Supreme Court of India
SARUP SINGH AND ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 816
- Decided
- 25 November 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
Holding
The amendment benefits apply only to awards made between 30‑April‑1982 and 24‑September‑1984; awards made earlier are excluded, making the High Court’s order granting enhanced solatium and interest without jurisdiction and a nullity.
Summary
The appellants sought enhanced solatium (30% instead of 15%) and higher interest rates (9% for the first year and 15% thereafter) under the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, claiming that the amendment should apply to their awards which were finalized before the amendment came into force. The Supreme Court examined the transitional provisions of the amendment, which limited the benefit to awards made between 30‑April‑1982 and 24‑September‑1984. Since the awards in all three appeals were made before 30‑April‑1982, the amendment could not be applied. The Court also held that a decree that is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction cannot be altered by a later order, and the High Court’s order granting the enhanced rates was therefore without jurisdiction and void. Consequently, the executing court’s dismissal of the execution petitions was upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether claimants whose awards were finalized before the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 can claim the enhanced solatium and interest rates introduced by that amendment.
- Whether the High Court’s order enhancing compensation can be set aside by the executing court and whether the executing court can go behind the decree.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 151, s. 152
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23(1A), s. 23(2), s. 30(1), s. 30(2), s. 34
Subjects
Land acquisitionSolatiumInterest rateAmendment Act 68 of 1984JurisdictionNullityExecution of decreeCPC sections 151 and 152Transitional provisions
Judgment
[2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 131
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005)
NOVEMBER 25, 2010
B
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND
ANIL R. DAVE, JJ. ]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
ss. 23(1 A), 23(2) and 34 - Whether the benefit of
enhancement in the rate of solatium and interest as introduced
by the Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be given to such
of the claimants whose cases for payment of compensation
were finalized prior to coming into force of the aforesaid 0
Amendment Act of 1984 - Held: For entitlement to enhanced
rates under the Amendment, the award of the Land Acquisition
Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must, have been
made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, i.e., the dates of
introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in E
the House of the People and that of commencement of
operation of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
respectively - In the instant appeals, the award of the
Collector and that of the reference court in their case was
passed prior to 30.04.1982 - Therefore, the said amendment
brought in by the Act of 1984 to the concerned provisions F
could not have been made applicable to the proceeding of
th.e present cases.
Judgment given by High Court enhancing the quantum
of compensation by giving benefit of enhanced solatium from G
15% to 30% and interest from 6% to 9% per annum in view
of the Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 - Whether, on facts, the
judgment could be negated by the Executing Court - Held:
Though the Executing court cannot go behind the decree and
131 H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A grant interest not granted in the decree, but, if a decree is
found to be nullity, the same could be challenged and
interfered with at any subsequent stage, say, at the execution
stage or even in a collateral proceeding - In the instant
appeals, the judgment passed by the High Court before the
B amendment Act of 68 of 1984 became final and binding as
no appeal was brought to this Court thereafter - However,
consequent to the Amendment in the Land Acquisition Act,
the appellants filed civil miscellaneous applications for the
grant of 30 per cent solatium and 9 per cent interest for first
c year and 15 per cent interest thereafter, which was allowed by
the High Court - Such a judgment and decree which has
become final and binding could not have been reopened by
the High Court on the basis of revision applications filed under
ss.151 and 152 of CPC - The orders passed by the High
Court granting enhanced solatium and interest as amended
0
by Act 68 of 1984 is without jurisdiction and a nullity - If a
particular Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree
or making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court
would be without jurisdiction and the same is non-est and void
ab initio - The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very root and
E authority of the Court to pass decree which cannot be cured
by consent or waiver of the parties - The validity of any such
decree or order could be challenged at any stage - Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 - ss.151 and 152.
F The questions which arose for consideration in the
instant appeals were 1) whether the benefit of
enhancement in the rate of solatium and interest as
introduced by the Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be
given to such of the claimants whose cases for payment
G of compensation were finalized prior to coming into force
of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1984; and 2) whether
the judgment and order given by the High Court
enhancing the quantum of compensation by giving
benefit of enhanced solatium from 15% to 30% and
H
SAR UP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 133
ANR.
interest from 6% to 9% per annum in view of the A
Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be negated by the
Executing Court and whether the Executing Court could
go behind the judgment and decree passed by the High
Court.
