SARVA SHRAMIK SANGHversusMIS. INDIAN SMELTING AND REFINING CO. LTD. AND ORS.

                     SARY A SHRAMIK SANGH                                    A
                                    v.
 MIS. INDIAN SMELTING AND REFINING CO. LTD. AND ORS.

                          OCTOBER 28, 2003

        [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]
                                                                             B

     Labour Laws :

      Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971-Jurisdiction under-Scope of-Held, C
jurisdiction under the Act can be availed only after employer-employee
relationship having been adjudicated upon under ID Act and not when
such issue is in dispute-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

     Interpretation of Statutes :
                                                                             D
     Legislative intent and meaning of statute-Ascertainment of-Held,
has to be ascertained not only from the language but also from its nature,
design and consequences.

     Practice and Procedure :                                                E
      Review of its previous judgments by Supreme Court-Scope o/-
Held: : Though the Court has inherent jurisdiction to revise its earlier
decision, but the same should not be done only because alternate view
pressed on subsequent occasion is more reasonable-Stare decisis.         F
     In General Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad Mfg.
and Calico Printing Co. Ltd and Ors., [1995] Suppl. 1 SCC 175, Vividh
Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels Ltd. and Anr, (2001] 2 SCC 381 and
CJPLA Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Ors., [2001] 3
sec 101, it was held that before filing any complaint under Maharashtra G
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Pract~ces
Act, 1971 (Maharashtra Act}, workmen have to establish employer-
employee relationship.

     In the present case appellants-workmen contended that the above H
                                    1003
    1004               SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A decisions needed to be revised as various relevant provisions of .the
    Maharashtra Act were not taken into consideration, that Maharashtra
    Act as well as Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are co-extensive and
    remedies are available under both the above enactments at the option
    of the workmen, though not under both the Acts; that Sections 7, 28
B   and 32 of Maharashtra Act cannot be construed to keep an adjudication
    regarding workmen and principal employer relationship out of the
    purview of the Maharashtra Act notwithstanding it being disputed;
    that in case of having more than one provision for governing a
    situation, the provisions have to be harmoniously construed; that the
    definition of 'workmen' was by logic of incorporation, and, therefore,
C   the Tribunal under the ID Act alone cannot be held competent to
    effectively decide the question of employer-employee relationship.

         Respondents contended that when three different Benches of
    Supreme Court had consistently taken the view for over 10 years, the
D   same could not be "interfered only on the ground that there may be
    scope for another possible view.

           Dismissing the appeal, the Court

E        HELD: 1.1. In order to entertain a complaint under the Maharashtra
    Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices
    Act, 1971, it has to be established that the claimant was an employee of
    the employer against whom complaint is made, under the Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947. When there is no dispute about such relationship the
    Maharashtra Act would have full application. When that basic claim is
F   disputed obviously the issue has to be adjudicated by the forum which is
    competent to adjudicate. The sine qua non for application of the concept
    of unfair labour practice is the existenceofa direct relationship ofemployer
    and employee. Until that basic question is decided the forum recedes to

G
    the background in the sense that first that question has to be got separately
    adjudicated. Even ifit is accepted for th~ sake ofargument thattwo forums
    are available, the Court certainly can say which is the more appropriate
    fro um to effectively get it adjudicated. Once the existence of contractor is
                                                                                    -
    accepted, it leads to an inevitable conclusion that a relationsip exists
    between the contractor and the complainant. It is the relationship existing     :
H   bycontractualarrangementwhich issoughtto beabandonedarid negated
    SARVA SHRAMIKSANGH v. INDIAN SMELTING & REFINING CO. LTD. 1005

    and in its place the complainant's claim is to the effect that there was in A
    reality a relationship between the em ployer and the complainant directly.
    It is the establishment of the existence of such an arrangement which
    decides the jurisdiction. An industrial dispute has to be raised before the
    Tribunal under the ID Act to nave the issue relating to actual nature of
    employment sorted out. [1023-H, 1024-A-E)                                   B
           1.2. Inferentially, from Sections 7, 28 and 32 of Maharashtra Act
    it is sought to be asserted that there is a statutory recognition in Section
    59 as to the entitlement of a worker, at his option or choice to have
    recourse to anyone of the statutory remedies under the different Acts
    and therefore all and every question relating to the redress sought C
    including as to whether a person is an 'employee' can also be decided
    by the Courts under the Maharashtra Act. This too general and wide
    assertion completely overlooks the stipulation made. "if any proceeding
    in respect of any matter falling within the purview of this Act is
    instituted" in the said provision. As to what matters fall within the D
    purview of the Act is to be found outside Section 59 and there is no
    such indicator, in this regard in Section 59 itself. Section 59 of
    Mahar1Rhtra Act makes it clear that no proceeding under the Bombay
    Industrial Relations Act, 1946 or the ID Act shall be entertained when
    proceedings in respect of any matter falling within the purview of the E
    Maharashtra Act is already instituted. A complaint in which relief is
    sought for a declaration of a status as a direct employee of the principal
    employer and other consequential reliefs in terms of benefits and
    conditions of service applicable to workers directly employed by the
    principal employer is not a matter which falls within the purview of
    the Maharashtra Act. Therefore, Section 59 has no application in such F
    a case. That was, what has been specifically, elaborately and analyticallr
    found dealt with in CIPLA 's ·case and mere non-mention of Section 59
    in the judgment is no justification to say that they were either unaware
    of it or that a relevant and necessary provision which ought to have


