Holding

Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 unequivocally prohibits any court from staying proceedings under the Act, including when exercising inherent jurisdiction under CrPC Section 482.

Summary

The appellant was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the IPC, and obtained a stay of trial by filing a petition under CrPC Section 482 in the Rajasthan High Court, which was used to delay the trial for seven years. The High Court dismissed the petition, and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 could be exercised notwithstanding the bar in Section 19(3)(c) of the Act. The Court examined whether the statutory prohibition on staying proceedings applied to both revisional powers under Section 397 and inherent powers under Section 482. It held that the explicit non‑obstante clause in Section 19(3)(c) bars any court from staying proceedings under the Act, even when exercising inherent jurisdiction. Consequently, no stay of trial can be granted in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the appellant must seek expeditious hearing of any petition rather than a stay. The appeal was dismissed and the trial was ordered to proceed on a day‑to‑day basis.

Issues considered

Whether Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 bars a court from staying proceedings under the Act even when exercising inherent jurisdiction under CrPC Section 482.
Whether the bar in Section 19(3)(c) applies only to revisional powers under CrPC Section 397 or also to inherent powers of the High Court.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 397, s. 482
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 19(3)(c), s. 5(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actstay of trialinherent jurisdictionSection 482Section 19public servant corruptioncriminal procedurerevision

Judgment

A SATYA NARAYAN SHARMA
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

B [K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.J

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988-Sections 5(2 ), 19-Public servants-
Trial against-Stay of-Held, not to be granted on any ground even when·
court is exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Criminal Procedure
C Code-Further if an enactment contains a specific bar then inherent jurisdiction·
can.not be- exercised to get over that bar-:-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973,.
sections 482, 397.

Trial Court took cognizan.ce against the appellant by an order passed· ,
by Special Judge constituted under the Prevention of Corruption Act; •
D 1988. Appellant filed miscellaneous .petition\ before High Court, for quashing:• ·.
the order passed by the special Judge and got a stay of the trial. Thereafter,.
to
the ease was adjourned ftom time time and as such the trial w~s delayedl
for seven years. Ultimately the High Court dismissed the petition. Hence .
the present appeal.
.J-.

E· .Appellants contended that the inherent power, vested in a High ·
Court was' not circumvented by the limitations which are there whilst·
exercising revisional powers and the power to pass stay order was part of. '
the inherent power of the Court. On behalf of the appellant it was contended~ '
that section 19(3)(c) of the Act applies only to the revisional powers ·as
F exercised under section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not to the·' ·
inherent jurisdiction exercised by Higli Court under section 482 of the ·
Code.

On behalf of the respondent it w11s contended th·at the inherent
jurisdiction of a Court could not be exercised if there was a specific
G provision for redressal of the grievances of the aggrieved party or.against
an express bar of law _engrafted in any other provision; and that it has to·
be very sparingly exercised only to prevent abuse of process of court or to·
secure the ends of justice.

H Dismissing the appeal, the Court
268
S. N. SHARMA v. STATE 269
HELD : PER VAR/AVA, J. 1. When public servants are sought to be A
prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 courts grant 'stay
of the trials without considering and/or in contravention of section 19(3)(c)
of the Act which has an adverse effect on combating corruption amongst
public servants. [271-H; 272-A; B]
2. In cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, there can be no B
stay of trials. Even if petition under section 482 is entertained there can be
no stay of trials under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is for the party
to convince the concerned court to expedite the hearing of that petition.
[275-G; H]
3. If section 19 of the Act was only to deal with revisional powers then c
clause (b) would have been sufficient. The legislature has, by adding the
words "no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other
ground" under section 19(3){c), clearly indicated that no stay could be
granted by use of any power on any ground. Therefore, section 19 of the
.._ Act would apply even where a court is exercising inherent jurisdiction
under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [275-A-C] D

4. Under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code the inherent

- power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the
Cr.P.C. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that
inherent jurisdicti:.'"' can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision
contained in any other enactment. Thus if an enactment contains a specific E
bar then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar.
(275-C; DJ
Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, [1977) 4 SCC 551; Janata
Deal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., [1992) 4 SCC 305; Indra Sawhney v. Union
of India, [2000) 1SCC168, relied on. F

Income Tax Officer v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, [1969) 2 SCR 65, referred
to.