B
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to
be amended by virtue of the Amendment Act of 68 of
1984. The said amendment became effective from
24.09.1984. By the aforesaid Amendment Act of 68 of C
1984, amendments were brought into the provisions of
Section 23, in that provisions of Sub-Section 23 (1A) and
Sub-Section 23(2) were inserted and added. Similarly, an
amendment was brought into the provisions of Section
34 by way of Amendment Act of 68 of 1984, which deals D
with the quantum of compensation of interest to be paid
to the claimants. In the said section interest became
payable on amendment at 9 per cent per annum for the
period of first one year from the date on which
possession was taken, and thereafter, at the rate of 15 E
per cent per annum on expiry of the period of one year
on the amount of compensation. The aforesaid
amendment was made effective by the amending Act of
68 of 1984 from 24.09.1984. [Paras 12, 13) [142-A-B; G-H;
143-A] F
1.2. The provisions in Sub-Sections 30 (1) & 30(2) of
the Act of 68 of 1984 regarding application of the
provisions of the aforesaid amendment to proceedings
pending on or after 30.04.1982 came to be considered in
various decisions of this Court. In Raghubir Singh case*, G
this Court was called upon to determine as to which
awards, references and/or appeals would be entitled to
avail of the enhanced rates of interest by virtue of the
Amendment of 1984. In adjudicating the matter, this Court
clearly held that the award made by the Collector under H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Section 11 of the Act made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984, i.e., the c'ates of introduction of the Land
Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the
People and that of commencement of operation of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 respectively, will
B be entitled to the enhanced rates under the Amendment.
This Court also held that an award made by the Principal
Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the
parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under
Section 19 of the Act between the aforesaid dates would
c also be entitled to the same, even though it be upon
reference from an award made before 30-4-1982. This
decision of the Court, passed by a Bench of 5 Judges,
squarely applies to the appeals in this case, and makes
it amply clear that the award of the Land Acquisition
Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must have
0
been made between the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e.,
between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. [Paras 14, 15 and 16]
[143-B; 144-B-E; 147-F-G]
1.3. The applicability of the Amendment Act to a
E proceeding of the aforesaid nature was made clear by the
Act of 1984 by enacting the provision of Section 30(2). In
all the instant appeals, the award of the Collector and that
of the reference court in their case was passed prior to
30.04.1982. Therefore, the said amendment brought in by
F the Act of 1984 to the concerned provisions could not
have been made applicable to the proceeding of the
present cases. Hence, the judgment and order passed by
the High Court giving the benefit provided by the
Amendment Act of 68 of 1984, viz., Section 23(1A) and
G 23(2) and the amended provision of Section 34 of the Act,
cannot be made applicable in the cases of the appellants-
landholders. [Para 17] [146-G-H; 147-A-B]
Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs.
H Etc. (1989) 2 SCC 754 - followed.
SAR UP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 135
ANR.
2.1. Though the Executing court cannot go behind A
the decree and grant interest not granted in the decree,
but, if a decree is found to be nullity, the same could be
challenged and interfered with at any subsequent stage,
say, at the execution stage or even in a collateral
proceeding. This is in view of the fact that if a particular B
Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or
making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court
would be without jurisdiction and the same is non-est
and void ab initio. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the
very root and authority of the Court to pass decree which c
cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the parties. The
validity of any such decree or order could be challenged
at any stage. [Paras 18, 19 and 20] [147-C-F]
2.2. In the instant appeals, the judgment and order D
passed by the High Court before the amendment Act of
68 of 1984 became final and binding as no appeal was
brought to this Court thereafter. However, consequent to
the Amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, the
appellants had filed civil miscellaneous applications for
the grant of 30 per cent solatium and 9 per cent interest E
for first year and 15 per cent interest thereafter, which was
allowed by the High Court. Such a judgment and decree
which has become final and binding could not have been
reopened by the High Court on the basis of revision
applications filed under Section 151 and 152 of CPC. F
[Paras 24 and 29] [149-D-E; 154-H; 155-A-B]
2.3. The orders passed by the High Court granting
enhanced solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of
1984 is without jurisdiction and a nullity. [Paras 30 and G
31) [155-C-D)
State of Punjab & Others v. Krishan Dayal Sharma AIR
1990 SC 2177; Union of India v. Sube Ram & Others (1997)
9 SCC 69; Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Others v. Kashinath
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Janardhan Trade & Anothers (1983) 3 SCC 437; Balvant N.
