Holding

A complaint filed within one month, computed by excluding the first day and including the last, is timely under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Summary

The appellants issued cheques that bounced, and the respondent served a notice demanding payment on 29 September 1995. Under Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the appellants had 15 days to pay, which expired on 14 October 1995, giving rise to a cause of action on 15 October 1995. The respondent filed a criminal complaint on 15 November 1995, and the appellants argued that the complaint was filed beyond the one‑month period prescribed by Section 142(b). The Supreme Court applied the well‑settled rule that the first day is excluded and the last day included when computing a period, as reflected in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Consequently, the one‑month period was counted from 16 October 1995, making the 15 November filing timely. The Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the complaint was within the statutory period.

Issues considered

Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must be filed within one month from the date the cause of action arises, and how that period is to be computed.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 9
Limitation Act, 1963s. 12(1), s. 12(2)
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138, s. 142

Subjects

cheque bouncesection 138section 142complaint filing periodcause of actiontime computationGeneral Clauses ActLimitation Actcriminal law

Judgment

SAKETH INDIA LTD. AND ORS. A
v.
INDIA SECURITIES LTD.

MARCH 10, 1999

(KT. THOMAS AND M.B: SHAH, JJ.] B

Criminal Law :

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 : Sections 138 proviso (c) and
142(b)-Cl1eque-Bouncing of--Complaint against-:-Filing of-Period of C
limitation for-Computation of-ModC--Cause of action-Arising of-Date
of-Notice demanding payment se1ved on drawer-HELD, the date on which
the cause of action arises is to be executed-Rules followed-Adopted
in-Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897-Ss. 12( 1) & 12(2) of Limitation
Act, 1963.
D
Cheques issued by the appellants in favour of the respondent bounced
when presented for encashment as per the bank endorsement. The respon-
dent served a notice demanding payment, on the drawer on 29.9.1995.As per
Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 the appellants were
required to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice,
which period expired on i.e. on or before 14.10.1995. E

Since the appellant failed to make the payment within stipulated time,
the respondent filed complaints against the appellants on 15.11.1995 before
the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who issued the process
against the appellants. The petitions filed by the appellants for quashing the F
aforesaid process were dismissed by the High Court. Hence these appeals.

On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the complaints were
not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose
under Section 138(c) of the Act and, therefore, the complaints filed on
15.11.1995 were beyond time. G

Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1. Where a particular time is given from a certain date
within which an act is to be done, the day on that day is to be excluded; the
effect of defining period from such a day until such a day within which an H
,
963
964 S_UPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

-A act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. There
is no reason for n_ot adopting this Rule which is consistently followed and
which is adopted in the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the Limitation Act,
1963._ [967-B; 968-D]

1.2. Applying the aforesaid Rule, the period of one months for filing
B the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day
on which the period of15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the
drawer expires. Period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14.10.1995.
So cause of action for filing the complaint would arise from 15.10.1995. That
day (15.10.1995) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month.
C Therefore, the complaint filed on 15.11.1995 is within time. [968-E]

Ham Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 1 SCC 639, relied on.

- Goldsmith Co. v. The West Metropolitan Railway Co., [1904] KB 1;
Cmtwright v. Macconnack, [1963] 1 All ER 11; MaJTen v. Dawson Bentley &
D Co. Ltd., [1961] 2 QB 135; Stewmt v. Chadman, [1951] 2 KB 792 and /11 re:
Nmth, Ex pmte. Was luck (1895] 2 QB 264, cited._

Halsbwy's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 37 pp 92 and 95, referred
to.

E CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal
Nos. 288-289 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9.97 of the Karnataka High
Court in Crl.i>. No. 2152 of 1996.

