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Supreme Court of India

SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR MEHRAversusTHE STATE OF JHARKHAND

Citation
2018 INSC 262
Decided
23 March 2018
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is limited to the stay of payment of compensation out of a fine and does not stay the fine itself; thus the High Court could validly direct the appellant to deposit the fine while suspending the sentence.

Summary

Satyendra Kumar Mehra was convicted under several IPC offences and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000 in each of four counts. He appealed the conviction and also sought suspension of his sentence. The High Court suspended the sentence, released him on bail, but directed that he deposit the fine amount before the trial court. Mehra challenged this direction, contending that Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure automatically stays the fine during the pendency of an appeal. The Supreme Court held that Section 357(2) applies only to the payment of compensation out of a fine and does not stay the fine itself, and therefore the High Court’s order was valid. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. bars a court from directing the accused to deposit a fine while the sentence is suspended pending appeal.
  • Whether the fine, being part of the sentence, is automatically stayed under Section 357(2) during the pendency of an appeal.
  • Whether the power to suspend a sentence and impose conditions lies under Section 389 Cr.P.C. and is independent of Section 357.

Legislation cited

Subjects

finesuspension of sentenceSection 357 CrPCcompensationappealstay of finecriminal procedure

Judgment

                        [2018] 4 S.C.R. 1033                             1033


   SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                               A
                    MEHRA
                                  v.
                  THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 406 of 2018)                       B
                         MARCH 23, 2018
          [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.357(2) – Appellant
was tried for the offence punishable u/ss.420,467,468,471 r/w.120-B
                                                                         C
IPC – Trial Court convicted the appellant and awarded sentence
with fine – Appellant filed appeal before the High Court and also
filed application for suspension of sentence – High Court allowed
the application for suspension of sentence, however, directed
appellant to deposit the fine amount awarded before the Court below
– Whether by virtue of s.357(2) Cr.P.C., the said fine which was         D
part of sentence automatically was stayed till the decision of the
appeal and would not have been directed by the High Court to be
deposited by the appellant – Held: No infirmity in the order of the
High Court – In instant case, s.357(2) Cr.P.C. not attracted since
there was no direction of payment of any compensation out of the
                                                                         E
fine imposed by the trial court as part of sentence – s.357 Cr.P.C.(2)
comes into play only where any order of payment of compensation
utilising the fine imposed as sentence u/s.357(1) Cr.P.C. or
compensation as directed u/s. 357(3) Cr.P.C. is made – Present being
neither a case of s.357(1) Cr.P.C. nor s.357(3), sub-section(2) of
s.357 Cr.P.C. clearly not applicable.                                    F
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.357(2) – Purpose and
object – Held: s.357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplated utilisation of fine
imposed in certain circumstances as compensation to be paid to
victim – Sub-s.(2) of s.357 engrafted an embargo that such payment
shall not be made till the period allowed for appeal has elapsed or      G
if the appeal is filed, till the same is decided – Legislature was
conscious that compensation paid if utilised, there may not be
appropriate measures to recover the said amount utilised from victim
to whom the compensation is paid hence embargo in payment has
been engrafted in sub-s.(2) – Thus at best sub-s.(2) of s.357 Cr.P.C.
                                                                         H
                                1033
1034            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     is a provision which defers or withholds the utilisation of the amount
       of compensation awarded till the limitation of appeal elapses or if
       filed till it is decided – The provision in no manner stays the sentence
       of fine during the pendency of the appeal.
             Dismissing the appeal, the Court
 B            HELD: 1. The fine is contemplated to be utilised for
       compensating different circumstances as enumerated in Section
       357(1) Cr.P.C. Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. sub-section (2) of Section
       357 Cr.P.C. has been engrafted in reference to what was stated
       in sub-Section (1) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. Crucial words used in
 C     sub-section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. are “no such payment
       shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal
       has elapsed, or if an appeal be presented, before the decision of
       the appeal”. Thus, what is prohibited under Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.
       is that payment of compensation utilising the fine be not paid till
       the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or if an
 D     appeal is filed then before the decision of the appeal. It does not
       involve any concept of stay of sentence. [Para 14] [1041-C-D]
              2. Section 357 Cr.P.C. contains an embargo that on passing
       a judgment of sentence of fine, the fine be not utilised for payment
       of compensation till contingency as mentioned therein does not
 E     occur. The sentence awarded by the Court including sentence of
       fine is in no way affected by embargo contained in Section 357(2)
       Cr.P.C. The operation of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is restricted to
       payment of compensation as contemplated by Section 357(1) and
       (3) Cr.P.C. The heading of the Section 357 Cr.P.C. i.e. “Order to
 F     pay compensation” as well as contents of the Section lead to only
       one conclusion that the entire provision has been engrafted
       regarding payment of compensation out of the fine imposed or
       when Court imposes sentence the fine is not part of which, the
       Court may by way of compensation direct payment of such amount
       to a person who has suffered the injury. Thus, Section 357 Cr.P.C.
 G     has nothing to do with suspension of sentence awarded by the
       trial court and the sentence of fine imposed on the accused is in
       no way affected by Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The present is not a
       case where trial court has directed payment of any compensation
       to anyone out of fine imposed. There is no direction for payment
 H     of compensation in the order of the trial court nor present case is
   SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                  1035
          MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND

covered by the circumstances mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to                A
(d) of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Present is also not a case of Section
357(3) Cr.P.C. Hence, there is no question of applicability of
Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The heading of Section 357 Cr. P.C. throws
considerable light in finding the object and purpose of the Section.
Section 357 Cr.P.C. is only attracted when Court orders for
                                                                            B
payment of compensation. Section 357 is not attracted in any other
case. It is well settled that heading of the Section plays a role
when there is any doubt in interpretation of the Section. [Para
15] [1041-F-H; 1042-A-C]
       3. Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplated utilisation of fine
imposed in certain circumstances as compensation to be paid to              C
victim. Sub-section (2) engrafted an embargo that such payment
shall not be made till the period allowed for appeal has elapsed
or if the appeal is filed, till the same is decided. Legislature was
conscious that compensation paid if utilised, there may not be
appropriate measures to recover the said amount utilised from               D
victim to whom the compensation is paid hence embargo in
payment has been engrafted in sub-section (2). Thus at best sub-
section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. is a provision which defers or
withholds the utilisation of the amount of compensation awarded
till the limitation of appeal elapses or if filed till it is decided. The
provision in no manner stays the sentence of fine during the                E
pendency of the appeal. The purpose for which sub-section (2) of
Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been enacted is different as noted above
and it never contemplates as stay of sentence of fine imposed on
accused. [Para 33] [1052-H; 1053-A-C]
      4. Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. was not attracted in the present            F
case since there was no direction of payment of any compensation
out of the fine imposed by the trial court as part of sentence.
Section 357 Cr.P.C.(2) comes into play only where any order of
payment of compensation utilising the fine imposed as sentence
under Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. or compensation as directed under              G
Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. is made. Present being neither a case of
Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. nor Section 357(3), sub-section(2) of
Section 357 Cr.P.C. is clearly not applicable. [Para 37] [1054-A-B]
      Kedar Nath v. State of Haryana 2006 (3) PLR 194 –
      distinguished.                                                        H
1036            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A           Bharat Mandal son of Sitaram Mandal & Ors. v. The
             State of Bihar, 2012 (2) PLJR 855; Dilip S. Dahanukar
             v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. and Another (2007) 6 SCC
             528 : [2007] 4 SCR 1122; K.C.Sareen v. C.B.I.
             Chandigarh (2001) 6 SCC 584 : [ 2001] 1 Suppl.
             SCR 224 – inapplicable.
 B
             Stanny Felix Pinto v. Jangid Builders Pvt. Ltd. and
             another, (2001) 2 SCC 416 : [2001] 1 SCR 390; Bhinka
             and others v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 : [1959]
             Suppl. SCR 798; N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India
             and others, (2004) 2 SCC 579 : [2003] 6 Suppl.
 C           SCR 674; Irrigation Engineering Company (India)
             Private Limited and Anr. v. The Small-Scale Industrial
             Development Bank of India (SIDBI) 2003 (6) KarLJ
             387; Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and others (1988) 4
             SCC 551 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 571 – referred to.
 D                            Case Law Reference
       [2001] 1 SCR 390                referred to               Para 8
       [1959] Suppl. SCR 798           referred to               Para 15
       [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 674         referred to               Para 16
 E     [2007] 4 SCR 1122               inapplicable              Para 17
       2003 (6) KarLJ 387              referred to               Para 26
       2006 (3) PLR 194                distinguished             Para 27
       2012 (2) PLJR 855               referred to               Para 29
 F     [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 571         referred to               Para 32
       [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 224         inapplicable              Para 35
             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
       No. 406 of 2018.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2018 of the High Court
 G     of Jharkhand at Ranchi in I. A. No. 892 of 2018 in Crl. Appeal (SJ) No.
       176 of 2018.
             Sunil Kumar, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Shekhar, Adv. for the Appellant.
             Aman Lekhi, ASG, Rajiv Nanda, T. A. Khan, B. V. Balramdas,
 H     Advs. for the Respondent.
   SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                   1037
          MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             A
       ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against
an order of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal
NO.176 of 2018 by which High Court by allowing I.A.No. 892 of 2018
filed by the appellant, has directed to grant suspension of sentence of
the appellant. The High Court further directed that the appellant should     B
also deposit the fine amount awarded before the court below. The
appellant is aggrieved only against that part of the order by which the
High Court directed the deposit of fine amount.
        2. The appellant was an accused in R.C. Case No.68(A) of 1996-
State (through CBI) vs. Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav and others.          C
Accused were tried for the offence punishable under Sections 120-B/
read with 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of the IPC read with Section
13(1)(c) & (d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
trial court by order dated 24.01.2018 convicted the accused and awarded
sentence. The appellant, who was one of the accused, was awarded the
following sentence by the trial court:                                       D
          “44. Satyendra Kumar Mehra convicted for offence
        punishable U/s 120-B/420, 120-B/467, 120-B/468 and 120-
        B/471 IPC:
        U/s 120-B/420 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with fine of
        Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine S.I. for Three         E
        (03) Months.
        U/s 120-B/467 IPC R.I. of Five (05) Years with fine of
        Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine S.I. for Three
        (03) Months.
        U/s 120-B/468 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with fine of                F
        Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine S.I. for Three
        (03) Months.
        U/s 120-B/471 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with fine of
        Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine S.I. for Three
        (03) Months.                                                         G
        All the sentences shall run concurrently and the period
        undergone shall be set off.”
      3. Aggrieved against the above conviction and sentence order the
appellant filed Criminal Appeal No.176 of 2018 before the High Court.
The appellant also filed application praying suspension of sentence. After   H
1038            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     hearing, the High Court allowed the application granting the privilege of
       suspension of sentence to the appellant and directing the appellant be
       released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties.
       However, while allowing the application the High Court passed the
       following direction:
 B             “Appellant should also deposit the fine amount awarded before
               court below.”
              4. The appellant aggrieved by the aforesaid direction of the High
       Court to deposit the fine amount awarded by the court below has come
       up in this appeal.
 C            5. We have heard Shri Sunil Kumar, learned senior counsel
       appearing for the appellant and Shri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional
       Solicitor General for India appearing for the respondent-State.
              6. Learned counsel for the appellant relying on Section 357 sub-
       Section (2) of Criminal Procedure Code submits that since the appellant
       has already filed an appeal before the High Court, the amount of fine
 D
       imposed by the trial court automatically stands stayed till the decision of
       the appeal. He submits that in the present case sentence of fine was
       also imposed by the trial court which is the subject of the appeal, hence
       Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is attracted in the present case and the High
       Court should not have directed the appellant to deposit the fine amount
 E     awarded by the trial court which direction is in the teeth of provisions of
       Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of
       his submission placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in
       Dilip S. Dahanukar vs. Kotak Mahindra Co.Ltd. And another, (2007)
       6 SCC 528.
 F            7. Shri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General for India
       refuting the submission of learned counsel for the appellant contends
       that the High Court did not commit error in directing the appellant to
       deposit the fine amount awarded by the court below. He submits that
       provisions of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is not attracted in the present case.
       He submits that what is contemplated by sub-Section (2) of Section 357
 G     Cr.P.C. is “payment of the compensation as envisaged in Section 357(1)
       Cr.P.C.”. He submits that stay of payment of compensation is entirely
       different from the stay of fine which is a part of sentence imposed on
       accused.
             8. He submits that this Court in Stanny Felix Pinto vs. Jangid
 H     Builders Pvt. Ltd. and another, (2001) 2 SCC 416, has also upheld a
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                     1039
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