Viswamitra & Others v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead)
Through Lrs. & Others (2004) 8 SCC 706; Chiranjilal Shrilal
Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs. v. Jasjit Singh & Others
(1993) 2 SCC 507; Union of India v. Swaran Singh & Others
B (1996) 5 SCC 501; Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead) by
Lrs. (1995) 5 SCC 585; Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. &
Another(1999) 3 SCC 500; State ofHaryana & Others v. Ram
Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321; State of Bihar & Others v.
Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Another (2000) 9 SCC 94 Secy.,
c Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain 1996 (7)
SCALE 135 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(1989) 2 sec 754 followed Para 15
D AIR 1990 SC 2177 referred to Para 18
(1997) 9 sec 69 referred to Para 20
(1983) 3 sec 437 referred to Para 21
E (2004) 8 sec 106 referred to Para 22
(1993) 2 sec 507 referred to Para 23
(1996) 5 sec 501 referred to Para 24
(1995) 5 sec 585 referred to Para 25
F
(1999) 3 sec 500 referred to Para 26
(1997) 3 sec 321 referred to Para 26
(2000) 9 sec 94 referred to Para 28
G
1996 (7) SCALE 135 referred to Para 28
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3568 of 2005.
H
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 137
ANR.
From the Judgment & Order dated 24.09.2002 of the High A1
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.
5481 of 2001.
WITH
B
C.A. Nos. 3566 & 3567 of 2005.
Nanita Sharma, Shalini, Vivek Sharma, K.R. Gupta, R.C.
Gubrela, Suresh Kumar Sharma, Shishpal L., Balbir Singh
Gupta for the Appellants.
c
Mohan Parasaran, ASG, S. Wasim A. Qadri, M. Ullah, Anil
Katiyar, Sushma Suri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. As the facts and D
issues involved are similar and interconnected, we propose to
dispose of all the appeals by this common judgment and order.
However, we may record the facts of each of the cases
separately and deal with !he issues at one place as they are
interconnected. · . ' .. ·,' E
Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005
2. This appeal arises out of the acquisition of land of
Sarup Singh, the appellant herein, by issuing a notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter F
referred to as "the Act"] on 09.10.1974. Possession of the land
was taken on 03.12.1974 and the award was passed on
11.06.1975. As against the award passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda Cantonment, a reference case
was filed which was decided by the Reference Court on G
31.07.1979. Finally, the matter came to be decided by the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court by an order dated
08.12.1982, determined the market value of the land and the
appellants herein were also granted solatium at 15 per cent
and also interest at 6 per cent per annum. The aforesaid H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A judgment and order passed by the High Court became final and
binding as no appeal was brought to this Court thereafter.
3. Subsequently, however, the decree holders-appellants
filed Civil Miscellaneous Applications No. 1296 of 1985 under
Sections 151 and 152 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for
8
short "C.P.C."] praying for solatium and interest at the enhanced
rate as provided for by the amendment in the Act (by way of
Act 68 of 1984) which was given effect from 24.09.1984. The
High Court allowed the said Miscellaneous Petition by order
C dated 17 .02.1986 by passing an order enhancing the payment
of solatium from 15 per cent to 30 per cent and interest from 6
per cent to 9 per cent per annum for the first year after
acquisition and 15 per cent per annum thereafter till the date
of actual payment of the enhanced amount of compensation.
