SAKURUversusTANAJI

                                                              109


                                                                    A
                            SAKURU
                               v.
                             TANAJI
                           JULY 10, 1985
                                                                    B
      · [V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]

      Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act 1950, Section 90 and 91 Appeal or revison under the Act
- Condonation of delay in filing of - Section 5 Limitation Act
1963 - Whether applicable.                                          C

      The Revenue Divisional Officer declared the Respondent to
be the owner of an extent of about 6 acres of land under section
38E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricul-
tural Lands Act, 1950 on the ground that he was a 'protected
tenant'. Though an appeal lay to the Collector against this         D
order under section 90 of the Act, the appellant-land-holder did
not file an appeal but preferred a Writ Petition to the High
Court which was dismissed by a learned single Judge. The deci-
sion of the learned single Judge was confirmed in writ appeal by
a Division Bench.

      Long thereafter, the appellant preferred an appeal before     E
the District Collector purporting to be one filed against the
order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, together with an appli-
cation for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. That application and the appeal were opposed by the
Respondent· but the objections were overruled, the delay was
condoned and the appeal was allowed by the Collector.               F

      The Respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid order pre-·
ferred a Revision Petition to the High Court under section 91 of
the Act. A Single Judge following,the Division Beneh ruling in
LVenka!ah and others v. K. Venkateswara Hao & Anr. A.I.R. 1978
A.P. 166 allowed the Revision Petition holding that the Collector   G
had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing of the appeal
by invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

      In the appeal to this Court, the correctness of the view
taken in K. Venkafab and Others v. K.Venkateswara Hao & Another
was challenged and it was further contended that subsequent to      H
that decision, the State Legislature had enacted the Andhra
        110               SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

                                                                            t-.
A
        Pradesh Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 whereby section 93 of
        the Act had been amended and that the provisions of section 5 of
        the Limitation Act, 1963 had expressly been made applicable to
        Appeals and Revision Petitions preferred under sections 90 and 91
        of the Act.

              Dismissing the Appeal.
B
              HELD: 1. The view taken by the Division Bench in K.Ven\afah
        and Others v. K. Veokateawara. Rao and Another is correct and
        sound. Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of render-
        ing the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
        applicable to the proceedings before the Collector. (114 A-BJ
c              2. On a plain reading of section 93 of the Act it is abso-
        lutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the
        proceedi1138 before the Collector, the provisions of the Limi-
        tation Act relating to 'computation of the period of limitation'.
        The provisions relating to computation of the . period of
        limitation are contained in section 12 to 24 included in Part III
        of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing
D
        with 'computation of the period of limitation'. It is only after
        the process of computation is completed and it is found that an
        appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the
        prescribed period that the question of extension of the period
        under section 5 can arise. [113 G-11]
E
             3. It is well settled that the provisions of the Limitation
        Act, 1963. apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to
        appeals or applications before bodies other than· Courts such as
        quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstand-
        ing the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with
        certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of
F
        Civil or Criminal Procedure. However, the relevant special
        statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appel~
        late authority, the power to extend the prescribed period of
        limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that
        the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be
        applicable to such proceedings. (113 A-CJ
G
            4. The provisions of section 93 as it stood prior to its
        amendment by Act 2 of 1979 were free from any ambiguity and
        called for no clarification. The Legislature has also not given
        any indication of any intention to clarify but on the other hand
        what has been done by it is to amend the section with only pros-
    H
        pective effect. The amended provisions of section 93 are of no
               SAKlJRU v. TANA.JI [BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.]         111


assistance to the appellant. This case is governed by the sec-           A
tion as it waa originally enacted. [114 D-E]

      K.V.,.siah and others v. x:;Ventateswxa Bao and Another,
A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 166, approved.

      T1111n llmdcipal Coo me fl , Athan1 v. Presiding Officer, Labour   B
Court, Bubll and Ors. [1970] 1 s.c.R. 51, Hityanm:ida H•Joshi and
Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of lodia and Ors. [1970] 1
s.c.R. 396 and Sushfla Devi v. llmmmandan Prasad and Ors. [1976]
2 S.C.R. 845, referred, to.

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION        Civil Appeal No. 1852 of     c
1979.

     From the Judment and Order dated 12.4.1978 of the An<lhra
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 3289 of 1977.

     T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, K. Ram Kumar and Mrs. J. Ramachand-       D
ran for the Appellant.

        s. Markandeya for the Respondent.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      llALAKRISllNA El!ADI, J. In this appeal filed by special           E
leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12,
1978 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the
provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be
invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before
the Collector under section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana          F
Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 - Act 21 of 1950
(hereinafter called 'the Act').

