Supreme Court of India
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.versusANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 555
- Decided
- 3 December 2012
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The Court held that the suit was timely, the purchaser was ready and willing to perform, the vendor was in breach, and therefore specific performance of the 1970 agreement must be decreed, with the sale deed to be executed at the current market price.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a suit for specific performance of a 1970 agreement to sell a Delhi bungalow. The plaintiffs argued they were ready to fulfil their obligations, while the defendant claimed the suit was time‑barred and that the plaintiffs breached clause 7 by not paying an additional Rs 1 lakh. The Court held that, applying Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, the suit was filed within time because the defendant’s periods of absence from India were excluded. It found that clause 7 required payment only to the Income‑Tax authorities, not to the vendor, and that the plaintiff had consistently expressed willingness to comply. The High Court’s invocation of the business‑efficacy doctrine to read an extra payment obligation into the contract was rejected. Consequently, the vendor was in breach, and the Court decreed specific performance, directing execution of the sale deed at the current market price. The appeals were allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963
- Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract
- Whether the defendant breached the agreement, particularly clause 7
- Whether the plaintiff breached clause 7 by failing to pay an additional amount to the defendant
- Whether specific performance of the 1970 agreement should be granted despite the lapse of time and escalation in property value
Legislation cited
Subjects
specific performancelimitation periodbusiness efficacyreadiness and willingnesscontract interpretationsale deedmarket priceIndian contract law
Judgment
[2013] 3 S.C.R. 319
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. A
v.
ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8653 of 2012 ETC.)
DECEMBER 3, 2012
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]
Specific Performance:
Agreement to sell - Suit by purchaser, for specific c
, performance of agreement - Decreed by trial court - High
Court reversed the decree - Held: Purchaser was, at all times,
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract - It was
the seller who defaulted in execution of sale deed -Insistence
of the seller on further payments by the purchaser directly to D
him and not to the Income Tax Authorities was not justified -
Purchaser was not obliged to make any further payment to
seller apart from payment of earnest money - Purchaser
entitled to decree of specific performance - However, due to
efflux of time and escalation of price of property, seller is E
entitled to additional compensation ie. a price higher than
what was stipulated in the agreement - Direction to execute
the sale deed for the market price of the suit property as on
date - Trial court directed to ascertain the market price.
Suit for specific performance - Test of readiness and F
willingness of plaintiff - Held: No straitjacket formula can be
laid down on the basis of which the readiness and willingness
of the plaintiff is to be judged - It would depend on overall
conduct of the plaintiff in the light of the conduct of the
defendant. G
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s. 20 - Parameters for exercise
of discretion under - Held : Cannot be entrapped within any
precise expression of language and the contours thereof
319 H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case -
The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement
and that too after lapse of a long period, has to be exercised
on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles -
The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness
B and reasonableness - Efflux of time and escalation of price
of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the
relief of specific performance.
Principle of 'Business Efficac( - Applicability of - The
C test of business efficacy requires that a term can only be
implied if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract to avoid such a failure of consideration that the
parties cannot as reasonable businessmen have intended -
If the contract makes business sense without the term, courts
will not imply the same - In the instant case, invocation of the
D principle by the High Court, notwithstanding the clear
language of the agreement, not correct.
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 15(5) - Limitation for filing suit -
The period of the absence of the defendant from India has
E to be excluded while computing the limitation for filing of the
suit - Thus the suit in the instant case was filed well within time.
Plaintiff No. 1 was the tenant of the defendant in
respect of the suit property. They entered into an
agreement dated 22.12.1970 to sell the suit property to
F
plaintiff No.1. for Rs. 3,75,0001-. Plaintiff No.1 paid Rs.
50,000/- to the defendant as earnest money. Under clause
7 of the agreement, plaintiff No.1 was required to pay to
the Income Tax Authorities such amount as would be
desired by the defendant against the tax dues of the
G defendant so as to facilitate the grant of the required tax
clearance certificate and such money was to be deducted
from the balance of the sale price at the time of the
execution of the sale deed. In response to the query of
plaintiff No.1 as regards Tax Clearance, the defendant
H
'
'
-1
I
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIEJ321
(D) TR.LRS.
sent a legal notice stating that he had written a letter to A
the plaintiff No.1 on 9.9.1971 calling upon him to pay a
sum of Rs. 1 lakh to the defendant. Plaintiff No.1 denied
the receipt of letter dated 9.9.1971. He also reiterated his
readiness to tender any payment as might be due under
clause 7 of the agreement. Plaintiff No.1 received a notice B
from the defendant terminating the tenancy. The plaintiff
filed the suit seeking a decree for specific performance
of the agreement dated 22.12.1970. The defendant in his
written statement contended, inter alia, that the suit was
barred by limitation; that the plaintiffs were not entitled c
to a decree for specific performance as plaintiff No.1 had
breached the conditions of the agreement, particularly,
clause 7 thereof. The trial court decreed the suit and
directed execution of the sale deed. High Court, in
appeal, reversed the decree.
D
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. On due application of the provisions of
Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit filed by
the plaintiff was well within time as the period of the E
absence of the defendant from India has to be excluded
while computing the limitation for filing of the suit. [Para
15] [337-B-C]
P C K Muthia Chettiar and Ors v. V E S Shanmugham
F
Chettair (D) and Anr. AIR 1969 SC 552: 1969 SCR 444 -
relied on.
