Holding

Clause (b) of Section 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is operative only from 7 September 1976, so the unregistered dealer was not liable to tax for the assessment years in question.

Summary

The Oriental Coal Corporation, an unregistered coal dealer, was assessed to central sales tax for the years 1967-68 and 1968-69. The Allahabad High Court set aside the assessment, holding that Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 imposed tax liability only on registered dealers. The State appealed, contending that the 1976 amendment to Section 9, specifically clause (b) of the proviso, was retrospective and therefore made unregistered dealers liable. The Supreme Court examined whether the amendment was intended to have retrospective effect and whether it was merely procedural. It held that clause (b) became operative only from 7 September 1976 and could not be read back to 1957, so the earlier provision applied and the unregistered dealer was not liable. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether clause (b) of the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, as amended by the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1976, is to be given retrospective effect from 5 January 1957.
Whether an unregistered dealer is liable to central sales tax for inter‑state sales under the provisions applicable before 7 September 1976.

Legislation cited

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956s. 9(1)
Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1976s. 6, s. validation

Subjects

Central Sales Taxunregistered dealerretrospective legislationtax liabilityprocedural vs substantive amendmentvalidation clauseinter‑state sales taxjurisdiction

Judgment

A SALES TAX OFFICER, WARD 2 MORADABAD
AND 2 ORS. ~
v.
ORIENTAL COAL CORPORATION MORADABAD. I
"
JANUARY 12, !988
B
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956: Section 9-Amendment to-Central
-1-
Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 1976, Sec. 6-Effect of-Whether prospec- >

c.
tive or retrospective.

The respondent, an unregistered firm of coal merchants with its
.., -
place of business in Bihar and an office in U.P., was assessed to sales tax
by the first appellant in respect of the turnover of coal supplied by the -.ot'
respondent-assessee for the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69. The
assessee filed writ petitions alleging that the assessment orders were
D without jurisdiction on several grounds.

· The High Court allowed the writ petitions holding that s. 9 of the
Central Sales Tax Act as it stood at the relevant time cast a liability to
tax only on a 'registered dealer' and not an 'unregistered dealer'.

E In the appeals it was contended on behalf of the Department that
by virtue of s. 9 of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1976, cl. (b)
of the proviso to s. 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act was deemed to have
been in force since 5.1.57 and, therefore, the position was as if the Act
had always imposed a liability to pay tax even on unregistered dealers
"
-
just as it had originally done on registered dealers, and that the amend-
F ment only affected the venue of taxation, and being procedural in
. _:~
nature, it was required to be construed retrospectively,
-~

Dismissing the appeals,

HELD: I. Clause (b) of s. 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
G is operative only from 7.9.76. [573D]
-(

The instant case is, therefore, governed by the earlier provision, "'
and the respondent-assessee being an unregistered dealer is not liable to l'
pay tax. [573D]

H State v. Kasturi Lal Har Lal, [1987] 67 STC 154 SC, relied on.
562
~ALESTAXOFFICERv. ORIENTALCOALCORPN. 563

2.1 Where the statute, Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act,
1976, on its face, clety indicates retrospective effect where intended, A
there can be no justification to read retrospectivity into the amendment
made by cl. (c) of s. 6 of the Amending Act, which does not contain any
words to that effect. [57 ID I

2.2 The language of the validation section clearly concerns only B
1" penalties which are dealt with under s. 9(2). The amending Act refers to
s. 9 in general and not to s. 9(2) only.because s. 9(1) also contains a
•
reference to sub-section (2). From this circumstance alone it cannot be
-¥ inferred that retrospectivity to the amendment of s. 9(1) also is
intended. [572C-D)

..,. 2.3 The employment of word "also" cannot be treated as an c
indication of intention by the Legislature that the amendment of s. 9(1)
by s. 6 of the Amending Act was to be effective from 5.1.57. If the
Legislature had intended it; the intention could and would have been
expressed clearly in cl. (a) ofs. 6 itself as it had been in the other clauses
and in the other sections. If s. 9(1) of the Amendment Act had been D
inserted as cl. (d) ins. 6 thereof, it could not have changed the prospec-
tive effect of cl. (a). The position is not different merely because this
provision is contained in s. 9 and not s. 6 of the Amendment Act.