D 4. On the basis of the aforesaid order dated 17.02.1986,
the appellants filed an execution application before the
Additional District Judge, Bhatinda. The execution application
was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda by
an order dated 30.08.2001 holding that the appellants herein
E are not entitled to enhanced rate of solatium and interest as
the award of the Collector and that of the reference court in their
case was passed prior to 30.04.1982. The Additional District
Judge further held that the order passed by the High Court under
Sections 151 and 152 of C.P.C. was without jurisdiction and
F as such a nullity.
5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein
filed a miscellaneous petition before the High Court which was
registered as Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 and by the
impugned order dated 24.09.2002, the same was dismissed
G upholding the order passed by the Additional District Judge,
Bhatinda as against which the present appeal was filed.
Civil Appeal No. 3566 of 2005
6. This appeal arises out of the same notification dated
H
SAR UP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 139
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
09.10.1974, as that of Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005, issued A
by the respondents under Section 4 of the Act proposing to
acquire land belonging to one Chuhar Singh. Chuhar Singh
died subsequently and therefore his sons, viz., Hardev Singh,
Balwant Singh and Gurbachan Singh preferred claim on the
basis of which the Special Land Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda B
Cantonment gave his award on 11.06.1975. As the appellants
sought for reference, a reference case was registered in which
the Additional District Judge passed a judgment and order
dated 31.07 .1979. The matter was taken to the High Court
which was initially registered as RFA No. 10687 of 1980 and c
was decided on 30.07.1981. After which a Letters patent
Appeal No. 128 of 1982 was filed which was decided on
18.12.1985 and the said was partly allowed and the
respondents were directed to pay solatium at the rate of 30 per
cent of the market value of the acquired land as determined D
by the court and also interest at the rate of 9 per cent for the
first year from the date of their possession by the Land
· Acquisition Collector and at the rate of 15 per cent thereafter
till the date of actual payment of enhanced amount of
compensation.
E
7. The appellants herein filed an execution application for
realization of the balance amount in pursuance to the order of
the High Court in LPA No. 128 of 1982 dated 18.12.1985 which
was rejected by the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda by his
order dated 30.08.2001 and the aforesaid execution F
applications of the appellants were dismissed by holding that
they were not entitled to enhanced rate of solatium and interest
as the award of the Collector and that of the reference court
were prior to 30.04.1982. Additional District Judge, Bhatinda
further held that the aforesaid order passed by the High Court G
is nullity in the eyes of law as the benefit of the order of the High
Court dated 18.12.1985 cannot be given to the appellants in
view of various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court.
8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda the appellants
filed Civil Revision which was registered as Civil Revision No.
6171 of 2001. The aforesaid matter was also heard along with
the Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 filed by Sarup Singh and
Gurdip Singh which was disposed of by the impugned
s judgment and order which is under challenge in Civil Appeal
Nos. 3568 and 3566 of 2005.
Civil Appeal No. 3567 of 2005
9. In this case, the lands of the appellants were acquired ·
C by Bhatinda Cantonment in the year 1976 and Special Land
Acquisition Collector of Bhatinda Cantonment gave his award
on 18.06.1979. On an application being filed by the appellants
for reference the same was referred to Additional District
Judge, Bhatinda and it was decided on 31.7.1980. Being
D aggrieved by the said decision of the Additional District Judge,
Bhatinda appellants filed FRA No. 412of1981 before the High
Court which was decided on 27.07.1983. Still aggrieved,
appellants filed Special Leave Petition No. 6701-23 of 1984
in this Court culminating in Civil Appeal Nos. 4132-65of1986.
E This Court on 1.9.1986 decided the aforesaid appeals
alongwith the Civil Appeal Nos. 5142-65of1986 and enhanced
the compensation holding that the ends of justice require that
compensation shall be awarded to the appellants at the rate
of Rs. 17/- per sq. yard upto the depth of 500 meter of the
F acquired and at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yard beyond the
depth of 500 meters. This Court also held that consequential
payments would also be made on the basis of the aforesaid
rate of compensation. Appellants then filed their first execution
application before the Additional District Judge for getting said
G enhanced amount which was accordingly ordered vide order
dated 9.3.1998 but with regard to benefits of amended
Sections, viz., 23(2) and 28 of the Act, it rejected the prayer of
the appellants holding that since the award of the Collector was
given on 18.6.1979 and award of the Court was given on
31. 7.1980, appellants are not entitled to the said benefits.
