Holding

The Bar Council of India's review order was set aside and the original three‑year suspension of the advocate was restored.

Summary

The Delhi Bar Council suspended advocate Pritam Singh for three years in 1984. He continued to practice during the suspension, using the alias "P.S. Madan", and had concealed a prior conviction under the Narcotic Drugs Act at the time of his enrolment. The complainant, Sardul Singh, filed a complaint leading the Delhi Bar Council to find Singh guilty of misconduct and impose an admonition. The Bar Council of India on appeal enhanced the punishment to a further three‑year suspension, but a review by the Bar Council of India set aside that order, treating the breach as a single act and dismissing the concealment allegation. The Supreme Court held that the breach was not a solitary instance, that the issue of concealment was properly framed and that the respondent had an opportunity to contest it, and therefore restored the original three‑year suspension, directing the Delhi Bar Council to issue a fresh prohibition order.

Issues considered

Whether practising during a period of suspension constitutes a single act or multiple acts for disciplinary purposes.
Whether the Bar Council can consider concealment of a prior conviction when the original complaint did not specifically allege it.
Whether the Bar Council of India erred in setting aside its earlier order of suspension.
Whether practising under a false name during suspension amounts to grave professional misconduct warranting suspension.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 35, s. 44

Subjects

Advocates Actprofessional misconductsuspensionconcealment of convictionpractice during suspensionname changeBar Council of Indiadisciplinary proceedings

Judgment

A SARDUL SINGH
v.
PRITAM SINGH AND ORS.

MARCH I 8, 1999

B ,,, [M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND A.~. MISRA, JJ.J

Advocates Act, 1961 :
...
Advocate-Miscohduct-Punishment-Respondent held guilty of
C professional miscondilct-Suspension from practice for three years-
Notwithstanding the order of suspension Respondent continued to practice
in violation of the suspension order-Complaint filed before Delhi Bar Council
by appellant that the respondent committed fresh misconduct-Delhi Bar
Council found him guilty ofprofessional misconduct and also for concealment
of fact at the time of enrolment that earlier he was convicted by a criminal
D court-Punishment of admonition imposed-Dissatisfied with punishment
appellant preferred appeal before Bar Council of India which held the '
respondent guilty for practice during suspension and for concealment of
fact-Bar Council of India enhanced the punishment for suspension of three
years-Review preferred by respondent before Bar Council ofIndia-In review
Bar Council set aside its earlier order on two grounds-(i) Fact relating to
E suppression was not specifically referred in the complaint by the appellant-
(ii) During suspension of practice there was only a single and solitary act
offiling of vakalatnama by the respondent-Appeal preferred by complainant
before Supreme Court against the order of Bar Council of India-Held-The
Bar Council of India was not right in treating the breach as a solitary
p instance in the circumstances of the case-Notwithstanding the absence of
pleadings before a court or authority, still if an issue is framed and the
parties were conscious of it and went to trial on that issue and adduced
evidence and had an opportunity to produce evidence or cross examine
witnesses in relation to the said issue, no objection as to want of a specific
pleading can be permitted to be raised later-The misconduct on the part
G of the first respondent was very grave and the Bar Council of India in its
initial order was perfectly justified in imposing the punishment of suspension
for three years~A fresh. order of prohibition of three years from practice
should be issued by the Bar Council of Delhi.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. l 763 of
H 1993.
22
SARDUL SINGH v. PRIT AM SINGH 23
From the Judgement and Order dated 17.4.92 of the Disciplinary A
Committee of the Bar Council of India in R.P. No. 6 of 1991.

A.D. Sikri for Appellant.

Ex-parte for Respondents.
B
The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This is an appeal filed by a complainant against orders passed by the
Bar Council ofindia on 27.4.92 in a review petition filed by the first respondent-
advocate whereby the review was allowed and the order passed by the Bar
Council oflndia dt. 4.10.1991 was set aside and the order of the Delhi Bar C
Council dt. 2.5.90 was restored.