Atul Kristo Bose v. Lyon and Co. ILR 14 Cal 457;
Muthukanni Muda/iar v. Andappa Pillai AIR 1955 Mad 96 -
referred to. G
2.1 Under clause 7 of the agreement, the obligation
of plaintiff No.1 was to pay to the Income Tax
Department. Neither clause 7 nor any other Clause of the
H
I
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A agreement had cast upon plaintiff No.1 a duty to tender
any further payment to the defendant or to credit the bank
account of the defendant with any further advance
amount. Plaintiff No.1 had repeatedly asserted i,n his
correspondence that he was always ready and willing to
B pay any amount (within the balance consideration
payable) to the Income Tax department so that the
necessary tax clearance certificate could be issued.
Nothing has been brought on record by the defendant to
show that any demand or request had been made by him
c to plaintiff No.1 for payment of any amount to the Income
. Tax Department. [Para 20] [340-D-F]
2.2 The High Court, notwithstanding the clear
language of clause 7 of the agreement, had invoked the
principle of "business efficacy" to hold that a slight
D deviation from the plain meaning of the language of
clause 7 would be justified so as to read an obligation on
the part of the plaintiff to pay the further amount of Rs.
one lakh as demanded by the defendant instead of
insisting on making such further payment(s) only to the
E Income Tax Authorities. [Para 21] [340-G]
2.3 The principle of business efficacy is normally
invoked to read a term in an agreement or contract so as
to achieve the result or the consequence intended by the
F parties acting as prudent businessmen. Business efficacy
means the power to produce intended results. The test
of business efficacy requires that a term can only be
implied if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract to avoid such a failure of consideration that the
G parties cannot as reasonable businessmen have
intended. But only the most limited term should then be
implied • the bare minimum to achieve this goal. If the
contract makes business sense without the term, the
courts will not imply the same. [Para 22] [340-H; 341-A·C]
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 323
(D) TR.LRS.
United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Manubhai A
Dharamasinhbhai Gajera and Ors. (2008) 10 SCC 404: 2008
(9) SCR 778 - relied on.
The Moorcock by Lord Justice Bowen - referred to.
2.4 The business efficacy test, therefore, should be 8
applied only in cases where the term that is sought to be
read as implied is such which could have been clearly
intended by the parties at the time of making of the
agreement. In the instant case not only the language of
clause (7) of agreement dated 22.12.1970 is clear and ·C
unambiguous there is no other clause in the agreement
which had obliged plaintiff No.1 to make any further
payment after the initial part payment of Rs.50,000/-. The
obligation of plaintiff No.1 was to pay any further
amount(s) to the Income-Tax authorities, at the request D
of the defendant, in order to facilitate the issuance of the
Tax Clearance Certificate. No payment to the defendant
beyond the initial amount of Rs.50,000/- was
contemplated. The intent of the parties, acting as prudent
businessmen, appears to be clear. An obvious intent to E
exclude any obligation of the plaintiff to pay any further
amount (beyond Rs.50,000/-) to the defendant is clearly
discernible. Consequently, resort to the principle of
business efficacy by the High Court to read such an
implied term in the agreement dated 22.12.1970 was not F
warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
[Para 24] [342-G-H; 343-A-D]
3. No straitjacket formula can be laid down on the
basis of which the readiness and willingness of the
plaintiff in a suit for specific performance is to be judged. G
The test of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff
would depend on his overall conduct i.e. prior and
subsequent to the filing of the suit which has also to be
viewed in the light of the conduct of the defendant. In
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A the instant case, plaintiff No.1 was, at all times, ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. On the
contrary, it is the defendant who had defaulted in the
execution of the sale document. The insistence of the
defendant on further payments by the plaintiff directly to
B him and not to the Income Tax authorities as agreed upon
was not at all justified and no blame can be attributed to
the plaintiff for not complying with the said demand(s) of
the defendant. [Para 25] [343-F-G; 344-A-B]
C J.P. Builders and Anr. v. A. Ramdas Rao and Anr. (2011)
1 sec 429: 2010 (15) SCR 538 - relied on.
R. C. Chandiok vs. Ch uni Lal Sabharwal (1970) 3 SCC
140: 1971 (2) SCR 573; N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R.
Jagan Mohan Rao (1995) 5 SCC 115: 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR
D 53; P.D' Souza vs. Shondri/o Naidu (2004) 6 SCC 649: 2004
(3) Suppl. SCR 186 -·referred to.
4. The discretion to direct specific performance of an
agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of
E time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound,
reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The
parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be
entrapped within any precise expression of language and
F the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test
would be the principles of fairness and reasonableness
as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given
case, which features the experienced judicial mind can
perceive without any real difficulty. Efflux of time and
G escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid
ground to deny the relief of specific performance. These
two features, at best, may justify award of additional
compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher
than what had been stipulated in the agreement which
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 325
(D) TR.LRS.
price, in a given case, may even be the market price as A
on date of the order of the final Court. [Paras 28 and 29]
[344-H; 345-A-C and F]
P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagya/akshmi (2007)
10 SCC 231: 2007 (2) SCR 876; Narinderjit Singh v. North B
Star Estate Promoters Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 712 - relied on.
5. The findings and conclusions recorded by the
High Court are set aside and the suit for specific
performance of the agreement dated 22.12.1970 is
decreed. The sale deed to be executed by the defendants C
in favour of the plaintiffs for the market price of the suit
property as on the date of the present order. As no
material is available to enable this Court to make a correct
assessment of the market value of the suit property as
on date, the trial judge is requested to undertake the said D
exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the
prevailing facts and circumstances. [Para 30] [345-G; 346-
A-C]
Case Law Reference:
E
1969 SCR 444 relied on Para 14, 15
ILR 14 Cal 457 referred to Para 14
AIR 1955 Mad 96 referred to Para 14
F
AIR 1928 Mad 1088 referred to Para 14
AIR 1944 Mad 437 referred to Para 14
2008 (9) SCR 778 relied on Para 23
2010 (15) SCR 538 relied on Para 25 G
1971 (2) SCR 573 referred to Para 25
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 53 referred to Para 25
2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 186 referred to Para 25 H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 2007 (2) SCR 876 relied on Para 28
(2012) s sec 112 relied on Para 28
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8653 of 2012.