. Section 9(1) of the Amendment Act talks only of reading these extra
words into s. 9(1) of the Principal Act between 5.1.57 and 7.9. 76. It does
not contain any operative words that requires. 9(1) of the Principal Act
being read in the form in which it has been amended by s. 6 during that
E

- ~

,,.,' earlier period. [572E-G I

All that the provision requires is that for the period 5.1.57 to
ft;. 7 .9.76, the section is to be read as if it also included the additional
substantive provisions referred to therein. It was earlier not clear F
~ whether all these provisions could be read into the section before 7 .9. 76,
the date when the amendment Act came into force. So, the validation
section declares that the section should be read, even earlier, as if it
comprehended also these substantive provisions. It is in this context
that the word "also" is nsed. [572D-E)
• }
G
2.4 The question whether a charge to tax can be imposed in one
T State or another is not a mere question of venue. It may have an impact
on the rate of tax in certain cases a.nd it also regulates the rights inter se
of States to levy taxes on such inter-state sales. [573B-C)

... The amendment changes the position that an unregistered dealer H
i
:·.1
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

is not taxable under the proviso and imposes a substantive liability on ".f
A
such a dealer. It is also one which confers jurisdiction on an officer in a
particular State to levy a tax which he otherwise cannot. It is thus a ...
substantive provision. [573B I

The amendment cannot, therefore, be treated as purely pro-
B cedural and hence necessarily retrospective. [573C]

S. T.O. v. Coal & Coke Supplies Corporation JT, [1987] 4 S.C.
f
i

..,. -
472; Khemka v. State, (1975] 3 SCR 753 and Shiv Dutt Rai v. Union,
[1983] 3 S.C.C. 529 referred to.

c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 953-
954 (NT)/1975.
('
From the Judgmeut and order dated the 15th February 1974 of
the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petitions Nos. 6904
and 6906 of 1973.
D
S.C. Manchanda and A.K. Srivastava for the Appellants.

Harish N. Salve, Mrs. A.K. Verma, J. Peres and D.N. Mishra
for the Respondent.

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. These are two appeals by certificate from
the common order, dated 15.2.74, of the Allahabad High Court in "
-"'
Civil Miscellaneous Petiti<>ll Nos. 6904 and 6906 of 1973. They can be
disposed of together since the question raised is the same. This corn-
F mon question arises out of the assessment to central sales tax of the -~
~.
respondent, Oriental Coal Corporation of Moradabad (hereinafter
referred to as the assessee), for the.assessment year 1967-68 and 1968-
69.

2. The relevant facts bearing on the controversy may be briefly
~
G stated. The assessee is a firm of coal merchants with its place of busi- '
ness in Jharia (Bihar State) and an office at Moradabad (in U. P.). It is
-r
not registered either under the Central or the State Sales Tax Act.
According to the assessee it places orders for coal on the collieries at
Jharia on behalf of constituents in Uttar Pradesh, realises the sale
proceeds and remits the same to Jharia. The Sales Tax Officer assessed
H the assessee to sales tax in respect of the turnover of the coal thus
SALES TAX OFFICER v. ORIENTAL COAL CORPN. [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 565
'j
supplied by the assessee. The assessee filed two writ petitions alleging A
that the assessment orders were· without jurisdiction on several
. 'I j grounds. The High Court allowed the writ petitions on one of these
grounds and hence did not go into the other contentions. It referred to
s. 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, as it stood at the relevant time, and
held that the provision cast a liability to tax only on a registered dealer
and not an unregistered dealer like the assessee. It is the correctness of B
+ this decision that is challenged in the present appeals.

