Holding

The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving a material effect, so the election was not set aside.

Summary

In the 1985 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly election for constituency No. 41, Smt. Pushpa Devi was declared elected with 23,006 votes, defeating the runner‑up by a margin of 2,271 votes. A candidate (Respondent No. 8), a college teacher, secured 3,606 votes, exceeding that margin. An elector, Sarnam Singh, filed an election petition alleging that Respondent No. 8 held an office of profit, rendering his nomination improperly accepted, and that this improper acceptance materially affected the result, warranting the election’s nullification. The High Court held the nomination was not illegal and, even if it were, the petitioner failed to prove a material effect on the result. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that the petitioner bore the burden of proving material effect under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and had not discharged it; consequently, the election stood.

Issues considered

The petitioner must prove that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper acceptance of a nomination under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Legislation cited

Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100(1)(c), s. 100(1)(d)(i), s. 116-A

Subjects

Representation of the People Actimproper acceptance of nominationmaterially affected electionburden of proofoffice of profitUttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly election

Judgment

A
SARNAM SINGH
v.
."'"'
SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS.

OCTOBER 27, 1987

B [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.]

Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section JOO-Improper
,...
rejection/acceptance of nomination-Distinction and effect of-Result
of election-Whether materially affected-Burden of proof-Whether
discharged.
c In the election to the Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly _l_
fro111 coastituency No. 41 held in early March, 1985, 16 candidates
clllltel!ted. Respondent No. 1 was declared elected having secured
23,fl06 votes. Respondent No. 2 secured 20, 735 votes being the next
...hest. The difference of votes secured by them was in the order of
D 2,271 votes. Respondent No. 8 who was working as a teacher in a college
and who was one of the candidates secured 3,606 votes which were more
than the difference between the votes secured by respondent No. 1
and2.

The appellant who was an elector at the said election filed an
election petition contending that respondent No. 8 was holding an '"r-1
E
'oMce of profit' under the State Government as he was working as a
teacher in a college and therefore, the acceptance of his nomination by
the returning omcer was illegal, that since respondent No. 8 secured
3,'416 votes which were higher than the difference between the votes
~
secured by respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, the election of
F respoadent No. 1 should be considered as having been materially

I~
affected by the wrongful acceptance of the nomination paper of respon·
dent No. 8, and the election of the respondent No. 1 was, therefore,
liable to be set aside. Respondent No.I contested the election petition
pleading that the acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent

G
No. 8 was not illegal since he was not holding an office of profit under
the State Government, and that even if the acceptance was illegal the ~,~
election could not be set aside since the result of the election was not
materially affected thereby.
'~
<
DiBmissing the petition, the High Court held that the acceptance
of the nomination paper of respondent No. 8 was not illegal as he was
H net holding an office of profit under the State Government and that
630
SARNAM SINGH •· PUSHPA DEVI . 631

..,J.,.. even if the acceptance of the nomination paper was illegal, the appellant
had not established that the result of the election of respondent No. 1 A
had been materially affected on the facts and in the circumstances or the
case.

In the appeal to this Court on the question: whether the appellant ·.
had established that the result of the election·or respondent No; 1 had.· B
been materially affected by the wrongful acceptance of the nomlnailon ·
)I( paper ofrespondent No. 8.

Dismissing the appeal to this Court,

HELD: The appellant has not discharged the burden which·
clearly lay on him of proving that the result of the election had been C
materially affected, even assuming that the nomination of respondent·.
No. 8 had been improperly accepted. [640E)

Section 100 of the Representation· of the People Act makes a
distinction between the effect of improper rejection or any nomination, D
and the . effect or the improper acceptance or any nomination on
the election. IC a nomination of any person at an election had been
improperly rejected the election of the returned candidate Is liable
to be set aside without any further proof because it is difficult to
visualise the number of votes which the person whose nomination has
been rejected would have secured at the election and there Is every E ·
likelihood of the returned candidate not securing the highest number of
votes. [634E-G) ·. ·

Clause (c) of sub-section (1) states that if the High Court is of the ·
opinion that any nomination has been improperly rejected it shall dee-.· ·· ·
lare the election of the returned candidate to be void, [634G) ·· ·F
r.

r
' - ' -

Sub-clause (i) of clause (d) ofsub-section (1) requires a petitioner
in an election petition to establish two grounds in order to get the
election or the returned candidate set aside. namely (i) that there has .
been improper acceptance of any nomination and (ii) that by reason or
entry or the candidate whose nomination baS been improperly accepted • G .... ·
into the contest ·the result of the election insofar as the returned candi·
date is concerned has been materially affected. [63SA-B) . ·