H
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIAAND 141
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Respondents then filed revision before the High Court but the A
same was dismissed. Respondents then filed appeals before
this Court and vide order dated 12.7.99, the matter was
directed to be filed before the High Court.
10. All the above-mentioned three appeals were listed for 8
hearing and we heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties who have ably taken us through all the relevant
documents on record and also placed before us the various
decisions which may have a bearing on the issues raised in
· the present appeals.
c
11. On the basis of the arguments advanced before us the
following issues arise for our consideration: -
(a) Whether the benefit of enhancement in the rate of
solatium and interest as introduced by the D
Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be given to
such of the claimants whose cases for payment of
compensation were finalized prior to coming into
force of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 98 of
1984?
E
AND
(b) Whether the judgment and order given by the High
Court enhancing the quantum of compensation by
giving benefit of enhanced solatium from 15 per F
cent to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to
9 per cent per annum in view of the Amendment Act
of 68 of 1984 could be negated by the Court of
Additional District Judge, Bhatinda while acting as
an Executing Court and whether the Executing G ~
Court of Additional District Judge, Bhatinda could
go behind the judgment and decree passed by the
High Court?
12. In order to answer the aforesaid two issues which arise
for our consideration, we need to point out that the Land H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be amended by virtue of the
Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The said amendment became
effective from 24.09.1984. By the aforesaid Amendment Act
of 68 of 1984, amendments were brought in to the provisions
of Section 23, in that provisions of Sub-Section 23 1(A) and
B Sub-Section 23 (2) were inserted and added, which read as
follows: -
"Section 23 - Matters to be considered in determining
compensation [ ... ]
c [ ... ] [(1A) In addition to the market value of the land above
provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount
calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on
such market-value for the period commencing on and from
the date of the publication of the notification under section
D 4, sub-section (1 ), in respect of such land to the date of
the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession
of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.-ln computing the period referred to in this sub-
section, any period or periods during which the
E
proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up
on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any
court shall be excluded.
(2) In addition to the market-value of the land as above
F provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of
[thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration
of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.]"
13. Similarly, an amendment was brought in to the
G provisions of Section 34 by way of Amendment Act of 68 of
1984, which deals with the quantum of compensation of interest
to be paid to the claimants. In the said section interest became
payable on amendment at 9 per cent per annum for the period
of first one year from the date on which possession was taken,
H and thereafter, at the rate of 15 per cent per annum on expiry
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 143
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
of the period of one year on the amount of compensation. The A
aforesaid amendment was made effective by the amending Act
of 68 of 1984 from 24.09.1984.
14. We may also refer to the provisions in Sub-Sections
30 (1) & 30 (2) of the Act of 68 of 1984 regarding application B
of the provisions of the aforesaid amendment to proceedings
pending on or after 30.04.1982 which read as follows: -
"30. Transitional Provisions -
(1) The Provisions of sub-section (1 A) of Section 23 of the C
principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of
this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied,
also to, and in relation to:
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under D
the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982
[the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People], in
which no award has been made by the Collector before
that date.
E
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or
not an award has been made by the Collector· before the
date of commencement of this Act.
F
(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and
Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b)
of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall
apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and
in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court G
or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April,
1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and
before the commencement of this Act.." H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 15. The aforesaid amended provisions and their
application came to be considered in various decisions of this
Court. Reference in this connection can be made to the
decision of Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead)
by Lrs. Etc. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754. This Court in the
B aforesaid case was called upon to determine as to which
awards, references and/or appeals would be entitled to avail
of the enhanced rates of interest by virtue of the Amendment
of 1984. In adjudicating the matter, this Court clearly held that
the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act
c made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, i.e., the dates of
introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in
the House of the People and that of commencement of
operation of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
respectively, will be entitled to the enhanced rates under the
0 Amendment. This Court also held that an award made by the
Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23
of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector
under Section 19 of the Act between the aforesaid dates would
also be entitled to the same, even though it be upon reference
E from an award made before 30-4-1982,. in which this Court held
as follows: -
"31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear
that the award made by the Collector referred to here is
the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the
F parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award
made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction
under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made
to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act.