5. It cannot be said that section 19 of the Act would not apply to a
High Court. Section 5(3) of the Act shows that the Special Court under the G
Act is a Court of Session. Therefore, the power of revision under/Qr the
inherent jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court. [275-F]
PER THOMAS, J. (CONCURRING)

1. When Parliament imposed an undiluted ban against granting stay H
r
I

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A of any proceedings involving an o.ffence under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 on any ground '"'.hatsoever, no court shall circumvent the ban .
. through any means. A provision prohibiting the grant of stay is included in
..
the statute for speeding up the proceedings. [275-E; G]
)

2. The prohibition of grant of stay is incorporated under section
B 19(3) of the Act.with the non-obstante words "notwithstanding anything I-
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973". Hence none of the
provisions in the Code could be invoked for circumventing any one of the
bans enumerated in the sub-section. [277-A-C]

3. Section 19(3)(b) contains prohibition against stay of proceedings
c under tile Act but is restricted to sanction aspect alone. No error, omission
or irregularity in the sanction shall be a ground for staying proceedings
under the Act unless it is satisfied .that the omission has resulted in a
failure of justice. In determining" whether there was any such failure of
j~tlce as stated under section 19(3)(b) it is mandated that the court shall
D 1
have regard to the fact whether the objection regarding t~at aspect could
or should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Merely
because objection regarding sanction was raised at the early stage, there is
no ground for holding that there was failure of justice. If the Special Judge
has overruled the objection raised regarding that aspect it is normally
E inconceivable that there could be any failure of justice even if ~o.:ch objections
were to be upheld by the High Court. Overruling an objection on the
ground of sanction does not end the case detrimentally to the accused. It
only ·equips a judicial forum to examine the allegations against a public
servant judicially. Hence it is an uphill task to show that discountenance of
any objection regarding sanction has resulted in failure of justice and the
F corollary of this is that the High Court would not normally grant stay on
that ground either. [277-E-H]

4. Prohibition under section (19)(3)(c) that "No court shall stay the
proceedings under this Act on any other gro.und" does not mean that the
G legislative ban contained in clause (c) is restricted. only to a situation when ....
the High Court exercises its inherent powers of revision which would be a
misinterpretation of the enactment. [278-A-C]

5. Several High Courts, overlooking the ban, are granting stay of
proceedings involving offences under the Act pending before courts of
H Special Judges. It might be on account of a possible chance of missing the
'
S. N. SHARMA v. STATE [VARIAVA, J.J 271
legislative ban contained in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 19 of the A
Act because the title to section 19 is "previous sanction necessary for
prosecution". It could have been more advisable if the prohibition contained

- in sub-section (3) has been included in a separate section by providing a
separate distinct title. Be that as it may, that is no ground for by-passing
the legislative prohibition contained in the sub-section. [278-C-E]
B
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 981
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.4.2001 of the Rajasthan High
Court in S.B. Cr!. M.P. No. 578 of 1994. C
Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, Ashwani Kumar, Pallav Shishodia,
Ms. Shalini Shishodia, Hemant Sharma, Ranbir Singh Yadav, P. Parmeswaran,
Ranji Thomas and Javed Mahmud Rao for the appearing parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by D
S.N. VARIAVA, J. Leave granted.

Heard parties.

This Apper.l is against an Order dated 25th April, 2001. By this Order E
a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, for quashing an Order dated 8th July, 1984 passed by a Special Judge
constituted under the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter called the said
Act) has been dismissed.
F
On 8th July, 1984 the Trial Court took cognizance against the Appellant
for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the l.P.C.
and Section 5(2) of the said Act. The Appellant then approached the High
Court with Miscellaneous Petition No. 578 of 1984 and get a stay of the trial.
Having obtained a stay of the trial the Miscellaneous Petition was got
adjourned, from time to time. By this method the Appellant has successfully G
delayed trial for 7 years.