In this appeal, notice was ordered on 1.11.93 and the first respondent
was served and he also filed a counter. Thereafter the petitioner complainant
filed a rejoinder dt.18.3.94. The matter came up for hearing in this court on D
29.1.99 and was heard for considerable time when neither the first respondent

..
nor his counsel Mr. N.S. Bisht were present. After more than an hour and half
the said counsel appeared and represented that the file was taken away by
the first responde.nt from him two months earlier on the ground that the first
respondent wanted to engage another counsel and therafter no instructions
were given to him (Mr. Bisht). In these circumstances, we adjourned the E
matter and directed fresh notice to the first respondent af house no.190 first
floor, Gautam Nag<'ll", New Delhi and informed him that if he does not appear
the case would be proceeded ex-parte. The office has now filed a report
dt.8.2.99 that this court's order dt. 21.1.99 has been complied with and notice
was issued to the first respondent and acknowledgement was also received.
It is further stated that none is appearing on behalf of the first respondent. F
After some adjournments, the matter has come up again today and neither the
first respondent nor his counsel are present. Therefore, we have no choice
but to dispose of the matter upon hearing the arguments of the learned
counsel for the appellant and taking into account the counter filed on behalf
of the first respondent and the further rejoinder filed by the appellant. G
The facts of the case are that on 29. l l.1984 the Bar Council of Delhi
held Sri Pritam Singh the first respondent guilty of professional misconduct
and suspended him from practice for a period of three years. The first respondent
filed an appeal in this court and obtained stay of the said order of the Bar
Council of Delhi. The appeal preferred by the first respondent before the Bar H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A Council of India was dismissed on 13.12.1986 and a notification was issued
on 22.1.1987, the operative portion of which reads as follows :

"Therefore Shri Pritam Singh, Advocate enrolled that his counsel YD
No. D/300 by 1.9.1983 is suspended from practising as an Advocate
for a period of three years from the expiry of 16.9.1986."
B
This notification dt. 22.1.1987 was communicated among others to the
first respondent as is disclosed from the said notification itself.

The appellant filed a complaint before the Delhi Bar Council that
C notwithstanding the order of suspension of the first respondent for the period
from 16.9.1986 to 16.9.1989, the first respondent continued to practise in
violation of the order of the Bar Council of India and even after the above
notification and that he thereby committed fresh misconduct which was liable
to be punished. The first respondent filed a reply before the Bar Council of
Delhi and thereafter, an order was passed on 2.5.90 by the Bar Council. of
D Delhi holding the respondent guilty of professional is conduct inasmuch as
he continued to practise during the period of suspension by another name
"P.S. Madan" instead of"Pritam Singh". One other matter in regard to which
the Delhi Bar Council held him guilty states was that the first respondent had
concealed material facts at the time of his enrolment, in regard to an earlier
..
E conviction by a criminal court. It was proved that the first respondent was
convicted for an offence under Narcotics Drugs Act and was sentenced to
six months imprisonment. (In fact he was earlier in service and was compulsorily
retired.) The Delhi Bar Council noticed that the first respondent was convicted
by the Court of Mr. T.S. Oberoi on 4.12.1974 but the enrolment form filled by
the first respondent did not disclose the said fact. The Delhi Bar Council
F discussed the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant (appellant),
namely CW 1 to 4 of whom three were employees of the courts wherein the
first respondent had filed a vakalatnama or was appearing during the period
of suspension from 16.9.1986 to 16.9.1989. The relevant copies of court records
evidencing the fact that the first respondent was practising during this period
G were marked as CWI/A, CWl/B, CWl/C, CWl/D, CWl/E, CWl/F, CW2/A &
CW2/B by the Delhi Bar Council and referred to in its order. It was also
noticed that the first respondent had changed his name while practising
during the said period as "P.S. Madan". The final finding of the Delhi Bar
Council reads as follows :

H "After hearing the parties and perusing the record, we have given our
SARDUL SINGH v. PRITAM SINGH 25
thoughtful consideration on the facts and circumstances of the case A
and have come to the conclu¥ns that the respondent did file petition
and vakalatnama during th71)eriod of suspension in the matter of Smt.
Savita Devi and also suppressed the fact of his conviction from the
court of Shri T.S. Oberoi in the enrolment form and the complainant
has successfully proved his case against the respondent on both B
sides."