-   been considered has been overlooked, which if had been adverted to, G
    the result would or ought to be different from the one taken, in that
    case. [1022-F-H, 1019-A-C, 1022-G-H, 1023-A)

       1.3. The interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
    Maharashtra Act appears to be in tune with the legal sense of the words H
    1006              SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A construed in the context of the statute and the jurisdiction of the
  authorities constituted thereunder. Such a construction paves way for
  avoiding uncertainty as well as possible inconsistency or expression of
  contradictory views when more than one group chose to avail different
  forums for similar kind of relief and therefore could not be said to have
B resulted in serious injustice, hardship or anomaly to warrant the
  countenance of a different view. A careful, critical and analytical
  scrutiny of the various provisions which consciously and conspicuously
  use the words 'employee' and 'employer' in all the relevant provisions
  would postulate the pre-existing relationship of such employee and
  employer being an accepted/acceptable fact. Consequently, the question
C of ousting the jurisdiction of an assumed and unfound jurisdiction to
  be otherwise existing does not at all arise. [1023-C-E]

          1.4. The principl~s laid down in CIPLA 's case are unexceptionable
    and weil merited having regard to the scheme, purpose and object of the
D   legislations under consideration and legislative intent as expressed in the
    language of the various provisions therein and do not call for any .
    reconsideration, merely because there was no reference to a particular
    provision or other, wherein all relevant principles and criteria necessary
    for the purpose have been found effectively keptinto consideration. There
E   is no scope for reconsidering the judgment, the view which really echoed
    the one taken about almost a decade back. [1024-D-F]

        Steel Authority of India Ltd and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront
    Workers and Ors., [2001) 7 SCC 1, followed.

F        General Labour Union (Red flag) Bombay v. Ahmedabad Mfg. and
    Calico Printing Co. Ltd and Ors., [1995) l SCC 175 and Vividh Kamgar
    Sabha v. Kalyani Steels Ltd and Anr., [2001) 2 SCC 381, referred to and
    reiterated.

G       CIPLA Ltdv. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Ors., (2001)
    3 sec 101, relied on.                                                         (




         Rex v. Basudev, (1950) FC 67; Canada Income War Tax R.S.C.,
    (1927) C. 97 S. 66; Nana/no Community Hotel, (1~45) 3 D.L.R. 225, -
H   referred to.
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGHv. INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LTD. 1007

     2. The meaning and intention of the legislature, which must A
govern the interpretation of a provision in a statute, have to be
ascertained not only from the language in which it is clothed but also
by considering its nature, its design and the consequences, which would
follow in construing it either way. Reports of Commissions or Inquiry
Committees proceeding the introduction of a Bill for the enactment B
have been always viewed as providing evidence of the historical facts
or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil intended to be
remedied and at times even for interpreting the Act, as external aids
to construction of the Act.

     R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183, followed.               c
     Mithilish Kumar v. Prem Bihari Khare, AIR (1989) SC 1247and
Shriram Chits and Investments (P.) Ltd v. U.O.I., AIR (1993) SC 2063,
relied on.
                                                                           D
     3. Though this Court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and
revise its earlier decisions, it would at the same time be reluctant to
entertain such pleas unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and
substantial reasons to do so and not undertake such an exercise merely
for the asking or that the alternate view pressed on the subsequent E
occasion is more reasonable.

     Keshav Mills Ltd v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, [1965) 2 SCR 908,
followed.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8452 of F
2003.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 7.11.200 l of the Industrial Court
Maharashtra at Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 835 of 2000.

                                 WITH                                      G

     C.A. Nos. 8453, 8454-59, 8460, 8461, 8462, 8463 of 2003.

    Ms. Indira Jaising, Chander Udai Singh, V.A. Mohta, P.P. Rao,
Shekhar Naphade, Bhimrao Naik, Dushyant Dave, Ms. Sangeet Panicker, H
    1008               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A R.K. Kumar, Bharat Sang11l, Gopal Jain, Sanjay Singhvi, Mahesh Agarwal,
    Ms. Jane Cox, F.C. Agrawala, Ms. Aparna Bhat, P. Ramesh Kumar, Vipin
    M. Benjamin, Nitin S. Tambwekar, C. Ravichandran Iyer, Ms. Purnima
    Bhat, Shivaji M. Jadhav, G. Balaji, A Sumanth, J.S. Balliya, Ms. Praveena
    Gautam, Pramod B. Aggarwala, P.N. Anaokar, K.P. Krishnan Nair, P.
B   Venugopal, P.S. Su1heer, Ms. Anuradha Rastogi, S.V. Deshpande, Prabhijit
    Jauhar, R.N. Shah, S.S. Jauhar, D.J. Bhanage and Ms. Meenakshi Arora
    for the appearing parties.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

c          ARIJIT PASAYA T, J : Leave granted.
                                                                                  )

         Appellants contend that tlie view which was first expressed by this
    Court in General Labour Union (Red flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad Mfg.
    And Calico Printing Co. Ltd and Ors., [1995] Supp I SCC 175, subsequently
D   echoed in many cases including Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels
    Ltd and Anr., [2001] 2 SCC 381 and finally in CIPLA Ltd v. Maharashtra
    General Kamgar Union and Ors., [2001] 3 SCC 101 is legally unsound
    and needs a fresh look.