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.10.2011 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 11 of 1984.
WITH
C C.A. Nos. 8654-8655, 8656, 8657, 8675-76 of 2012.
Shanti Bhushan, A.B. Dial, P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Dr.
Abhishek Singhvi, V. Giri, Vijay Hansaria, Pradeep Aggarwal,
Umesh Pratap Singh, Ruchi Kohli, Aruna Gupta, Ananya Datta
Majumdar, Rajiv Nanda, Pankaj Bhagat, Dr. Sushil Balwada,
D Lal Pratap Singh, Ram Niwas, Vijay Kumar Paradesi, Vikram
Singh Arya, Sarad Kumar Singhania, N. Annapoorani, Shaveer
Ahmed, Ashish Rana, Tanmay Mehta, V. Balaji, C. Kannan
Sneha Kalita, Sadique Mohd., MSM A. Thambhi, Prashant
Kenle and Sanjay Sharawat for the appearing parties.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants, apart from the appellant Narendra Jain
F (Plaintiff No.2), claim to be the Legal heirs and representatives
of the original plaintiffs 1 and 3 who had instituted suit No. 994/
1977 in the High Court of Delhi seeking a decree of specific
performance in respect of an agreement dated 22.12.1970
executed by and between original plaintiff No.1 (Bhikhu Ram
G Jain) and the original defendant Anis Ahmed Rushdie in
respect of a property described as Bungalow No.4, Flag Staff
Road, Civil Lines, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit
property'). The plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were/are the sons of the
original plaintiff No.1. The suit was decreed by the learned trial
H judge. The decree having been reversed by a Division Bench
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 327
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
of the High Court the present appeals have been filed by the A
original plaintiff No.2, Narendra Jain and the other appellants
who claim to be vested with a right to sue on the basis of the
claims made by the original plaintiffs in the suit. It is, however,
• made clear at the very outset that though all such persons
• claiming a right to sue through the deceased plaintiffs 1 and 3 B
are being referred to hereinafter as the plaintiffs and an
adjudication of the causes/claims espoused is being made
herein the said exercise does not, in any way, recognize any
right in any such impleaded 'plaintiffs' which Question(s) are
left open for decision if and when so raised.
c
3. The pleaded case of the respective parties may now
b~ briefly noticed.
In the suit filed by the original plaintiffs it was pleaded that
the defendant, who was the owner of the suit property, after D
inducting the plaintiff No. 1 as a tenant in respect of the half
portion of the suit property at a monthly rent of Rupees three
hundred w.e.f. 20.12.1970 had executed an agreement dated
22.12.1970 to sell the suit property to the said plaintiff No.1.
According to the plaintiffs the price fixed under the agreement E
was Rupees 3,75,000/- (Rupees three lakh and seventy five
thousand only) out of which an amount of Rupees 50,000/-
(Rupees fifty thousand only) was paid to the defendant by the
plaintiff No.1 as part payment. Under clauses 4, 5 and 7 of the
agreement dated 22.12.1970 the defendant was required to F
obtain necessary Tax Clearance Certificate from the Income
Tax Authorities for sale of the suit property and intimate the said
fact and also deliver to the plaintiff No.1 a copy of such certificate
within twelve months from the date of the execution of the
agreement dated 22.12.1970. Within three months thereafter, G
the plaintiff No.1 was required to pay the balance sale
consideration on receipt of which the defendant was under an
obligation to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
Under clause (7) of the agreement dated 22.12.1970 the
plaintiff No.1 was to pay to the Income Tax Authorities such
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A amount as may be desired by the defendant (not exceeding the
balance sale price of the property) against the tax dues of the
defendant so as to facilitate the grant of the required tax
clearance certificate. Clause (7) of the agreement also
contemplated that such money as may be paid by the plaintiff
8 No.1 to the Income Tax Authorities in the defendant-vendor's
account was to be deducted by the plaintiff from the balance
of the sale price at the time of the execution of the sale deed.
