SAMIR AGRAWALversusCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ORS.

1044                     [2020] REPORTS
                SUPREME COURT   13 S.C.R. 1044             [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A                             SAMIR AGRAWAL
                                        v.
              COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 3100 of 2020)
 B                            DECEMBER 15, 2020
              [ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, K. M. JOSEPH
                    AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
             Competition Act, 2002:
 C            ss. 3, 19 and 26 – Application u/s. 26(2) – Seeking initiation
       of inquiry – Alleging violation of s. 3 – Competition Commission of
       India (CCI) dismissed the case holding that no case of contravention
       of provisions of s. 3 were made out – Appellate Tribunal held that
       the informant had no locus standi to move the CCI – Appeal to
       Supreme Court – Held: When CCI performs inquisitorial functions,
 D
       the doors of approaching the CCI and the appellate authority must
       be kept wide open in public interest, so as to subserve the high
       public purpose of the Act – The provisions of the Act and
       Competition Commission Regulations show that ‘Any person’ may
       provide information to CCI irrespective of whether such person is
 E     personally affected or not – Hence, the informant was competent to
       move the CCI – However, no case of contravention of provision in
       s. 3 is made out – Competition Commission Regulations, 2009 –
       Regulations 10, 25 and 35.
             Words and Phrases:
 F         ‘Person’ – Definition of – In the context of s. 2(l) of
       Competition Act, 2002.
             Disposing of the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. A reading of the provisions of the Competition
 G     Act, 2002 and the Competition Commission of India (General)
       Regulations, 2009 would show that “any person” may provide
       information to the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which
       may then act upon it in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
       In this regard, the definition of “person” in section 2(l) of the
       Act, is an inclusive one and is extremely wide, including
 H
                                       1044
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1045
                     & ORS.

individuals of all kinds and every artificial juridical person. This   A
may be contrasted with the definition of “consumer” in section
2(f) of the Act, which makes it clear that only persons who buy
goods for consideration, or hire or avail of services for a
consideration, are recognised as consumers. [Para 13][1066-E-
F]
                                                                       B
      1.2 A look at section 19(1) of the Act would show that the
Act originally provided for the “receipt of a complaint” from any
person, consumer or their association, or trade association. This
expression was then substituted with the expression “receipt of
any information in such manner and” by the 2007 Amendment.
This substitution is not without significance. Whereas, a complaint    C
could be filed only from a person who was aggrieved by a particular
action, information may be received from any person, obviously
whether such person is or is not personally affected. This is for
the reason that the proceedings under the Act are proceedings
in rem which affect the public interest. That the CCI may inquire      D
into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its
own motion, is also laid down in section 19(1) of the Act. Further,
even while exercising suo motu powers, the CCI may receive
information from any person and not merely from a person who is
aggrieved by the conduct that is alleged to have occurred. This
also follows from a reading of section 35 of the Act, in which the     E
earlier expression “complainant or defendant” has been
substituted by the expression, “person or an enterprise,” setting
out that the informant may appear either in person, or through
one or more agents, before the CCI to present the information
that he has gathered. [Para 14][1066-G-H; 1067-A-C]                    F
      1.3 Section 45 of the Act is a deterrent against persons
who provide information to the CCI, mala fide or recklessly,
inasmuch as false statements and omissions of material facts are
punishable with a penalty which may extend to the hefty amount
of rupees one crore, with the CCI being empowered to pass other        G
such orders as it deems fit. This, and the judicious use of heavy
costs being imposed when the information supplied is either
frivolous or mala fide, can keep in check what is described as
the growing tendency of persons being “set up” by rivals in the
trade. [Para 15][1067-C-E]
                                                                       H
1046            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A            1.4 The 2009 Regulations also point in the same direction,
       inasmuch as Regulation 10, does not require the informant to
       state how he is personally aggrieved by the contravention of the
       Act, but only requires a statement of facts and details of the alleged
       contravention to be set out in the information filed. Also,
       Regulation 25 shows that public interest must be foremost in the
 B
       consideration of the CCI when an application is made to it in
       writing that a person or enterprise has substantial interest in the
       outcome of the proceedings, and such person may therefore be
       allowed to take part in the proceedings. What is also extremely
       important is Regulation 35, by which the CCI must maintain
 C     confidentiality of the identity of an informant on a request made
       to it in writing, so that such informant be free from harassment
       by persons involved in contravening the Act. [Para 16][1067-E-
       G]
              1.5 Given the context of the Act in which the CCI and the
 D     NCLAT deal with practices which have an adverse effect on
       competition in derogation of the interest of consumers, it is clear
       that the Act vests powers in the CCI and enables it to act in rem,
       in public interest. This would make it clear that a “person
       aggrieved” must, in the context of the Act, be understood widely
       and not be constructed narrowly. Further, it is not without
 E     significance that the expressions used in Sections 53B and 53T
       of the Act are “any person”, thereby signifying that all persons
       who bring to the CCI information of practices that are contrary
       to the provisions of the Act, could be said to be aggrieved by an
       adverse order of the CCI in case it refuses to act upon the
 F     information supplied. By way of contrast, Section 53N(3) speaks
       of making payment to an applicant as compensation for the loss
       or damage caused to the applicant as a result of any contravention
       of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, having been committed
       by an enterprise. By this sub-section, clearly, therefore, “any
       person” who makes an application for compensation, under sub-
 G     section (1) of Section 53N of the Act, would refer only to persons
       who have suffered loss or damage, thereby, qualifying the
       expression “any person” as being a person who has suffered loss
       or damage. Thus, the preliminary objections against the
       Informant/Appellant filing Information before the CCI and filing
 H     an appeal before the NCLAT are rejected. [Para 20][1069-E-H;
       1070-A-B]
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1047
                     & ORS.