E          It was held in first of the three cases that the workmen have to
    establish that they are workmen of the respondent-company before they
    ca~_ file any complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
    and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (in short the
    'Maharashtra Act'). Similar was the view expressed in Vividh Kamgar 's
F   case (supra) and CIPLA Ltd. 's case (supra).

         According to the appellants a fresh look is necessary in the matter,
    as various relevant provisions were not kept in view when the above
    decisions were rendered.

G        Ms. Indira Jaisingh, made leading submissions followed by Shri V.A.
    Mohta, Mr. Chander Udai Singh, Sr. Advocates and others on behalf of
    the appellants, whereas Shri P.P. R.ao. learned Senior Counsel followed by
    Sarvashri D.A. Dave, B.R. Naik and Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Advocates and
    others responded on behalf of the respondents. On behalf of the appellants-
H   workmen, relying upon Section 59 of the Maharashtra Act, it was urged
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH v. INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LTD. (PASAYAT, J.)   1009
strenuously that the machinery under the said Act as well as Industrial A
Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'ID Act') are co-extensive and equally
wide and the scope of judicial determination under both the Acts is the
same and that therefore there was no warrant to assume that the procedure
envisaged under the Maharashtra Act is summary. While pursuing further
the said stand it is claimed that in cases where the workmen seek to obtain B
a declaration that they were at all times the workmen of the principal
employer and the interposition of contractor or engagement through him
was neither bona fide nor genuine but merely a camouflage designed to
defeat the rights of the labourers remedies are available under both the
above enactments to be availed of at the option and choice of the workman C
concerned under anyone or other, though not under both. It was also
contended that Section 7 or Section 28 and 32 of the Maharashtra Act
cannot be construed so as to keep out of the purview of the Act, even an
adjudication as to the existence of relationship of the workmen vis-a-vis
the principal employer not withstanding that it is disputed or denied by the
principal employer and being a beneficial legislation meant to provide .D
workmen a more beneficial and expeditious additional remedy a liberal
construction has to be placed in furtherance of the avowed object. Further,
it is contended that when more than one statute governed the situation the
provisions have to be harmoniously construed, giving each of them a full
play rationally without whittling down the scope of anyone of them, E
keeping in view the basic principle that where there is no express bar to
a jurisdiction, ouster of jurisdiction could not be lightly inferred, to avoid
rendering provisions in a statute otiose or redundant. Most rational way
of such an harmonious construction would therefore, according to the
appellants lead to the ultimate conclusions a) of questions relating to F
abolition of contracts and consequential absorption can be raised before
 Industrial Courts, though by virtue of Sec.tion 10 of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (in short the 'Contract Labour Act')
the question relating to abolition will be decided only by the Government
and the Industrial Forums will keep the matter pending, to finally dispose
 of the other issues after the decision of Government under the said Act and G
b) the dispute relating to the sham nature of the employment through
contractor can be raised under the Maharashtra Act or ID Act at the option
or choice of the workmen. The expression 'enquiry' as appearing under
the Maharashtra Act is said to go far beyond the' adjudication' contemplated
 in Industrial Law and therefore convey wider powers and juris~iction. H
    1010                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A          It was submitted that the Maharashtra Act is a complete code in itself.
    If the forum provided therein can co-exist with the Tribunal under the ID
    Act, it is essentially art alternative forum with additional remedies.
    Definition of "workman" was by the logic of incorporation and, therefore,
    the Tribunal under the ID Act alone can not held competent to effectively
B   decide the question whether the claimant in reality was a workman or
    not. It was also submitted that this Court erroneously proceeded on the
    footing as if the proceedings under the Maharashtra Act are summary in
    nature.

           Per contra, on behalf of the respondents-Management/establishments,
C it was contended that when three different Benches of this Court have
    consistently taken the view that the basic question as to existence of
    relationship of employer-employee is not within the purview of the
    Maharashtra Act and the same hold the field for over 10 years it would
    require very strong reasons for any one to doubt the correctness of such
D   a view and that the mere reason that there may even be scope for another
    possible view, is no ground for reconsideration of the earlier decisions as
    held by this Court in Keshav Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax
    [1965] 2 SCR 908 at pages 921, 928.

E         On the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants
    while reiterating the plea that the principles laid down in CIPLA 's case
    (supra) are unexceptionable and well merited having regard to the scheme,
    purpose and object of the legislations under consideration and legislative
    intent as expressed in the language of the various provisions therein and
    do not call for any reconsideration, merely because there was no reference
F   to a particular provision or other, wherein according to the respondents all
    relevant principles and criteria necessary for the purpose have been found
    effectively kept into consideration. According to the respondents the scope
    for the Maharashtra Act is limited in nature and confined to consideration
    of claims and grievances of unfair labour practices of certain kind by
G   prohibiting employer or union and employees from engaging in any unfair
    labour practice and the existence of an undisputed or indisputable relationship
    of employer-employee is an essential pre-requisite for the labour or
    Industrial Court under the Maharashtra Act to entertain any proceedings
    in respect of any grievance under the said Act. Section 32 of the
H   Maharashtra Act, it is urged is to be considered in the context of Sections
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH v. INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LTD. [PASAYAT,J.]   1011