There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced
G solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an
award made by the Collector between 30-4-1982 and 24-
9-1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is
extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made
by the Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, even
H
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 145
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
though it be upon reference from an award made before A
30-4-1982.
•
On the question of appeals to the High Court or Supreme Court,
however, this Court adopted a different stand. It held:-
32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words "or 8
to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court
on appeal against any such award?" Are they limited, as
contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award
of the Collector or the Court made between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, or do they include also, as contended by the C ,
respondents, appeals disposed of between 30-4-1982
and September 24, 1984 even though arising out of awards
of the Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We
are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the
appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the D
respondents. The submission on behalf of the respondents
is that the words 'any such award' mean the award made
by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting
sense; and that in this context, upon the language of
Section 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order E
made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 - in which
case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may
have been made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the
words 'any such award' cannot bear the broad meaning
suggested by learned counsel for the respondents.[ ... ] The F ·
words 'any such award' are intended to have deeper
significance, and in the context in which those words
appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended
to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between
30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other words Section 30(2) G
of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced
solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by
the Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or
to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court
and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-
1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award
by the Coltector or by the Court should have been made
between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 [ ... ] {T]o our mind it
must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court
8 or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the
enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to
an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the
Court rendered between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.
[ ... ] 34. Learned counsel for the respondents has
c strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal
is a rehearing of the original matter, but we are not
satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that
principle. [ ... ] If the proceeding has terminated with the
award of the Collector or of the Court made between the
D aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be
applied to such award made between the aforesaid two
dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal
before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that
stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied.
E But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the
Court must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-
9-1984."
16. This decision of the Court, passed by a Bench of 5
F Judges, squarely applies to the appeals in this case, and
makes it amply clear that the award of the Land Acquisition
Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must have been
made between the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e., between
30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.
G 17. The applicability of the Amendment Act to a
proceeding of the aforesaid nature was made clear by the Act
of 18 of 1984 by enacting the provision of Section 30(2). In all
the appeals before us, the award of the Collector and that of
the reference court in their case was passed prior to
H 30.04.1982. Therefore, the said amendment brought in l>y the
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 147
· ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Act of 18 of 1984 to the concerned provisions could not have A
been made applicable to the proceeding of the present cases.
Hence, the judgment and order passed by the High Court giving
the benefit provided by under the Amendment Act of 68 of 1984,
viz., Section 23(1A) and 23(2) and the amended provision of
Section 34 of the Act, cannot be made applicable in the cases B
of the appellants herein.
18. In so far as the second issue is concerned, it is true
that the executing court cannot go behind the decree and grant
interest not granted in the decree as submitted by the counsel
appearing for the appellants in the light of the decision rendered C
by this Court in State of Punjab & Others v. Krishan Dayal
Sharma reported in AIR 1990 SC 2177.
19. But, if a decree is found to be nullity, the same could
be challenged and interfered with at any subsequent stage, say, D
at the execution stage or even in a collateral proceeding. This
is in view of the fact that if a particular Court lacks inherent
jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree
or order passed by such Court would be without jurisdiction and
the same is non-est and void ab initio. E
20. The aforesaid position is well-settled and not open for
any dispute as the defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very root
and authority of the Court to pass decree which cannot be cured
by consent or waiver of the parties. This Court in several
decisions has specifically laid down that validity of any such F
decree or order could be challenged at any stage. In Union of
India v. Sube Ram & Others reported in (1997) 9 SCC 69 this
court held thus:
"5. [ ... ] here is the case of entertaining the application G
itself; in other words, the question of jurisdiction of the
court. Since the appellate court has no power to amend
the decree and grant the enhanced compensation by way
of solatium and interest under Section 23(2) and proviso
to Section 28 of the Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A it is a question of jurisdiction of the court. Since courts
have no jurisdiction, it is the settled legal position that it is
a nullity and it can be raised at any stage."
