SANGEETA SINGHversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                           SANGEETA SINGH                                       A
                                     V.
                      UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                            AUGUST 23, 2005
                                                                                B
                [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]

     Interpretation of Statutes-Casus Ornissus-Eligibility criteria enumer-
ating prohibited categories of relationships for obtaining petroleum product
dealership-Certain relationships specifically not mentioned-Writ petitions
filed before High Court allowed holding that a literal or narrow meaning        C
should not be adopted in such cases and disqualification is permissible even
 if a relationship does not figure within the prohibited categories-On appeal
Held, Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provisions or a stipulated
condition which is plain and unambiguous-Defective phrasing of an Act
cannot be added to or mended so to make up the deficiencies-Rules of            D
interpretation do not permit so, unless the provisions as it stands is
meaningless or of doubtful meaning-A casus omissus cannot be supplied
by a court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it
is found in the four corners offhe salute ilse/f-Casus omissus should not
be readily inferred and for that purpose parts of the statute should be
construed together so that the construction is consistent with the whole        E
statute-Where casus omissus occurs either due to inadvertence of the
legislatured or on the principle, quad semel out bis existit proete,-eunt
legislators, then the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be
disposed of according to the previous law-Matter remitted to High Court
for considering other issues raised.                                            F
      The appellants were selected as eligible petroleum product dealers.
Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court to challenge their
eligibility, against the judgment of which, the present five appeals were
filed. The issue involved was whether the appellants could be held
ineligible because their close relatives had a petroleum product dealer-        G
ship. In two of these appeals, the selected person's father-in-law held a
dealership and the remaining appeals were similarly placed. Although,
none of tile relationships in question came within the prohibited catego-
 ries. High Court allowed the writ petitions holding that a literal or
 narrow meaning should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a            H
                                     823
     824                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A dealership, the daughter-in-law is disqualified, notwithstanding the fact
    that such a relationship does not figure within the prohibited categories
    as per the eligibility criteria on the advertisements. Appellants being
    aggrieved by the judgments filed these appeals.

           Appellants contended that view of the High Court was clearly
B untenable as the advertisement indicated the covered persons in clear
    and unambiguous terms; and that it was not permissible for the High
    Court to add persons to the list of relatives.

           Respondents contended that intentions have to be seen as monopoly
c   has to be discouraged and while dealing with State or public sector
    undertakings largesse a narrow meaning should not be given; and that
    it is a clear case of casus omisus, an unintentional omission, which is to
    be ignored as the intention is clear.

           Allowing the appeals, the Court
D
         HELD: 1.1. Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provision
    or a stipulated condition, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is
    an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
    determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar is the position for
    conditions stipulated in advertisements. [828-H; 829-A]
E                                 I

          1.2. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental refer-
    ences to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the ·
    intention of the Legislature e~acting it. The intention of the Legislature
    is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that
F   attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not
    been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its
    support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection
    of words as meaningless has to be avoided. Courts, cannot ·aid. the
    Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, and cannot add or mend, and
    by construction mak~ up deficiencies, which are left there. It is contrary
G   to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is abso-
    lutely necessary to do so, Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts
    to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful
    meaning. Courts are not entitled to read. words into an Act of Parlia-
    ment unless clear reason for it is to be within the four corners of the
H   Act itself. [829-B-C-D-E]
                     SANGEETA SINGH v. U.0.1.                         825

     Institute a/Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis. Price Water House     A
and Anr., A.LR. (1998) SC 74; Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., J.T.
(1998) 2 SC 253; Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Devioh and
Ors., A.l.R. (1962) SC 847; Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De
Gama o/Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981; D.R. Venkatchalam
and Ors. Etc. v, Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. Etc., A.l.R. (1977)      B
SC 842, relied on.

     Crawford v. Spooner, (1946) 6 Moor PCI; Stock v. Frank Jones
(Tiptan) ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL), Vickers Sons and Maxim ltd. v.
Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL) and lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218
FR 547, referred to.                                                          c
     2. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law
and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected
to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify
or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omissus cannot       D
be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (830-B]

     Commissioner o/Sales Tax, MP. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain,
(2000] 5 sec 511, relied on.