G. Umapathy and Rakesh K. Sharma for the Appellants.
F
Mohit Mathur for Subramonium Prasad for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted.
G
The short question involved in these appeals is whether the com-
plaint filed by the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act is within or beyond time as it is contended that it is not filed
within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under
clause ( c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
H (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
/

SA.KEIB IND.IA LTD. v. INDIA SECURITIES LTD. [SHAH,J.] 965
_..
In the present case, cheques dated 15th and 16th March, 1995 issued A
by the appellants bounced when presented for encashment as per the bank
endorsement. Notices WP,re served on the accused on 29th September,
1995. As per section 138 (c) accused were required to make payment of
I I
the said amount of money within 15 days. The accused failed to pay the
said amount, hence the cause of action for filing the complaint arose from
15th October, 1995. Complaints were filed on 15th November, 1995. There-
B
fore, it is contended that complaints were filed beyond time. Accused
petitioners approached the High Court by filing petition under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing and setting aside the process
issued by the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore.
Those petitions were rejected by the High Court by common order and c
Judgment dated 25th September, 1997. Hence, these appeals.

For appreciating the contention raised by the learned Counsel for
the appellants, it would be necessary to reproduce sections 138 and 142 of
.... the Act which are as under:-
D
"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the
account. -- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of
money to another person from out of that account for the dis-
charge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned E
by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money stand-
ing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque
or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall
'> •
be deemed to have committed an ·offence and shall, without F
prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with
fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with
both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply G
unless:-
j
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period
of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the
, period of its validity, whichever is earlier; H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the
case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount
of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
within fifteen days of receipt of information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
B ( c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the
said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the
holder in ·due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the
receipt of the said notice.

c 142. Cognizance of offences --Notwithstanding anything con-
tained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,(1973),--

(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by
the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the
D
cheque;

· (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on
which the cause of action arises under clause( c) of the proviso to
Section 138;
E
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable
under Section 138."

F Afore-quoted Section 138 of the Act inter alia provides that where
any cheque drawn by a person is returned by the Bank unpaid, such person
shall be deemed· to have committed an offence, however, it will apply, if
conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. Section 142
further provides that Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
under Section 138 on a written complaint made by the payee or the holder
G in due course, if such complaint is filed within one month of the date on
which the cause of action arises. A month is to be reckoned according to
the British Calendar as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. The
question would be whether for calculating the period of one month which
is prescribed under Section 142 (b), the period has to be reckoned by
H excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?
SAKE1H INDIA LTD. v. INDIA SECURITIES LTD. [SHAH, J.] 967

Similar contention was considered by this Court in the case of Haru A
Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein it was held
that the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from
a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that day is to
be excluded; the effect of defining period from such a day until such a day
within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include
the last day. In the context of that case, the Court held that in computing
B
the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February
5th, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirm-
ing the detention order and continuing the detention thereunder had to be
made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5th
has to be excluded; so done, the order of confirmation dated May 5th, 1971 c
was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the
date of detention. The Court held that there is no reason why the aforesaid
rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not be
applied. For the aforesaid principle Court referred to the principle fol-
lowed in English Courts. The relevant discussion is hereunder:-
D
"These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction
between a term created within which an act may be done and a
time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established
that where a particular time is given from a certain date within
which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. E
(See Goldsmith Company v. The West Metropolitan Railway Com-
pany, 1904 KB 1 at 5) This rule was followed in Cartwnight v.
Maccormack, (1963) 1 All ER 11 at 13, where the expression
"fifteen days from the commencement of the policy" in a cover note
issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the F
first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day,
and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135,
a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of
employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limita-
tion the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action,
was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman, [1951) 2 KB 792 and G
In re North, Ex parte Wasluck (1895) 2 QB 264.) Thus, as a general
role the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day
within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to
include the last day. (See Hallsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.),
Vol.37, pp.92 and 95.) There is no reason why the aforesaid rule H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A of construction followed consistently and for so long should not
also be applied here."

The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period
is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section12 (1) and (2) of the Limitation
Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period
B of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such
period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provision is made in
sub- section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also
incorporated in Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter-alia,
provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the
C General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the
first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from',
and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other
period of time, to use the word 'to'.

Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the
D aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the
General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the
time, the rule .observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last..
Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint
will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the
E period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer,
expires. Period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14th October,
1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15th October,
1995. That day(15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of
one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The result would
be that the complaint filed on 15th November is within time.
F
Hence, the appeals are dismissed.

v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.