21. In yet another case of Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Others v.
Kashinath Janardhan Trade & Anothers reported in (1983) 3
B SCC 437 this Court has held that when a Tribunal of limited
jurisdiction erroneously assumes jurisdiction by ignoring a
statutory provision and its consequences in law on the status
of parties or by a decision are wholly unwarranted with regard
to the jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and its validity
C can be raised in collateral proceeding.
22. In Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others v. Yadav Sadashiv
Mule (Dead) Through Lrs. & Others reported in (2004) 8 SCC
706 this Court stated thus:
D
"9. The main question which arises for our consideration
is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said
to be "null" and "void". In our opinion, the law on the point
is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is
void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or
E not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or
ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in
passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order
passed by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est
and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes
F to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of
the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect
has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a
decree or order passed by a court or an authority having
no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order
G can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or
collateral proceedings."
23. In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs.
v. Jasjit Singh & Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 this
H Court stated thus:
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 149
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
"18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without A
jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the grounds on
which the decree made which goes to the root of its
jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a coram non
judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is
non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought B
to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right,
even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.
The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the
court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent
or waiver of the party .............. " c
24. In the present cases the judgment and order passed
by the High Court before the amendment Act of 68 of 1984
became final and binding as no appeal was brought to this
Court thereafter. However, consequent to the Amendment in
the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants had filed civil D
miscellaneous applications for the grant of 30 per cent solatium
and 9 per cent interest for first year and 15 per cent interest
thereafter. This Court has also held in a catena of decisions
that a decree once passed and which has become final and
binding cannot be sought to be amended by filing petition under E
Sections 151 and 152, C.P.C. In the case of Union of India v.
Swaran Singh & Others reported in (1996) 5 SCC 501 this
- Court held thus:-
"8. The question then is whether the High Court has power F
to entertain independent applications under Sections 151
and 152 and enhance solatium and interest as amended
under Act 68 of 1984. This controversy is no longer res
integra. In State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and also in a
catena of decisions following thereafter in Union of India G
· v. Pratap Kaur; State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan
Hatkar; State of Punjab v. Babu Singh; Union of India v.
Raghubir Singh and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala,
this Court has held that the Reference Court or the High
Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain any H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A applications under Sections 151 and 152 to correct any
decree which has become final or to independently pass
an award enhancing the solatium and interest as amended
by Act 68 of 1984. Consequently, the award by the High
Court granting enhanced solatium at 30% under Section
B 23(2) and interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the
date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15%
till date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under
Act 68of1984 is clearly without jurisdiction and, therefore,
a nullity. The order being a nullity, it can be challenged at
c any stage. Rightly the question was raised in execution.
The executing court allowed the petition and dismissed the
execution petition. The High Court, therefore, was clearly
in error in allowing the revision and setting aside the order
of the executing court."
D 25. In the case of Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead)
by Lrs. Reported in (1995) 5 SCC 585 held as follows: -
"4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has
considered the scope of the power of the High Court under
E Sections 151 and 152, CPC and also under Section 13-
A of the Act. This Court has held that once the civil court
made an award as per law then in force which became
final and that there is no error of law as on that date.
Subsequent amendment does not give power to the court
F to amend the decree under Sections 151 and 152, CPC.
This was held in State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan
Hatkar and Union of India v. Pratap Kaur. In Maharau
Srawan Hatkar case this Court held that the civil court
lacked inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power
to entertain an application to award additional benefits
G
under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The facts therein
were that the award had become final and the Amendment
Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-9-1984. The
respondents made an application under Sections 151 and
152, CPC to award enhanced solatium and additional
H
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIAAND 151
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
benefits etc. and the civil court allowed and granted the A
same. In that context, considering the civil court's power
under Sections 151 and 152, CPC, this Court laid the
above law."
