Holding

Section 4(2) creates an absolute prohibition on transfer of granted land without prior government permission, applicable even after the fifteen‑year period, and the competent authority’s action was lawful.

Summary

The State of Karnataka granted agricultural land to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with a non‑alienation clause prohibiting transfer for fifteen years. After the period, the appellant purchased the lands from the original grantees, claiming that prior government permission was not required. The Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner set aside the sale deeds, finding no permission and that the documents were forged. The Supreme Court held that Section 4(2) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 imposes an absolute ban on any transfer without prior government permission, even after the fifteen‑year period, and that the competent authority acted within its jurisdiction. The Court also ruled that the eight‑year delay does not bar action as limitation does not apply to this beneficial legislation. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 4(2) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 requires prior government permission for transfer of granted land after the fifteen‑year non‑alienation period.
Whether Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 can limit or modify the effect of Section 4(2).
Whether the competent authority can set aside transfers after an eight‑year delay, i.e., applicability of limitation or laches.
Whether a new plea that permission is not required after fifteen years can be entertained at the Supreme Court stage.
Effect of forged documents purporting to show prior permission on the relief sought.

Legislation cited

Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969s. Rule 9
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964s. Section 197
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978s. 11, s. 4(1), s. 4(2)

Subjects

Scheduled CastesScheduled TribesLand transfer prohibitionPrior government permissionNon‑alienation clauseLimitationLachesForgeryStatutory interpretation

Judgment

872 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 872
REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A SATYAN
v.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2976-2983 of 2019)
B APRIL 30, 2019
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978:
C s. 4 – Prohibition of transfer of granted lands – The grant
put a condition of non-alienation of the granted land for a period
of 15 years – The granted land transferred to the appellants by the
beneficiaries of the grant, after 15 years of the grant – Application
alleging that the sale deeds were illegal as they were executed without
prior permission of competent authority – Asstt. Commissioner set
D
aside the sale deeds – Order confirmed by Deputy Commissioner in
appeal – Order further confirmed in writ petition and writ appeal
by the High Court – Appeal to Supreme Court – Plea of appellants
that permission for transfer was not required post the period of 15
years – Held: Appellant throughout having sought to make out a
E case based on prior permission, cannot take such new plea before
Supreme Court – Sub-section (2) of s. 4 puts an absolute ban on
transfer after commencement of the Act without prior permission
of the Government – Therefore, after a period of 15 years also,
prior permission was required – The competent authority had acted
within its jurisdiction to nullify the transactions which were contrary
F
to the statutory provisions of s. 4(2) – Delay of 8 years by itself
cannot come in the way of the competent authority taking the action,
the Act being a beneficial legislation – Karnatka Land Grant Rules,
1969 – r. 9 – Delay/Laches.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1 All the orders below are predicated on a
reasoning that while the appellant sought to make out a case that
permission had been granted, no such permission had actually
been granted by the competent authority, and the documents
furnished in this behalf were found to be forged and fabricated.
H
872
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 873

There ought to have been full disclosure of documents. The A
criminal proceedings, however, are still pending qua that aspect.
It is not necessary to non-suit the appellant on this ground itself.
[Para 25][893-A-B]
1.2 The appellant had throughout sought to make out a case
based on prior permission by the competent authority. It was B
nobody’s case that permission was not required to be obtained.
The appellant, faced with a factual situation where the permissions
do not exist, now sought to build another bridge to contend that
be that as it may, no permission is required. Such a plea cannot
be countenanced. At this stage of the civil appeal, without any
pleadings being there, it is not even really open to the appellant C
to have pleaded the interpretation they so sought to plead. This
cannot be categorized as a legal plea alone, and that too raised at
the fifth level of scrutiny in the hierarchy of proceedings.
[Para 26][893-C-D]
1.3 The non-alienation clause existing in the Karnataka D
Land Grant Rules, 1969 and incorporated in the grants, was found
to be inadequate to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes, who were given land owing to their
ignorance and poverty. Influential and powerful sections of society
were stated to be obtaining sales and mortgages for E
consideration, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
became victims of circumstances. The objective of the State
Government in enacting the said Act was to prevent such misuse
and, therefore, in categorical terms, transfer with permission was
prescribed. This would be de hors the terms of the grant or the
said Rules. Thus, whether it was a case where it was within the F
window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years, or the period beyond fifteen
(15) years, such permission would be required. [Para 27]
[893-E-G]
1.4 No doubt Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a
different enactment, prior to the enactment of the said Act (and G
thereafter even amended), does contemplate transfer between
the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years on certain terms and
conditions, which are required to be satisfied by the Deputy
Commissioner. There is, in fact, a prohibition in grant of such
permission until and unless there is satisfaction of the Deputy H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A Commissioner that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring
other land, or for improving the remaining land and that the
grantee credits to Government an amount equal to fifty percent
of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of
such alienation. Thus, more rigorous terms have been put for
transfer within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years.
B
[Para 28][893-H; 894-A-B]
1.5 The reason for the competent authority to arrive at a
decision whether to grant permission or not after the period of
fifteen (15) years may or may not be coloured by such
considerations. But certainly, he may satisfy himself that the
C members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only,
who have been allotted the land, are not taken for a ride, and it is
possibly in their best interest for recorded reasons that such
permission should be granted. The wordings of Section 4(2) of
the said Act are quite clear in its terms. [Para 29][894-C-D]
D 1.6 Section 4 of the Act, dealing with prohibition of transfer
of granted land, in sub-section (1), begins with a non obstatnte
clause. It is notwithstanding anything in any agreement, contract
or instrument, or for that matter in any law. Section 11 of the said
Act further enforces this by giving the said Act an overriding
E effect over any other law. [Para 30][894-E]
1.7 Section 4 is applicable for grants made either before or
after the commencement of the Act. The terms of the grant cannot
be contravened, but the last part of sub-section (1) of Section 4
of the said Act makes any transfer in violation of sub-section (2)
F also null and void. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act is
crisp and clear in its terms, putting an absolute ban on transfer
after the commencement of the Act, without previous permission
of the Government. Thus, a bare reading of the provision makes
it abundantly clear that it brooks no two interpretations. After
the period of fifteen (15) years also, thus, permission was required
G to be taken. [Para 31][894-G-H; 895-A]
1.8 The courts below committed no error, and the competent
authority has acted within its jurisdiction to nullify the transactions
which are contrary to the statutory provisions of Section 4(2) of