26 and 27 read with the relevant entries in the Schedules in these cases, A
particularly items 5, 6, 9 & 10 and in the absence of accepted or existing
relationship of employer-employee duly declared in competent proceedings,
neither Section 5 nor Section 7 or even Section 28 enabled a complaint
to be entertained for consideration of such grievances as are sought or
permitted to be agitated under the Maharashtra Act.                        B
      The further plea on behalf of the respondents was that the scope of
adjudication under the ID Act is much wider in which all or any types and
nature of industrial disputes including claims for declaration of status or
rel&tionship of "Master and Servant or Employer and Employee" can also
be agitated and determined and not under the Maharashtra Act. C
Consequently, it is claimed that questions as to whether the contract under
which contract labour was engaged was a sham and nominal or a mere
camouflage and if so whether by piercing the veil they should be declared
to be really the employees of the principal employer are matters which
could be got referred to for adjudication by seeking a reference under ID D
Act only and are totally outside the jurisdiction of the Courts constituted
under the Maharashtra Act.

     The decision of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authority ofIndia Ltd.
and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., [2001] 7 sec E
1 in several paragraphs particularly paras 65, 108, 112, 113, 117, 125
makes the position clear that a dispute of the nature previously projected
has perforce to be adjudicated on the issue as to whether a person was a
workman under the employer.

     The relevant paragraphs so far as relevant read as follows:                F
         "65. The contentions of the learned counsel for the parties,
         exhaustively set out above, can conveniently be dealt with under
         the following two issues :

         A. Whether the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour G
         in the establishment of the principal employer on issuance of the
         abolition notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA Act;
         and

         B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract Jabour in connection H
    1012             SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A          with the work entrusted to him by a principal employer, the
           relationship of master and servant between him (the Principal
           employer) and the contract labour, emerges.

           108. The next issue that remains to be dealt with is :
B
           B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection
           with the work entrusted to him by a principal employer, the
           relationship of master and servant between. him (the principal
           employer) and the contract labour emerges.

c          112. The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Basti
           Sugar Mill's case (supra), was given in the context of reference
           of an industrial dispute under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
           Act, 1947. The appellant-Sugar Mills entrusted the work of
           removal of press-mud to a contractor who engaged the respondents
D          therein (contract labour) in connection with that work. The
           services of the respondents were terminated by the contractor and
           they claimed that they should be reinstated in the service of the
           appellant. The Constitution Bench held :


E                       "The words of the definition of workmen in Section
                      2(z) to mean "any person (including an apprentice)
                      employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled,
                      manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire
                      or reward, whether the terms of employment be express
                      or implied" are by themselves sufficiently wide to
F                     bring in persons doing work in an industry whether the
                      employment was by the management or by the
                      contractor of the management. Unless however the
                      definition of the word "employer" included the
                      management of the industry even when the employment
G                     was by the contractor the workmen employed by the
                      contractor could not get the benefit of the Act since a
                      dispute between them and the management would not
                      be an industrial dispute between "employer" and
                      workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty
H                     in the way of workmen employed by contractors that
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH'" INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LID. [PASAYAT, J.]   1013

                    the definition of employer has been extended by sub- A
                    clause (iv) of Section 2(i). The position thus is: (a) that
                    the respondents are workmen within the meaning of
                    Section 2(z), being persons employed in the industry
                    to do manual work for reward, and (b) they were
                    employed by a contractor with whom the appellant B
                    company had contracted in the course of conducting
                    the industry for the execution by the said contractor of
                    the work of removal of press-mud which is ordinarily
                    a part of the industry. It follows therefore from Section
                    2(z) read with sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(i) of the Act C
                    that they are workmen of the appellant company and
                    the appellant company is their employer."

         113. It is evident that the decision in that case also turned on the
         wide language of statutory definitions of the terms "workmen"
         and "employer". So it does not advance the case pleaded by the D
         learned counsel.

         117. We find no substance in the next submission of Mr. Shanti
         Bhushan that a combined reading of the definition of the terms
         contract labour, establishment and workman would show that a E
         legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and
         the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to
         who has brought about such relationship.

           125(5). On issuance of prohibition notification under Section F
           l O( l) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour
           or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any
           contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial
           adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor
           has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to
           produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of G
         . contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine
           contract or is a mere ruse camouflage to evade compliance of
           various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the
           benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but
           a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be H
     1014                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A              treated as empl9yees of the principal employer who shall be
               directed to regularise the services of the contract Jabour in the
               concerned establishment subject to the conditions as may be
               specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder."

B          In view of the rival submissions it would be appropriate to take note
     of the conclusions arrived at by this Court earlier. First at point of time
     is the General Labour Union's case (supra). This Court, inter alia,
     observed as follows:

                     "The workmen have first to establish that they are the
c              workmen of the respondent-company before they can file any
               complaint under the Act. Admittedly, this has not been done. It
               is open for the workmen to raise an appropriate industrial dispute
               in that behalf if they are entitled to do so before they resort to the
               provisions of the present Act".
·D          In V. Kamgar 's case (supra) it was, inter alia, observed as follows:

                    "At this stage it must be mentioned that this Court has also
               in the case of General Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay v.
               Ahmedabad Mfg. And Calico Printing Co. Ltd held that where
E              the workmen have not been accepted by the company to be its
               employees, then no complaint would lie under the MRTU and
               PULP Act. We are in full agreement with the above-mentioned
               view.