26. In the case of Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. & Another
8
reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 this Court described the scope
of Section 152, C.P.C. thus:
"6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical
or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders
of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or C
omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the
correction of mistakes by the court of its ministerial
actions and does not contemplate of passing effective
judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The
settled position of law is that after the passing of the D
judgment, decree or order, the court or the tribunal
becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to
vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders
earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of
correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not E
all omissions and mistakes which might have been
committed by the court while passing the judgment,
decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected
which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope
of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the F
aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It
implies that the section cannot be pressed into service
to correct an omission which is intentional, however
erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts
below have been liberally construing and applying the G
province of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even after
passing of effective orders in the /is pending before them.
No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid sections,
modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment,
decree or order. . ............ "
H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 27. There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it
has also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High
Court cannot be taken as precedence for perpetrating such
wrong. In the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Ram Kumar
Mann reported in (1997) 3 SCC 321 held as follows: -
B
"3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken by
the High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the
respondent had voluntarily resigned from the service and
the resignation was accepted by the Government on 18-
5-1982. On and from that date, the relationship of
c employer and the employee between the respondent and
the State ceased and thereafter he had no right,
whatsoever, either to claim the post or a right to withdraw
his resignation which had already become effective by
acceptance on 18-5-1982 ... The doctrine of discrimination
D is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was
discriminated and denied equality as some similarly
situated persons had been given the same relief. Article
14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted
out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any
E rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent
has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief
wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of
resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching
the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we
F cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after
committing mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from
service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he
is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly
circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14 for
G reinstatement? The answer is obviously "No" .. A wrong
decision by the Government does not give a right to
enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two
wrongs can never make a right. Under these
circumstances, the High Court was clearly wrong in
H
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 153
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
directing reinstatement of the respondent by a mandamus A
with all consequential benefits."
28. In the case of State of Bihar & Others v. Kameshwar
Prasad Singh & Another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 this
Court held thus: - B
"30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14
of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be
enforced in a negative manner ... Benefits extended to
some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be
claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined C
in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed
in the High Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465,
para 9)
"Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the D
equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the
High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If
such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to
continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal
order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a
E
claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be
established by the petitioner that his claim being just and
legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended
to others and in this process there has been a
discrimination."
F
Again in Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal
Jain reported in 1996 (7) SCALE 135 this Court considered
the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its
earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding: (SCC
pp. 51-52, para 28) G
"Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon
ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other
persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure
it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal
H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial
process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities.
Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly
in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the
respondents."
B
31. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann this Court
observed: (SCC p. 322, para 3)
"The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence
of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied
c equality as some similarly situated persons had been
given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when
invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and
similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or
relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right,
D whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given
to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High
Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that
there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a
wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing
E misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service
and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is
reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced
person claim equality under Section 14 for
reinstatement? The answer is obviously 'No'. In a
F converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong
but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming
equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated
earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right
to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement
thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not
G
give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity
or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right."
29. In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, when
we examine the facts of the present cases it is patently obvious
H that the reference case and the matter of payment of
SARUP SINGH AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA AND 155
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
compensation to the appellants became final and binding after A
the award was passed and the judgment was pronounced by
the reference court and further by the High Court and thereafter,
no appeal having been filed in this Court. Such a judgment and
decree which has become final and binding could not have
been reopened by the High Court on the basis of revision 8
applications filed under Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C.
30. In view of the two issues that we have discussed and
elaborated herein, we are of the considered opinion that the
executing court as also the High Court were justified in holding
that the orders passed by the High Court granting enhanced C
solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984 is without
jurisdiction and a nullity.
·31. We, therefore, find· no merit in these appeals. The
orders passed by the executing court and the High Court are D
found to be legal, valid and justified. We, accordingly, dismiss
all these appeals, but, we leave the parties to bear their own
costs.
B.B.B. Appeals dismissed.
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