H
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 875

the Act, and the manner of execution itself raised many doubts. A
[Para 36][896-E-F]
Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika & Anr. (2008) 14 SCC
517 : [2008] 2 SCR 451 – relied on.
Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.
(1984) 3 SCC 301 : [1984] 3 SCR 502 ; Ibrahimpatnam B
Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy
& Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 667 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 698 ;
Situ Sahu & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (2004)
8 SCC 340 : [2004] 3 SCR 504 ; Chhedi Lal Yadav &
Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead) through C
Legal Representatives & Ors. (2018) 12 SCC 527 ;
Harishchandra Hegde v. State of Karnataka & Ors.
(2004) 9 SCC 780 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1111 ; K.D.
Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited & Ors. (2008)
12 SCC 481 : [2008] 10 SCR 454 ; A. Shanmugam v.
Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya D
Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented by its
President & Ors. (2012) 6 SCC 430 : [2012] 4 SCR
74 ; Hari Narain v. Badri Das [1964] 2 SCR 203 –
referred to.
2. A delay of eight (8) years by itself cannot come in the way E
of the competent authority taking the action, as limitation
principles would not apply. The period of eight (8) years cannot
be said to be such, as to amount to such delay and laches as
would make the action void, considering that it is in respect of a
beneficial legislation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled F
Tribes community. [Paras 33 and 34][895-G; 896-A-C]
Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.
(2004) 10 SCC 65 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 42
– relied on.
Case Law Reference G
[1984] 3 SCR 502 referred to Para 9
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 698 referred to Para 12
[2004] 3 SCR 504 referred to Para 12
H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A (2018) 12 SCC 527 referred to Para 12
[2008] 2 SCR 451 relied on Para 20
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1111 referred to Para 20
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 42 relied on Para 20
B [2008] 10 SCR 454 referred to Para 23
[2012] 4 SCR 74 referred to Para 23
[1964] 2 SCR 203 referred to Para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2976-
C 2983 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.2009 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal Nos. 335 of 2009 (SC/
ST) and order dated 29.10.2009 in Writ Appeal Nos. 321, 325, 327, 329,
331, 336 and 349 of 2009 (SC/ST).
D Dushyant A. Dave, Sr. Adv., Mrityunjai Singh, Ms. Swati
Bhardwaj, Ms. Preeti Panwar (for M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co.), Advs.
for the Appellant.
Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Dharm Singh,
Suraj Kaushik (for M/s. Nuli & Nuli), Krishna Kumar Singh (for M. P.
E Shorawala), V. N. Raghupathy, Manender Pal Gupta, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
F 1. The State Government of Karnataka granted lands to members
of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community, free of charge,
to assist in their economic empowerment and to provide them with
opportunity for self-employment through agriculture, the lands granted
being agricultural lands. In the early 1980s, the private respondents
No.3 were made beneficiaries of such grants on 12.8.1982, of lands
G
measuring approx. two (2) acres for each of these beneficiaries,
numbering eight (8), in Bannikuppe Village, Bidadi Hobli, Ramanagaram,
Bangalore Rural District. These grants came with certain restrictions,
especially qua transfer, so that the very objective with which the lands
have been allotted is not defeated. We are concerned, in the present
H appeals, with the transfer of these lands to the appellant by all the eight
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 877
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

(8) beneficiaries, in August and September, 1997, which were sought to A
be annulled by the orders of the competent authority, under The Karnataka
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of
Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’).
2. The grants made are on similar terms, and for the present
controversy, clause 8 of the grant is material, which puts a condition of B
non-alienation for a period of fifteen (15) years. This clause appears to
be in pursuance of Rule 9(i) of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’), formulated in pursuance of
the powers conferred under Section 197 of the Karnataka Land Revenue
Act, 1964. The said Rule 9, to the extent applicable on the relevant date,
reads as under: C