similar order passed by the High Court where the High Court directed          A
payment of rupees four lakhs as a condition to suspend the sentence
which was part of the fine imposed as part of sentence.
       9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that judgment of this
Court in Stanny Felix Pinto(supra) cannot be pressed into service with
regard to interpretation of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. which section is neither   B
referred to nor adverted to by this Court in above case.
       10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the records. From the facts brought on
record, it is clear that the sentence awarded to the appellant was a
sentence of R.I. of five years with payment of fine of Rs.25,000/- and in     C
default S.I. of three months. The said sentence was recorded in four
cases and all sentences were to run concurrently. Thus, the fine was
part of the sentence. The question which is to be answered in the present
case is as to whether by virtue of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C., the said fine
which was part of sentence automatically was stayed till the decision of
the appeal and would not have been directed by the High Court to be           D
deposited by the appellant.
       11. For answering the question we need to reflect upon the statutory
scheme as delineated by Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.
is part of Chapter XXVII- “THE JUDGMENT” of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973. Section 353 deals about the judgment, its               E
pronouncement, signatures, delivery and other aspects. Section 354 deals
with language and contents of judgment. Section 355 refers to
Metropolitan Magistrate’s judgment. Section 356 deals with order for
notifying address of previously convicted offender and then Section 357
bears heading “Order to pay compensation”. Order to pay                       F
compensation, thus, is a part of judgment where Court directs payment
for compensation.
      12. Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplates that when a Court imposes
a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a part, the Court
may, while passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine          G
recovered to be applied. Section 357 is to the following effect:-
        “357. Order to pay compensation.
        (1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence
        (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part,
                                                                              H
1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     the Court may, when passing judgment order the whole or
       any part of the fine recovered to be applied-
       (a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the
       prosecution;
       (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any
 B     loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is,
       in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a
       Civil Court;
       (c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having
       caused the death of another person or of having abetted
 C     the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation
       to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855
       (13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from the person
       sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death;
       (d) when any person is convicted of any offence which
 D     includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach
       of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received or
       retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of,
       stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same
       to be stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of
 E     such property for the loss of the same if such property is
       restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto.”
       (2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal,
       no such payment shall be made before the period allowed
       for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be
 F     presented, before the decision of the appeal.
       (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not
       form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order
       the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such
       amount as may be specified in the order to the person who
       has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which
 G
       the accused person has been so sentenced.
       (4) An order under this section may also be made by an
       Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session
       when exercising its powers of revision.
 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                      1041
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        (5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent             A
        civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take
        into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation
        under this section.”
       13. All the circumstances in sub-section (1) of Section 357 refer
to direction to pay compensation out of the fine imposed. Thus, all the        B
circumstances are circumstances where fine imposed and recovered is
to be applied in the above circumstances.
       14. The fine is thus contemplated to be utilised for compensating
different circumstances as enumerated in Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Sub-
Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been engrafted in reference to          C
what was stated in sub-Section (1) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. Crucial words
used in sub-Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. are “no such payment
shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has
elapsed, or if an appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal”.
Thus, what is prohibited under Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is that payment of
compensation utilising the fine be not paid till the period allowed for        D
presenting the appeal has elapsed, or if an appeal is filed then before the
decision of the appeal. It does not involve any concept of stay of sentence.
       15. Chapter XXIX deals with the appeals. In the said Chapter
Section 389 deals with the subject “suspension of sentence pending the
appeal; release of appellant on bail”. Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. empowers         E
the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order
appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he
be released on bail. Thus, the power of suspension of sentence emanates
from Section 389 Cr.P.C. where Appellate Court is empowered to pass
such an order. Sections 357 and 389 Cr.P.C. operate in two different           F
fields. Section 357 Cr.P.C. contains an embargo that on passing a
judgment of sentence of fine, the fine be not utilised for payment of
compensation till contingency as mentioned therein does not occur. The
sentence awarded by the Court including sentence of fine is in no way
affected by embargo contained in Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The operation
of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is restricted to payment of compensation as          G
contemplated by Section 357(1) and (3) Cr.P.C. The heading of the Section
357 Cr.P.C. i.e. “Order to pay compensation” as well as contents of the
Section lead to only one conclusion that the entire provision has been
engrafted regarding payment of compensation out of the fine imposed
or when Court imposes sentence the fine is not part of which, the Court        H
1042            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     may by way of compensation direct payment of such amount to a person
       who has suffered the injury. We, thus, are of the view that Section 357
       Cr.P.C. has nothing to do with suspension of sentence awarded by the
       trial court and the sentence of fine imposed on the accused is in no way
       affected by Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The present is not a case where trial
       court has directed payment of any compensation to anyone out of fine
 B
       imposed. There is no direction for payment of compensation in the order
       of the trial court nor present case is covered by the circumstances
       mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Present is
       also not a case of Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. Hence, there is no question of
       applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The heading of Section 357 Cr. P.C.
 C     throws considerable light in finding the object and purpose of the Section.
       Section 357 Cr.P.C. is only attracted when Court orders for payment of
       compensation. Section 357 is not attracted in any other case. It is well
       settled that heading of the Section plays a role when there is any doubt
       in interpretation of the Section. This Court in Bhinka and others vs.
       Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960, while examining the role of a heading
 D
       of section while interpreting a section noticed the following principle;
                  “15......Section 180 provides for the eviction of a person
               who but for the eviction would become a hereditary tenant
               by efflux of the prescribed time. If there is any ambiguity —
               we find none — it is dispelled by the heading given to the
 E             section and also the description of the nature of the suit
               given in the Schedule. The heading reads thus:
                  “Ejectment of person occupying land without title.”
               “Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., gives the
 F             scope of the user of such a heading in the interpretation of
               a section thus, at p. 50:
               “The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some
               modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections.
               They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they
 G             may explain ambiguous words.”
               If there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the
               section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that
               doubt.......”