4. According to the plaintiffs, as the plaintiff No.1 had not
received any intimation from the defendant in the matter of
C execution of the sale deed he h-ad written a letter dated
27 .12.1971 to the defendant enquiring about the steps taken
to obtain the necessary Tax Clearance certificate from the
Income Tax Authorities. The plaintiffs had pleaded that the said
letter was not replied to. Instead a legal notice dated 6.11.1972
D was issued on behalf of the defendant wherein it was, inter alia,
claimed that defendant had written a letter to the plaintiff No.1
as far back as on 9.9.1971 calling upon him to pay a sum of
Rupees One lakh so as to enable the defendant to furnish a
bank guarantee to the Income Tax Authorities in order to
E facilitate the issuance of the necessary Tax Clearance
certificate. The request of the defendant was not responded to
by the plaintiff No.1. Accordingly, by the notice dated
6.11.1972, the defendant had asked/required the plaintiff to pay
the aforesaid amount of Rupees One lakh within three days
F failing which, it was mentioned, the agreement dated
22.12.1970 would stand terminated and the earnest money
(Rupees fifty thousand) paid shall stand forfeited. According to
the plaintiffs, in response to the aforesaid notice dated
6.11.1972, the plaintiff No.1 wrote a letter dated 14.11.1972
G denying the receipt of any communication from the defendant
that he had applied for the tax clearance certificate or any
intimation to the effect any amount is required to be paid to the
Income Tax Authority for processing the matter of grant of the
clearance certificate. In the aforesaid letter the plaintiff No.1 had
H further stated that under clause (7) of the agreement he was
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 329
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
obliged to deposit, at the request of the defendant, any amount A ·
not exceeding the total sale consideration with the Income Tax
- Authorities and no further/additional amount was required to be
tendered to the defendant after payment of the initial amount
of Rupees Fifty Thousand. In the said letter dated 14.11.1972
the plaintiff No.1 had also reiterated his readiness to tender any B
payment as may be due under the aforesaid clause (7) of the
agreement. As the letter dated 14.11.1972 was not responded
to, the plaintiff No.1 had addressed another letter dated
15.12.1972 to the Advocate of the defendant reiterating the
contents of his earlier letter dated 14.11.1972. Thereafter, there c
was no correspondence between the parties for about five
years until the suit was filed on 3.11.1997. It may be specifically
noted, at this stage, that according to the plaintiffs the suit could
not be instituted earlier as the defendant was all along residing
in London. Another relevant fact that would be required to be D
noticed is that on 16.9.1977 the plaintiff No.1 had received a
notice terminating the tenancy qua half portion of the suit
property which had commenced on and from 20.12.1970. It is
in these circumstances that the plaintiff had filed the suit
seeking a decree of specific performance of the agreement
dated 22.12.1970 and, in the alternative, for a decree of a sum E
of Rs.1,30, 120.50 being the total of the part amount paid to the
defendant and damages along with interest thereon.
5. Denying the claims made by the plaintiffs the original
defendant had filed a written statement contending, inter alia, F
that the suit was barred by limitation. Though the defendant
had admitted the creation of the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff
No.1 on 20.12.1970 as well as execution of the agreement to
sell dated 22.12.1970, it was contended that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a decree of specific performance of the G
agreement inasmuch, as the plaintiff No.1 had breached the
conditions of the agreement, particularly, clause (7) thereof. In
this regard, it was specifically pleaded by the defendant that
on 09.09.1971 the defendant had addressed a letter to the
plaintiff No.1 informing him that as the Income Tax Authorities H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A had agreed to issue the necessary tax clearance certificate on
furnishing of a bank guarantee of Rs.One lakh in favour of the
Commissioner of the Income Tax, the aforesaid amount be
made available to the defendant or the same be credited in
the defendant's bank account. According to the defendant, the
B plaintiff No.1 failed to so act as a result of which the bank
guarantee could not be furnished and consequently the Income
Tax clearance certificate was not issued. The defendant had
also filed an amended/additional written statement pleading
that undue hardship would be caused to him in the event a
c decree for specific performance is to be granted. The
defendant had also taken the plea that apart from addressing
the letter dated 9.9.1971, the demand/request of the defendant
to make available the additional amount of Rs. One lakh for the
purpose of furnishing the bank guarantee to the Income Tax
authorities was conveyed to the plaintiff No.1 through the
0
common broker of the parties, one Lajjya Ram Kapur (PW-3).
6. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were
framed for trial in the suit:
E 1. Whether the suit is within time?
2. Whether the suit is for mis-joinder of plaintiff Nos.
2 and 3?
3. Whether the written statement has been signed and
F verified by a duly authorized person? If not to what
effect?
4. Whether plaintiff No.1 has always been ready and
willing to perform his part of the agreement dated
G 22.12.1970?
5. Whether the defendant has committed the breach
of the agreement dated 22.12.1970?
6. Whether plaintiff No.1 has committed breach of any
H of the terms of the agreement dated 22.12.1977,
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED 331
RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
if so, to what effect? A
7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to specific
performance of the agreement dated 22.12.1970?
8. If Issue No. 7 is not proved, whether plaintiff No.1 is
not entitled to refund of earnest money and interest B
thereon?
7. The learned trial judge by judgment dated 5.10.1983
decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance of the
agreement dated 22.12.1970 and directed execution of the c
sale deed by the defendant in favour of any of the plaintiffs,
failing which, the Registry of the Court was directed to ensure
the execution of the same. The balance of the sale consideration
i.e. Rupees 3.25 lakhs was to be paid by the plaintiffs at the
time of the execution of the sale deed and in the event the sale D
deed was to be executed through the Registry of the Court the
aforesaid amount was to be deposited in Court before
registration of the sale document.
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree
passed by the learned trial judge, the original defendant had E
filed an appeal which was allowed by the impugned judgment
dated 31.10.2011. During the proceedings of the appeal before
the High Court the original plaintiffs 1 and 3 as well as the
original defendant had died. As already noticed, while the
original plaintiff No.2 continues to remain on record as an F
appellant, the remaining appellants claim to be the legal heirs/
representatives of the deceased plaintiff Nos.1 and 3. In so far
as the original defendant in the suit is cdncerned the legal
representatives of the said defendant are on record having
been so impleaded. G
9. We have heard Mr.Shanti Bhushan, Mr.AB. Dial and
Mr.P.Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior counsels appearing
for the appellants and Dr.Abhishek Singhvi, Mr.V.Giri and Mr.
Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsels appearing for the H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A respondents.