Having regard to the facts or the instant case it is not possible to ·
hold that the appellant has established that the result or the election llr
the returned candidate had been ~aterially affected because the dif· H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

ference between the votes secured by respondent No. 1, the returned
A candidate and respondent No. 2, the candidate who secured next hig·
hest votes was 2,271 votes. Respondent No. 8, the validity of whose
nomination was questioned, had secured only about 1/7th of the
number of votes polled by respondent No. 1 and there were 15 canidates
(excluding respondent No. 8) contesting the election. It is not possible to
B reach a finding in this case by making a judicial guess that all the 3606
voters who had voted in favour of respondent No. 8 would have cast
their votes in favour of respondent No. 2 alone. Even if about 1350 of
them had cast their votes in favour of any of the other 14 candidates
(including the returned candidate) respondent No. 2 could not have
become the candidate who had secured the highest number of votes at
the election, [639C·EI
c
The High Court was, therefore, right in taking the view that the
appellant or any other party had not placed any satisfactory evidence to
reach the conclusion that all or sufficient number of wasted votes which
had been cast in favour of respondent No. 8 would have gone In favour
D of respondent No. 2, had respondent No. 8 not been one of the candi·
dates at the election, that in the context particularly of ·the poll being
heavy and the contestants being large in number, 16 in all-It was
unreasonable to guess that if the respondent No. 8 were excluded from
the arena of contest the wasted votes would have gone to the respondent
No. 2 thereby enabling him to succeed, and that the burden lying upon
E the petitioner remained clearly undischarged and the speculative possi-
bility did not attain the level of proof. [640B·DI

V ashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and Others, ]1955] 1
S.C.R. 509; Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and Ors.
etc., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603 and Chhedi Ram v. Jhi/mit Ram and Others,
]1984] 2 sec 281, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1177
(NCE) of 1986.

From the Judgmept and Order dated 17 .1.1986 of the Allahabad
G High Court (Election Tribunal) in Election Petition No. 54 of 1985.

R.K. Garg and Ravi Parkash Gupta for the Appellant.

Qamarrudin and Mrs. Qamarrudin for the Respondents.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARNAM SINGH v. PUSHPA DEVI (VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 633

,.....,. VENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal is filed under section 116- A
A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act') by the ~ppellant against the Judgment dated January
17, 1986 of the High Court of Allahabad in Election Petition No. 34 of
1985 dismissing the Election Petition.

The election to the Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly B
from Constituenc No. 41-Gunnaur, Village Mirzapur, District
Baduan took place in early March, 1985. 16 candidates contested at
the said election. Respondent No. 1-Smt. Pushpa Devi was declared
elected having secured 23006 votes. The next highest number of votes
was secured by Shri N aurangi Singh. He secured 20735 votes. The
difference between the votes secured by Respondent No. I and the
votes secured by Respondent No. 2 was in the order of 2271 votes. C
Respondent No. 8, who was working as a teacher in the Babu Ram
Singh Intermediate College, Baburala, Baduan was also one of the
candidates in the election. He secured 3606 votes, which were more
than the difference between the votes secured by Respondent No. I
and by Respondent No. 2. The appellant, who was an elector at the D
said election, filed the Election Petition, out of which this appeal
arises, contending that Respondent No. 8, who was working as a
teacher in the Babu Ram Singh Intermediate College, Baburala,
Baduan, was holding an office of profit under the State Government
and, therefore, the acceptance of his nomination by the Returning
Officer was illegal. Since Respondent No. 8 secured 3606 votes, which E
-.vere higher than the difference between the votes secured by Respon-
dent No. I and the votes secured by Respondent No. 2, the election of
Respondent No. I should be considered .as having been materially
affected by the wrongful acceptance of the nomination paper of
Respondent No. 8 and the election of Respondent No. 1 was liable to
be set aside. The Election Petition was contested by Respondent F
No. 1. It was pleaded by Respondent No. 1 that the acceptance of the
nomination paper of Respondent No. 8 was not illegal since Respon-
dent No. 8 was not holding an office of profit under the State Govern-
ment and secondly even if the acceptance of the nomination paper of
Respondent No. 8 was illegal, the election could not be set aside since
the result of the election was not materially affected thereby. The High G
Court held that the acceptance of the nomination paper of Respondent
No. 8 was not illegal as Respondent No. 8 was not holding an office of
profit under the State Government and it further held that even if the
acceptance of the nomination paper of Respondent No. 8 was illegal,
the appellant had not established that the result of the election of
Respondent No. l had been materially affected on the facts and in the H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

A circumstances of the case. The High Court accordingly dismissed the
petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the appellant
has filed this appeal.