      1.6 When the CCI performs inquisitorial, as opposed to            A
adjudicatory functions, the doors of approaching the CCI and the
appellate authority, i.e., the NCLAT, must be kept wide open in
public interest, so as to subserve the high public purpose of the
Act. [Para 22][1073-D-E]
      A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. (2011) 7 SCC 616 :                B
      [2011] 9 SCR 453; Competition Commission of India v.
      Steel Authority of India (2010) 10 SCC 744 : [2010] 11
      SCR 112 – relied on.
      Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate
      General of Maharashtra (1970) 2 SCC 484 : [1971] 1                C
      SCR 863 – distinguished.
       2. In the concurrent findings of fact of the CCI and the
NCLAT, it has been found that Ola and Uber do not facilitate
cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers, who
are independent individuals, who act independently of each other,       D
so as to attract the application of Section 3 of the Act, as has been
held by both the CCI and the NCLAT. There is no reason to
interfere with these findings. [Para 23][1073-E-F]
                          Case Law Reference
[1971] 1 SCR 863                 distinguished        Para 18           E
[2011] 9 SCR 453                 relied on            Para 19
[2010] 11 SCR 112                relied on            Para 21
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3100
of 2020.                                                                F
      From the Judgment and Order dated 29.05.2020 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal in Competition Appeal (AT) No. 11 of
2019.
      Balbir Singh, ASG Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Amit Sibal, Sr.
Advs., Naval Chopra, Anuj Berry, Rohan Arora, Aman Singh Sethi, PSS     G
Bhargava, Ms. Anjali Kumar, Devarsh Kotak, Shardul S Shroff, Arjun
Krishnan, Shyam Gopal, Ms. Khushboo Mittal, Rajshekhar Rao,
Ms. Nisha Kaur Uberoi, Gautam Chawla, Akshay Nanda, Ms. Ankita
Dhawan, Sonal Sarda, Karthik Sundar, Avneesh Arputham, Advs. for
the appearing parties.                                                  H
1048             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A           Petitioner-in-person.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             R. F. NARIMAN, J.
              1. The present appeal is at the instance of an Informant who
 B     describes himself as an independent practitioner of the law. The Appellant/
       Informant, by an Information filed on 13.08.2018 [“the Information”],
       sought that the Competition Commission of India [“CCI”] initiate an
       inquiry, under section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 [“the Act”],
       into the alleged anti-competitive conduct of ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
       [“Ola”], and Uber India Systems Pvt. Ltd., Uber B.V. and Uber
 C     Technologies Inc. [together referred to as “Uber”], alleging that they
       entered into price-fixing agreements in contravention of section 3(1)
       read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act, and engaged in resale price
       maintenance in contravention of section 3(1) read with section 3(4)(e)
       of the Act. According to the Informant, Uber and Ola provide radio taxi
 D     services and essentially operate as platforms through mobile applications
       [“apps”] which allow riders and drivers, that is, two sides of the platform,
       to interact. A trip’s fare is calculated by an algorithm based on many
       factors. The apps that are downloaded facilitate payment of the fare by
       various modes.

 E             2. The Informant alleged that due to algorithmic pricing, neither
       are riders able to negotiate fares with individual drivers for rides that are
       booked through the apps, nor are the drivers able to offer any discounts.
       Thus, the pricing algorithm takes away the freedom of riders and drivers
       to choose the best price on the basis of competition, as both have to
       accept the price set by the pricing algorithm. As per the terms and
 F     conditions agreed upon between Ola and Uber with their respective
       drivers, despite the fact that the drivers are independent entities who are
       not employees or agents of Ola or Uber, the driver is bound to accept
       the trip fare reflected in the app at the end of the trip, without having any
       discretion insofar as the same is concerned. The drivers receive their
 G     share of the fare only after the deduction of a commission by Ola and
       Uber for the services offered to the rider. Therefore, the Informant
       alleged that the pricing algorithm used by Ola and Uber artificially
       manipulates supply and demand, guaranteeing higher fares to drivers
       who would otherwise compete against one and another. Cooperation
       between drivers, through the Ola and Uber apps, results in concerted
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1049
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

action under section 3(3)(a) read with section 3(1) of the Act. Thus, the         A
Informant submitted that the Ola and Uber apps function akin to a trade
association, facilitating the operation of a cartel. Further, since Ola and
Uber have greater bargaining power than riders in the determination of
price, they are able to implement price discrimination, whereby riders
are charged on the basis of their willingness to pay and as a result,
                                                                                  B
artificially inflated fares are paid. Various other averments qua resale
price maintenance were also made, alleging a contravention of section
3(4)(e) of the Act.
      3. The CCI by its Order dated 06.11.2018, under section 26(2) of
the Act, discussed the Information provided by the Appellant/Informant
and held:                                                                         C

      “13. At the outset, it is highlighted that though the Commission
      has dealt with few cases in this sector, the allegations in the present
      case are different from those earlier cases. The present case
      alleges that Cab Aggregators have used their respective algorithms
      to facilitate price-fixing between drivers. The Informant has not           D
      alleged collusion between the Cab Aggregators i.e. Ola and Uber
      through their algorithms; rather collusion has been alleged on the
      part of drivers through the platform of these Cab Aggregators,
      who purportedly use algorithms to fix prices which the drivers are
      bound to accept.                                                            E
        xxx xxx xxx
      15. In the conventional sense, hub and spoke arrangement refers
      to exchange of sensitive information between competitors through
      a third party that facilitates the cartelistic behaviour of such
      competitors. The same does not seem to apply to the facts of the            F
      present case. In case of Cab Aggregators model, the estimation
      of fare through App is done by the algorithm on the basis of large
      data sets, popularly referred to as ‘big data’. Such algorithm
      seemingly takes into account personalised information of riders
      along with other factors e.g. time of the day, traffic situation, special   G
      conditions/events, festival, weekday/weekend which all determine
      the demand-supply situation etc. Resultantly, the algorithmically
      determined pricing for each rider and each trip tends to be different
      owing to the interplay of large data sets. Such pricing does not
      appear to be similar to the ‘hub and spoke’ arrangement as
                                                                                  H
1050      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     understood in the traditional competition parlance. A hub and spoke
       arrangement generally requires the spokes to use a third party
       platform (hub) for exchange of sensitive information, including
       information on prices which can facilitate price fixing. For a cartel
       to operate as a hub and spoke, there needs to be a conspiracy to
       fix prices, which requires existence of collusion in the first place.
 B
       In the present case, the drivers may have acceded to the
       algorithmically determined prices by the platform (Ola/Uber), this
       cannot be said to be amounting to collusion between the drivers.
       In the case of ride-sourcing and ride-sharing services, a hub-and-
       spoke cartel would require an agreement between all drivers to
 C     set prices through the platform, or an agreement for the platform
       to coordinate prices between them. There does not appear to be
       any such agreement between drivers inter-se to delegate this pricing
       power to the platform/Cab Aggregators. Thus, the Commission
       finds no substance in the first allegation raised by the Informant.
 D      xxx xxx xxx
       17. …In case of app-based taxi services, the dynamic pricing
       can and does on many occasions drive the prices to levels much
       lower than the fares that would have been charged by independent
       taxi drivers. Thus, there does not seem to be any fixed floor price
 E     that is set and maintained by the aggregators for all drivers and
       the centralized pricing mechanism cannot be viewed as a vertical
       instrument employed to orchestrate price-fixing cartel amongst
       the drivers…
        xxx xxx xxx
 F     18. Based on the foregoing discussion, the allegations raised by
       the Informant with regard to price fixing under section 3(3)(a)
       read with section 3(1), resale price maintenance agreement under
       section 3(4)(e) read with section 3(1). Moreover, the Commission
       observes that existence of an agreement, understanding or
 G     arrangement, demonstrating/indicating meeting of minds, is a sine
       qua non for establishing a contravention under Section 3 of the
       Act. In the present case neither there appears to be any such
       agreement or meeting of minds between the Cab Aggregators
       and their respective drivers nor between the drivers inter-se. In
       result thereof, no contravention of the provisions of Section 3 of
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1051
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