10. On behalf of the appellants it is urged that the decree
passed by the learned trial Judge has been reversed in appeal,
inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiffs' suit is barred by
limitation. It is contended that the said conclusion has been
8
reached on an apparent mis-interpretation of the provisions of
Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is also contended
that the claim of the plaintiff that a letter dated 9.9.1971, had
been sent by the defendant to the plaintiff, requesting for a
further sum of Rupees One lakh for the purpose of furnishing a
C bank guarantee in favour of the Income Tax Authorities so as
to facilitate the issuance of the tax clearance certificate(s) and
the alleged refusal/failure of the plaintiff to comply with the said
request, is not borne out by the evidence on record. No such
request was made and neither the letter dated 9.9.1971 nor the
D verbal request to the said effect allegedly made through the
broker, Lajjia Ram Kapur, was received or communicated to
the plaintiffs. In any event, according to learned counsel, under
clause (7) of the agreement the plaintiff was obliged to make
further amounts available, on the defendant's account, to the
E Income Tax Authorities only. Apart from the initial payment of
Rupees Fifty thousand the plaintiff was not required to make
any further payment directly to the defendant. The meaning
attributed by the first appellate court to clause (7) of the
agreement on the principle of "business efficacy" and the
F consequential findings on the question of readiness and
willingness of the plaintiffs are plainly incorrect. Learned counsel
has submitted that in such a situation, notwithstanding the expiry
of long efflux of time, when the plaintiff was in no way at fault a
decree of specific performance should follow, if required by
G suitably enhancing the value of the property. Specifically,
learned counsel has indicated the willingness of the plaintiffs
to offer an amount of Rs. 6 crores for the property in question
as against the amount of Rs.3.75 lakhs as mentioned in the
agreement dated 22.12.1970.
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED 333
RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
11. Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the A
appellants, learned counsels for the respondent (referred
hereinafter in the singular) have submitted that the meaning
sought to be attributed to the provisions of Section 15(5) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is wholly unacceptable. It is argued that
the law does not countenance a situation where the initiation B
of a civil action can be postponed till the availability of the
defendant in India, which would be the virtual effect of Section
15(5) of the Limitation Act if the arguments made on behalf of
the appellants on this score are to be accepted. It is further
urged that the cause of action for the suit arose on the expiry c
of 15 months from the date of the agreement, namely, on
22.03.1972 and the period of three years for filing the suit had
expired on 22.03.1975. Alternatively, as by letter dated
06.11.1972, three days further time has been granted by the
defendant to the plaintiff the cause of action may be understood D
to have arisen on 09.11.1972 and the period of limitation of
three years to be over on 09.11.1975. Learned counsel has
also submitted that as by letter dated 13/15.11.1972 further four
month's time had been granted by the plaintiff to the defendant
the cause of action may be understood to have accrued on
14.03.1973 and the period of three years for fling the suit to · E
be over on 14.03.1976. Yet, the present suit was filed on
03.11.1977 though from the materials on record it is evident
that the defendant was present in India between 07 .9.1977 to
01.10.1977. The provisions of Section 15(5) of the Limitation
Act, according to learned counsel, have to be purposively and F
reasonably interpreted so as to avoid any absurd
consequence(s). Continuing, learned counsel has urged that the
materials on record, particularly the correspondence
exchanged between the parties, indicate that even when the
contents of the letter dated 09.09.1971 were specifically G
brought to the notice of the plaintiff in the subsequent
correspondence addressed by the defendant, the plaintiff had
not denied receipt of the said letter. As the plaintiff failed to
respond to the defendant's request to make available the
amount of Rupees One lakh required by him for the purpose H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A of furnishing the bank guarantee, the defendant, who was a
British national, could not comply with the demand of the Income
Tax Authorities as a result of which the necessary Tax Clearance
certificate (s), which is a pre-requisite for the sale of the
property, could not be obtained. It is, therefore, contended that
B though the defendant was, at all times, ready and willing to
execute the sale deed it is the plaintiff who had failed to perform
his part of the bargain. Consequently, the High Court was
correct in refusing the decree of specific performance. In any
event, according to learned counsel, specific performance of
c the agreement dated 22.12.1970 ought not to be ordered by
this Court at this juncture in view of the completely altered
market conditions in respect of immovable property in the
National Capital where the suit property is situated. It is also
pointed out that the High Court had already granted refund of
the part consideration (Rupees fifty thousand) paid by the
0
plaintiff to the defendant alongw'ith interest at the rate of 12%
from the date of payment of the said amount till the date of the
realization/return of the same. The said direction, it is submitted,
adequately takes care of the equities arising in the present
case.
E
12. On the basis of the discussions that have preceded
three issues, in the main, arise for our determination. In proper
sequential order, the first would be whether the suit is barred
by limitation. If not, which of the parties to the agreement dated
F 22.12.1970 are in breach of the terms and conditions thereof
and, lastly, if no such breach can be attributed to the plaintiff
whether a decree of specific performance should be granted
at this belated point of time.
G 13. Even going by any of the three different/alternative
dates on which the cause of action for the plaintiffs' suit had
arisen, as conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent,
it is evident that the suit was filed beyond the stipulated period
of three years from any of the dates of the accrual of the cause
of action. However, the plaintiffs have invoked the provisions
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED 335
RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
of Section 15 (5) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to claim the benefit A
of the exclusion of the period during which the d.efendant was
absent from India. There can, indeed, be no doubt that if the
plaintiff is entitled to exclude the period of such absence the
bar of limitation will not apply to the present suit. The court,
therefore, must make an endeavour to find out the true meaning B
of the provisions contained in Section 15 (5) of the Limitation
Act in order to determine as to whether the plea put forward
by the plaintiffs is sustainable in law.