 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                    1043
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      16. The similar proposition was again reiterated by three-Judge        A
Bench of this Court in N.C. Dhoundial vs. Union of India and others,
(2004) 2 SCC 579, where in paragraph 15 following has been held:
        “15......The language employed in the marginal heading is
        another indicator that it is a jurisdictional limitation. It is a
        settled rule of interpretation that the section heading or           B
        marginal note can be relied upon to clear any doubt or
        ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern
        the legislative intent (vide Uttam Das Chela Sunder Das v.
        Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, (1996) 5 SCC
        71 and Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960).”
                                                                             C
       17. Now we come to the judgment which has been relied on by
the learned counsel for the appellant, i.e., Dilip S. Dahanukar (supra).
In the above case this Court had occasion to interpret Section 357 Cr.P.C.
The appellant therein was accused No.2, who was directed to pay
compensation to the complainant of Rs.15 lakh apart from the simple
imprisonment. The facts have been noted in paragraph 3 of the judgment       D
which is to the following effect:
           “3. Accused 1, M/s Goodvalue Marketing Co. Ltd., a
        company registered and incorporated under the Companies
        Act, 1956 and Accused 2, the appellant herein were convicted
        for commission of an offence involving Section 138 of the            E
        Act by a judgment of conviction and sentence dated 23-2-
        2006 holding:
           “Accused 1 company, M/s Goodvalue Marketing Co. Ltd.
        stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section
        138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.         F
           Accused 1 company is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs
        25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only). In default of
        payment of fine, Accused 2 Mr Dilip Dahanukar, the
        Chairman of Accused 1 and representative at the trial, shall
        suffer SI for 1 month.                                               G
        Accused 2 Mr Dilip S. Dahanukar, stands convicted for the
        offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 141
        of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

