested right of the tenant under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, and Section 32‑0 is inapplicable.

Summary

The appellant, a hereditary watandar, claimed that the tenant's notice to purchase the land under Section 32‑G of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was invalid because it was not served within one year as required by Section 32‑0, and that the proviso to Section 8 of the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Office) Act, 1962 gave only prospective effect, thereby divesting the tenant's vested right under Section 32. The Supreme Court held that both statutes must be read harmoniously; the proviso merely postpones the operation of the 1962 Act and does not extinguish the vested right created by the legal fiction of Section 32. Consequently, Section 32‑0 does not apply and the tenant's right to purchase remains vested. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 32‑0 of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 to the tenant's notice of purchase.
Whether the proviso to Section 8 of the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Office) Act, 1962 gives only prospective effect, thereby nullifying the vested right under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act.

Legislation cited

Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948s. 2(2), s. 2(8), s. 2(9), s. 31, s. 32, s. 32-0, s. 32-G

Subjects

tenancy lawagricultural landsvested rightlegal fictionSection 32Section 32-0proviso interpretationretrospective effectlandlord-tenantBombay Tenancy ActMaharashtra Revenue Patels Act

Judgment

A
SADASHIV DADA PATIL
v.

- PURSHOTTAM ONKARPATIL (D) BY LRS.

SEPTS:MBER 29, 2006
B
[S.B.SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.]

Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948-Sections 2(2),
2(8), 2(9), 31, 32, 32-G and 32-0-Tenancy Act conferring certain statutory
rights upon tenant-Section 8 of 1962 Act making existing tenancy law C
applicable in respect of watan /and-Landlord contending that Section 8
• read with proviso appended thereto provides only prospective effect-Held,
provisions of both the Acts are required to be construed harmoniously-
Proviso may create an exception but ordinarily does not create a right or
takes away a vested or accrued right-'-Proviso appended to Section 8 of D
1962 Act has limited role to play and does not create any right in favour
of the landlord nor does it take away vested right of the tenant conferred
under the Tenancy Act-Proviso merely postponed operation of the statute-
Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Office) Act, 1962-lnterpretation
of Statutes.
E
Ancestors qf appellant were seized and possessed of watait lands and
were known as Watandars and land was cla~silied as 'Patil Inam Land of Class
VI. 8'. Ancestor of respondent was inducted as tenant. Respondent served
notice upon appellant-landlord expressing his desire to pay the purchase price
ofland in terms of Section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands
Act, 1948. Tehsildar dropped proceedings opining that notice had not been F
given within one year from date thereof as contemplated under Section 32-0
thereof. Respondent filed appeal and Appellate Authority opined that
provisions of Section 32-0 of the Tenancy Act were not applicable and tenant.
was entitled to purchase the tenanted land in terms of Section 32-G thereof.
·Revision application filed by appellant before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal G
was allowed. Respondent filed writ petition challenging the order -OfTribunal
which was allowed and Single Judge held that Section 32-0 of the Tenancy
Act was not applicable. Letters Patent Appeal preferred by appellant was ·
dismissed by Division Bench. Renee the present appeal.

843 H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Appellant contended that High Court committed error in holding that
Section 32-0 of the Tenancy Act was not applicable ; and that Section 8 of
Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Office) Act, 1962 must be read
with the proviso appended thereto and so construed the same gives only

B
prospective effect to Section 8.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD :1.1. Indisputably, the rights and obligations of the parties were
-
governed by the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act. Section 31
thereof entitled the watandar to serve a notice upon the tenant to hand over
vacant possession to him of the tenanted land, if the land was required for one
C or the other purposes mentioned therein. Such a notice was to be served on
or before 31.12.1956. It is not contended that Respondent was served with
such a notice. No proceeding was initiated before 31.3.1957. The tenancy,
therefore, continued. (850-E, F, GI f

1.2. If a person remained a tenant on 1.4.1957, by reason of the legal
D fiction created under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, he would be deemed to
have purchased the land from his landlord, free from all encumbrances
subsisting thereon on the said date. Section 32-G thereof, on the other hand,
casts an obligation on the Tribunal. The Tribunal is required to publish or
cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form calling upon the
tenants who under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act are deemed to have purchased
E the land. Section 32-0 contains a no11-obstante clause providing
notwithstanding any agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating
personally would be entitled within one year from the commencement of such
tenancy to purchase from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof
as will raise the holding of the tenant to the ceiling area.·
F (850-G, H; 851-A-BI