Since it is possible to dispose of this appeal on the second ground
we do not propose to express any opinion in this case on the question
B whether Respondent No. 8 was, in fact, holding an office of profit
under the State Government or not on the date on which the nomina-
tion paper was filed or on the date of the election. We leave the said
question open.

In order to decide the second question it is necessary to set Out
C the relevant part of section 100 of the Act which reads thus:

"JOO. Grounds for declaring election to be void-(1) Sub-
ject to the provisions of sub-sect/on (2) if the High Court is
of opinion-

D
( c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected-

E (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
"

Section 100 of the Act makes a distinction between the effect of
improper rejection of any nomination and the effect of the improper
acceptance of any nomination on the election. If a nomination of any
F person at an election has been improperly rejected the election of the
returned candidate is liable to be set aside without any further proof ~
because it is difficult to visualise the number of votes which the person
whose nomination has been rejected would have secured at the elec-
tion and there is every likelihood of the returned candidate not secur-
ing the highest number of votes. It is for this reason clause (c) of
(l section JOO( J) of the Act states that if the High Court is of the opinion
that any nomination has been improperly rejected it shall declare the
election of the returned candidate to be void. Sub-clause (i) of clause
(d) of sub-section (1) of section 100 of the Act is, however, worded .':>-t
differently. It says that if the High Court is of opinion that the result of
the election insofar as it concerns the returned candidate has been
H materially affected by the inwroper acceptance of any nomination it
SARNAM SINGH v. PUSHPA DEVI (VENKATARAMIAH, J.) 635

...,,
. shall declare the election of the returned candidate as void. Sub-clause
A
(i) of clause (d) of section 100( 1) of the Act requires a petitioner in an
election petition to establish two grounds in order to get the election of
the returned candidate set aside, namely, (i) that there has been
improper acceptance of any nomination; and (ii) that by reason of the
entry of the candidate whose nomination has been improperly acccp-
ted into the contest the result of the election insofar as the returned B
candidate is concerned has been materially affected. The reason for
--{ making a distinction between a case falling under clause (c) of section
100( 1) of the Act and a case falling under sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of
... s~ction 100( 1) of the Act can be explained with reference to a hypo-
thetical case. Let us assume that the returned candidate has secured at
an election 30,000 votes and 20,000 votes have been secured by a
c
.1 candidate who has secured the next highest number of votes. We shall
assume that a third candidate,. whose nomination paper had been
improperly accepted has secured just 1000 votes. In this case even if it
is held while deciding an election petition that the nomination of the
third candidate has been improperly accepted, there is no justification
to set aside the election of the successful candidate because even if all D
the votes secured by the third candidate are added to the ~idllte
who has secured the next highest ·number of votes he 'ltoutd be a
person who has secured 21000 votes and the successful candidate
would still be a person who has secured the highest number of votes at
the election. In this hypothetical case it has to be held that the result of
--( the election has not been materially affected at all. Such election peti- E
tion has necessarily to be rejected. This Court was called upon to

-
decide a case similar to the present one in V ashist Narain Sharma v.
Dev Chandra and Others., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 509. In that case the re-
turned candidate Vashist Narain Sharma had secured 12868 votes and
Vireshwar Nath Rai secured the next highest number of votes, i.e.,
10,996. The difference in the number of votes secured by these two F
..,.c candidates was 1872. Another candidate by name Dlidh Nath at the
election, whose validity was in issue in that case, had secured 1983
votes. There were also two other candidates in the field. One of the
grounds in the election petition, out of which the above case arose,
was that the election of the returned candidate was liable to be set
aside since the nomination paper of Dudh Nath had been improperly G
accepted by the Election Commissioner. The Court in that case held
that the burden of proving that the result of the election had been
~ materially affected on account of the improper acceptance of a nomi-
nation was on the petitioner and that even if there was wrongful
acceptance of the nomination having regard to the number of votes
secwed by the several candidates it was not possible to hold that the H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] l S.C.R.