                                                                             H
1044             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A             Accused 2 is sentenced to suffer SI for 1 month.
               Accused 2 is also directed to pay compensation to the
               complainant, quantified (sic) at Rs 15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakhs
               only), under Section 357(3) CrPC. Accused 2 is entitled to pay
               the amount of compensation in two equal monthly instalments of
 B             Rs 7,50,000 each. The first instalment of Rs 7,50,000 shall be
               paid on or before 23-3-2006 and the second instalment of
               Rs 7,50,000 shall be paid on or before 24-4-2006; in default of
               payment of the amount of compensation Accused 2 shall suffer
               further SI for 2 months.”
 C            18. An appeal was preferred against the conviction order. The
       Appellate Court while admitting the appeal directed the accused to deposit
       a sum of Rs.5 lakh each within four weeks from the said date. Writ
       petition was filed questioning the legality of the said order of the Appellate
       Court which was dismissed and thereafter the matter was taken to this
       Court. A submission was raised before this Court that having regard to
 D     the provisions of Section 357(2) of the Code, the impugned judgment is
       wholly unsustainable inasmuch as in terms thereof the amount of fine
       imposed would automatically be suspended.
              19. In the above case this Court considered sub-Sections (1), (2)
       and (3) of Section 357 of the Code and observed that sub-Section (2)
 E     shall be applicable both in regard to compensation as well as direction
       under sub-Section (3). In paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 following has been
       laid down:
                  “43. It does not appeal to us that although a compensation
               payable out of the quantum of fine would remain stayed under
 F             sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the Code, if a compensation is
               directed to be paid under sub-section (3) thereof, the same would
               not attract the said provision. (See P. Suresh Kumar v. R.
               Shankar, [(2007) 4 SCC 752].)
                  44. Magistrates cannot award compensation in addition to
 G             fine. When a fine is imposed, however, the private party has no
               right to insist that compensation may be awarded to him out of
               the amount of fine. The power to award compensation under
               Section 357(3) is not an ancillary power. It is an additional power.
               (See Balraj v. State of U.P., [(1994) 4 SCC 29].)
 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                      1045
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