2. Section 8 of the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Office)
Act, 1962 provides that the rights and liabilities of the holder of such land
and his tenant or tenants shall, subject to the provisions of the said part, be
governed by the provisions of the tenancy law. (851-B, q
G
3.1. The provisions of both the Acts are required to be construed
harmoniously. They have to be construed keeping in view the purport and
object, they seek to achieve. Section 32 of the Tenancy Act confers an absolute
right to the tenant. As in 1957 the right of the respondent to purchase the
land became a vested right, proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act
H could not be read to mean that such right stood divested. Proviso appended to
SADASHIVDADA PATIL1·. PURSHOTTAMONKARPATIL(D)BYLRS. 845
Section 8 refers to the application 'of the provisions of the relevant tenancy A
laws as the same does not abrogate a vested right. Proviso, it is well known,
has a limited role to play. It may create an exception. It ordinarily does not
create a right or takes away a vested or accrued right. Proviso to Section 8
of the 1962 Act, does not take away a vested right conferred under the Tenancy
Act. The proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act merely postponed the
operation of the statute. Fixation of price of the land in question subject to B
exercise of option by the tenant was to that extent beneficial to the landlord;
but the same would not mean that legal fiction created under Section 32 of
the Tenancy Act would stand effaced. [851-E-G; 852-A-B)
3.2. 31.3.1957 was the cut-off date. A statutory right was conferred upon
the tenant. The said right was created to fulfil the object that the tiller should C
become the owner; but thereby the landlord was not to be deprived of the price
of the land. Section 32-0 of the Tenancy Act would not be attracted, only
because proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act provides for a new
date. For the said purpose, it was not necessary to make any amendment in
the Tenancy Law in view of the fact that the relevant provisions of the Tenancy D
Act were made part of the 1962 Act. It is not a case where the Tenancy Act
was required to be made applicable with retrospective effect, as proviso
appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act was to be read in the light of Section
32-G and Section 32-0 of the Tenancy Act. Proviso appended to Section 8 of
the 1962 Act has limited role to play. Proviso to Section 8 of the 1962 Act,
therefore, should be interpreted accordingly. It did not create any right in E
favour of the landlord nor did it take away the right of the tenant.
[852-C-D; 853-Al

S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR (1985) SC 582 and Swedish
Match AB and Anr. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, [2004) II SCC p
641, referred to.

4. It would not be correct to contend that only because Section 31 of the
Tenancy Act gives an option to the landlord to terminate the tenancy and take
possession of the land, Section 32-0 thereof had been given a retrospective
effect. The legal fiction created under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act cannot G
be given a limited meaning. A legal fiction, as is well known, must be given
its full effect. By giving the effect to the legal fiction created in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the same is not extended beyond the scope thereof.
[853-A-B; H; 854-AI
Ashok Leyland Ltd v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2004) 3 SCC t, H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. P. Kesavan & Anr., (2004) 9 SCC 772
and Maruti Udyog Ltd v. Ram la/ and Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 638, referred to.

East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951 J ALL
ER 587, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4334 of2006.
B
From the final Judgment and Order dated 22. 1.2003 of the High Court
of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in LP.A. No. 54 of 2003.