    the Act appears to be made out given the facts of the present            A
    case.
    19. Further, the allegation as regards price discrimination also
    seems to be misplaced and unsupported by any evidence on record.
    Price discrimination can perhaps be scrutinised under Section 4
    of the Act, which has not been alleged by the Informant. Imposition      B
    of discriminatory price is prohibited under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of
    the Act only when indulged in by a dominant enterprise. It is not
    the Informant’s case that any of the OPs is dominant in the app-
    based taxi services market. Given this, the Commission does not
    find it appropriate to delve into such analysis given that the market
    in question features two players, Ola as well as Uber, none of           C
    which is alleged to be dominant. Further, the provisions of the Act
    clearly stipulate dominant position by only one enterprise or one
    group and does not recognise collective dominance. This position
    was amply made clear in Case Nos. 6 & 74 of 2015 and later
    reiterated in Case Nos. 25, 26, 27 & 28 of 2017, both matters            D
    pertaining to the Cab Aggregators market. Thus, given these facts
    and legal position, the Commission rejects the allegation of the
    Informant with regard to price discrimination.
    20. …The situation of cement manufacturers colluding through a
    trade association is different from an App providing taxi/cab            E
    services. If drivers were colluding using an App as a platform, the
    said arrangement would have amounted to cartelisation; however,
    this cannot be equated with the facts of the present cases as
    demanded by the Informant. Ola and Uber are not an association
    of drivers, rather they act as separate entities from their respective
    drivers. In the present situation, a rider books his/her ride at any     F
    given time which is accepted by an anonymous driver available in
    the area, and there is no opportunity for such driver to coordinate
    its action with other drivers. This cannot be termed as a cartel
    activity/conduct through Ola/Uber’s platform. Thus, the present
    case is different from the Cement case, not only with regard to          G
    adoption of digital App but also with regard to other relevant
    aspects as elucidated hereinbefore.
     xxx xxx xxx
    23. Based on the foregoing, the Commission is of the view that
    no case of contravention of the provisions of Section 3 has been         H
1052            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A           made out and the matter is accordingly closed herewith under
             Section 26(2) of the Act.”
              4. The Appellant/Informant, being aggrieved by the Order of the
       CCI, filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
       [“NCLAT”] which resulted in the impugned judgment dated 29.05.2020.
 B     This judgment recorded that the point as to resale price maintenance
       was not pressed before it, after which it delved into the locus standi of
       the Appellant to move the CCI. After setting out section 19 of the Act,
       the NCLAT held:
             “16. It is true that the concept of locus standi has been
 C           diluted to some extent by allowing public interest litigation,
             class action and actions initiated at the hands of consumer
             and trade associations. Even the whistle blowers have been
             clothed with the right to seek redressal of grievances
             affecting public interest by enacting a proper legal
             framework. However, the fact remains that when a statute
 D           like the Competition Act specifically provides for the mode
             of taking cognizance of allegations regarding contravention
             of provisions relating to certain anti-competitive agreement
             and abuse of dominant position by an enterprise in a
             particular manner and at the instance of a person apart from
 E           other modes viz. suo motu or upon a reference from the
             competitive government or authority, reference to receipt
             of any information from any person in section 19(1) (a) of
             the Act has necessarily to be construed as a reference to a
             person who has suffered invasion of his legal rights as a
             consumer or beneficiary of healthy competitive practices.
 F           Any other interpretation would make room for unscrupulous
             people to rake issues of anti-competitive agreements or
             abuse of dominant position targeting some enterprises with
             oblique motives. In the instant case, the Informant claims to be
             an Independent Law-Practitioner. There is nothing on the record
 G           to show that he has suffered a legal injury at the hands of Ola and
             Uber as a consumer or as a member of any consumer or trade
             association. Not even a solitary event of the Informant of being a
             victim of unfair price fixation mechanism at the hands of Ola and
             Uber or having suffered on account of abuse of dominant position
             of either of the two enterprises have been brought to the notice of
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1053
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      this Appellate Tribunal. We are, therefore, constrained to hold         A
      that the Informant has no locus standi to maintain an action qua
      the alleged contravention of Act.”
                                                    (emphasis in original)
     5. Despite having held that the Informant had no locus standi to
move the CCI, the NCLAT went into the merits of the case and held:            B