     3.1. Two principles of construction· one relating to casus omissus       E
and the other to reading the statute as a whole are well settled. Under
the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court
except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in
the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus
should no be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a         F
statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a
section should be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular pro-
vision makes a consistent enactmentofthe whole statute. This would be
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly
absurd or anomalous results, which could not have been intended by            G
the Legislature. [830-C-D-E]

     3.2. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save
in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does
really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the   H
    826                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that
    the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according
    to the law as it existed before such statute-Casus omissus et oblivioni
    datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur. (830-H; 831-A-B)

B        Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr.,
    J.T. (2004) 6 SC 227, relied on.

         Artemious v. Procopiou, (1966) 1 QB 878; Luke v. IRC, (1963) AC
    557; Fenton v. Hampton, (1858) XI Moore, P.C. 347; Jones v. Smart, 1
    T.R. 52; Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L. Cas. 61 and Abley v. Dale, 11
C   C.B. 378, referred to.

         4. The High Court has not dealt with any other issue and has
    disposed of only on the ground that the father-in-law was holding
    dealership, thereby rendering daughter-in-law ineligible. The matter is
D   remitted to the High Court for consideration of other issues raised.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8737 of
    2003.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 14.5.2003 of the Allahabad High
E   Court in C.M.W.P. No. 18104 of 2002.

                                        WITH

          C.A. Nos. 8739, 8740, 8741 and 8742 of 2003.

F        K.P. Pathak, Additional Solicitor General, Vijay Hansaria, Rakesh K.
    Khanna, Dr. Rashmi Khanna, Shashank Shekhar, Surya Kant, H.K. Puri,
    R.D. Upadhyay, Munendra Kumar Singh, A.K. Singh, R.K. Singh, Ms.
    Minakshi Sharma, Shiv Prakash Pandey, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Rudreshwar
    Singh, T.A. Khan and B.V. Bairam Das for the appearing parties.
G
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. : Civil Appeal nos. 8739/2003 and 8740/2003
    relate to civil writ petition no.24966/2001 disposed of by a Division Bench
H   of Allahabad High Court, while, Civil Appeal nos. 8742/2003, 8741/2003,
              SANGEETA SINGH v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT, J.]                      827

8737/2003 relate to civil writ petition no. 18104/2002, which was disposed        A
of following the view expressed in the other writ petition. The dispute relates
to eligibility of appellants to be selected for dealership in petroleum prod·
ucts.

        Factual controversy lies in a narrow compass and is as follows:           B
        In both writ petitions challenge was to the selection of the appellants
in Civil Appeal nos.873 7/2003 and 8739/2003 for retail dealership oflndian
Oil Corporation Limited (in short 'IOC') at different places. The appellants
and writ-petitioners in the writ petitions before the High Court were appli·
cants for dealership and distributionship of various petroleum products.          c
Challenge to the selection was on the ground that the selected persons were
not eligible for selection on several grounds. One of the grounds highlighted
was that their relatives already hold letters .of intent for dealership or
distributionship ofMS/HSD/Kerosene/LDO/LPG of another or same public
sector oil company. So far as appellant in Civil Appeal no. 8739/2003 is          D
concerned, it was pointed out that the selected person's father-in-law was
already holding dealership. In the case of appellant in civil appeal no.8737/
2003 similar plea was raised. Successful persons took the stand that the
person who was already holding dealership did not come within the enu·
merated prohibited category and, therefore, there was no illegality in the
selection. The High Court, however, held that no doubt the terms and              E
conditions of grant of dealership mention that if daughter-in-law holds
dealership then the father-in-law is disqualified. A literal or narrow meaning
should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a dealership, daughter·
in-law is also disqualified. A literal interpretation need not be given to the
 requirement, but the intention has to be seen. It was observed that the          F
intention of the prohibition criteria for awarding of dealership was that if
a close relative is already holding a dealership, relatives of such persons
should not be granted a dealership. If father-in-law is a close relation to the
daughter-in-law reverse is also true and, therefore, the daughter-in-law is
ineligible ifthe father-in-law had already a dealership. IOC and the selected
persons have challenged the correctness of the judgments rendered by the          G
High Court. Writ petitioner in Civil Misc. petition No.24966/2001 has
questioned correctness of High Court's order in Civil Appeal no.8742/2003
on the ground that it had raised several other points to contend that the
selected person was ineligible but the High Court did nPt refer to them.
Originally, selected persons and IOC are appellants in other Civil Appeals.       H
    828                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A           Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view of the
    High Court is clearly untenable. In clear and unambiguous terms the
    advertisement indicated persons who are covered. It was not permissible
    for the High Court to add persons to the list of the relatives. The writ-
    petitioners before the High Court, the respondents herein supported the
B   judgment of the High Court. Their stand is that intentions have to be seen,
    monopoly has to be discouraged and while dealing with State or public
    sector undertakings largesse a narrow meaning should not be given. It is
    a clear case of casus omissus, an unintentional omission, which is to be
    ignored as the intention is clear. IOC's stand is similar to that of originally
    selected candidates. It does not subscribe to the stand that it is a case of
C   casus omis's.J,Js. It is to be noted at this juncture that the eligibility criteria
    so far as relatives are concerned are different from 1997 onwards. Pre 1997
    the relatives enumerated are as follows:

                Spouse
D
          II    Father/Mother

          III   Brother/Sister

          IV    Son/Daughter
E
          V     Daughter-in-law/Son-in-law

          VI    Parent-in-law

          After 1997, the list reads as follows:
F
                Spouse

          II    Father/Mother (not applicable to daughter)

          III   Brother/Brother's wife (Not applicable for women applicants)
G
          IV    Son/Daughter in law.

         It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything
    into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and
H
               SANGEETA SINGH v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT, J.]                     829

unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language em-            A
ployed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar
is the position for conditions stipulated in advertisements.

      Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to
referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of   B
the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
v. Mis Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR (1998) SC 74). The intention of the
Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means
that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not
been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as        C
meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawfordv. Spooner, (1846
(6) Moore PC I), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of
an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies
which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai
Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., JT (1998) 2 SC 253). It is contrary to all rules        D
of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary
to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL).
Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision
as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled
to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be
found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in        E
 Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in
Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR (l 962)
SC 847.

     The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but            F
what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of
Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley
Coal Co. v. Yensavage, (218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union
of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR
(1990) SC 98 l.                                                                    G

     In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors. Etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
and Ors. Etc., AIR (1977) SC 842, it was observed that Courts must avoid
the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on
their own pre~conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into            H
    830                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not
    entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

         While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and
    cannot legislate it. If a provision oflaw is misused and subjected to the abuse
    of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, m~dify or repeal it, if
B   deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP. v. Popular Trad-
    ing Coriipany, Ujjain, (2000] 5 SCC 511. The legislative casus omissus
    cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

          Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the
C   other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled.
    Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court
    except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the
    four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should
    not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section
D   must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed
    with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construe-
    tion to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the
    whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular
    clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have
    been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable
E   result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (I 966) I QB 878,
    "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction avail-
    able". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention
    of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do
    some violenci.; to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and
     produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. !RC, (1963) AC
F
     557 where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though
    our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".

          It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an incon-
    venience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good
G   reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus
    omissus, and that the law intended ~uae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the
    other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to
    an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well
    as if it happened more frequeP.tly, because it happens but seldom" (See
H   Fenton v. Hampton, (1858) XI Moore, P.C. 347. A casus omissus ought not
               SANGEETA SINGH v. U.0.L [PASAYAT, J.]                        83I

to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where,      A
however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence
of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt
legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must
be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - Casus
omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni comrnunis juris relinquitur; "a casus       B
 omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (I T.R. 52), "can in no case
be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws." The
principles were examined in detail in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraha1n Umarji
v. State of Gujarat and Anr., JT (2004) 6 SC 227.

      The golden rule for construing all written instruments has been thus          c
stated: ''The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered
to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or incon-
sistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity
and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L. Cas.         D
61 ). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with
much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain
and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their
ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity
or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their inport
 is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we         E
depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because
we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence
to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).

        In the aforesaid background the High Court's judgment cannot be             F
maintained and is set aside. However, writ petitioner in writ petition no.24966/
200 I has taken the plea that other grounds were highlighted in the writ
petition to show as to how the selected person was ineligible. The High
Court has not dealt with any other issue and has disposed of only on the
ground that the father-in-law was holding dealership, thereby rendering
daughter-in-law ineligible.                                                         G

       We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court for consideration
of other issues raised. We make it clear that we have not expressed any
opinion on any other issue then those indicated above. So, far as writ petition
18104/2002 is concerned, it is not the case that any other point was raised.        H
    832                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   Therefore, only writ petition no.24966 of 200 I remitted to the High Court
    to consider if the other pleas raised are tenable. Parties shall be permitted
    to place material in support of their respective stand, and not on the issue
    of relationship.

B          The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent with no
    order as to costs.

    A.Q.                                                        Appeal allowed.