'· 3. Section 9 relied upon by the High Court, reads thus:

3. "9.(1) The tax payable by any dealer under this Act on
¥ sales of goods effected by him in the course of inter-state
trade or commerce, whether such sales fall within clause
c
·'f·
(a) or clause (b) of section 3, shall be levied by the Govern-
ment of India and the tax so levied shall be collected by
that Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-
section (2), in the State from which the movement of the
goods commenced. D
)

Provided that, in the case of a sale of goods during
their movement from one State to another, being a sale
subsequent to the first sale in respect of the same goods,
the tax shall, where such sale does not fall within sub-
section (2) of section 6, be levied and collected in the State E

- ..
' '
from which the registered dealer effecting the subsequent
sale obtained or, as the case may be, could have obtained,
the form prescribed for the purpose of clause (a) of sub-
section (4) of section 8 in connection with the purchase of
such goods.
f. F
~-
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the
rules made thereunder, the authorities for the time being
empowered to assess, re-assess, collect and enforce pay-
ment of any tax under general sales tax law of the appro-
priate State shall, on behalf of the Government of India,
', l
assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of tax, includ- G
·y ing any penalty, payable by a dealer under this Act as if the
tax or penalty payable by such a dealer under this Act is a
tax or penalty payable under the general sales tax law of
the State; and for this purpose they may exercise all or any
of the powers they have under the general sales tax law of
the State; and the Provisions of such law, including provi- H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

sions relating to returns, provisional assessment, advance
y
A
payment of tax, registration of the transferee of any busi-
ness, impositwn of the tax liability of a person carrying on {
I"
business on the transferee of or successor to such business
transfer of liability of any firm or Hindu undivided family to
pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or parti-
B tion of such family, recovery of tax from third parties, appe-
als, reviews, revisions, references, 3(refunds, rebates, penal-
ties) compounding of offences and treatment of documents
+'
furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly: f

Provided that if in any State or part thereof there is
c no general sales tax law in force, the Central Government '"!
may, by rules made in this behalf make necessary provision
for all or any of the matters specified in this sub-section." -r
The High Court pointed out that, under the terms of the section, tax
on sales of goods effected by a dealer in the course of inter-state trade
D or commerce shall be levied in the State from which the movement of
the goods commenced: in this case, the State of Bihar. The proviso,
however, carves out an exception. It provides that, if there is a subse-
•
quent sale of the same goods in the course of their movement from one
State to another and such sale is effected by a registered dealer, tax

E
can be levied and collected in the State from which such dealer
obtained or could have obtained the forms prescribed under s. 8(4}(a)
..,
(popularly known as 'the C Form'): in this case, the State of Uttar
Pradesh. But, the High Court pointed out, the assessee was not a
registered dealer and so there was no scope for his being taxed in the
State of U.P. The High Court accordingly quashed the assessments in
.. ,
question and hence these appeals by the State.
F -~
4. We may at once say that the conclusion of the High Court is -~
unassailable in view of the decision of this Court in State v. Kasturi Lal
Har/al, 4 J.T. 1987 3 S.C. 234 affirming the view taken on this issue by
the Allahabad High Court in an earlier case Kasturilal Har/al v. State, '
[ 1972] 29 STC 495. Shri Manchanda, however, submits that this view
G can no longer hold the field in view of a retrospective amendment of )
the Central Sales Tax Act by the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act
No. 103 of 1976. Two provisions of this Amendment Act may be ·r
extracted:

"6. Amendment of section 9. In section 9 of the Principal
H Act-(a) in sub-section (1) for proviso, the following pro-
SALES TAX OFFICER v. ORIENTALCOALCORPN. [RANGANATHAN, J.[ 567
'(
viso shall be substituted, namely. A
.. )
"Provided that, in the case of sale of goods during their
movement from one State to another, being a sale subse-
quent to the first sale in respect of the same goods and
being also a sale which does not fall within sub-section (2)
of section 6, the tax shall be levied and collected- B
t
(a) where such subsequent sale has been effected by a
'
-,. registered dealer, in the State from which the registered
dealer obtained or, as the case may be could have obtained,
the form prescribed for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-
section (4) of section 8 in connection with the purchase of c
T such goods, and