                    The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act can only be
F
               enforced by persons who admittedly are workmen. If there is
               dispute as to whether the employees are employees of the
               company, then that dispute must first be got resolved by raising
               a dispute before the appropriate forum. It is only after the status
               as a workmen is established in an appropriate forum that a
G              complaint could be made under the provisions of the MRTU and
               PULP Act.

           Then comes the last of the cases i.e. CILPA 's case (supra) where
     detailed analysis have been made of the legal position. In paras 8 and 9
H    and l 0 it was observed as under:
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH"· INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]   1015

               "8. But one thing is clear - if the employees are working A
         under a contract covered by the Contract Labour (Regulation and
         Abolition) Act then it is clear that the Labour Court or the
         industrial adjudicating authorities cannot have any jurisdiction to
         deal with the matter as it falls within the province of an appropriate
         Government to abolish the same. If the case put forth by the B
         workmen is that they have been directly employed by the
         appellant company but the contract itself is a camouflage and,
         therefore, needs to be adjudicated is a matter which can be gone
         into by appropriate Industrial or Labour Court. Such question
         cannot be examined by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court
         constituted under the Act. The object of the enactment is, amongst C
         other aspects, enforcing provisions relating to unfair labour
         practices. If that is so, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that
         there is employer-employee relationship between the parties, the
         question of unfair practice cannot be inquired into at all. The
         respondent Union came to the Labour Court with a complaint that D
         the workmen are engaged by the appellant through the contractor
         and though that is ostensible relationship the true relationship is
         one of master and servant between the appellant and the workmen
          in question. By this process, workmen repudiated their relationship
          with the contractor under whom they are employed but claim E
          relationship of an employee under the appellant. That exercise
          ofrepudiation of the contract with one and establishment ofa legal
          relationship with another can be done only in a regular Industrial
          Tribunal/Court under the ID Act.

         9. Shri K.K. Singhvi, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for F
         the respondent, submitted that under Section 32 of the Act the
         Labour Court has the power to "decide all matters arising out of
         any application or complaint referred to it for decision under any
         of the provisions of the Act." Section 32 would not enlarge the
         jurisdiction of the court beyond what is conferred upon it by other G
         provisions qf the Act. If under other provisions of the Act the
         Industrial or the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a
         particular aspect of-the matter, Section 32 does not give such
         power to it. In. the cases at hand before us, whether the workman
         can be stated to be the workman of the appellant establishment H
    1016             SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A          or not, it must be held that the contract between the appellant and
           the second respondent is a camouflage or bogus and upon such
           a decision it can be held that the workman in question is an
           employee of the appellant es!ablishment. That exercise, we are
           afraid, would not fall within the scope of either Section 28 or
           Section 7 of the Act. In cases of this nature where the provisions
B
           of the Act are summary in nature and give drastic remedies to the
           parties concerned elaborate consideration of the question as to
           relationship of employer-employee cannot be gone into. If at any
           time the employee concerned was indisputaoly an employee of the
           establishment and subsequently it is so disputed, such a question
c          is an incidental question arising under Section 32 of the Act. Even
           the case pleaded by the respondent Union itself is that the
           appellant establishment had never recognized the workmen
           mentioned in Exhibit 'A' as its employees and throughout treated
           these persons as the employees of the second respondent. If that
D          dispute existed throughout, we think, the Labour Court or the
           Industrial Court under the Act is not the· appropriate court to
           decide such question, as held by tl:lis Court in General Labour
            Union (Red Flag) v.AhmedabadMfg. & CalicoPr'intingCo. Ltd.,
            (1995] Supp 1 SCC 175; which view was reiterated by us in Vividh
E          Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels Ltd.; (2001] 2 SCC 381.

            I 0. However, Shri Singhvi very strenuously contended, by
           adverting to the scope of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and
           the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputed Act, that
           these questions can be gone into by the courts and, in this context,
F          he relied upon the decision of the High Court of Bombay in
            Vishwanath Tukaram v. G.M Centeral Rly., V. T. In determining
           whether the wages had been appropriately paid or not, the
           authority under the Payment of Wages Act was held to have
           jurisdiction to decide the incidental question of whether the
G          applicant was in the employment of the railway administration
           during the relevant period. It means that at one time or the other
           the employee concerned was indisputably in employment and
           later on he was found to be not so employed and in those
           circumstances, the court stated that it w~!i an incidental question
H          to be considered."
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH v. INDIAN SMELTING& REFTNTNGCO. LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]   1017