14. The provisions contained in Section 15 (5) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 are pari materia with those in Section 13 C
of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The aforesaid provision of
the Act of 1908 has received a full and complete consideration
of this Court in P C K Muthia Chettiar & Ors v. V E S
Shanmugham Chettair (D) & Anr. 1• While holding that the
words of the Section (Section 13), namely, "that time during D
which the defendant has been absent from India" are clear and
therefore must be excluded in computing the period of
limitation. two earlier decisions in Atul Kristo Bose v. Lyon &
Co. 2 and Muthukanni Muda/iar v. Andappa Pi/lai3 were also
noticed by this Court. The discussion in respect of the aforesaid E
two earlier decisions which had formed the basis of the
co11clusions in P C K Muthia Chettiar (Supra), as noticed
above, have been set out in paragraph 6 of the judgment which
may be profitably extracted below :
F
" 6. In Atul Kriato Bose v. Lyon & Co. 4 the defendants
were foreigners and they never came to India on or after
the date of the accrual of the cause of action. The
Calcutta High Court held that Section 13 applied and that
the suit was not barred by limitation. The Court was not G
impressed with the argument that according to this
1. AIR 1969 SC 552.
2. ILR 14 Cal 457 para 6.
3.- AIR 1955 Mad 96.
4. (1887) ILR 14 Cal 457. H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A construction a defendant who was in England when a
cause of action against him accrued, and has remained
there ever since might be liable after an indefinite time
to be sued in a Calcutta court. In Mathukanni v. Andappa5
the plaintiff and the defendant who were residents of
B Mannargudi in India had gone to Kaula Lampur to earn
their livelihood, and while there the defendant executed
a promissory note to the plaintiff on November 16, 1921.
In 1925 the plaintiff brought a suit on the promissory note
in the District Munsifs Court of Mannargudi. The cause
c of action in the suit arose outside India. A Full Bench of
the Madras High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to the benefit of Section 13 and in computing the period
of limitation he was entitled to exclude the time during
which the defendant was absent in Kaula Lampur. We
agree with this decision. The Full Bench rightly overruled
D
the earlier decisions in Ruthinu v. Packiriswami6 and
Subramania Chettiar v. Maruthamuthu7 . We hold that the
suit is not barred by limitation.
15. In the present case from the evidence on record it is
E established that till the date of filing of the suit i.e. 03.11.1977,
the defendant was in India during following periods:
1. from 24.09.1970 to 15.10.1970,
2. from 17.12.1970 to 28.12.1970,
F
3. from 16.08.1971 to 11.09.1971,
4. from 29.10.1972 to 10.11.1972,
5. from 02.09.1977 to 01.10.1977
G
The decision of this Court in P C K Muthia Chettiar
5. AIR 1955 Mad 96.
6. AIR 1928 Mad 1088.
H 7. AIR 1944 Mad 437.
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 337
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
(Supra) clearly lays down that the operation of Section 13 of A
the Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponding to Section 15 (5) of
the Limitation Act, 1963) does not make any exception in cases
where the cause of action had arisen in a foreign country or in
India or in cases in which the defendant was in India or in a
foreign country at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. B
Taking into account the ratio laid down by this Court in P C K
Muthia Chettiar (Supra) and the period during which the
defendant was absent from India there can be no doubt,
whatsoever, that on due application of the provisions of Section
15(5) of the Limitation Act of 1963, the suit filed by the plaintiff c
was well within time as the period of the absence of the
defendant from India has to be excluded while computing the
limitation for filing of the suit.
16. To answer the next question that would arise
consequent to our decision on the first issue the clauses of the D
agreement between the parties will have to be noticed in some
detail. The total sale price was agreed at Rs. 3,75,000/- out
of which a sum of Rs.50,000/- had been acknowledged to have
been paid by the purchaser(plaintiff No.1) to the vendor
(defendant) by means of an account payee cheque. Under E
clause 4 of the agreement, the vendor was required to obtain,
at his own cost, a Wealth Tax clearance certificate to enable
the transfer of property to be made and to intimate the said fact
along with a copy of the tax c;:learance certificate to the
purchaser not later than 12 months from the date of the F
agreement. Under Clause 5 of the agreement, the vendor was
to execute the sale deed within a period of 15 months from the
date of the agreement. The purchaser, in turn, was to pay to
the vendor the balance sale consideration after deducting the
amount of Rs.50,000/- at the time of the registration of the sale G
deed which was to be within three months after receipt of the
necessary intimation that the tax clearance certificate has been
obtained along with the copy thereof as contemplated under
clause 4 of the agreement. Under Clause 7 of the agreement,
the purchaser was obliged to pay to the Income Tax authorities H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A such amount as may be desired by the vendor (not exceeding
the balance sale price payable) in order to enable the vendor
to get the required Wealth Tax clearance certificate. The
aforesaid clause further stipulated that such money as may be
paid to the Income Tax authorities, at the request of the vendor
B and on the vendor's account, will be deducted by the purchaser
from the balance sale consideration at the time of the execution
of the sale deed. It must also be noted that under the terms of
the agreement between the parties apart from the payment
contemplated by Clause 7 to the authority and in the manner
c specified therein the purchaser had no obligation to tender any
further payment directly to the vendor.