A result of the election had been materially affected. In Samant N.
Balakrisl,na etc. v. George Fernandez and Ors etc., [ 1969] 3 S.C.R. 603
section IOO(l)(d)(i)) of the Act again arose for consideration. In that
case this Court commented at pages 643-644 on the decision in Vashist
Narain Sharma's case (supra) thus:-

B "Mr. Chari relies upon the rulings of this Court where it
has been laid down how the burden of proving the effect on
the election must be discharged. He referred to the case
reported in Vas hist Na rain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and
Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dilip Singh and the later rulings
of this Court in which Vashist Narain's case has been fol-
lowed and applied.
c
In our opinion the matter cannot be considered on
possibility. Vashist Narain's case insists on proof. If the
margin of votes were small something might be made of the
points mentioned by Mr. Jethmalani. But the margin is
D large and the number of votes earned by the remaining
candidates also sufficiently huge. There is no room, there-
fore, for a reasonably judicial guess. The law requires
proof. How far that proof should go or what it should con-
tain is not provided by the Legislature. In Vashist's case
and in Inayatullah v. Diwanchand Mahajan, the provision
E was held to prescribe an impossible burden. The law has
however remained as before. we are bound by the rulings
of this Court and must say that the burden has not been

F
successfully discharged. We cannot overlook the rulings of
this Court and follow the English rulings cited to us."

The very same question was considered by this Court in Chhedi
-
Ram v. Jhilmit Ram and Others, [1984] 2 SCC 281 by a bench of which I _.
one of us (Venkataramiah, J.) was a member. The judgment in that -r"-'
case was delivered by Chinnappa Reddy, J. In that case the returned
candidate Jhilmit Ram had secured 17, 822 votes and Chhedi Ram, the
runner-up had secured 17449 votes. Thus the difference between the
G successful candidate and the candidate who secured next highest votes
was 373 votes. There were four other candidates, of whom Moti Ram
secured 6710 votes. Chhedi Ram challenged the election of Jhilmit
Ram on the ground that.Moti Ram was a Kahar by caste, not entitled r
to seek election from the reserved constituency, i.e., his nomination
had been improperly accepted and the result of election was materially
H affected. The High Court found that Moti Ram was a Kahar by caste
SARNAM SINGH v. PUSHPA DEVI [VENKATARAMIAH. J.l 637

and not a member ·of the -Scheduled Castes. Having arrived at the
A
"""" conclusion that Moti Ram's nomination had been accepted impro-
perly, the High Court was not prepared to set aside the election of
Jhilmit Ram as it took the view that the result of the election had not
been shown to have been affected in view of the improper acceptance
of the nomination of Moti Ram. The election petition in that case was,
therefore, dismissed. Chhedi Ram then preferred an appeal to this B
Court against the judgment of the High Court. This Court allowed the
--(
appeal. In the course of the judgment Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed

- thus:-

"2. We are afraid the appeal has to be allowed.
Under section lOO(l)(d) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, the election of a returned candidate shall c
.--l be declared to be void if the High Court is of opinion that
the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the
returned candidate, has been materially affected by the
improper acceptance of any nomination. True, the burden
of establishing that the result of the election has been mate- D
rially affected as a result of the improper acceptance of a
nomination is on the person impeaching the election. The
burden is readily discharged if the nomination which has
been improperly accepted was that of the successful candi-
date himself. On the other hand, the burden is wholly in-
--r capable of being discharged_if the candidate whose nomina- E
tion was improperly accepted obtained a less number of

- votes than the difference between the number of votes
secured by the candidate who got the next highest number
of votes. In both these situations, the answers are obvious.
The complication arises only in cases where the candidate,
whose nomination was improperly accepted, has secured a F
large number of votes than the difference between the
'"'"'(._ number of votes secured by the successful candidate and
the number of votes got by the candidate securing the next
. highest number of votes. The complication is because of
the possibility that a sufficient number of votes actually cast
for the candidate whose nomination was improperly accep- G
ted might have been cast for the candidate who secured the
highest number of votes next to the successful candidate, so
~ as to upset the result of the election, but whether a suffi-
cient number of voters would have so done, would ordi-
narily remain a speculative possibility only. In this situa-
tion, the answer to the question whether the result of the H
638 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

election could be said to have been materially affected ~
A
must depend on the facts, circumstances and reasonable
probabilities of the case, particularly on the difference bet-
ween the number of votes secured by the successful candi-
date and the candidate securing the next highest number of
votes, as compared with the number of votes secured by the
B candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted and
the proportion which the number of wasted votes (the votes
· secured by the candidate whose nomination was impro- )(
perly accepted) bears to the number of votes secured by the
successful candidate. If the number of votes secured by the
·- candidate whose nomination was rejected is not dispro-
portionatelylarge as compared with the difference between
c the number of votes secured by the successful candidate .....(
and th~ candidate securing the next highest numhber of \_
votes, 1t wou1d be next to impossible to conclude t at the
result of the election has been materially affected. But, on
the other hand, if the number of votes secured by the candi-
o· date whose nomination was improperly accepted is dispro-
( portinately large as ~ompared with the difference between
· the votes secured by the successful candidate and the candi-
date ~ecuring the next highest number of votes and if the
votes secured by the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted bears a fairly high proportion to the
E votes secured by the successful candidate, the reasonable
probability is that the result of the election has been mate-
. rially affected and one may venture to hold the facl as
proved. Under the Indian Evidence Act, a fact is said to be
proved ·when after considering the matters before it, the
. court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circum-
\ stanc~s of. the particu.lar case, to act upon the supp?sition ~ -
that 1t eXJsts. If havmg regard to the facts and circum- · !
· • ·. stances of a case, the reasonable probability is all one way,
a court must not lay down an impossible standard of proof
· and hold a fact is not proved. In the present case, the candi-
G . date whose nomination was improperly accepted had ob-
tained 67 IO votes, that is, almost 20 times the difference
between the number of votes secured by the successful
candidate and the candidate securing the next highest
number of votes. Not merely that. Th number of votes
secured by the candidate whose nomination was impro-
H perly accepted bore a fairly high proportion to the number
SARNAM SINGH v. PUSHPA DEVI (VENKATAllAMIAH, J.) 639