      “17. Assuming though not accepting the proposition that the
      Informant has locus to lodge information qua alleged contravention
      of the Act and appeal at his instance is maintainable, on merits
      also we are of the considered opinion that business model of Ola
      and Uber does not support the allegation of Informant as regards        C
      price discrimination. According to Informant, the Cab Aggregators
      used their respective algorithms to facilitate price fixing between
      drivers. It is significant to notice that there is no allegation of
      collusion between the Cab Aggregators through their algorithms
      which necessarily implies an admission on the part of Informant         D
      that the two taxi service providers are operating independent of
      each other. It is also not disputed that besides Ola and Uber there
      are other players also in the field who offer their services to
      commuters/ riders in lieu of consideration. It emerges from the
      record that both Ola and Uber provide radio taxi services on
      demand. A consumer is required to download the app before he is         E
      able to avail the services of the Cab Aggregators. A cab is booked
      by a rider using the respective App of the Cab Aggregators which
      connects the rider with the driver and provides an estimate of
      fare using an algorithm. The allegation of Informant that the drivers
      attached to Cab Aggregators are independent third party service         F
      provider and not in their employment, thereby price determination
      by Cab Aggregators amounts to price fixing on behalf of drivers,
      has to be outrightly rejected as no collusion inter se the Cab
      Aggregators has been forthcoming from the Informant. The
      concept of hub and spoke cartel stated to be applicable to
      the business model of Ola and Uber as a hub with their                  G
      platforms acting as a hub for collusion inter se the spokes
      i.e. drivers resting upon US Class Action Suit titled
      “Spencer Meyer v. Travis Kalanick” has no application as
      the business model of Ola and Uber (as it operates in India)
      does not manifest in restricting price competition among                H
1054      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     drivers to the detriment of its riders. The matter relates to
       foreign antitrust jurisdiction with different connotation and
       cannot be imported to operate within the ambit and scope
       of the mechanism dealing with redressal of competition
       concerns under the Act. It is significant to note that the Informant
       in the instant case has alleged collusion on the part of drivers
 B
       through the platform of the Cab Aggregators who are stated to be
       using their algorithms to fix prices which are imposed on the
       drivers. In view of allegation of collusion inter se the drivers through
       the platform of Ola and Uber, it is ridiculous on the part of Informant
       to harp on the tune of hub and spoke raised on the basis of law
 C     operating in a foreign jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced.
       The argument in this core is repelled.
              Admittedly, under the business model of Ola, there is no
       exchange of information amongst the drivers and Ola. The taxi
       drivers connected with Ola platform have no inter se connectivity
 D     and lack the possibility of sharing information with regard to the
       commuters and the earnings they make out of the rides provided.
       This excludes the probability of collusion inter se the drivers through
       the platform of Ola. In so far as Uber is concerned, it provides a
       technology service to its driver partners and riders through the
       Uber App and assist them in finding a potential ride and also
 E     recommends a fare for the same. However, the driver partners
       as also the riders are free to accept such ride or choose the App
       of competing service, including choosing alternative modes of
       transport. Even with regard to fare though Uber App would
       recommend a fare, the driver partners have liberty to negotiate a
 F     lower fare. It is, therefore, evident that the Cab Aggregators do
       not function as an association of its driver partners. Thus, the
       allegation of their facilitating a cartel defies the logic and has to
       be repelled.
       18. Now coming to the issue of abuse of dominant position, be it
 G     seen that the Commission, having been equipped with the
       necessary wherewithal and having dealt with allegations of similar
       nature in a number of cases as also based on information in public
       domain found that there are other players offering taxi service/
       transportation service/ service providers in transport sector and
       the Cab Aggregators in the instant case distinctly do not hold
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1055
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      dominant position in the relevant market. Admittedly, these two        A
      Cab Aggregators are not operating as a joint venture or a group,
      thus both enterprises taken together cannot be deemed to be holding
      a dominant position within the ambit of Section 4 of the Act. Even
      otherwise, none of the two enterprises is independently alleged to
      be holding a dominant position in the relevant market of providing
                                                                             B
      services. This proposition of fact being an admitted position in the
      case, question of abuse of dominant position has to be outrightly
      rejected.”
                                                   (emphasis in original)
      Based on these findings, the appeal was accordingly dismissed.         C
       6. The Appellant/Informant, who appeared in person before this
Court, referred to a Services Agreement between Uber and its drivers,
updated on 08.09.2015, and an Agreement between Ola and its transport
service providers, dated 01.11.2016. He reiterated the submissions made
before the CCI and the NCLAT. In particular, he attacked the finding of      D
the NCLAT as to locus standi and referred us to various provisions of
the Act, including, in particular, sections 19 and 35, arguing that the
amendments made in the sections would show that any person can be
an informant who can approach the CCI, as one does not have to be a
“consumer” or a “complainant”, which was the position before the
Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 [“2007 Amendment”]. He                     E
contrasted these provisions with sections 53B and 53T of the Act, where
the expression used is “person aggrieved”, but hastened to add that once
an informant had moved the CCI, for the purposes of filing an appeal,
such informant would certainly be a “person aggrieved”, howsoever
restricted the expression “person aggrieved” may be in law.                  F
       7. The Appellant then argued substantially what was submitted
before the CCI and NCLAT on the merits, stating that the arrangements
in the present case amounted to “hub and spoke” arrangements and
referred us to a particular diagram depicting Ola and Uber as the “hub”
and drivers as “spokes” (at page 263 of the paper book of the Civil          G
Appeal), which indicated that the provisions of section 3 of the Act had
clearly been violated.
      8. As against this, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior
advocate appearing on behalf of Uber, took us through the concurrent
findings of fact of the CCI and the NCLAT, and stated that they could
                                                                             H
1056            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     not be said to be, in any sense, even remotely perverse and would
       therefore have to be upheld. He was at pains to stress that every driver
       of a taxi cab, who uses the Ola or Uber app, can have several such apps
       including both Ola, Uber and the apps of some of their competitors, and
       can take private rides de hors these apps as well. There is, therefore,
       complete discretion with the drivers to negotiate fares with riders, not
 B
       only insofar as Ola and Uber are concerned, but also otherwise, there
       being nothing in either the agreements or practice, which prevents them
       from doing so. Furthermore, there would be no question of any anti-
       competitive practice in the form of cartelization, as there are thousands
       of drivers, none of whom have anything to do with each other, there
 C     being no common meeting of minds as far as they are concerned. On
       the contrary, the apps allow drivers to negotiate fares that are below
       what is quoted in the app, thereby increasing competition and giving
       riders greater flexibility to take rides with those drivers who offer the
       most competitive fares.
 D            9. Shri Rajshekhar Rao, learned advocate appearing on behalf of
       Ola, also supported Dr. Singhvi’s submissions on merits, but went on to
       add that even if the Appellant could be said to be an informant for the
       purposes of section 19 of the Act, he could not be said to be a “person,
       aggrieved” for the purposes of filing an appeal under section 53B under
       the Act, and referred to the judgment in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v.
 E     H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCC
       484, [“Adi Pherozshah Gandhi”]. He also went on to argue that
       information can be provided by persons like the Appellant at the behest
       of competitors, which will have a deleterious effect on persons like Ola
       and Uber, as the value of their shares in the share market would instantly
 F     drop the moment the factum of the filing of such information before the
       CCI would be advertised. In any event, he exhorted us to lay down that
       in such cases heavy costs should be imposed to deter such persons from
       approaching the CCI with frivolous and/or mala fide information, filed
       at the behest of competitors.
 G           10. The learned ASG, Shri Balbir Singh, appearing on behalf of
       the CCI, took us through the provisions of the Act together with the
       regulations made under it, and stated that though he would support the
       CCI’s Order closing the case, he would also support the right of the
       Appellant to approach the CCI with information.