      The facts which have led up to the present controversy m.:.y
now be briefly set out. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad
declared the respondent- Tanaji to be the owner of an extent of 6        G
acres, 39 guntas comprised in Survey Nos. 289 a11d 290 of Hasna-
pur village under section 38-E of the Act on the ground that he
(the respondent) was a "protectd tenant". Though an appeal lay
to the Collector under section 90 of the Act against the said
order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the appellant land
holder did not prefer an appeal but, instead, filed a Writ               H
Petition - W.P.No. 2064 of 1976 before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh challenging the legal! ty and correctness of the order
     112                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A    passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Writ Petition was
     dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on July 1,
     1976. Writ Appeal No.385 of 1976 filed against the decision of
     the learned Single Judge was subsequently dismissed by a Division
     Bench of the High Court on December 6, 1976. Long thereafter, on
     August 22, 1978, the appellant preferred an appeal before the
     Uistrict Collector purporting to be one filed against the order
B    dated January 22, 1975 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer
     together with an application for condonation of delay under
     section 5 of the Limitation Act. That application and the appeal.
     were opposed by the respondent herein. But his objections were
     overruled, the delay was condoned and the appeal was allowed by
     the Collector on October 24, , 1977. The respondent - Tanaji
     thereupOn moved the High Court by filing a revision petition
c    under section 91 of the Act. By the judgment impugned In this
     appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed that
     revis~on petition holding that the Collector had no jurisdiction
     to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal by invoking
     section 5 of the Limitation Act following an earlier ruling of a
     Di visiorl   .Hench of the same High Court reported in K.. Venkai ah &
     Ors. V• K.Veokateswara Rao & Aor. A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 166. In that
lJ   decision the Uivision Bench of the High Court had taken the view
     that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a
     C.:ivil or Criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an
     appeal is filed under section 90 of the Act is not a Civil or
     Criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have
     no application to the proceedings before him unless there is
     express provision in the special enactment whereunder the Collec-
     tor is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any particular
     section' of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to such
     proceedings. It was further held by the Division Bench that sec-
     tion 93 . of the Act, as it then stood, made applicable to procee-       I
     dings before the Collector only those provisions of the Limita-
F    tior. Act which related to the 'computation of the period of
     limitation' and since section 5 did not fall within the group of
     sections (sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act) dealing with
     computation of the period of limitation, the provisions of sec-
     tion 5 1 -were not c:.pplicable to the proceedings before the
     CollectOr. The learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed
 G   before us the correctness of the view so taken by the Ui vision
      Berich in Verikaiah's case.

            After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the
      conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the

 H
      view taken by the Division Bench in Venla1ah's case is perfectly        1
                SAKlJRlJ v. TANAJI [ BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J • ]       113


    correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this        A


l   Court in Town Municipal C<Jomci I , Athan! v. Presiding Officer,
    Labour Court, llubli & Ors. [1970] 1 s.c.R. 51, Nicyananda M.
    Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. [1970]
    1. S.C.R. 396 and Susbila Devi v. Rmpanand;m Prasad and Ors.
    [1976J 2. s.c.R. 845 that the provisions of the Limitation Act,
    1903 apply only to proceedings in "Courts_" and not to appeals or     B
    applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judi-
    cial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact
    that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain speci-
    fied powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or
    Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was
    preferred by the appellant herein under section 90 of the Act not     c
    being a Court,the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability
    to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the
    relevant special statute may contain an express provision con-
    ferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the
    power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient
    cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of section.5     D
    of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings.
    lie.nee it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains
    any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provi-
    sions of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the
    delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on
    by the appellant in this connection is section 93 of the Act          E
    which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following
    terms~-



               "93. Limitation - Every appeal and every application
               for revision under this Act shall be filed within
               sixty days from the . date of the order against which
               the appeal or application is filed.and the provisions      F
               of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the
               purpose of the computation of the said period."

    On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its
    effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the
    Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to 'com-     G
    putation of the period of limitation • The provisions relating to
    computation of the period of limitation are Contained in sections
    12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sec-
    tion 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period
    of limitation .   It is only after the process of computation    is
    completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been
    filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question     H
    114               SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.




                                                                          l
A   of extension of the period under section 5 can arise. We are,
    therefore, in complete agreement with the view expre•sed by the
    Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah' s case that section
    93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision
    of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the
    proceedings·before the Collector.
B
          Our attention was drawn to the fact that subsequent to the
    decision of the High Court, the State Legislature has enacted the
    ADdhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws ( Amendment) Act, 1979 - Act 2 of
    1979, whereby section 93 ·of the Act has been amended and the
    provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have now been
c   expressly made appll.cable to appeals and revisions preferred
    Wider sections 90 arid 91 of the Act. We see no force in the
    contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the said
    amendment is clarificatory in nature. The provisions of section
    93 as they stood prior to this amendment were free from any ambi-
D   guity and called fot no clarification. The Legislature has also
    not given any indication of any intention to clarify but, on the
    other hand> what has been done by it is to amend the section wHh
    only prospective effect. The amended provisions of section 93
    are, therefore, of no assistance to the ·appellant in this c-...ase
    which is governed by the Section as it was originally enacted.
E
          The c:Onclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion
    is that this appeal is devoid of merits and has only to be dls-
    missed. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but in the circum-
    stances without any order as to costs.
F



                                                      Appeal dismissed.