We find that what has happened in this case is happening in a large
number of matters. Corruption in public offices is becoming rampant. When
public servants are sought to be prosecuted under the said Act, by filing H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S,C.R.
A revisions under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code or by filing petitions
uoder'Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, stay of the trials are ol5tained
~na\parties'successfully manage to delay the trials. The stays are gran-tefl)y
Courts' without' considering and/or in contravention of Section 19(3)(c) of tlie
said Act. This has an 'adverse effect on c6mbating corruption amongst public
B servants. It has' th·e~efore become necessary to reiterat~ the law. We have' th~~
heard ~his -P<:tition
I 1 l
only
.
on the question of law as,. to whether or not trials
under the Prevention of Corruption Act could be stayed.

, .. .Mr. S~ishodia submitted that by virtue of Section 27 of the said ~ct, the
High Court can exercise all the powers of. appeal and revision under the
Criminal Procedure Code as if the Court of the Special Judge were a Court
of Sessibns. He further- submitted that Sections 22 and 23 of the said Act
make it clear tnat the Criminal Procedure Code would apply to proceedings
before the Special Judge in relation to an offence punishable under the said
Act.

Mr. Shishodia submitted that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
, '"
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was distinct ffom its
revisional jurisdiction. He submitted that the Special Court (under ~~e said
Act) was subordinate to the High Court. He submitted that the inherent power,
E vested in a High Court was not circumvented by the limitat!:iu.> which are
there .whilst exercising revisional powers. He submitted that the power..td'pass
an interim order, like a stay order, was part of the inherent power of the Court
He submitted that this must necessarily be so as otherwise the Court could not
effectively exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.

F . .-
In support of this last submission, he relied upon the case of Income Tax
Officer v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, [1969] 2 SCR 65. This was a case under
the. Income Tax Act. Certain amounts were imposed as penalty upon 1the
assessee for concealment of income and for furnishing inaccurate particulars.
The assessee preferred appeals and prayed for stay of recovery of -the
G penalties. The Tribunal declined to grant stay on the ground that it had1i10
power to do so. The High Court held that the Tribunal had the inherent power
to stay and directed the Tribunal to dispose of the application for stay in
accordance with law. In appeal by the Income Tax Officer, this Court
confirmed the findings of the High Court that the Tribunal had power to stay
H recovery. Tliis Court held that the power of stay was incidental to the
S. N. SHARMA v. STATE [VARIAVA, J.] 273
appellate jurisdiction of the Court. It must immediately be noted that there A
was no statutory provision barring grant of stay.

- Mr. Shishodia further submitted that both the High Courts and this
Court have time and again exercised inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code to quash proceedings even urider the said Act. He
submitted that it takes a number of years for matters to reach hearing. He
B

- submitted that it was absolutely necessary that, during the pendency of such
proceedings, there should be a stay of the trial. He submitted that otherwise
there would an anomalous position inasmuch as the trial may conclude before
the High Court has examined the legality of the charge itself.
c
Mr. Shishodia next submitted that the expression "no court" in Section
19 of the said Act would not include the High Court. He submitted that it only
apply to a Court which had revisional jurisdiction over the Special Court. He
submitted that many of the Judges of the Special Court were Assistant
---- Sessions Judges. He submitted that the revisional power would thus be D
exercised by the Sessions Court.