 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1057
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the       A
various parties, it is necessary to first set out the sections of the Act
which have a bearing on the matter before us:
      “Definitions
      2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
                                                                            B
        xxx xxx xxx
      (c) “cartel” includes an association of producers, sellers,
      distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement
      amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the
      production, distribution, sale or price of, or, trade in goods or     C
      provision of services;
        xxx xxx xxx
      (f) “consumer” means any person who—
         (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or
                                                                            D
         promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system
         of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other
         than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or
         promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system
         of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval
         of such person, whether such purchase of goods is for resale       E
         or for any commercial purpose or for personal use;
         (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which
         has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised,
         or under any system of deferred payment and includes any
         beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires       F
         or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or
         partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
         payment, when such services are availed of with the approval
         of the first-mentioned person whether such hiring or availing
         of services is for any commercial purpose or for personal use;
                                                                            G
        xxx xxx xxx
      (l) “person” includes—
         (i) an individual;
         (ii) a Hindu undivided family;
                                                                            H
1058      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A        (iii) a company;
          (iv) a firm;
          (v) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether
          incorporated or not, in India or outside India;
 B        (vi) any corporation established by or under any Central, State
          or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in
          section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
          (vii) any body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of
          a country outside India;
 C        (viii) a co-operative society registered under any law relating
          to co-operative societies;
          (ix) a local authority;
          (x) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the
          preceding sub-clauses;”
 D
       “Anti-competitive agreements
       3. (1) No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or
       association of persons shall enter into any agreement in respect
       of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control
 E     of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to
       cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.
        xxx xxx xxx
       (3) Any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations
       of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between
 F     any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken
       by, any association of enterprises or association of persons,
       including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or
       provision of services, which—
          (a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices;...
 G
          xxx xxx xxx
       (4) Any agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different
       stages or levels of the production chain in different markets, in
       respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or price
       of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including—
 H
        xxx xxx xxx
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1059
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

       (e) resale price maintenance”                                         A
    “Duties of Commission
    18. Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the
    Commission to eliminate practices having adverse effect on
    competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the interests
    of consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by other             B
    participants, in markets in India:
    Provided that the Commission may, for the purpose of discharging
    its duties or performing its functions under this Act, enter into any
    memorandum or arrangement with the prior approval of the Central
    Government, with any agency of any foreign country.”                     C

    “Inquiry into certain agreements and dominant position of
    enterprise
    19. (1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention
    of the provisions contained in subsection (1) of section 3 or sub-       D
    section (1) of section 4 either on its own motion or on—
       (a) receipt of any information, in such manner and accompanied
       by such fee as may be determined by regulations, from any
       person, consumer or their association or trade association; or
       (b) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a             E
       State Government or a statutory authority…’’
    “Procedure for inquiry under section 19
    26. (1) On receipt of a reference from the Central Government
    or a State Government or a statutory authority or on its own
    knowledge or information received under section 19, if the               F
    Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case,
    it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be
    made into the matter:
    Provided that if the subject matter of an information received is,
    in the opinion of the Commission, substantially the same as or has       G
    been covered by any previous information received, then the new
    information may be clubbed with the previous information.
    (2) Where on receipt of a reference from the Central Government
    or a State Government or a statutory authority or information
                                                                             H
1060      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     received under section 19, the Commission is of the opinion that
       there exists no prima facie case, it shall close the matter forthwith
       and pass such orders as it deems fit and send a copy of its order
       to the Central Government or the State Government or the
       statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may
       be….”
 B
       “Appearance before Commission
       35. A person or an enterprise or the Director General may either
       appear in person or authorise one or more chartered accountants
       or company secretaries or cost accountants or legal practitioners
 C     or any of his or its officers to present his or its case before the
       Commission.
       Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
          (a) “chartered accountant” means a chartered accountant as
          defined in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the
 D        Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (38 of 1949) and who has
          obtained a certificate of practice under sub-section (1) of
          section 6 of that Act;
          (b) “company secretary” means a company secretary as
          defined in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the
 E        Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980) and who has
          obtained a certificate of practice under sub-section (1) of
          section 6 of that Act;
          (c) “cost accountant” means a cost accountant as defined in
          clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 2 of the Cost and Works
 F        Accountants Act, 1959 (23 of 1959) and who has obtained a
          certificate of practice under sub- section (1) of section 6 of
          that Act;
          (d) “legal practitioner” means an advocate, vakil or an attorney
          of any High Court, and includes a pleader in practice.”
 G     “Penalty for offences in relation to furnishing of information
       45. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 44, if a person,
       who furnishes or is required to furnish under this Act any particulars,
       documents or any information,—

 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1061
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

       (a) makes any statement or furnishes any document which he               A
       knows or has reason to believe to be false in any material
       particular; or
       (b) omits to state any material fact knowing it to be material;
       or
       (c) wilfully alters, suppresses or destroys any document which           B
       is required to be furnished as aforesaid, such person shall be
       punishable with fine which may extend to rupees one crore as
       may be determined by the Commission.
    (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the
    Commission may also pass such other order as it deems fit.”                 C

    “Appeal to Appellate Tribunal
    53B. (1) The Central Government or the State Government or a
    local authority or enterprise or any person, aggrieved by any
    direction, decision or order referred to in clause (a) of section           D
    53A may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
    (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period
    of sixty days from the date on which a copy of the direction or
    decision or order made by the Commission is received by the
    Central Government or the State Government or a local authority
                                                                                E
    or enterprise or any person referred to in that sub-section and it
    shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be
    prescribed:
    Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal
    after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that
                                                                                F
    there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
    (3) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate
    Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity
    of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming,
    modifying or setting aside the direction, decision or order appealed
    against.                                                                    G

    (4) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made
    by it to the Commission and the parties to the appeal.
    (5) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section
    (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and              H
1062      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal within six
       months from the date of receipt of the appeal.”
       “Awarding compensation
       53N. (1) Without prejudice to any other provisions contained in
       this Act, the Central Government or a State Government or a
 B     local authority or any enterprise or any person may make an
       application to the Appellate Tribunal to adjudicate on claim for
       compensation that may arise from the findings of the Commission
       or the orders of the Appellate Tribunal in an appeal against any
       findings of the Commission or under section 42A or under sub-
 C     section (2) of section 53Q of the Act, and to pass an order for the
       recovery of compensation from any enterprise for any loss or
       damage shown to have been suffered, by the Central Government
       or a State Government or a local authority or any enterprise or
       any person as a result of any contravention of the provisions of
       Chapter II, having been committed by enterprise.
 D
       (2) Every application made under sub-section (1) shall be
       accompanied by the findings of the Commission, if any, and also
       be accompanied with such fees as may be prescribed.
       (3) The Appellate Tribunal may, after an inquiry made into the
 E     allegations mentioned in the application made under sub-section
       (1), pass an order directing the enterprise to make payment to the
       applicant, of the amount determined by it as realisable from the
       enterprise as compensation for the loss or damage caused to the
       applicant as a result of any contravention of the provisions of
       Chapter II having been committed by such enterprise: Provided
 F     that the Appellate Tribunal may obtain the recommendations of
       the Commission before passing an order of compensation.
       (4) Where any loss or damage referred to in sub-section (1) is
       caused to numerous persons having the same interest, one or more
       of such persons may, with the permission of the Appellate Tribunal,
 G     make an application under that sub-section for and on behalf of,
       or for the benefit of, the persons so interested, and thereupon, the
       provisions of rule 8 of Order 1 of the First Schedule to the Code
       of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall apply subject to the
       modification that every reference therein to a suit or decree shall
       be construed as a reference to the application before the Appellate
 H
       Tribunal and the order of the Appellate Tribunal thereon.
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1063
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

    Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared              A
    that—
    (a) an application may be made for compensation before the
    Appellate Tribunal only after either the Commission or the Appellate
    Tribunal on appeal under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section
    53A of the Act, has determined in a proceeding before it that              B
    violation of the provisions of the Act has taken place, or if provisions
    of section 42A or sub-section (2) of section 53Q of the Act are
    attracted.
    (b) enquiry to be conducted under sub-section(3) shall be for the
    purpose of determining the eligibility and quantum of compensation         C
    due to a person applying for the same, and not for examining
    afresh the findings of the Commission or the Appellate Tribunal
    on whether any violation of the Act has taken place.”
    “Right to legal representation
    53S.                                                                       D
    xxx xxx xxx
    (3) The Commission may authorize one or more chartered
    accountants or company secretaries or cost accountants or legal
    practitioners or any of its officers to act as presenting officers
                                                                               E
    and every person so authorized may present the case with respect
    to any appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
    Explanation – The expressions “chartered accountant” or
    “company secretary” or “cost accountant” or “legal practitioner”
    shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the
                                                                               F
    Explanation to section 35.
    Appeal to Supreme Court
    53T. The Central Government or any State Government or the
    Commission or any statutory authority or any local authority or
    any enterprise or any person aggrieved by any decision or order            G
    of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court
    within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision
    or order of the Appellate Tribunal to them;
    Provided that the Supreme court may, if it is satisfied that the
    applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal         H
1064            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A           within the said period, allow it to be filed after the expiry of the
             said period of sixty days.”
              12. The relevant regulations that are contained in the Competition
       Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 [“2009 Regulations”]
       are set out as under:
 B           “2. Definitions. –
             (1) In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires, –
               xxx xxx xxx
                (i) “Party” includes a consumer or an enterprise or a person
 C              defined in clauses (f), (h) and (l) of section 2 of the Act
                respectively, or an information provider, or a consumer
                association or a trade association or the Director General
                defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Act, or the Central
                Government or any State Government or any statutory authority,
 D              as the case may be, and shall include an enterprise against
                whom any inquiry or proceeding is instituted and shall also
                include any person permitted to join the proceedings or an
                intervener;...”
             “10. Contents of information or the reference. –
 E           (1) The information or reference (except a reference under sub-
             section (1) of section 49 of the Act) shall, inter alia, separately
             and categorically state the following seriatum-
                (a) legal name of the person or the enterprise giving the
                information or the reference;
 F              (b) complete postal address in India for delivery of summons
                or notice by the Commission, with Postal Index Number (PIN)
                code;
                (c) telephone number, fax number and also electronic mail
                address, if available;
 G
                (d) mode of service of notice or documents preferred;
                (e) legal name and address(es) of the enterprise(s) alleged to
                have contravened the provisions of the Act; and
                (f) legal name and address of the counsel or other authorized
 H              representative, if any;
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1065
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

    (2) The information or reference referred to in sub-regulation (1)      A
    shall contain –
       (a) a statement of facts;
       (b) details of the alleged contraventions of the Act together
       with a list enlisting all documents, affidavits and evidence, as
       the case may be, in support of each of the alleged                   B
       contraventions;
       (c) a succinct narrative in support of the alleged contraventions;
       (d) relief sought, if any;
       (da) Details of litigation or dispute pending between the            C
       informant and parties before any court, tribunal, statutory
       authority or arbitrator in respect of the subject matter of
       information;
       (e) Such other particulars as may be required by the
       Commission.                                                          D
    (3) The contents of the information or the reference mentioned
    under sub- regulations (1) and (2), alongwith the appendices and
    attachments thereto, shall be complete and duly verified by the
    person submitting it.”
    “14. Powers and functions of the Secretary. –                           E

        xxx xxx xxx
    (4) The Commission may sue or be sued in the name of the
    Secretary and the Commission shall be represented in the name
    of the Secretary in all legal proceedings, including appeals before     F
    the Tribunal.”
    “25. Power of Commission to permit a person or enterprise
    to take part in proceedings.
    (1) While considering a matter in an ordinary meeting, the
    Commission, on an application made to it in writing, if satisfied,      G
    that a person or enterprise has substantial interest in the outcome
    of proceedings and that it is necessary in the public interest to
    allow such person or enterprise to present his or its opinion on
    that matter, may permit that person or enterprise to present such
    opinion and to take part in further proceedings of the matter, as
                                                                            H
    the Commission may specify….”
1066            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A           “35. Confidentiality. –
             (1) The Commission shall maintain confidentiality of the identity
             of an informant on a request made to it in writing.
             Provided that where it is expedient to disclose the identity of the
             informant for the purposes of the Act, the Commission shall do so
 B           after giving an opportunity to the informant of being heard….”
             “51. Empanelment of special counsel by Commission.–
             (1) The Commission may draw up a panel of legal practitioners or
             chartered accountants or company secretaries or cost accountants
 C           to assist in proceedings before the Competition Appellate Tribunal
             or any other quasi-judicial body or Court.
             (2) The Director General may call upon the legal practitioners or
             chartered accountants or company secretaries or cost accountants
             from the panel for assistance in the proceedings before the
 D           Commission, if so required.
             (3) The remuneration payable and other allowances and
             compensation admissible to counsel shall be specified in consultation
             with the Commission.”
             13. A reading of the provisions of the Act and the 2009 Regulations
 E     would show that “any person” may provide information to the CCI, which
       may then act upon it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In this
       regard, the definition of “person” in section 2(l) of the Act, set out
       hereinabove, is an inclusive one and is extremely wide, including
       individuals of all kinds and every artificial juridical person. This may be
       contrasted with the definition of “consumer” in section 2(f) of the Act,
 F
       which makes it clear that only persons who buy goods for consideration,
       or hire or avail of services for a consideration, are recognised as
       consumers.
              14. A look at section 19(1) of the Act would show that the Act
       originally provided for the “receipt of a complaint” from any person,
 G     consumer or their association, or trade association. This expression was
       then substituted with the expression “receipt of any information in such
       manner and” by the 2007 Amendment. This substitution is not without
       significance. Whereas, a complaint could be filed only from a person
       who was aggrieved by a particular action, information may be received
 H     from any person, obviously whether such person is or is not personally
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1067
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