Uday B. Dube, R.K. Pandey and Kuldip Singh for the Appellant.
C Shivaji M. Jadhav and Himanshu Gupta for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
The ancestors of Appellant were seized and possessed of watan lands.
D They were known as Watandars and the land was classified in the record of
rights as Patil lnam Land of Class VIB. The ancestor of Respondent was
inducted as a tenant in Survey Nos. 208/1 and 208/2 of Village Yaval in the
District of Jalgaon, State of Maharashtra.
The erstwhile State of Bombay enacted the Bombay Tenancy &
E Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, "the Tenancy Act"). The Tenancy
Act was enacted to amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands
and to make certain other provisions in regard thereto. By reason of the said
provisions having regard to the economic and social conditions of peasants
and for ensuring full and efficient use of land for agriculture, it was considered
expedient to assume management of estates held by landholders and to
F regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling
houses, sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by
agriculturalists, agricultural labourers and artisans in the Province of Bombay
and to make provisions for certain other purposes thereinafter appearing.
G The Tenancy Act came into force with effect from 02.04.1940.
"Landholder" has been defined in Section 2(9) thereof to mean :
"Landholder'' means a zamindar, jahagirdar, saranjamdar, inamdar,
talukdar, malik or a khot or any person not hereinbefore specified who
is a holder of land or who is interested in land, and whom the State
Government has declared on account of the extent and value of the
H
land or his interests therein to be a landholder for the purposes of this
SADASHIV DADA PATIL 1·. PURSHOITAM ON KAR PATIL(D)BY LRS. (SINHA,J.J 847
Act;" A
"Agriculturist" has been defined in Section 2(2) of the Tenancy Act to
mean a person who cultivates land personally. The words "to cultivate" with
... grammatical variation and cognate expressions mean to till or husband the
land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce, whether by
manual or labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any B
agricultural operation thereon; and the expression "uncultivated" is to be
construed correspondingly. The expression "to cultivate personally" is further
defined in Section 2(6) of the Tenancy Act to mean :

"2(6) "to cul:ivate personally" means to cultivate land on one's own
ac~ount - c
(i) by one's own labour, or
(ii) by the labour of any member of one's family or
(iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of
one's family, by hired labour or by servants on wages payable D
in cash or kind but not in crop share, being land, the entire area
of which-
(a) is situate within the limits of a single village, or

(b) is so sitilated that no piece of land is separated from E
another by a distance of more than five miles, or
(c) forms one compact block :

Provided that the restrictions contained in clauses (a) (b) and (c) shall
not apply to any land, - F
(i) which does not exceed twice the ceiling area,
(ii) upto twice the ceiling area, if such land exceeds twice the
ceiling area.
Explc.nation I. A widow or a minor, or a person who is subject to G
physical or mental disability or a serving member of the armed forces
shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if such land is
t
cultivated by servants, or by hired labour, or through tenants.
Explanation II. In the case of a joint family, the land shall be deemed
to have been cultivated personally if it is cultivated by any member H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A of such family."

Section 31 of the Tenancy Act empowers a landlord to terminate a
tenancy after giving notice and making an application for possession as
provided for in sub-section (2) thereof, if the same is required by him, inter

B
:ilia, for cultivating purposes. However, such option could be exercised in the
manner required under sub-section (2), in terms whereof notices were to be
•
....
served by 31.12.1956.

Section 32 of the Tenancy Act provides for an option to the tenants to
purchase the land in their possession, which reads as under :

c "32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers' day. - (!)On
the first day of April, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the tillers day)
every tenant shall subject to the other provisions of this section and
the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have
purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting
thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if, -
D
(a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land
personally;
(b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land
leased personally; and
E (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy
under section 3 I ; or
(ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has
not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before t~e 31" day of March
1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or
F
(iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the
grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy
but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31" day
of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the
lands :
G
Provided that if an application made by the landlord under section
29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the
Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the
,
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the
tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on
H which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the
SADASHIV DADA PATIL 1·. PURSHOITAM ON KAR PATIL(D) BY LRS. [SINHA,J.] 849
final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as "the A
postponed date" :

Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to
the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 31 shall be
deemed to have purchased the land on the I" day of April 1958, if no
separation of his share has been effected before the date mentioned B
in that proviso."

The said provision was amended by Maharashtra Act IX of 1961. The
amended provision also indicates that the statutory scheme is that the legal
fiction contained therein enures to the benefit of the tiller of the land. It
provides for the right to purchase in favour of a tenant who had.also been C
evicted subject to the conditions laid down therefor.

By reason of the said provision, a legal fiction is created which must
be given full effect.

The State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Revenue Patels D
(Abolition of Office) Act, 1962 (for short, "the 1962 Act'). The watan land was
defined to mean the land forming part ofwatan property. Section 3 of the 1962
Act provides for abolition of pate! watans together with incidents thereof.
Section 8 thereof makes the existing tenancy law applicable in respect of the
watan land which has been lawfully leased and subsisted on the appointed E
day.