It may here be mentioned that when the complainant-appellant examined
the above witnesses CWl to CW4, the first respondent did not choose to
cross examine the said witnesses. However, the Delhi Bar Council when it
came to the question of punishment felt that 'admonition' of the first respondent C
would be sufficient punishment and passed an order of admonition and
directed that the same be entered in the rolls.

Dissatisfied with the quantum of punishment awarded to the first
respondent, the appellant-complainant filed an appeal before the Bar Council
of India. The Bar Council of India by its order dt. 4.10.91, came to the D
conclusion that the two findings of the State Bar Council were supported by
' evidence, that the first respondent was guilty of suppression of facts relating
to his conviction at the time when he was enrolled and that the first respondent
was also practising during the period between 16.9.1986 to 16.9.1989 in violation
of the prohibition contained in the earlier order of the Bar Council of India E
dt. 13.12.1986 under a different name P.S. Madan rather than as Pritam Singh.
The Bar Council of India then proceeded to go into the quantum of punishment
and it felt that the appellant should not have been let off with an admonition
but that he should have been suspended again from practice for a period of
three years from the date of the order. The Bar Council of India pa!:sed an
order suspending him from practice for a period of three years from 4.10.1991. F

The first respondent instead of filing an appeal before this Court, filed
a review application under Section 44 of the Advocates Act before the Bar
Council of India. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed by the Bar
Council oflndia on 27.4.92, setting aside the earlier order dt. 4.10.1991 and G
restoring the order of admonition passed by the Delhi Bar Council. In the
order of review, the Bar Council of India observed that the suppression of
facts relating to conviction, at the time of enrolment, was not specifically
referred to in the complaint filed by the appellant before the Delhi Bar Council
and should not have been gone into. So far as the violation of the order of
the suspension of practice was concerned, the Bar Council of India observed H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A that the matter related to the filing of vakalatnama and a petition only in the
case of Smt. Savita Devi and was therefore a single and solitary act. In respect
of the first respondent practising in a different name namely, P.S. Madan. The
Bar Council observed as follows :

"Whether he has signed in the name of Pritam Singh Madan or P.S.
B Madan is not relevant."

It is the above order dated 27.4.92 that is in appeal before us. We have
heard the learned counsel for the appellant. As already stated, the first
respondent has chosen to remain ex-parte. We have perused the counter filed
by him and also the rejoinder filed by the appellant.
c
It will be noticed that though the documents filed before the Delhi Bar
Council and marked as evidence related to Smt. Savita Devi, the cases were
four in number as is disclosed from the order of the Delhi bar Council dt.
2.5.90, namely, Case No. 500/90 (Smt. Savita Devi v. Rewa Devi), Suit No.
D 501/90 original Suit No. 376/88 Smt. Savita Devi v. lslamuddin, Suit No.
502/90 Smt. Savita Devi v. Ram Chandra, Case No. 37/88 Smt. Savita Devi
v. Jaydev. It is therefore clear that though the case related to one person, Smt.
Savita Devi the cases were four in number. The Bar Council of India, therefore
was not right in treating the breach as a solitary instance.