of votes secured by the successful candidate-it was a little
A
over one-third. Surely, in that situation, the result of the
election may safely be said to have been affected."

In the case before us Respondent No. 1 had ~llfed 23006 votes
and Respondent No. 2 had secured 20735 votes. The marJin thus was
of 22371 votes. Respondent No. 8, the validity of whoic nomination was B
questioned, had secured 3606 votes. It is no doubt true that if we
--{
assume that all the 3606 votes secured by Respondent No. 8 would
have gone to Respondent No. 2, Respondent No. 2 would have been
-c the successful candidate· at the election. Having re1ilrd to the facts of
this case we feel that it is not possible to hold that the appellant in this
appeal has established that the result of the election of the returned
_j candidate had been materially affected because the difference between c
the votes secured by Respondent No .. ] and the votes secured by
Respondent No. 2 was 2272 votes. Respondent No. 8 bad secured only
about V7th of the number of votes polled by the Respondent No. I
and there were 15 candidates (excluding respondent N-0. 8) contesting
the election. It is not possible to reach a finding in this case by making D
a judicial guess that all the 3606 voters who had voted in favour of
Respondent No. 8 would have cast their votes in favour of Respondent
No. 2 alone. Even if about 1350 of them had cast their votes in favour
of any of the other 14 candidates (including the returned candidate)
Respondent No. 2 could not have become the candidate who had
-...,- secured the highest number of votes at the election. At this stage it is E
relevant to refer to the observation of Gulam Hasan, J. In Vashist
Narain Sharma's, case (supra) which run thus:-

- "But we are not prepared to bold that the mere fact
that the wasted votes are greater than th.: margin of votes
between the returned candidate and the candidate securing F
-,.,.(_ the next highest number of votes must lead to the necessary
inference that the result of the election hai-been materially
affected. That is a matter which bas to be proved and the
onus of proving it lies upon the petitioner. It will not do
merely to say that all or majority of the wasted votes might
have gone to the next highest candidate. The casting of G
votes at an election depends upon a variety of factors and it
is not possible for any one to predicate how many or which
~ proportion of the votes will go to one or the other of the
candidates. While it must be recognised that the petitioner
in such a case of confronted with a difficult situation, it is
not possible to relieve him of the duty imposed upon him H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ i988] I S.C.R.

A by section lOO{l){c) and hold without evidence that the · 'r-"-
duty has been discharged. Should the petitioner fail to ad-
duce satisfactory evidence to enable the Court to find in his
favour on this point, the inevitable result would be that the
Tribunal would not interfere in his favour and would allow
the election to stand."
B
In the case before us we are of the vi.ew that the High Court was }--
right in observing that the appellant or any other party had not placed
satisfactory evidence to reach the conclusion that all or a sufficient
number of the wasted votes which had been cast in favour of Respon- ro
dent No. 8 would have gone in favour of Respondent No. 2, had
c Respondent No. 8 not been one of the candidates at the election. The \
High Court has on the evidence before it held that "in the context ~
particularly of the poll being heavy and the contestants being large in
number 16 in all-it remains unreasonable to guess that if the respon-
dent No. 8 were excluded from the arena of contest the wasted votes
would have gone to the respondent no. 2 thereby enabling him to
D succeed. The burden lying upon the petitioner remains clearly undis-
charged and the speculative possibility does not attain the level of
proof." We agree with the above observation of the High Court since
the appellant has not discharged the burden which clearly lay on him
or proving that the result of the election had been materially affected

E
even assuming that the nomination of Respondent No. 8 had been 'r--·
improperly accepted. This appeal should, therefore, fail. We accord-
ingly dismiss it. We, however, make no order as to costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
-