Mr. Shishodia next submitted that Section 19(3)(c) applies only to the

- revisional powers as exercised under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code
and not to the inherent jurisdiction, which a High Court exercises under
Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code.
E

On the other hand the learned Solicitor General points out the Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
relevant portion of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 reads as follows : F

"2. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was amended in
1964 based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee.
There are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code to deal
with public servants and those .who abet them by way of criminal
misconduct. There are also provisions in the Criminal Law Amendment
G
Ordinance, 1944, to enable attachment of ill-gotton wealth obtained
through corrupt means, including from transferees of such wealth. The
Act seeks to incorporate all these provisions with modifications so as
to.make the provisions more effective in combating corruption among
public servants. H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 3. The Act inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition
of the expression "public servant", incorporation of offences under
sections 161 to 165A of the Indian Penal Code, enhancement of
penalties provided for these offences and incorporation of a provision
that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and
B
the trial has commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions
for day-to-day trial of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to
grant of stay and exercise of powers of a revision on interlocutory
orders have also been included." (emphasis supplied)

C The learned Solicitor General Salve submitted that inherent jurisdiction
of a Court could not be exercised if there was a specific provision for
redressal of the grievances of the aggrieved party or against an express bar of
law engrafted in any other provision. He further submitted that inherent
jurisdiction had to be very sparingly exercised only to prevent abuse of
process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. In support of this
D
submission he relied .upon t.he cases of Madhu Limaye v. The State of
Maharashtra, reported in [1977] 4 SCC 551, Janata Deal v. H.S. Chowdhary
& Ors., reported in [1992] 4 SCC 305 and Indra Sawhriey v. Union of India
and Ors., reported in [2000] 1 SCC 168.

E We have heard the parties. Section 19(3)(c) of the said Act reads as
follows :

"(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

F xxxx xxxxx xxxxx

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under .this Act on any other
ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation
to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other
proceedings."
G
It is thus to be seen that this Section provides :

(a) that no court should stay the proceedings under the Act on any
ground and

H (b) that no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any
S. N. SHARMA v. STATE [VARIAVA, J.] 275
interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. A
To be noted that (b) above is identical to Section 397(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code which deals with revisional power of the Court. If Section 19
was only to deal with revisional powers then the portion set out in (b) above,
would have been sufficient. The legislature has, therefore, by adding the
words "no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other
B
ground" clearly indicated that no stay could be granted by use of any power
on any ground. This therefore would apply even where a Court is exercising
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

There is another reason also why the submission that, Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption would not apply to the inherent jurisdiction of the c
High Court, cannot be accepted. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
starts with the words "Nothing in this Code." Thus the inherent power can be
exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Criminal Procedure
Code. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that
inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision
D
contained in any other enactment. Thus if an enactment contains a specific bar
then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar. As has been
pointed out in the cases of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra,
reported in [1977] 4 SCC 551, Janata Deal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors.,
reported in [1992] 4 SCC 305 and Indra Sawhney v. Union of bulia and Ors.,
reported in [2000] l SCC 168, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be resorted to E
if there was a specific provision or there is an express bar of law.

We see no substance in the submission that Section 19 would not apply
to a High Court. Section 5(3) of the said Act shows that the Special Court
under the said Act is a Court of Session. Therefore the power of revision and/ F
or the inherent jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court.

Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act there can be no
stay of trials. We clarify that we are not saying that proceedings under Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases
proceedings under Section 482 can be adapted. However, even if petition G
under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code is entertained there can be no
stay of trials under -the said Act. It is then for the party to convince the
concerned Court to expedite the hearing of that petiton. However, merely
because the concerned Court is not in a position to take up the petition for
hearing would be no ground for staying the trial even temporarily. H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A In this Appeal we see no reason to interfere with the impugned Order.
The Appeal stands dismissed. We clarify that merits of the case have not been
argued before us. We are thus not expressing any opinion on the merits of the
case.

As the trial h;:is ql!"eady been delayed, we direct that now the trial .be
B
taken up foF hearing on a day to day basis and the same be concluded within
a period of 6 ~onths from today.
' .
It has been brought to our attention that in a large number of cases stays
~rnve been gr~nted by th~. High Court~ in matters under the Prevention of
c Com~ption Ac.t, even though there is a specific bar again~t the grant of any
stay.· We therefore d!rect t~e Registrars of ~II the High Courts to list all cases
in which such stay is granted before the Court concerned so that appropriate
action can be taken by the Court in the light of this decision. The Registrar
of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the Registrars of all
D the High Courts.

There shall. be no Order as to costs.