17. The defendant had claimed that on 09.09.1971 he had
hand delivered a letter of the even date (Exh.D/1) to the plaintiff
No. 1 requesting the plaintiff to pay to the defendant or to
D deposit in the defendant's bank account a sum of one lakh in
order to enable the defendant to furnish a bank guarantee for
the purpose of obtaining the necessary tax clearance
certificate. According to the defendant though the plaintiff had
written a letter dated 27.12.1971 (Ex. PW/11) enquiring about
E the status of the tax clearance certificate and reiterating his
anxiety to have the sale transaction completed there was
neither any mention of the letter dated 09.09.1971 in the said
communication dated 27 .12.1971 nor did the same contain the
response of the plaintiff to the request of the defendant for
F further money. The defendant has also relied on a notice dated
06.11.1972 issued to the plaintiff (Exh.P-6) wherein reference
to the letter dated 09.09.1971 of the defendant was made and
the request for further money was reiterated. Furthermore,
according to the defendant, though the plaintiff had replied to
G the aforesaid notice dated 06.11.1972 by his letter dated
14.11.1972, once again, the plaintiff had remained silent with
regard to the letter dated 09.09.1971. On the other hand,
according to the plaintiffs, the letter dated 09.09.1971 was not
received by the plaintiff No.1 at any point of time; neither had
H the plaintiff been intimated about the defendant's demand or
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE339
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
request, as may be, for the further amount of Rs.1 lakh through A
the broker Lajja Ram (PW 3). Furthermore, in his reply dated
14.11.1972 the plaintiff No.1 had stated that under the
agreement he was duty bound to pay such further amount as
may be requested by the defendant (upto the limit of the balance
sale consideration) only to the Income Tax authorities. No such B
request had been received by the plaintiff, though, the plaintiff
was ready to deposit any amount, upto the extent of the balance
sale price, with the Income Tax authorities as required under
Clause 7 of the agreement.
18. Though considerable arguments had been advanced
c
by the learned counsels for either side on what would be the
correct conclusion that should be drawn from the above
correspondence exchanged by and between the parties in so
far as the question of identification of the party at fault is
concerned it will not be necessary for us to enter into the said D
arena and record any finding on the contentions advanced.
Nothing would hinge on the existence or receipt of the letter
dated 09.09.1971 as the demand for the additional payment
of Rs.1 lakh by the defendant was clearly made by the
defendant's legal notice dated 06.11.1972 which, admittedly, E
the plaintiff No.1 had received. In his reply dated 14.11.1972
to the said notice dated 06.11.1972 the plaintiff No.1 had
unequivocally stated that under the terms of the agreement he
was required to pay, at the defendant's request, further
amount(s) only to the Income Tax authorities which he is ready F
to do, if a request is so made by the defendant. What, therefore,
has to be addressed by the Court is whether the demand raised
by the defendant for an additional amount of rupees one lakh
for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the Tax Clearance
certificate and the refusal of the plaintiff to pay any such amount G
renders either of the parties in default of the terms of the
agreement dated 22.12.1970.
19. Clause 7 of the agreement is in the following terms:
"7. That the purchaser agree to pay to the Income Tax H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A authorities such money as may be desired by the
Vendor(not exceeding the balance sale price of the
property, against the Tax dues from the Vendor to
facilitate the Vendor to get the required wealth tax
certificate. Such money as paid to the Income Tax
B Authorities on the request of the Vendor will be paid in
the Vendor's account and will be deducted by the
purchaser from the balance of the sale price at the time
of the execution of the sale Deed."
20. Under the said clause 7 of the agreement, clearly, the
C obligation of the plaintiff No.1 was to pay to the Income Tax
department such sum (not exceeding the balance consideration
payable) as may be requested by the defendant. Neither clause
7 nor any other Clause of the agreement had cast upon the
plaintiff No.1 a duty to tender any further payment to the
D defendant or to credit the bank account of the defendant with
any further advance amount after payment of the initial amount
of Rs.50,000/-. In as far as the obligation to pay the Income
Tax Department as contemplated by clause 7 is concerned it
has been already noticed that the plaintiff No.1 had repeatedly
E asserted in the correspondence referred to above that he was
always ready and willing to pay any amount (within the balance
consideration payable) to the Income Tax department so that
the necessary tax clearance certificate can be issued in favour
of the defendant. Nothing has been brought on record by the
F defendant to show that any demand or request had been made
by him to the plaintiff No.1 for payment of any amount to the
Income Tax Department.
21. The High Court, notwithstanding the clear language of
clause 7 of the agreement, had invoked the principle of
G "business efficacy" to hold that a slight deviation from the plain
meaning of the language of clause 7 would be justified so as
to read an obligation on the part of plaintiff to pay the further
amount of Rs. One lakh as demanded by the defendant instead
of insisting on making such further payment(s) only to the
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 341
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
Income Tax authorities. A
22. The principle of business efficacy is normally invoked
to read a term in an agreement or contract so as to achieve
the result or the consequence intended by the parties acting
as prudent businessmen. Business efficacy means the power B
to produce intended results. The classic test of business
efficacy was proposed by Lord Justice Bowen in The
Moorcock8 • This test requires that a term can only be implied
if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract to
avoid such a failure of considerat,on that the parties cannot as C
reasonable businessmen have intended. But only the most
limited term should then be implied - the bare minimum to
achieve this goal. If the contract makes business sense without
the term, the courts will not imply the same. The following
passage from the opinion of L.J. Bowen in the Moorcock
(supra) sums up the position: D
•
"xx x xxx xxx
In business transactions such as this, what the law desires
to effect by the implication is to give such business efficacy E
to the transaction as must have been intended at all events
by both parties who are business men; not to impose on
one side all the perils of the transaction, or to emancipate
one side from all the chances of failure, but to make each
party promise in law as much, at all events, as it must have F
been in the contemplation of both parties that he should
be responsible for in respect of those perils or chances."
23. Though in an entirely different context, this court in
United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Manubhai
Dharamasinhbhai Gajera and Others9 had considered the G
circumstances when reading an unexpressed term in an
agreement would be justified on the basis that such a term was
8. (1889) 14 PD 64.
9. c2008) 10 sec 404. H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A always and obviously intended by and between the parties
thereto. Certain observations in this regard expressed by
Courts in some foreign jurisdictions were noticed by this court
in para 51 of the report. As the same may have application to
the present case it would be useful to notice the said
s observations:
"Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied
and need not be expressed is something so obvious that
it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties were
making their bargain, an officious bystander, were to
c suggest some express provision for it in their agreement,
they would testily suppress him with a common 'Oh, of
course!