affected. This is for the reason that the proceedings under the Act are          A
proceedings in rem which affect the public interest. That the CCI may
inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its
own motion, is also laid down in section 19(1) of the Act. Further, even
while exercising suo motu powers, the CCI may receive information
from any person and not merely from a person who is aggrieved by the
                                                                                 B
conduct that is alleged to have occurred. This also follows from a reading
of section 35 of the Act, in which the earlier expression “complainant or
defendant” has been substituted by the expression, “person or an
enterprise,” setting out that the informant may appear either in person,
or through one or more agents, before the CCI to present the information
that he has gathered.                                                            C
       15. Section 45 of the Act is a deterrent against persons who provide
information to the CCI, mala fide or recklessly, inasmuch as false
statements and omissions of material facts are punishable with a penalty
which may extend to the hefty amount of rupees one crore, with the
CCI being empowered to pass other such orders as it deems fit. This,             D
and the judicious use of heavy costs being imposed when the information
supplied is either frivolous or mala fide, can keep in check what is
described as the growing tendency of persons being “set up” by rivals in
the trade.
       16. The 2009 Regulations also point in the same direction inasmuch        E
as regulation 10, which has been set out hereinabove, does not require
the informant to state how he is personally aggrieved by the contravention
of the Act, but only requires a statement of facts and details of the
alleged contravention to be set out in the information filed. Also, regulation
25 shows that public interest must be foremost in the consideration of
the CCI when an application is made to it in writing that a person or            F
enterprise has substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings,
and such person may therefore be allowed to take part in the proceedings.
What is also extremely important is regulation 35, by which the CCI
must maintain confidentiality of the identity of an informant on a request
made to it in writing, so that such informant be free from harassment by         G
persons involved in contravening the Act.
      17. This being the case, it is difficult to agree with the impugned
judgment of the NCLAT in its narrow construction of section 19 of the
Act, which therefore stands set aside.
                                                                                 H
1068             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A            18. With the question of the Informant’s locus standi out of the
       way, one more important aspect needs to be decided, and that is the
       submission of Shri Rao, that in any case, a person like the Informant
       cannot be said to be a “person aggrieved” for the purpose of sections
       53B and 53T of the Act. Shri Rao relies heavily upon Adi Pherozshah
       Gandhi (supra), in which section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961 came
 B
       up for consideration, which spoke of the right of appeal of “any person
       aggrieved” by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar
       Council. It was held that since the Advocate General could not be said
       to be a person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee
       of the State Bar Council against a particular advocate, he would have no
 C     locus standi to appeal to the Bar Council of India. In so saying, the
       Court held:
             “11. From these cases it is apparent that any person who feels
             disappointed with the result of the case is not a “person aggrieved”.
             He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received
 D           if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a
             legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. It is no
             doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters
             but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure him. That the
             order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to
             be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance….”
 E
                                                                        (page 491)
              19. It must immediately be pointed out that this provision of the
       Advocates Act, 1961 is in the context of a particular advocate being
       penalized for professional or other misconduct, which concerned itself
 F     with an action in personam, unlike the present case, which is concerned
       with an action in rem. In this context, it is useful to refer to the judgment
       in A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616, in which the
       expression “person aggrieved” in section 198(1)(c) of the Code of
       Criminal Procedure, 1973, when it came to an offence punishable under
       section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (being the offence of bigamy),
 G     was under consideration. It was held that a “person aggrieved” need not
       only be the first wife, but can also include a second “wife” who may
       complain of the same. In so saying, the Court held:
             “25. Even otherwise, as explained earlier, the second wife suffers
             several legal wrongs and/or legal injuries when the second
 H           marriage is treated as a nullity by the husband arbitrarily, without
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1069
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      recourse to the court or where a declaration sought is granted by        A
      a competent court. The expression “aggrieved person” denotes
      an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the
      bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope
      and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the
      content and intent of the statute of which the contravention is
                                                                               B
      alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and
      extent of complainant’s interest and the nature and the extent of
      the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant. Section 494
      does not restrict the right of filing complaint to the first wife and
      there is no reason to read the said section in a restricted manner
      as is suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. Section        C
      494 does not say that the complaint for commission of offence
      under the said section can be filed only by the wife living and not
      by the woman with whom the subsequent marriage takes place
      during the lifetime of the wife living and which marriage is void by
      reason of its taking place during the life of such wife. The complaint
                                                                               D
      can also be filed by the person with whom the second marriage
      takes place which is void by reason of its taking place during the
      life of the first wife.”
                                                                (page 628)
       20. Clearly, therefore, given the context of the Act in which the       E
CCI and the NCLAT deal with practices which have an adverse effect
on competition in derogation of the interest of consumers, it is clear that
the Act vests powers in the CCI and enables it to act in rem, in public
interest. This would make it clear that a “person aggrieved” must, in the
context of the Act, be understood widely and not be constructed narrowly,
as was done in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi (supra). Further, it is not without       F
significance that the expressions used in sections 53B and 53T of the
Act are “any person”, thereby signifying that all persons who bring to
the CCI information of practices that are contrary to the provisions of
the Act, could be said to be aggrieved by an adverse order of the CCI in
case it refuses to act upon the information supplied. By way of contrast,      G
section 53N(3) speaks of making payment to an applicant as
compensation for the loss or damage caused to the applicant as a result
of any contravention of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, having
been committed by an enterprise. By this sub-section, clearly, therefore,
“any person” who makes an application for compensation, under sub-
                                                                               H
1070            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     section (1) of section 53N of the Act, would refer only to persons who
       have suffered loss or damage, thereby, qualifying the expression “any
       person” as being a person who has suffered loss or damage. Thus, the
       preliminary objections against the Informant/Appellant filing Information
       before the CCI and filing an appeal before the NCLAT are rejected.
 B           21. An instructive judgment of this Court reported as Competition
       Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India, (2010) 10 SCC
       744 dealt with the provisions of the Act in some detail and held:
             “37. As already noticed, in exercise of its powers, the Commission
             is expected to form its opinion as to the existence of a prima facie
 C           case for contravention of certain provisions of the Act and then
             pass a direction to the Director General to cause an investigation
             into the matter. These proceedings are initiated by the intimation
             or reference received by the Commission in any of the manners
             specified under Section 19 of the Act. At the very threshold, the
             Commission is to exercise its powers in passing the direction for
 D           investigation; or where it finds that there exists no prima facie
             case justifying passing of such a direction to the Director General,
             it can close the matter and/or pass such orders as it may deem fit
             and proper. In other words, the order passed by the Commission
             under Section 26(2) is a final order as it puts an end to the
 E           proceedings initiated upon receiving the information in one of the
             specified modes. This order has been specifically made appealable
             under Section 53-A of the Act.
             38. In contradistinction, the direction under Section 26(1) after
             formation of a prima facie opinion is a direction simpliciter to cause
 F           an investigation into the matter. Issuance of such a direction, at
             the face of it, is an administrative direction to one of its own wings
             departmentally and is without entering upon any adjudicatory
             process. It does not effectively determine any right or obligation
             of the parties to the lis. Closure of the case causes determination
             of rights and affects a party i.e. the informant; resultantly, the
 G           said party has a right to appeal against such closure of case under
             Section 26(2) of the Act. On the other hand, mere direction for
             investigation to one of the wings of the Commission is akin to a
             departmental proceeding which does not entail civil consequences
             for any person, particularly, in light of the strict confidentiality that
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1071
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