       Reference has also been made to Sections 27, 28, 29 (d) and 32 of A
the Maharashtra Act. While Section 27 deals with prohibition on engaging
in unfair labour practices, Section 28 empowers filing of a complaint. Any
union or an employee or an employer or any investigating agency has the
locus to file a complaint. Section 29 (d) categorises parties on whom order
of Court is binding. Great emphasis was laid on Section 32 of the B
Maharashtra Act by the appellant to contend that matters connected with
the dispute can be gone into under the provision. The expression "all
matters arising out of' clearly emphasizes that it has connections, and not
that it is the basic issue. There is a gulf of difference between a basic issue
and something connected with or arising of the application. In Rex v.
Basudev (1950 FC 67), it was observed that the connection contemplated C;
must be real and proximate not far fetched or problematical. By no logic
it can be a substitute of the other. "In connection with any assessment"
(Canada: Income War Tax Act R.S.C. 1927 (C.97)S.66) has been interpreted
as "having to do with" in Re Nanaino Community Hotel (1945) 3 D.L.R.
225. The basic question which was raised also in CIPLA 's case (supra) D
relates to the existence of the relationship, and of any dispute connected
with that. For getting protection under the Maharashtra Act, it has first to
be established that the complainant is an employee of a person under whom
he claims to be an employee, and against whom he files a complaint. In
other words, the determinative question is can anybody who is not an E
 'employee' of or under a person against whom a grievance is sought to
be made file a complaint under the Act and the answer is inevitably 'No'.
 The fundamental issue therefore is whether the complainant is an employee
 of the person against whom a complaint is made under the Maharashtra
 Act and if there is a dispute, he has to establish it, first before the
 appropriate forum designated for adjudication of such industrial disputes. F
 Section 32 does not aid the appellant in the sense that it is not a matter
 arising out of the application, when the pre-existing relationship of
employer-employee is a must and an essential pre-requisite. It is the core
 issue on which only the very locus to make a complaint can at all be
 claimed. A person who does not answer the description has no legal locus G
to file a complaint. A jurisdictional fact is one on the existence or otherwise
 of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a court,
tribunal or the authority. Said fact has to be established and its existence
proved before a Court under the Maharashtra Act can assume jurisdiction
of a particular case. If the complaint is made prima facie accepting H
    1018               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A existence of the contractor in such a case what has to be first established
    is whether the arrangement or agreement between the complainant and the
    contractor is sham or bogus. There is an inherent admission in such a
    situation that patently the arrangement is between the complainant and the
    contractor and the claim for a· new and different relationship itself is a
B   disputed fact. To put it differently, the complainant seeks for a declaration
    that such arrangement is not a real one but something which is a fayade.
    There is no direct agreement between the complainant and the principal
    employer and one such is sought to be claimed but not substantiated in
    accordance with law. The relief in a sense relates to a legal assumption that
C   the hidden agreement or arrangement has to be surfaced. Entries 5, 6, 9
    and 10 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Act read as follows:

             "5- To show favouritism or partiality to one set of workers,
             regardless of merits.

D            6. To employ employees as "badlis'', casuals or temporaries and
             to continue them as such. for years, with the object of depriving
             them of the status and privileges .of permanent employees.

             9.   Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement.

E            10. To indulge in act of force or violence".

          The ID Act is undisputedly a comprehensive statute which provides
    for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The term 'industri<il
    dispute' as defined in Section 2(k) is· of a wide amplitude and can
F   encompass the nature of dispute raised by the complainant. The Contract
    Labour Act is also a self-contained legislation aiming at regulations and
    abolition of contract labour. What is conferred under Section 18 of the said
    Act is to be exercised having regard to the relevant factors which are
    mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) thereof. It is significant
    that both the ID Act and the Contract Labour Act were in existence and
G   operation when the Maharashtra Act was enacted. The method of availing
    benefit of the Contract Labour Act is indicated in Gujarat Electricity
    Board, Thermal Power Station, Ukai, Gujarat v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha and '
    Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 27 where it was specifically held by this Court that
    the status of erstwhile contract labourers can only effectively be determined
H   under the ID Act.
 SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH v. INDIAN SMELTING & REFINING CO. LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]   1019
        As noted above, considerable emphasis was laid on the fact that A
  Section 59 of the Maharashtra Act was not noticed in CJPLA 's judgment.
  A bare reading of the said provision makes it clear that no proceeding under
  the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 or the ID Act shall be
  entertained when proceedings in respect of any matter falling within the
  purview of the Maharashtra Act is already instituted. A complaint in which B
  relief is sought for a declaration of a status as a direct employee of the
  principal employer and other consequential reliefs in terms of benefits and
  conditions of service applicable to workers directly ~mployed by the
  principal employer is not a matter which falls within the purview of the
  Maharashtra Act. Therefore, Section 59 has no application in such a case. C
  Under the Maharashtra Act the Designated Court decides the complaint as
  provided under Sections 5 and 7 of the said Act. For the purpose of
  deciding the complaint enquiry under Section 30(3) of the said Act read
  with Section 28 is contemplated. The power to decide the complaint
   revolves round the question whether ingredients for constituting unfair
   labour practice exist or not. However, the power of adjudication under the D
· ID Act is not circumscribed by the existence or non-existence of unfair
   labour practice and goes far beyond it.