“9. Conditions of Grant:- (1) The grant of lands under these
rules (for agricultural purposes) shall be subject to the following
conditions namely:-
(i) the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of fifteen D
years from the date of taking possession:
Provided that he may, after a period of five years, with the previous
permission of, and subject to the provisions of the Karnataka
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes ( Prohibition of Transfer
of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), and such E
conditions as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner,
alienate the whole or any portion of such land. But however, the
Deputy Commissioner shall not grant such permission unless he
is satisfied that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other
land or for improving the remaining land and the grantee credits
to Government an amount equal to fifty percent of the market F
value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation as
determined by the Deputy Commissioner:
Provided that no person who has obtained permission to alienate
land under the rule shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4
be eligible for grant of any Government Land.” G
We may notice that the period of fifteen (15) years in clause (i)
stands substituted by the Notification dated 23.4.2005, with effect from
25.4.2005, with twenty-five (25) years, amongst certain other
amendments.
H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 3. The appellant purchased the lands from the private respondents
vide sale deeds of different dates, but beyond the period of fifteen (15)
years. The sale deeds have been executed by the private respondents,
in favour of the appellant through their attorney, who is the wife of the
appellant herein. The date of the General Power of Attorney (for short
‘GPA’) is stated to be 16.12.1996 (disclosed in pursuance of the order
B
dated 5.4.2019) and the consideration is same for each of the sale deeds,
i.e., Rs.4.50 lakhs and all such payments have been made in cash. It
may be noted herein itself that the date of the GPA is before the expiry
of fifteen (15) years. It is the case of the appellant that these sale deeds
were executed after having obtained the permission of the competent
C authority under Section 4 of the said Act. The said provision reads as
under:
“4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or
instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or
D after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms
of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or
sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest
in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed
by such transfer.
E (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer
or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous
permission of the Government.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) and (2) shall apply also to
the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil
F Court or any award or order of any other authority.”
4. An application was filed on 10.10.2005 by the villagers alleging
that the sale deeds were illegal and have been executed without prior
permission of the competent authority. This triggered off an inquiry into
the transactions in question.
G 5. On inquiry, the Assistant Commissioner passed an order dated
5.5.2006, setting aside the sale deeds and directing restoration of the
lands to the original allottees under Section 5 of the said Act. The appeal
preferred against this order before the Deputy Commissioner was
dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2006. The appellant assailed these
orders in a writ petition filed before the Karnataka High Court, but that
H
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 879
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

endeavour also failed when the learned single Judge dismissed the petition A
on 15.12.2008. The writ appeal filed against the same has been dismissed
vide impugned order dated 16.10.2009. In the Special Leave Petitions
(for short ‘SLPs’) filed against the impugned order, an interim order to
maintain status quo, as on date, was passed on 23.3.2012 and,
subsequently, leave was granted on 11.3.2019.
B
6. We may notice that all the forums have found that the
documents purporting to indicate prior permission for execution of the
sale deeds had been found to be forged and fabricated, and separate
criminal proceedings are stated to be pending against the same.
7. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, C
in the course of his arguments, actually sought to adopt a completely
different plea, which had not been raised in the forums below. The plea
is predicated on an interpretation sought to be given to Section 4 of the
said Act. It was, thus, contended that Rule 9 of the said Rules (albeit
enacted under a different statute) makes a reference to the said Act,
insofar as the conditions of grant are concerned. In this behalf, our D
attention was invited to Rule 9, extracted aforesaid, where the said Rule
prescribes for a non-alienation restriction for a period of five (5) years
from the date of taking possession. This is, however, subject to a proviso
stipulating that after the initial period of five (5) years, previous permission
may be obtained subject to such conditions, as may be specified by the E
Deputy Commissioner, and the permission is subject to the satisfaction
that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other land or for
improving the remaining land and that the grantee credits to the
Government an amount equal to 50 per cent of the market value of such
land as on the date of sanction of such alienation, as determined by the
Deputy Commissioner. The contention, thus, formulated is that the F
restriction is only for a period of fifteen (15) years, and even within that
window, beyond the period of five (5) years, on meeting certain conditions,
alienation is possible. Thus, it was sought to be contended that there is
no question of grant of any permission post the period of fifteen (15)
years, as neither the grant nor the aforesaid Rule 9 deals with such an G
eventuality. One subsequent development, post the enactment of the
said Rules, but prior to the transaction in question, is the insertion of the
proviso vide GSR 169 dated 26.8.1993, with effect from 6.9.1993
(extracted aforesaid), which clearly stipulates that the permission to be
granted within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years would also be
subject to the provisions of the said Act. H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 8. In a nutshell, the contention of the learned senior counsel was
that the issue, whether the permission was or was not granted becomes
irrelevant as no such permission was required to be obtained after fifteen
(15) years from the date of grant of land.
9. Learned counsel sought to draw strength from the observations
B of this Court in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.,1
more specifically para 24. The said case dealt with a constitutional
challenge laid to Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act. The challenge was
repelled. As to the nature of controversy examined by the Court, it
would be apposite to reproduce para 7 of the said judgment, which reads
as under:
C
“7. The validity of the Act has been challenged mainly because of
the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act which
purport to declare transfers of “granted land” made either before
or after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the
terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant
D null and void and confer powers on the authority to take possession
of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof and to
restore such lands to the original grantee or his legal heirs and
where it is not reasonably practicable to so restore the land to a
person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in
E accordance with the rules relating to the grant of such land. It
may be noted that the validity of the Act insofar as it imposes
prohibition on transfer of granted land after the commencement
of the Act has not been challenged and the principal objection to
the validity of the Act is taken because of the provisions in the
Act seeking to nullify the transfers of granted lands effected before
F the commencement of the Act.”
10. The aforesaid would, thus, show that the real controversy
arose on account of the provisions of the said Act being made applicable
even to grants made prior to the commencement of the Act. It is in this
context that the Court observed in para 24 as under:
G
“24. Though we have come to the conclusion that the Act is valid,
yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain aspects clear. Granted
lands which had been transferred after the expiry of the period of
prohibition do not come within the purview of the Act, and cannot
1
H (1984) 3 SCC 301
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 881
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