(b) where such subsequent sale has been effected by an
unregistered dealer in the State from which such sub-
sequent sale has been effected."
D
(b) in sub-section (2), before the words "compounding of
offences", the words "charging or payment of interest",
shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been
inserted.
1- E
(c) after sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely:
•
~
(2A) All the provisions relating to offences and penalties
(including provisions relating to penalties in lieu of pro-
f-- secution for an offence or in addition to the penalties or
punishment for an offence but excluding the provisions F
~ relating to matters provided for in sections 10 and JOA) of
the general sales tax law of each State shall, with necessary
modifications, apply in relation to the assessment, re-
assessment, collection and the enforcement, of payment of
any tax required to be collected under this Act in such State
... J or in relation to any process connected with such assess-
G
,y men!, re-assessment, collection or enforcement of payment
as if the tax under this Act were a tax under such sales tax
law.

xxxx
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

9. Validation (1) the provisions of section 9 of the princi-

.
A
pal Act shall have effect and shall be deemed always to
have had effect in relation to the period commencing on the '
5th day of January, 1957, and ending with the date
immediately preceding the date of commencement of this
Act as if that section also provided-
B
(a) that all the provisions relating to penalties (including
provisions relating to penalties in lieu of prosecution for an
offence or in addition to the penalties or punishment on
conviction for an offence but excluding the provisions relat-
ing to matters provided for in sections 10 and IOA of the
-
principal Act and the provisions relating to offences) of the
c general sales tax law of each State shall, with necessary
modifications, apply in relation to-

(i) the assessment, re-assessment, collection and enforce-
ment or payment of any tax required to be collected under
D the principal Act in such State; and

(ii) any process connected with such assessment, re-assess-
ment, collection or enforcement of payment, and

(b) that for the purpose of the application of the provisions
E of such law, the tax under the principal Act shall be
deemed to be tax under such law.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, "'
decree or order of any Court or tribunal or other authority,
all penalties under the general sales tax law of any State --1
F imposed or purporting to have been imposed in pursuance
of the provisions of section 9 of the principal Act, and all 1
proceedings, acts or things taken or done for the purpose
of, or in relation to, the imposition or collection of such
penalties, before the commencement of this Act shall, for
all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been
G imposed, taken or done as validly and effectively as if the
provisions of sub-section ( 1) had been in force when such -y-
penalties were imposed or proceedings or acts or things
were taken or done and, accordingly, -

(a) no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or
H continued in or before any court or any tribunal or other
SALES TAX OFFICER v. ORIENTALCOALCORPN. [RANGANATIIAN,J.] 569

i authority for the refund of any amount received or realised
A
by way of such penalty;
~ )

(b) no court, tribunal or other authority shall enforce any
decree or order directing the refund of any amount
received or realised by way of such penalty;
B
i ( c) where any amount which had been received or realised
by way of such penalty had been refunded before the corn-

.. ' mencement of this Act and such refund would not have
been allowed if the provisions of sub-section ( !) had been
in force or the date on which the order for such refund was
~ passed, the amount so refunded. may be recovered as an
arrear of tax under the principal Act;
c
'f
(d) any proceeding, act or thing which could have been
validly taken, continued or done for the imposition of such
penalty at any time before the commencement of this Act if
the provisions of sub-section (!)had then been in force but D
which had not been taken continued or done, nray after
such commencement be taken, continued or done.

(3) Nothing in sub-section (2) shall be construed as pre-
venting any person-
f E
(a) from questioning the imposition or collection of any
-, penalty or any proceedings, act or thing in connection,
therewith or

(b) from claiming any refund, in accordance with the pro-
f visions of the principal Act read with sub-section(!)." F
>
Shri Manchanda contends that, by virtue of s. 9 of the Amendment
Act, clause (b) of the proviso to s. 9 (I) of the Central Sales Tax Act is
deemed to have been in force since 5. 1.1957. The position according to
him, therefore, is as if the Act had always imposed a liability to pay tax
) even on unregistered dealers just as it had originally done on regis- G
tered dealers.
I
5. We may mention that, while deciding S. T.O. v. Coal & Coke
Supplies Corporation, JT 1987 4 S.C. 472, we had assumed the correct-
ness of the contention of Sri Manchanda as, in that case, the above
argument that the amendment was retrospective was uncontroverted. H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A Sri Harish Salve, appearing for the assessee in this case, however, 'r
contests the correctness of Sri Manchanda's contention. We have
therefore considered this aspect and reached the conclusion that Sri ; ,
Salve is right and that no retrospective operation to clause (b) of s.
9( I) can be spelt out as suggested by counsel for the appellant.