       The meaning and intention of the legislature, which must govern the
 interpretation of a provision in a statute, have to be ascertained not only E
 from the language in which it is clothed but also by considering its nature,
 its design and the consequences, which would follow in construing it either
 way. Reports of Commissions or Inquiry Committees preceding the
 introduction of a Bill for the enactment have been always vie'wed as
 providing evidence of the historical facts or of surrounding circumstances F
 or of mischief or evil intended to be remedied and at times even for
 interpreting the Act, as external aids to construction of the Act (vide R.S.
 Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984] 2 SCC 183 @214 and Mithilish Kumar v.
 Prem Bihari Khare, [1989] SC 1247 @ 1252 and Shriram Chits &
 Investments (P) Ltd. v. U.0.1., (1993] SC 2063 @2066, 2080. The report
 of the Committee on unfair labour practices which preceded the Maharashtra G
 Act, while noticing the fact that the expression 'unfair labour practices' was
 being used in all fields and areas connected with industrial relations in a
 wider sense and loosely worded manner and not always to mean certain
 activities connected with collective bargaining, sought to enumerate the
 types of such practices as were illustrated during course of enquiries by         fl
    1020                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the employees and their organizations, unions and also individual workers
  or groups of individual workers and specifically states that "after a careful
  scrutiny, we have selected only a few of them because we are of the view
  that the net of unfair labour practices should not be cast too wide." As
  the preamble to the Maharashtra Act would recite, the State Legislature
B after taking into consideration the report of the Committee, thought fit to
  decide among other things to define and provide for the prevention of
  certain unfair labour practices and to constitute courts for carrying out the
  purposes of according recognition to trade unions and for enforcing in that
  context the provisions relating to unfair practices. The fact that there were
C in existence and force, at that point of time several related laws such as
  ID Act, Contract Labour Act, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, etc. and
  the provisions of the Maharashtra Act was not to be in derogation of those
  laws cannot also be overlooked in trying to understand and interpret the
  provisions in question, and the issue now the subject matter of these
  appeals.
D
         As pointed out supra the main grievance voiced is about the so-called ·
    omission to specifically notice Section 59 while rendering the decision in
    Ciplas case (supra). Section 59 reads as follows:

              "59. Bar of proceeding under Bombay or Central Act:- If any
E             proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of
              this Act is instituted under this Act, then no proceeding shall at
              any time be entertained by any authority in respect of that matter
              under the Central Act or, as the case may be, the Bombay Act;
              and if any proceeding in respect of any matter within the purview
F             of this Act is instituted under the Central Act, or as the case may
              be, the Bombay Act, then no proceedings shall at any time be
              entertained by the Industrial or Labour Court under this Act."

           Section 7 reads as follows:
G             "7. Duties of Labour Court:- It shall be-the duty of the Labour
              Court to decide complains relating to unfair labour practices
              described in item 1 of Schedule IV and to try.offences punishable
              under this Act."

H          Section 28 reads thus:
SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH''· INDIAN SMELTING&REFININGCO. LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]   1021

        "28. Procedure for dealing with complaints relating to unfair A
        labour practices:~ (I) Where any person has engaged in or is
        engaging in any unfair labour practice, then any union or any
        employee or any employer or any Investigating Officer may,
        within ninety days of the occurrence of such unfair labour
        practice, file a complaint before the Court competent to deal with B
        such complaint either under section 5, or as the case may be, under
        section 7, of this Act:

         Provided that, the Court may entertain a complaint after the period
         of ninety days from the date of the alleged occurrence, if good
         and sufficient reasons are shown by the complainant for the late C
         filing of the complaint.

         (2) The Court shall take a decision on every such complaint as
         far as possible within a period of six months from the date of
         receipt of the complaint.                                      D
         (3) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (1), the Court
         may, if it so considers necessary, first cause an investigation into
         the said complaint to be made by the Investigating Officer, and
         direct that a report in the matter may be submitted by him to the
         Court, within the period specified in this direction.                E
         (4) While investigating into any such complaint, the Investigating
         Officer may visit the undertaking, where the practice alleged is
         said to have occurred, and make such enquiries as he considers
         necessary. He may also make efforts to promote settlement of the F
         complaint.

         (5) The Investigating Officer shall, after investigating into the
         complaint under sub-section (4) submit his report to the Court,
         within the time specified by it, setting out the full facts and G
         circumstances of the case, and the efforts· made by him in setting
         the complaint. The Court shall, on demand and on payment of
         such fee as may be prescribed by rules, supply a copy of the report
         to the complainant and the person complained against.

         (6) If, on receipt of the report of the Investigating Officer, the    FI
    1022                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A             Court finds that the complaint has not been settled satisfactorily,
              and that facts and circumstances of the case require, that the matter
              should be further considered by it, the Court shall proceed to
              consider it, and give its decision.

              (7) The decision of the Court, which shall be in writing, shall be
B             in the form of an order. The order of the Court shall be final and
              shall not be called in question in any civil or criminal court.

              (8) The Court shall cause its order to be published in such manner
              as may be prescribed. The order of the Court shall become
C             enforceable from the date specified in the order.