be proceeded against under the provisions of this Act. The A
provisions of the Act make this position clear, as Sections 4 and 5
become applicable only when granted lands are transferred in
breach of the condition relating to prohibition on transfer of such
granted lands. Granted lands transferred before the
commencement of the Act and not in contravention of prohibition
B
on transfer are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the present
Act. Also in case where granted lands had been transferred before
the commencement of the Act in violation of the condition regarding
prohibition on such transfer and the transferee who had initially
acquired only a voidable title in such granted lands had perfected
his title in the granted lands by prescription by long and continuous C
enjoyment thereof in accordance with law before the
commencement of the Act, such granted lands would also not
come within the purview of the present Act, as the title of such
transferees to the granted lands has been perfected before the
commencement of the Act. Since at the date of the
D
commencement of the Act the title of such transferees had ceased
to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on
account of long and continued user for the requisite period, the
title of such transferees could not be rendered void by virtue of
the provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional
guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the E
Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands
made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer
of granted lands only in those cases where the title acquired by
the transferee was still voidable at the date of the commencement
of the Act and had not lost its defeasible character at the date
F
when the Act came into force. Transferees of granted lands having
a perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the
Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the
Act. Section 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have the
effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not
voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act.” G
11. The contention, however, of Mr. Dave was that the aforesaid
para indicates that granted lands, which had been transferred after the
expiry of the period of prohibition, do not come within the purview of the
said Act. These granted lands, transferred before the commencement
H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A of the said Act, and not in contravention of the conditions regarding
transfer are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the said Act.
Similarly, transfers made prior to the commencement of the said Act in
violation of the conditions regarding prohibition of transfer, where titles
were perfected before the commencement of the Act, by prescription,
by long and continuous enjoyment, in accordance with law, have been
B
excluded from the purview of the said Act.
12. The second limb of the submission of Mr. Dave, learned senior
counsel for the appellant, was that settled transactions cannot be disturbed
after a long period of time. The transactions were of the year 1997.
They were sought to be unsettled after almost eight (8) years, by
C preferring an application in the year 2005. To support this plea, he referred
to the following judicial pronouncements:
a. Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K.
Suresh Reddy & Ors.2 – the question posed to be decided in
the appeal is referred to in para 1 and the question has been
D answered in para 19. Both paras 1 and 19 are read as under:
“1. In all these appeals, the following question of law arises
for consideration:
“Whether the Collector can exercise suo motu power under
E sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
at any time or such power is to be exercised within a
reasonable time.”
…. …. …. …. ….
F “19. It is also necessary to note that the suo motu power
was sought to be exercised by the Joint Collector after 13-
15 years. Section 50-B was amended in the year 1979 by
adding sub-section (4), but no action was taken to invalidate
the certificates in exercise of the suo motu power till 1989.
There is no convincing explanation as to why the authorities
G
waited for such a long time. It appears that sub-section (4)
was added so as to take action where alienations or transfers
were made to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling
Act. The Land Ceiling Act having come into force on 1-1-
2
H (2003) 7 SCC 667
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 883
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

1975, the authorities should have made inquiries and efforts A
so as to exercise the suo motu power within reasonable
time. The action of the Joint Collector in exercising suo
motu power after several years and not within reasonable
per;iod and passing orders cancelling validation certificates
given by the Tahsildar, as rightly held by the High Court,
B
could not be sustained.”
The ratio, thus, is that such suo moto powers have to be exercised
within a reasonable period of time.
b. Situ Sahu & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.3 – the
exercise of power in respect of transactions, which required C
prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner was again
observed to be one which had to be exercised within a
reasonable period of time.
c. Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead)
through Legal Representatives & Ors. 4 – the view D
expressed is the same as in the aforesaid two judgments in
para 13, as under:
“13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed,
the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the
application of the parties, within a reasonable time. E
Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute.
In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly
delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in
view of the fact that the land was transferred several times
during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not F
encumbered by any rights.”
d. Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Aswatha & Ors.5– the provisions
of the said Act were in issue, where suo moto action was
sought to be taken in 1998, in respect of transactions of the
vintage 1967, and this was held to be a long delay, which did G
not warrant the exercise of such power.