E In fact, learned counsel for the ~ppellant stated that there were a large
number of other such cases of which a list was filed in this court. We find
that about 15 cases were mentioned in that list but we are not taking them
into account inasmuch as it is admitted in the written submissions filed by
the appellant before the Delhi Bar Council in para 11, that the documents
relating only to the above four cases pertaining to Savita Devi were exhibited
F through witnesses. We are, therefore, of the view that the Bar Council of
India in the order under review was not right in treating the case as a s\ngle
instance ignoring the fact that there were four cases pertaining to-'Savita
Devi in which the first respondent had filed the vakalatnamas or appeared in
the courts during the relevant period.
G
Further in regard to the suppression of facts relating to his conviction,
the Bar council of India in its review order committed yet another serious
mistake. Though the issue relating to his conviction was not specifically
raised in the original complaint there were two issues framed by the Delhi Bar
Council. One of them related to the suppression of facts relating to this
H conviction. Evidence was allowed to be led and the documents pertaining to
SARDUL SINGH v. PRIT AM SINGH 27
the first respondent's conviction were marked as exhibits. The first respondent A
had opportunity to cross examine the witnesses in relation to the documents
pertaining to his conviction but he did not even choose to cross examine the
witnesses. Nor did he produce any evidence to disprove that he was convicted.
It is well-settled that notwithstanding the absence of pleadings before a court

- or authority, still if an issue is framed and the parties were conscious of it and
went to trial on that issue and adduced evidence and had an opportunity to
produce evidence or cross examine witnesses in relation to the said issue, no
B

objection as to want of specific pleading can be permitted to be raised later.
The Bar Council of India therefore in the review order erred ignoring in the
finding of the Delhi Bar Council on the question of tht suppression of facts
relating to conviction of the first respondent. Yet another serious mistake C
committed by the Bar Council of India in the review order was that it had not
given any serious consideration to the respondent changing his name from
"Pritam Singh" to "P.S. Madan" and practising under the latter name. Such
a conduct clearly disclosed an intention to hoodwink the Bar Council of India
which had earlier suspended him from practise for three years. Further inas- D
much as the notification regarding suspension was specifically communicated
to him as stated earlier, it was not permissible for the respondent to plead
ignorance of the order of suspension and continue to practise during the
period of prohibition.

In the initial order passed by the Bar Council oflndia on 4.10.91, in the E
appeal preferred by the appellant, the Bar Council of India had given adequate
reasons for the suspension for three years. It was stated :

"Now coming to the question of awarding punishment, we are unable
to agree with the state bar Council. If persons found guilty of
professional misconduct and on whom, punishment of suspension F

- from practice has been imposed, continue to practice in courts, the
same has to be viewed seriously. The punishment if any has to be
undergone in letter and spirit. The same cannot be got over by
practising in courts under a different name. The fact that he has been
practising under a different name other than his correct name, makes G
it all the more serious. The same cannot be viewed lightly and the
guilty cannot be let off the hook with warning and reprimand.

Hence we allow the appeal setting aside the order of the Bar Council
of Delhi and the respondent Pritam Singh is suspended from practice
for a further period of 3 years from the date of receipt of this order." H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.
I
A In our view the misconduct on the part of the first respondent was very
grave and the Bar Council oflndia in its initial order dt. 4.10.91 was perfectly
justified in imposing the punishment of suspension for three years. The
manner in which the Bar Council of India in the review order had gone into
the question of misconduct as well as the quantum of punishment in our
opinion, was very casual and unsatisfactory. It had not given enough
B seriousness to the two items of misconduct proved against the first respondent
and particularly in his violating an order of the Bar Council of India itself and
in practising in a different name throughout the relevant period. .
-
For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the prder of the Bar Council of
C India passed in review dt. 27.2.92 and restore the order of the Bar Council of
India dt. 4.10.91. We direct that a fresh order of prohibition of three years from
practise should be issued by the Bar Council of Delhi by way of a notification
in the prescribed manner and to publish the same and also see that it is served
personally on the first respondent. It will be for the Bar Council of Delhi to
fix the date from which the fresh period of prohibition will start and upto what
D date it will run, covering three years. After the Bar Council of Delhi issues
the notification and serves the same on the first respondent, the same shall
be reported to this Court. The matter may be listed after receipt of the letter
from the Bar Council of India.

T.NA. Appeal disposed of. .
E

-