Respondent herein served a notice upon his landlord expressing his
desire to pay the purchase price of the land in terms of Section 32-G of the
Tenancy Act. The Tehsildar opined that as the tenancy commenced on the
date of re-grant, the tenant ought to have given a notice within one year from F
the date thereof as contemplated under Section 32-0 thereof; and as such a
notice had not been given, the proceedings were dropped by order dated
31.01.1984. An appeal thereagainst was filed by Respondent and by an order
dated 19 .11.1985, the Appellate Authority opined that the provisions of Section
32-0 of the Tenancy Act were not applicable and the tenant was entitled to
purchase the tenanted land in terms of Section 32-G thereof. G
., • The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was thereafter approached by
Appellant herein by filing a revision application which was marked as Tenancy
Appeal No. 3 of 1986. The said revision application was allowed.
H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A A writ petition questioning the legality and/or validity of the said order
was filed by Respondent. A learned Single Judge by an order dated 22.11.2002
opined that the provisions of Section 32-0 were not applicable. The learned
Single Judge in arriving at the said decision, followed an earlier judgment of
the Bombay High Court in Kallawwa Shattu Patil and Ors. v. Yallappa ,..
Parasharam Patil and Anr., (1992) Mh. L J. 34.
B
A Letters Patent Appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed. The Division
Bench in arriving at its findings, inter aha, opined that as Appellant did not
exercise the remedy of eviction of tenant available under the Bombay Hereditary
Offices Act, 1874 (for short, the 1874 Act') he was neither entitled for re-grant
of the land in question under the 1962 Act nor was he entitled to seek
c possession thereof.

Mr. Uday B. Dube, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Appellant,
would submit that the Division Bench committed a serious error in relying .
upon the provisions of the 1874 Act, which had no application in the facts
D and circumstances of the present case. It was further submitted that the High
Court also committed a manifest error in relying upon Kallawwa Shattu
Patil 's case (supra) to hold that the provisions of Section 32-0 were not
applicable. Section 8 of the 1962 Act, the learned counsel would contend,
must be read with the proviso appended thereto and so construed, the same
might have been held to give only prospective effect.
E
Mr. Himanshu Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent,
on the other hand, submitted that keeping in view the purport, and object of
the Act, the decision of the High Court cannot be faulted.

Indisputably, the rights and obligations of the parties were governed by
F the Tenancy Act. Section 3 1 thereof entitled the watandar to serve a notice
upon the tenant to hand Jver vacant possession to him of the tenanted land,
if the land was required for one or the other purposes mentioned therein. Such
a notice was to be served on or before 31.12.1956. It is not contended that
Respondent was served with such a notice. No proceeding was initiated
G before 31.3.1957. The tenancy, therefore, continued.
First day of April, 1957 was declared to be the "tillers day'. If a person
remained a tenant on the said date, by reason of the legal fiction created ..
under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, he would be deemed to have purchased
the land from his landlord, free from all enwmbrances subsisting thereon on
.-
H the said day. Section 32-G thereof, on the other hand, casts an obligation on
SADASHIVDADA PATIL 1·. PURSHOTTAM ONKAR PATIL(D) BY LRS. [SINHA,J.) 851

the Tribunal. The Tribunal is required to publish or cause to be published a A
public notice in the prescribed form calling upon the tenants who under
Section 32 of the Tenancy Act are deemed to have purchased the land.
Section 32-0 contains a non-obstante clause providing notwithstanding any
agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating personally would be
entitll!d within one year from the commencement of such tenancy to purchase
from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof as will raise the B
holding of the tenant to the ceiling area.

Section 8 of the 1962 Act, as noticed hereinbefore, provides that the
rights and liabilities of the holder of such land and his tenant or tenants shall,
subject to the provisions of the said part, be governed by the provisions of C
the that law. The proviso appended hereto whereupon reliance has been
placed by Mr. Dube reads as under :

"Provided that, for the purposes of application of the provisions
of the relevant tenancy law in regard to the compulsory purchase of
land by a tenant, the lease shall be deemed to have commenced from D
the date of the re-grant of the land under section 5 or 6 or 9, as the
case maybe.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section the expression
"land" shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in the relevant ·
tenancy law." E
·The provisions of both the Acts are required to be construed
harmoniously. They have to be construed keeping in view the purport and
object; they seek to achieve.