3
(2004) 8 SCC 340
4
(2018) 12 SCC 527
5
Civil Appeal No. 2166/2009, decided on 6.12.2017 H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 13. On the other hand, Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents sought to defend the impugned orders.
He disputed the interpretation sought to be given to Section 4 of the said
Act, read with Rule 9 of the said Rules, by emphasizing that under Section
4(2) of the said Act, there is an absolute embargo to transfer any land
without previous permission of the Government. The bar being statutory
B
in character, it was his submission, that this bar under the said Act prohibits
such transfer, even though the grant may have put the restriction only
for a period of fifteen (15) years. Thus, in case of both, the five (5) to
fifteen (15) years’ window, as well as post the fifteen (15) year period,
this bar would apply, as the bar is not qualified by any period of the grant,
C under the said Act.
14. Mr. Ahmadi also contended that Rule 9 of the said Rules
could not in any manner dilute the effect of the provisions of the said
Act, especially as the said Act had come into force subsequently. The
amendment to the proviso of Rule 9 would not imply that permission has
D to be obtained only for the window period of five (5) to fifteen (15)
years, while no such permission was required for a period beyond fifteen
(15) years.
15. In putting forth this proposition, apart from the plain reading of
the provision, he sought to support his contention also on the larger
E objective of the said Act, as is available from the Statement of Objects
and Reasons, which reads as under:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
KARNATAKA ACT No.2 of 1979

F Karnataka Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 30.6.1978
The non-alienation clause contained in the existing Land Grant
Rules and the provision for cancellation of grants where the land
is alienated in contravention of the above said provision are found
not sufficient to help the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
grantees whose ignorance and poverty have been exploited by
G
persons belonging to the affluent and powerful sections to obtain
sales or mortgages either for a nominal consideration or for no
consideration at all and they have become the victims of
circumstances. To fulfil the purposes of the grant, the land even if
it has been alienated, should be restored to the original grantee or
H his heirs.
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 885
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

The Government of India has also been urging the State A
Government for enacting a legislation to prevent alienation of lands
granted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by Government
on the lines of the model legislation prepared by it and circulated
to the State Government.
Hence the Bill.” B
16. The objective being to prevent exploitation of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes persons by more affluent persons, through
the process of acquisition of the land, there was no reason whatsoever
to read down the provisions of Section 4(2) of the said Act, based on the
earlier Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a different enactment. C
17. Insofar as the observations in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State
of Karnataka & Ors6 are concerned, emphasis was laid on the fact
that while learned senior counsel for the appellant sought to read para
24 in isolation, the same had to be read in the context of what was
sought to be decided, which would be apparent from paras 7 and 14. D
We have already extracted paras 7 and 24 aforesaid. The plea which
was sought to be urged is set out in para 14, which reads as under:
“14. What has been strongly urged before us is that the provisions
contained in Section 4 insofar as the same seek to nullify transfers
effected before the Act had come into force, are invalid.” E
18. It is his submission that, thus, the reading of the three paragraphs
together supports the case advanced by the State Government rather
than what was sought to be made out by learned senior counsel for the
appellant.
19. Insofar as the requirement of prior permission from the F
competent authority is concerned, learned counsel submitted that it was
never the case of the appellant, prior to the hearing before us, that such
prior permission was not required. In this behalf, he invited our attention
to the pleadings in this behalf, including in the synopsis.
20. Learned counsel also referred to certain judicial G
pronouncements to advance the proposition that such prior permission
would be required in the cases of the like kind at hand, including under
the provisions of the said Act. We proceed to discuss the same as
under:
6
(supra) H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A a. Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika & Anr.7 – the judgment
deals with the provisions of the said Act. It was observed in
paras 17 to 21 and 24 as under:
“17. Keeping these provisions and the objects and reasons
of the Act in mind, let us now deal with the submissions
B advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the
appellant, having regard to the fact that the transfer of the
granted land was made after the expiry of the prohibited
period and before the coming into force of the Act, such
transfer could not be hit by the provisions contained in Section
C 4(2) of the Act. In this connection, the learned counsel for
the appellant had drawn our attention to Section 3(1)(e) of
the Act, which defines “transfer”. We have already dealt
with the definition of “transfer” hereinearlier. According to
the learned counsel for the appellant, the prohibition imposed
D under Section 4 of the Act would not be applicable to the
facts of the present case. As noted hereinearlier, the learned
counsel, therefore, submitted that in view of the above, the
High Court as well as the authorities below had committed
an error in holding that the sale deed, having been executed
and registered after the commencement of the Act, must
E be found to be null and void and that by the said sale deed,
the right, title or interest in the granted land must be restored
by the Assistant Commissioner, in the exercise of his power
under Section 5 of the Act, to the respondents.
18. This submission of the learned counsel for the appellant
F was contested by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents. According to the learned counsel for the
respondents, the transfer of the granted land must be hit by
Section 4 of the Act as, admittedly, the sale deed was
executed and registered after the commencement of the
G Act. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended
that in view of the prohibition contained in Section 4 of the
Act, even if the transfer was made before the
commencement of the Act in view of the agreement for
sale, still since the sale deed was executed and registered
7
H (2008) 14 SCC 517
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 887
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