B 6. Act 103/76 received the assent of the President on 7.9.1976
which is, apparently, what is referred to as the date of its commence- i
ment in s. 9( 1) of the said Act. The Act amended several sections of
the Central Sales Tax Act and it did not when its words when it desired r
to give any degree of retrospective effect to any particular amend-
ment. The amendments to sections 3 and 4 of the Principal Act thus
C are clearly retrospective: the provisions added thereto, it is declared,
"shall be inserted and shall always be deemed to have been inserted
w.e.f. 1.4.1976." The amendments to Sections 2, 7, 14 and 15 of the
Principal Act are obviously intended to be only prospective. The
amendment to s. 9 of the Principal Act, with which we are at present
concerned, presents an amalgam. s. 6 of the Amending Act makes
D three amendments ins. 9 of the Principal Act by its three clauses (a),
(b) and (c). In clause (a), there is no hint of any retrospectivity
whereas the amendment by clause (b) is expressed to be fully
retrospective from 1956. The amendment by clause (b} attracts the
penal provision$ (including offences) of the relevant State Law and
can, in view of Article 20 of the Constitution, only be prospective.
E However, it appears that, even under the statute as originally framed,
such penal provisions had been enforced in several cases and this
action needed retrospective validation (in so far as penalties, other
than offences, were concerned) in view of the decision of this Court in
-
Khemka v. State, [1975] 3 SCR 753. This was the raison d'etre of s. 9 of
the Amendment Act which has been extracted above: (see Shiv Dutt
F Rai v. Union, [ 1983] 3 S.C.C. 529. This is also clear from paragraph 3
of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act,
which reads:

"Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act
empowers the State sales tax authorities to assess, re-assess
G collect and enforce payment of Central sales tax. The sub- r
section also authorises the authorities under the State sales
tax laws to exercise all the powers which they have under -~·-
those laws (including inter a/ia the power to impose
penalties) for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act
also. In Khemka & Co. (Agencies) Private Ltd. v. State of
H Maharashtra, 35 S.T.C. 571, the Supreme Court, by a ma-
SALES TAX OFFICER v. ORIENTALCOALCORPN. IRANGANATHAN. J.J 571

jority of 3:2, held that the provisions of the State sales tax A
laws as to penalties do not apply for purposes of the Cent-
" ) ral Sales Tax. In view of this judgment, the State Govern-
ments are faced with the problem of having to refund the
amounts collected in the past by way of penalties. The
judgment has also resulted in a vacuum being created in
regard to levy of penalties, it is, therefore, necessary to B
amend section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act to provide
expressly that the provisions relating to offences and

- penalties under the general sales tax law of each State shall.
with necessary modifications, apply in relation to the
assessment, re-assessment collection and the enforcement
of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. It is also necessary
to validate the penalties which have been levied in the past.
C

for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act, on the basis
of the provisions of the State sales tax laws."

Where the statute thus, on its face, clearly indicates retrospective
effect where intended, there can be no justification to read retrospec- D
tivity into the amendment made by clause (a) of section 6 of the
amending Act which does not contain any words to that effect.

7. Counsel for the appellant, however, relied on two circumst-
ances to say that such retrospective effect must necessarily have been
intended. Firstly, he placed emphasis (a) on the fact that s. 9( 1) of the E
Amendment Act refers to section 9 of the principal Act and not merely
to S. 9(2) and (b) on the use of the words"as if that section also
provided." He submitted that this language can only mean that the
legislature intended retrospective effect also to the amendment
effected in s. 9 bys. 6 of the Validation Act. Secondly, he submitted
that under s. 6 of the Central Sales Act, all dealers registered or F
unregistered, are liable to pay tax on sales effected by them in the
course of inter-state trade or commerce. S. 9( 1) imposes the liability
on the dealer in the State from which the movement of the goods
commences but this is without prejudice to the liability of dealers who
make subsequent sales during the course of such movement. Such
subsequent sale may be by a registered dealer or an unregistered G
dealer. It may be to a registered or an unre~istered dealer. If the sale is
to a registered dealer it is exempt under s. 6(2), whether it is by a
registered dealer or an unregistered dealer. Under the proviso to S.
9( 1), as it originally stood, if the sale was by registered dealer to an
unregistered dealer, it would be taxed in the State from which the
registered dealer obtained or could have obtained the C Forms. When H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 19881 2 S.C.R.