              (9) The Court shall forward a copy of its or:der to the State
              Government and such officers of the State Government as may
              be prescribed."
D          Section 32 reads as hereunder:

              "32. Power· of Court to decide all connected matters:-
              Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Court shall
              have the power to decide all matters arising out of any application
E             or a complaint referred fo it for the decision under any of the
              provisions of this Act. "

        Inferentially, from the above it is sought to be asserted that there is
  a statutory recognition in Section 59 as to the entitlement of a worker, at
F his option or choice to have recourse to anyone of the statutory remedies
  under the different Acts and therefore all and every question relating to
  the redress sought including as to whether a person is an 'employee' can
  also be decided by the Courts under the Maharashtra Act. This too general
  and wide assertion . completely overlooks the stipulation made, "If any
  proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of this Act
G is instituted" in the said provision. As to what matters fall within the
  purview of the Act is to be found outside Section 59 and there is no such
  indicator, in this regard in Section 59 itself. That was, what has been
  specifically, elaborately and analytically found dealt with in CJPLA 's case
  (supra) by the learned Judges and mere non-mention of Section 59 in the
H judgment is no justification to contend that they were either unaware of
SARVA SHRAMJK SANGH 1•. INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING. CO LTD. (PASAYAT, J.]   1023

it or that a relevant and necessary provision which ought to have been A
considered has been overlooked, which if had been adverted to the result
would or ought to be different from the one taken, in that case. We have
carefully gone through the construction placed upon the statutory provisions
noticed and conclusions drawn as to the class or category of matters which
only would fall within the purview of the M~harashtra Act and the B
necessity for any complainant to answer the description, as a condition
precedent, to be or having been treated by the employer as his 'employee'
and the relationship of employee and employer with the employer against
whom any such complaint of unfair labour practice is made and relief
therefor is sought is beyond controversy and common case or accepted
position and that we are in respectful agree with the same. The interpretation C
of the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act appears to be in tune with
the legal sense of the words construed in the context of the statute and the
jurisdiction of the authorities constituted thereunder. Such a construction
paves way for avoiding uncertainty as well as possible inconsistency or
expression of contradictory views when more than one group chose to avail D ·
different forums for similar kind of relief and therefore could not be said
to have resulted in serious injustice, hardship or anomaly to warrant the
countenance of a different view. A careful, critical and analytical scrutiny
of the various provisions which consciously and conspicuously use the
words 'employee' and 'employer' in all the relevant provisions would E
postulate the pre-existing relationship of such employee and employer
being an accepted/acceptable fact. Consequently, the question of ousting
the jurisdiction of an assumed and unfound jurisdiction to be otheiwise
existing, does not at all arise.

      The common thread passing through all these judgments is that the F
threshold question to be decided is whether the industrial dispute could be
raised for abolition of the contract labour system in view of the provisions
of the Maharashtra Act. What happens to an employee engaged by the
contractor if the contract made is abolished is not really involved in the
dispute. There can be no quarrel with the proposition as contended by the G
appellants that the jurisdiction to decide a matter would essentially depend
upon pleadings in the plaint. But in a case like the present one, where the
fundamental fact decides the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint itself
the position would be slightly different. In order to entertr.in a complaint
under the Maharashtra Act it has to be established that the claimant was H
    1024                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A an employee of the employer against whom complaint is made, under the
   ID Act. When there is no dispute about such relationship, as noted in
   paragraph 9 of CIPLA 's case (supra) the Maharashtra Act would have full
  .application. When that basic claim is disputed obviously the issue hits to
   be adjudicated by the forum which is competent to adjudicate. ·The sine
B qua non for application of the concept of unfair labour practice is the
   existence of a direct relationship of employer and employee. Until that
   basic question is decided the forum recedes to the background in the sense
   that first that question has to be got separately adjudicated. Even if it is
   accepted for _the sake of arguments that two forums are available, the Court
   certainly can say which is the more appropriate forum to effectively get
C it adjudicated and that is what has been precisely said in the three decisions.
   Once the existence of contractor is accepted, it leads to an inevitable
   conclusion that a relationship exists between the contractor and the
   complainant. According to them, the contract was a fa~ade and sham one
   which has no real effectiveness. As rightly observed in CJPLA 's case
D (supra), it is the relationship existing by contractual arrangement which is
   sought to be abandoned and negated and in its place the complainant's
   claim is to the effect that there was in reality a relationship between the
   employer and the complainant directly. It is the establishment of the
   existence of such an arrangement which decides the jurisdiction.· That
E being the position, CJPLA 's case (supra) rightly held that an industrial
   dispute has to be raised before the Tribunal under the ID Act to have the
   issue relating to actual nature of employment sort out. That being the
   position, we find that there is no scope for 11e-considering CJPLA 's case
   (supra), the view which really echoed the one taken about almost a decade
F back.
        That apart, as held by a seven member Constitution Bench judgment
  of this Court in Keshav Mills 's case (supra), though this Court has inherent
  jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, it would at the
  same time be reluctant to entertain such pleas unless it is satisfied that there
G are compelling and substantial reasons to do so and not undertake such an
  exercise merely for the asking or that the alternate view pressed on the
  subsequent occasion is more reasonable. For the reasons stated supra, we
  are of the view that the decision in CJPLA 's case (supra) was taken not . ·~
  only in tune with the earlier decisions of this Court in General Labour
H Union (Red Flag) Bombay's case (supra) and Vividh Kamgar Sabha 's case
    SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH r. INDIAN SMELTING& REFINING CO. LTD. [PASAYAT. !.]   1025



-   (supra) but quite in accordance with the subject of the enactment and the A
    object which the legislature had in view and the purpose sought to be
    achieved by the Maharashtra Act and consequently, there is no scope or
    necessity to reconsider the question once over again by a larger Bench.

         That being the position, these appeals are without merit and dese~ve B
    dismissal. Costs made easy.

    K.K.T.                                                   Appeals dismissed.