after the commencement of the Act, the same must be hit A
by Section 4 of the Act and, therefore, no right, title or
interest in such granted land shall be conveyed or be deemed
ever to have conveyed by such transfer and that being the
position, no interference could be made with the impugned
judgment as well as with the orders of the authorities.
B
19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after examining the objects and reasons and the relevant
provisions of the Act, as noted hereinearlier, in depth and in
detail, we have no hesitation to hold that the submissions of
the learned counsel for the appellant cannot at all be
accepted. It is true that the agreement for sale in respect C
of the granted land was executed before the commencement
of the Act. It is also an admitted position that “transfer”
under the Act includes an agreement to sell as well. Keeping
this fact in mind, let us now see whether in view of Section
4 of the Act, the transfer of the land, in respect of which D
the agreement for sale was executed before the
commencement of the Act but which was effected after
the commencement of the Act by execution and registration
of the sale deed, could be said to be null and void. Section
4(1) of the Act in clear terms provides that notwithstanding
anything contained in any law, agreement, contract or E
instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before
or after the commencement of the Act in contravention of
either (a) the terms of grant of such land; or (b) the
provisions of the law providing for such grant; or (c) sub-
section (2) of Section 4 of the Act, shall be null and void F
and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed
or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.
Therefore, under Section 4(1) of the Act, it can be safely
concluded that this provision declares any transfer of granted
land made either before or after the coming into force of
the Act, to be null and void if it is in contravention of the G
conditions specified therein.
20. Section 4(2) of the Act, as noted hereinearlier, deals
with the transfer of granted land after the commencement
of the Act i.e. after 1-1-1979. For the purpose of Section
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 4(2), the court must be satisfied that (1) the sale deed was
executed and registered after the commencement of the
Act, and (2) the same was executed and registered without
seeking prior permission of the State Government.
Therefore, Section 4(2) clearly postulates that a transferee
cannot acquire the granted land from the grantee without
B
seeking the permission of the Government nor can the
grantee transfer it without seeking prior permission from
the Government.
21. We have already considered the scheme of the Act as
also the objects and reasons for which it was introduced. It
C is an admitted position that the Act was introduced to help
and protect the right, title and interest of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in respect of the granted lands,
whose poverty and status in the society was taken advantage
of by some rich and affluent persons who took their lands
D either by paying a paltry sum or even without paying
anything to them.”
…. …. …. …. ….
“24. Let us, therefore, consider whether any of the
conditions is satisfied in the present case and thereby,
E whether, the transfer shall be null and void conveying or
deeming ever to have conveyed no right, title or interest of
such land by such transfer. So far as the first condition,
namely, transfer in contravention of the terms of the grant
of such land is concerned, it cannot be disputed in the facts
F of this case that there was no contravention of the terms of
the grant of such land as the transfer was admittedly made
after 15 years of the date of certificate, which was the only
condition regarding prohibition of transfer in the grant. It is
also not in dispute that there is no contravention of any law
providing for such grant. Therefore, so far as these two
G conditions are concerned, it cannot be disputed that they
are not satisfied. Now, let us take into consideration the
third condition i.e. transfer made in contravention of sub-
section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. In respect of this
condition, a transfer of any granted land made after the
H commencement of the Act in contravention of sub-section
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 889
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

(2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in A
such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have
conveyed by such transfer. Sub-section (2) of Section 4
clearly says that:
“4. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this
Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land B
without the previous permission of the Government.”
Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 4 prohibits transfer
or acquisition by transfer, either by the transferor or by the
transferee of any granted land without the previous
permission of the Government. Therefore, after the C
commencement of this Act, if any transfer is effected or
any person acquires any granted land by transfer, without
the previous permission of the Government, such transfer
shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such
land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed
by such transfer.” D

As to how the judgment in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors.8 has to be considered, it was further observed, in
para 27 as under:
“27. Before parting with this judgment, we may note that the E
learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention, as
noted hereinabove, relied on a decision of this Court in
Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka [(1984) 3 SCC 301]. This
decision was also relied on by the learned counsel who appeared
for the appellant before the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka
High Court. In our view, the decision of this Court in Manchegowda F
[(1984) 3 SCC 301] was rightly distinguished by the learned Single
Judge. We are in agreement with the decision of this Court in
Manchegowda [(1984) 3 SCC 301] but the scope of challenge by
the petitioners in that decision was limited which was stated at
para 7 of the said judgment, as follows: (SCC p. 306, para 7) G
“7. … It may be noted that the validity of the Act insofar as it
imposes prohibition on transfer of granted land after the
commencement of the Act has not been challenged and the
principal objection to the validity of the Act is taken because of
8
(supra) H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A the provisions in the Act seeking to nullify the transfers of
granted lands effected before the commencement of the Act.”
Therefore, we are in full agreement with the views expressed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the scope
of challenge by the petitioners in the aforesaid decision of this
B Court was limited and, therefore, that decision cannot be of
any help to the appellant in the present case.”