even a sale by a registered dealer is thus made liable, counsel argues, it Y'
A
could not have been the intention of the State to exempt from liability a
sale by an unregistered dealer. The amendment only clarifies this posi- <
tion. It imposes no fresh substantive liability. It is only an amendment "'
of a procedural nature shifting chargeability, in such cases, from the
State from which the goods moves, to the State in which the subse-
B quent sale takes place. In this view of the matter, counsel contends,
the amendment only affects the venue of taxation and, being pro- '
cedural in nature, requires to be construed retrospectively. I

8: We are unable to accept these contentions. So far as the first
point is concerned, the language of the validation section clearly con-
cerns only penalties which are dealt with under s. 9(2). The amending
c Act refers to S. 9 in general and not to s. 9(2) only perhaps because s. ft
r
-
9( l) also contains a reference to sub-section (2). From this circumst- T
ance alone, it cannot be inferred that retrospectivity to the amendment
of s. 9( !) also is intended. The use of the word 'also' does not also have
the result suggested by counsel. All that the provision requires is that,
D for the period 5.1.57 to 7 .9.1976, the section is to be read as if it also
included the additional substantive provisions referred to therein. It r
was earlier not clear whether all these provisions could be read into the
section before 7.9.1976, the date when the Amendment Act came into
force. So the validation section declares that the section should be
read, even earlier, as if it comprehended also these substantive pro-
E visions. It is in this context that the word "also" is used. The employ- 1'"
ment of this word cannot therefore be treated as an indication of
intention by the legislature that the amendment ot s. 9( 1) by section 6
of the amending Act was to be effective from 5. I. 1957. If the Legisla- '
-
ture had intended it, the intention could and would have been expres-
scd clearly in clause (a) of s. 6 itself as it had been in the other clauses
F and in the other sections. Ifs. 9( I) of the Amendment Act had been
inserted as clause (d) in section 6 thereof, it could not have changed
-1.
the prospective effect of clause (a). The position is not different
merely because this provision is contained in s. 9 and not s. 6 of the
Amendment Act. S. 9( l) of the Amendment Act talks only of reading
these extra words into s. 9( l) of the principal Act between 5.1.57 and
G 7.9.76. It does not contain any operative words that requires. 9(1) of (

the Principal Act being read in the form in which it has been amended
_.,(
by s. 6 during that earlier period. We, therefore, do not see in s. 9 of
the Amending Act any support to the contention of the counsel for the
appellant.

H 9. The contention that the amendment is purely procedural is
SALES TAX OFFICER v. ORIENTALCOALCORPN. IRANGANATIIAN,J.] 573

also misconceived. Assuming the correctness of the contention that a A
purely procedural amendment should ordinarily be construed to be
retrospective, we are unable to agree that the present amendment is of
such nature. The decision of this Court in Kasturi Lal's case, 4JT 1987
3 SC 234 had held that an unregistered dealer is not taxable under the
proviso. The amendment changes this position and imposes a substan- B
tive liability on such a dealer. It is also one which confers jurisdiction
on an officer in a particular State to levy a tax which he otherwise
cannot. It is thus a substantive provision. That apart, even the ques-
tion whether a charge to tax can be imposed in one State or another is
not a mere question of venue. It may have an impact on the rate of tax
in certain cases and it also regulates the rights inter se of States to levy
taxes on such inter-state sales. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the C
contention that the amendment should be treated as purely procedural
and hence necessarily retrospective.

10. In the result, we are of opinion that clause (b) of s. 9(1) of
the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is operative only from 7.9.1976. The
present case is, therefore, governed by the earlier provision and the D
decision of this Court in Kasturi Lal's case, (supra). The appeals,
therefore, fail and are dismissed. We, however, make no order as to
costs.

r N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.
>