    is expected to be maintained by the Commission in terms of Section      A
    57 of the Act and Regulation 35 of the Regulations.”
                                                             (page 768)
    “101. The right to prefer an appeal is available to the Central
    Government, the State Government or a local authority or
    enterprise or any person aggrieved by any direction, decision or        B
    order referred to in clause (a) of Section 53-A [ought to be printed
    as 53-A(1)(a)]. The appeal is to be filed within the period specified
    and Section 53-B(3) further requires that the Tribunal, after giving
    the parties to appeal an opportunity of being heard, to pass such
    orders, as it thinks fit, and send a copy of such order to the          C
    Commission and the parties to the appeal.
    102. Section 53-S contemplates that before the Tribunal a person
    may either appear “in person” or authorise one or more chartered
    accountants or company secretaries, cost accountants or legal
    practitioners or any of its officers to present its case before the     D
    Tribunal. However, the Commission’s right to legal representation
    in any appeal before the Tribunal has been specifically mentioned
    under Section 53-S(3). It provides that the Commission may
    authorise one or more of chartered accountants or company
    secretaries or cost accountants or legal practitioners or any of its
    officers to act as presenting officers before the Tribunal. Section     E
    53-T grants a right in specific terms to the Commission to prefer
    an appeal before the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date
    of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal to them.
    103. The expression “any person” appearing in Section 53-B has
    to be construed liberally as the provision first mentions specific      F
    government bodies then local authorities and enterprises, which
    term, in any case, is of generic nature and then lastly mentions
    “any person”. Obviously, it is intended that expanded meaning be
    given to the term “persons” i.e. persons or bodies who are entitled
    to appeal. The right of hearing is also available to the parties to     G
    appeal.
    104. The above stated provisions clearly indicate that the
    Commission, a body corporate, is expected to be party in the
    proceedings before the Tribunal as it has a legal right of
    representation. Absence of the Commission before the Tribunal
                                                                            H
1072      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 13 S.C.R.


 A     will deprive it of presenting its views in the proceedings. Thus, it
       may not be able to effectively exercise its right to appeal in terms
       of Section 53 of the Act.
       105. Furthermore, Regulations 14(4) and 51 support the view that
       the Commission can be a necessary or a proper party in the
 B     proceedings before the Tribunal. The Commission, in terms of
       Section 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, is entitled to commence
       proceedings suo motu and adopt its own procedure for completion
       of such proceedings. Thus, the principle of fairness would demand
       that such party should be heard by the Tribunal before any orders
       adverse to it are passed in such cases. The Tribunal has taken
 C     this view and we have no hesitation in accepting that in cases
       where proceedings initiated suo motu by the Commission, the
       Commission is a necessary party.
       106. However, we are also of the view that in other cases the
       Commission would be a proper party. It would not only help in
 D     expeditious disposal, but the Commission, as an expert body, in
       any case, is entitled to participate in its proceedings in terms of
       Regulation 51. Thus, the assistance rendered by the Commission
       to the Tribunal could be useful in complete and effective
       adjudication of the issue before it.”
 E                                                              (page 788)
       “125. We have already noticed that the principal objects of the
       Act, in terms of its Preamble and the Statement of Objects and
       Reasons, are to eliminate practices having adverse effect on the
       competition, to promote and sustain competition in the market, to
 F     protect the interest of the consumers and ensure freedom of trade
       carried on by the participants in the market, in view of the economic
       developments in the country. In other words, the Act requires not
       only protection of free trade but also protection of consumer
       interest. The delay in disposal of cases, as well as undue
 G     continuation of interim restraint orders, can adversely and
       prejudicially affect the free economy of the country. Efforts to
       liberalise the Indian economy to bring it on a par with the best of
       the economies in this era of globalisation would be jeopardised if
       time-bound schedule and, in any case, expeditious disposal by the
       Commission is not adhered to. The scheme of various provisions
 H
SAMIR AGRAWAL v. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 1073
            & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

       of the Act which we have already referred to including Sections          A
       26, 29, 30, 31, 53-B(5) and 53-T and Regulations 12, 15, 16, 22,
       32, 48 and 31 clearly show the legislative intent to ensure time-
       bound disposal of such matters.
       126. The Commission performs various functions including
       regulatory, inquisitorial and adjudicatory. The powers conferred         B
       by the legislature upon the Commission under Sections 27(d) and
       31(3) are of wide magnitude and of serious ramifications. The
       Commission has the jurisdiction even to direct that an agreement
       entered into between the parties shall stand modified to the extent
       and in the manner, as may be specified. Similarly, where it is of
       the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an           C
       appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect
       can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination,
       the Commission is empowered to direct such modification.”
                                                                (page 794)
                                                                                D
       22. Obviously, when the CCI performs inquisitorial, as opposed to
adjudicatory functions, the doors of approaching the CCI and the appellate
authority, i.e., the NCLAT, must be kept wide open in public interest, so
as to subserve the high public purpose of the Act.
      23. Coming now to the merits, we have already set out the                 E
concurrent findings of fact of the CCI and the NCLAT, wherein it has
been found that Ola and Uber do not facilitate cartelization or anti-
competitive practices between drivers, who are independent individuals,
who act independently of each other, so as to attract the application of
section 3 of the Act, as has been held by both the CCI and the NCLAT.
We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with these findings. Resultantly,     F
the appeal is disposed of in terms of this judgment.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                       Appeal disposed of.

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