b. Harishchandra Hegde v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 9
Once again, the case pertains to the same said Act and
C discusses the effect of Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors.10 In that context, it has been observed
that Section 4, by virtue of containing a non obstante clause,
would apply notwithstanding anything contained in any
agreement or any other Act for the time being in force.
D c. Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati &
Ors.11 – The provisions of the Orissa Scheduled Areas
Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes)
Regulations, 1956 were examined, and in that context,
observations were made in para 25 that the State is the
E custodian and trustee of the immovable property of tribals,
and is enjoined to see that the tribals remains in possession of
such property. In the Regulations in that case, no period of
limitation was prescribed, and the period of twelve (12) years
in Article 65 of the Limitation Act became irrelevant so far as
the immovable property of a tribal was concerned. Such tribal
F need not file a civil suit which will be governed by the law of
limitation since it is enough if he or anyone on his behalf moves
the State or the State itself moves into action to protect him
and restore property to him.
21. Insofar as the factual aspects of the execution of the document,
G stated to be the sale deeds, is concerned, it was highlighted that the land
owners were represented by a GPA, who was the wife of the vendee
(appellant), and the entire amount was paid in cash. This GPA was
9
(2004) 9 SCC 780
10
(supra)
11
H (2004) 10 SCC 65
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 891
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

executed even prior to the fifteen (15) years period, and thus obviously, A
the nature of transaction was such that it had occurred prior to the fifteen
(15) year period, though the formal sale deed was executed after the
fifteen (15) years period. In either eventuality, it was submitted that
prior permission would be required.
22. Another aspect which was sought to be highlighted by Mr. B
Ahmadi, learned senior counsel was that it was not even open to the
appellant to have raised any contention before this Court, much less a
new contention, in view of the conduct of the appellant, who grossly
misrepresented facts before this Court. The gravamen of the case of
the appellant throughout is that they have obtained prior permission and
that such prior permission was required. It was found that the documents C
purporting to be prior permission were forged and fabricated, for which
criminal proceedings are separately pending. However, while making
the relevant averments in the appeal, it has been categorically stated
that the permission to transfer land had been granted. The documents
which were found to be forged, were in fact, suppressed. Such D
suppression, it was submitted, would disentitle the appellant to any relief
whatsoever.
23. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel sought to
refer to certain judicial pronouncements on the effect of suppression as
under: E
a. K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited &
Ors.12 – In para 37 of this judgment, a reference was made to
the proposition as propounded by the King’s Bench in the
following terms:
“37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB F
486: 86 LJKB 257: 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading,
C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96)
“… Where an ex parte application has been made to this
Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to
the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application G
was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated
them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true
facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent
an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further
12
(2008) 12 SCC 481 H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent
in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases
which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has
been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful
examination will be made of the facts as they are and as
they have been stated in the applicant’s affidavit, and
B
everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the
view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows
the true facts. But if the result of this examination and
hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been
deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further
C from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been
set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit.”
(emphasis supplied)”
The aforesaid principle was observed to have been followed
while dealing with prerogative writs, whether under Article 32 or
D Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and a litigant cannot be
permitted to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the
facts he likes to disclose, and to suppress or not to disclose other
facts. Thus, a party with “soiled hands” is not liable to be
entertained.
E b. A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu
Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented
by its President & Ors.13
c. Hari Narain v. Badri Das14 - the leave granted was revoked
on the basis that where such leave has been obtained by
F suppression of facts, the mere fact that leave was granted,
would not come in the way of the Court disentitling the
appellant to relief.
24. We have examined the aforesaid elaborate contentions
advanced by both the learned senior counsel for the parties. In our
G view, the matter is in a very narrow compass.
25. Turning to the last aspect first, i.e., suppression of material
fact, we must observe that the manner of dealing with facts by the
appellant does leave much to be desired. There ought to have been full
13
(2012) 6 SCC 430
H 14
(1964) 2 SCR 203
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 893
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