Section 32 of the Act confers an absolute right to the tenant. p
As in 1957 the right of the respondent to purchase the land became a
vested right, proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act could not be read
to mean that such right stood divested. Proviso appended to Section 8 refers
to the application of the provisions of the relevant tenancy laws as the same
does 11ot 11brogate a vested right. Proviso, it is well known, has a limited role G
to play. It may create an exception. It ordinarily does not create a right or takes
away a vested or accrued right. Proviso to Section 8 of the 1962 Act, in our
considered opinion, does not take away a vested right conferred under the
Tenancy Act.

H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A By construing beth the Acts harmoniously, the High Court in our
opinion. did not make a new law. It merely interpreted the same in the light
of the object of the Act. The proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act
merely postponed the operation of the statute. Fixation of price of the land
in question subject to exercise of option by the tenant was to that extent
beneficial to the landlord; but the same would not mean that legal fiction
B created under 32 of the Tenancy Act would stand effaced.

We have noticed hereinbefore that 31.03.1957 was the cut-off date. A
statutory right was conferred upon the tenant. The said right was created to
fulfill the object that the tiller should become the owner; !Jut thereby the
C landlord was not to be deprived of the price of the land. Section 32-0 of the
Tenancy Act would not be attracted, only because proviso appended to
Section 8 of the 1962 Act provides for a new date. For the said purpose, it
was not necessary to make any amendment in the Tenancy Act in view of the
fact that the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act were made ;;an of the
1962 Act. It is not a case where the Tenancy Act was required to be made
D applicable with retrospective effect, as proviso appended to Section 8 of the
1962 Act was to be read in the light of Section 32-G and Section 32-0 of the
Tenancy Act. Proviso appended to Section 8 of the 1962 Act has a limited
role to play.

In S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR ( 1985) SC 582, a three-
E Judge Bench of this Court held that a proviso may serve four different
purposes, namely:

(I) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;

(2) it may entirely change the very concept of tne intendment of the
F enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled
in order to make the enactment workable;

(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral
pan of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the
substantive enactment itself; and
G
(4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the
enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the
statutory provision."

(See also Swedish Match AB and Anr. v. Securities & Exchange Board of
H India and Anr., [2004] l I sec 641.
SADASHIV DADA PATIL r. PURSHOTTAM ON KAR PATIL (D) BY LRS. [SINHA,!.) 853
Proviso to Section 8 of 1962 Act, therefore, should be interpreted A
accordingly. It did not create any right in favour of the landlord nor did it take
away the right of the tenant. lt would not be correct to contend that only
because Section 31 of ttie Tenancy Act gives an option to the landlord to
terminate the tenancy and take the possession of the land, Section 32-0
thereof had been given a retrospective effect. The legal fiction created under. B
Section 32 of the Tenancy Act cannot be given a limited meaning. A legal
fiction, as is well known, must be given its full effect.

In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952)
AC 109 - [1951] 2 All ER 587, it was held:

"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you C
must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the
consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had
" in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.
One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.
The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it D
does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your
imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of
that state of affairs."

The said decision has been quoted with approval by this Court in many
decisions. (See Ashok Leyland ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [2004] 3 E
SCC 1 and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. P. Kesavan & Anr., [2004]
9 sec 772.J

Mr. Dubey relied upon a decision ofthis Court in Maruti Udyog Ltd.
v. Ram Lal and Ors., [2005] 2 SCC 638 wherein this Court opined:
F
"In construing a legal fiction the purpose for which it is created
should be kept in mind and should not be extended beyond the scope
thereof or beyond the language by which it is created. Furthermore,
it is well known that a deeming provision cannot be pushed too far
so as to result in an anomalous or absurd position. The court must
remind itself that the expressions like "as if are adopted in law for a G
limited purpose and there cannot be any justification to extend the
same beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted it."

By giving the effect to the legal fiction created in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the same is not extended beyond the scope H
854 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A thereof. It has not been pushed too far, as was the case therein.

We fail to see as to how giving effect to both the provisions of the
· ·Acts; anomalous or absurd result would ensue.
. .
For the reasons aforementioned, we, with respect, agree with the findi_ngs
B of the High Court. However, keeping in view our findings aforementioned, it
is not necessary to consider the implication of the provisions of the 1874 Act.
The Appea~ therefore, is devoid of any merits, which is dismissed accordingly.
No costs. ·

A.K.T. Appeal dismissed.·
c
.

/~-·