Shir/aw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. (1939) 2 All
D ER 113 (CA)"
"An expressed term can be implied if and only if the court
finds that the parties must have intended that term to
E form part of their contract: it is not enough for the court
to find that such a term would have been adopted by the
parties as reasonable men if if had been suggested to
them: if must have been a term that went without saying,
a term necessary to give business efficacy to the contract,
F a term which, although tacit, formed part of the contract
which the parties made for themselves.
Trollope and Coils Ltd. v. North West Metropolitan Reg/.
Hospital Board (1973) 2 All ER 260 (HL)"
G 24. The business efficacy test, therefore, should be
applied only in cases where the term that is sought to be read
as implied is such which could have been clearly intended by
the parties at the time of making of the agreement. In the
present case not only the language of clause (7) of agreement
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 343
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
dated 22.12.1970 is clear and unambiguous there is no other A
clause in the agreement which had obliged the Plaintiff No.1
to make any further payment after the initial part payment of
Rs.50,000/-. The obligation of the Plaintiff No.1 was to pay any
further amount(s) to the Income-Tax authorities, at the request
of the defendant, in order to facilitate the issuance of the Tax 8
Clearance Certificate. No payment to the defendant beyond
the initial amount of Rs.50,000/- was contemplated by all. The
above would appear to be consciously intended by the parties
so as to exclude the possibility of any substantial monetary loss
to the plaintiff in the event the defendant is to resile from his c
commitment to execute the sale document. The intent of the
parties, acting as prudent businessmen, appears to be clear.
An obvious intent to exclude any obligation of the plaintiff to pay
any further amount (beyond Rs.50,000/-) to the defendant is
clearly discernible. Consequently, resort to the principle of D
business efficacy by the High Court to read such an implied
term in the agreement dated 22.12.1970, in our considered
view, was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
25. The principles of law on the basis of which the E
readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance is to be judged finds an elaborate enumeration
in a recent decision of this Court in J.P. Builders and another
v. A. Ramadas Rao and another10 . In the said decision
several earlier cases i.e. in R. C. Chandiok vs. Chuni Lal F
Sabharwar 1 , N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan
Rao 12 and P.D' Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu 13 have been
noticed. To sum up, no straitjacket formula can be laid down
and the test of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff would
depend on his overall conduct i.e. prior and subsequent to the G
10. (2011) 1 sec 429.
11. (1970) 3 sec 140.
12. (1995) 5 sec 115.
13. (2004) 6 sec 649. H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A filing of the suit which has also to be viewed in the light of the
conduct of the defendant. Having considered the matter in the
above perspective we are left with no doubt whatsoever that in
the present case the Plaintiff No.1 was, at all times, ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. On the contrary it is
B the defendant who had defaulted in the execution of the sale
document. The insistence of the defendant on further payments
by the plaintiff directly to him and not to the Income Tax
authorities as agreed upon was not at all justified and no blame
can be attributed to the plaintiff for not complying with the said
c demand(s) of the defendant.
26. Having arrived at the above conclusion it is wholly
unnecessary for us to consider the arguments advanced on
behalf of the appellants with regard to the provisions of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) in the light of
D which it had been contended that it was not open in law for the
plaintiff to comply with the demands for the additional amount(s)
made by the defendant. The failure of the defendant to bring
on record the draft sale deed which had to accompany the
application for the required Tax Clearance Certificate, an
E aspect highlighted on behalf of the appellants to show the
absence of a genuine desire of the defendant to go through the
transaction, also, would not require any consideration for the
above stated reason.
F 27. The ultimate question that has now to be considered
is whether the plaintiff should be held to be entitled to a decree
for specific performance of the agreement of 22.12.1970. The
long efflux of time (over 40 years) that has occurred and the
galloping value of real estate in the meantime are the twin
G inhibiting factors in this regard. The same, however, have to be
balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in no way
responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen
participation in the proceedings till date show the live interest
on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in
law. ·
H
SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE 345
(D) TR.LRS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
28. The discretion to direct specific performance of an A
agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time,
undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable,
rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the
exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise B
expression of language and the contours thereof will always
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and
reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any
given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can c
perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be
emphasized that efflux of time and escalation of price of
property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief
of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently
adopted by this Court. By way of illustration opinions rendered D
in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi14 and
more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate
Promoters Ltd. 15 may be usefully recapitulated.
29. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to
be read as a bar to the grant of a decree of specific E
performance would amount to penalizing the plaintiffs for no
fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a protracted
litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their
favour. From another perspective it may also indicate the
inadequacies of the law to deal with the long delays that, at F
times, occur while rendering the final verdict in a given case.
The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award of
additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher
than what had been stipulated in the agreement which price,
in a given case, may even be the market price as on date of G
the order of the final Court.
30. Having given our anxious consideration to all relevant
14. c2001) 10 sec 231.
15. c2012) 5 sec 112. H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A aspects of the case we are of the view that the ends of justice
would require this court to intervene and set aside the findings
and conclusions recorded by the High Court of Delhi in
R.F.A.No.11/1984 and to decree the suit of the plaintiffs for
specific performance of the agreement dated 22.12.1970. We
B are of the further view that the sale deed that will now have to
be executed by the defendants in favour .of the plaintiffs will be
for the market price of the suit property as on the date of the
present order. As no material, whatsoever is available to
enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value
c of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge
of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with
such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and
circumstances.
31. All the appeals shall accordingly stand allowed in terms
D of our above conclusions and directions.
K.K.T. Appeals allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "specific performance"Sign in to search