disclosure of documents. However, we cannot be oblivious of the fact A
that all the orders below are predicated on a reasoning that while the
appellant sought to make out a case that permission had been granted,
no such permission had actually been granted by the competent authority,
and the documents furnished in this behalf were found to be forged and
fabricated. The criminal proceedings, however, are still pending qua
B
that aspect, and we would not like to delve in the matter any further, on
this aspect, which is really in the nature of a preliminary objection by the
respondent-State. It is not necessary to non-suit the appellant on this
ground itself, as we feel that the merits of the matter itself ought to be
dealt with.
26. There is substance in the contention of the respondent-State C
that the appellant had throughout sought to make out a case based on
prior permission by the competent authority. It was nobody’s case that
permission was not required to be obtained. At this stage of the civil
appeal, without any pleadings being there, it is not even really open to
the appellant to have pleaded the interpretation they so sought to plead. D
This really cannot be categorized as a legal plea alone, and that too
raised at the fifth level of scrutiny in the hierarchy of proceedings. The
appellant, really faced with a factual situation where the permissions do
not exist, now sought to build another bridge to contend that be that as it
may, no permission is required. Such a plea cannot be countenanced.
E
27. If we analyze the aforesaid plea also, we find no merit in the
same. We cannot lose sight of the objective with which the said Act
was enacted. The non-alienation clause existing in the said Rules, and
incorporated in the grants, was found to be inadequate to protect the
interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who were given
land owing to their ignorance and poverty. Influential and powerful F
sections of society were stated to be obtaining sales and mortgages for
consideration, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes became victims
of circumstances. The objective of the State Government in enacting
the said Act was to prevent such misuse and, therefore, in categorical
terms, transfer with permission was prescribed. This would be de hors G
the terms of the grant or the said Rules. Thus, whether it was a case
where it was within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years, or the
period beyond fifteen (15) years, such permission would be required.
28. No doubt Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a different
enactment, prior to the enactment of the said Act (and thereafter even H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A amended), does contemplate transfer between the window of five (5) to
fifteen (15) years on certain terms and conditions, which are required to
be satisfied by the Deputy Commissioner. There is, in fact, a prohibition
in grant of such permission until and unless there is satisfaction of the
Deputy Commissioner that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring
other land, or for improving the remaining land and that the grantee
B
credits to Government an amount equal to fifty percent of the market
value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation. Thus,
more rigorous terms have been put for transfer within the window of
five (5) to fifteen (15) years.
29. The reason for the competent authority to arrive at a decision
C whether to grant permission or not after the period of fifteen (15) years
may or may not be coloured by such considerations. But certainly, he
may satisfy himself that the members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes only, who have been allotted the land, are not taken for
a ride, and it is possibly in their best interest for recorded reasons that
D such permission should be granted. The wordings of Section 4(2) of the
said Act are quite clear in its terms.
30. Section 4 of the said Act, dealing with prohibition of transfer
of granted land, in sub-section (1), begins with a non obstante clause.
It is notwithstanding anything in any agreement, contract or instrument,
E or for that matter in any law. Section 11 of the said Act further enforces
this by giving the said Act an overriding effect over any other law. The
said Section 11 reads as under:
“11. Act to override other laws.- The provisions of this Act
shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
F contained in any other law for the time being in force or any
custom, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court,
Tribunal or other Authority.”
31. The aforesaid Section is applicable for grants made either
before or after the commencement of the Act. The terms of the grant
G cannot be contravened, but the last part of sub-section (1) of Section 4
of the said Act makes any transfer in violation of sub-section (2) also
null and void. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act is crisp and
clear in its terms, putting an absolute ban on transfer after the
commencement of the Act, without previous permission of the
Government. Thus, a bare reading of the provision makes it abundantly
H
SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. 895
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

clear that it brooks no two interpretations. After the period of fifteen A
(15) years also, thus, permission was required to be taken.
32. The legal position enunciated in various judicial pronouncements
is also very clear in this behalf. The observations in Manchegowda &
Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.,15 in para 24, cannot be taken out of
context, as what would have to be scrutinized is the proposition sought B
to be determined in that case. The validity of the Act had been challenged
mainly because the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act
purported to declare transfer of “granted land” made before or after the
commencement of the Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of
such land or law, null and void. In para 14, what was urged before the
Court has been set out, i.e., the challenge being to Section 4 insofar as it C
seeks to nullify the transfer effected before the Act came into force. In
the conspectus of the aforesaid observations, para 24 has to be read.
33. The aforesaid aspect is really not in doubt, in view of the
subsequent judicial pronouncements, more specifically in Dharma Naika
v. Rama Naika & Anr.16 The context of the observations made in D
Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka17 has been clearly enunciated.
It is noted that the agreements for sale were executed before the
commencement of the Act. The sale deed was executed afterwards.
In that context it was observed that it could be safely concluded that
provisions of Section 4(1) declared any transfer of land made either E
before or after the commencement of the said Act to be null and void if
it contravened the conditions specified therein. Section 4(2) was held to
make it abundantly clear that if the sale deed was executed and registered
after the commencement of the said Act, and was without prior
permission of the State Government, such transfer would be invalid and
null and void. The scheme of the said Act was also discussed in detail F
with the objective with which it was enacted. Before parting with the
judgment, this Court observed in para 27 that Manchegowda & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors.18 has to be read in the context of the limited
scope, as enunciated in para 7 of that judgment. Nothing more is really
left to be said after this judgment, though there are certain other judicial G
pronouncements referred to aforesaid, cited by learned counsel for the
State. Suffice to say that a delay of eight (8) years by itself cannot
15
(supra)
16
(supra)
17
(supra)
18
(supra) H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A come in the way of the competent authority taking the action, as limitation
principles would not apply, as observed in Amrendra Pratap Singh v.
Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.19 The cases referred to by learned
senior counsel for the appellant involved huge gaps of around twenty
(20) to thirty (30) years, which is not so in the present case.
B 34. The period of eight (8) years cannot be said to be such, as to
amount to such delay and laches as would make the action void,
considering that it is in respect of a beneficial legislation for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes community.
35. We may also add that the documents of transfer executed
C themselves, also do not evoke much confidence. As observed aforesaid,
complete consideration is paid in cash. Further, the documents of transfer
were executed by the allottee, but through the attorney, who is none
other than the wife of the appellant. The GPA was executed prior to the
period of fifteen (15) years, and it is inconceivable that the same would
have been executed without consideration. It does seem to suggest that
D for all practical terms, the alleged transfer took place prior to the lapse
of the fifteen (15) year period, but the sale deed was executed after
such fifteen (15) year period. Be that as it may, in any case, it would not
make any difference to the result of the case.
36. We are of the view that the courts below committed no error,
E and the competent authority has acted within its jurisdiction to nullify the
transactions which are contrary to the statutory provisions of Section
4(2) of the said Act, and the manner of execution itself raises many
doubts.
37. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to
F bear their own costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.

G

19
H (supra)