THOMAS, J. I ain in respectful agreement with the judgment drafted
by, brother .Variava J. · When Parliament im;osed an undiluted ban against •
E gran'ting stay of a~y. proceedings in.Jolving an offence under Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (fo; shor~ 'the Act') on any gr~~nd whatsoever, no co~rt
shall circumvent the said ban through any means. The reasons which prompted
the Parliament to divest all the courts in India of the power to stay the proceedings
in the trial c'ou~ts involving any such offence, is to foreclose even the possible
chance of delaying ;uch trials on account of any party to such proceedings
F ~aisi~g' ~ny ,question before the' .High Court during the penden~y of tri.al
proceedings.

In the Objects and Reasons for bringing the Act with new measures the
iaw-'make~s declhr~d it' in abunc;lantly clear terms that' aprovision prohibiting
G the grant of stay is included in the statu.te for speeding up the proceedings. Thi_s
can be discerned from the following words:

· "In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial
of cases and ·prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and
exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory orders have also been
H
S. N. SHARMA v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 277
included." A

The prohibition is couched in a language admitting of no exception
whatsoever, which is clear from the provision itself. The prohibition is
incorporated in sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act. The sub-section
consists of three clauses. For all the three clauses the controlling non-obstante
B
words are set out in the commencing portion as:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure
1973."

Hence none of the provisions m the Code could be invoked for c
circumventing any one of the bans enumerated in the sub-section.

Clause (a) of the sub-section prohibits reversal or alteration of any
finding or sentence or order passed by a Special Judge on the ground of
absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required for
D
taking cognizance of an offence punishable in the Act, unless in the opinion
of the appellate or revisional court "a failure of justice has in fact occasioned
thereby".

Clause (b) contains the prohibition against stay of proceedings under this
Act, but it is restricted to sanction aspect alone. No error, omission or irregularity E
in the sanction shall be a ground for staying the proceedings under this Act
"unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice." In determining whether there was any such failure of justice
it is mandated that the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection
regarding that aspect could or should have been raised at any earlier stage in F
the proceedings. We may now point out that merely because objection regarding
sanction was raised anhe early stage is not a ground for holding that there was
failure of justice. If the special judge has overruled the objection raised
regarding that aspect it is normally inconceivable that there could be any failure
of justice even if such objections were to be upheld by the High Court.
Overruling an objection on the ground of sanction does not end the case G
detrimentally to the accused. It only equips a judicial forum to examine the
allegations against a public servant judicially. Hence it is an uphill task to show
that discountenance of any objection regarding sanction has resulted in a failure
of justice. The corollary of it is this: The High Court would not normally grant
stay on that ground either. H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A It is in clause (c) of the sub-section that the prohibition is couched in
unexceptional terms. It reads thus:

"No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other
ground."

B The mere fact that yet another prohibition was also tagged with the above
does not mean that the legislative ban contained in clause (c) is restricted only
to a situation when the High Court exercises powers o~ revision. It would be
a inisinterpretation of the enactment if a court reads into clause ( c ) of Section
19(3) a power to grant stay in exercise of inherent powers of the High Court.
c We are informed that several High Courts, overlooking the said ban, are
granting stay of proceedings involving offences under the Act pending before
. courts of Special Judges. This might be on account of a possible chance of
missing the legislative ban contained in clause ( c ) of sub-section (3) of Section
19 of the Act because the title to Section 19 is "previous sanction necessary
D for prosecution." It could have been more advisable if the prohibition contained
in sub-section (3) has been included in a separate Section by providing a
separate distinct title. Be that as it may, that is no ground for by-passing the
legislative prohibition contained in the sub-section.

I fully concur with the direction indicated by Variava J. in the judgment
E that the Registrar of each High Court shall list the cases in which such stay was
granted by orders happened to be passed by such High Court and to board all
such cases before the appropriate bench without further delay. This is to enable
the ~igh Court concerned' to dispose of such matters in the light of this
judgment.·

N.J. Appeal dismissed.