           45. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 357 and sub-           A
       section (1) of Section 357 and sub-section (3) of Section 357
       seek to achieve the same purpose. What is necessary is to find
       out the intention of the lawmaker and the object sought to be
       achieved. Sub-section (2) of Section 357 uses the word “fine”.
       It does not say that what would be stayed i.e. application of fine.
                                                                               B
       Sub-section (2) of Section 357, in our opinion, does not
       contemplate any other interpretation. Even assuming that Mr
       Lalit was correct in his submission, still then sub-section (3) would
       be squarely attracted.”
       20. Referring to Section 389 Cr. P.C., this Court noticed that
suspension of a sentence and enlarging an appellant on bail, who is            C
convicted and realisation of fine has been dealt with by Parliament under
different provisions of the Code. In paragraph 51 following has been laid
down:
           “51. Section 389 does not deal with exactly a similar
       situation. Section 389 of the Code is to be read with Section           D
       387 thereof. Suspension of a sentence and enlarging an
       appellant on bail, who is convicted and realisation of fine
       has been dealt with by Parliament under different provisions
       of the Code. The power of the court, thus, to suspend a
       sentence in regard to realisation of compensation may be                E
       different from that of a direction in realisation of fine.”
        21. This Court in the aforesaid case has noted the distinction
between fine of Rs.25,000/- which was imposed on the Company and
compensation of Rs.15 lakh which was directed to be paid by the
Chairman of the Company. In paragraph 71 the aforesaid was mentioned           F
to the following effect:
          “71. We are prima facie of the opinion (without going
       into the merit of the appeal) that the direction of the learned
       trial Judge appears to be somewhat unreasonable. The
       appellant herein has been sentenced to imprisonment. Only               G
       fine has been imposed on the Company. Thus, for all intent
       and purpose, the learned trial Judge has invoked both sub-
       sections (1) and (3) of Section 357 of the Code. The liability
       of the appellant herein was a vicarious one in terms of
       Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The question
                                                                               H
1046            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A             may also have to be considered from the angle that the learned
               trial Judge thought it fit to impose a fine of Rs 25,000 only
               upon the Company. If that be so, a question would arise as
               to whether an amount of compensation for a sum of Rs 15
               lakhs should have been directed to be paid by the Chairman
               of the Company. We feel that it is not.”
 B
             22. This Court ultimately directed the appellant to deposit rupees
       one lakh towards the compensation and recorded its conclusion in
       paragraph 72 which is to the following effect:
                  “72. We, therefore, are of the opinion:
 C             (i) in a case of this nature, sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the
               Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted even when the
               appellant was directed to pay compensation;
               (ii) the appellate court, however, while suspending the sentence,
               was entitled to put the appellant on terms. However, no such
 D             term could be put as a condition precedent for entertaining the
               appeal which is a constitutional and statutory right;
               (iii) the amount of compensation must be a reasonable sum;
               (iv) the court, while fixing such amount, must have regard to all
               relevant factors including the one referred to in sub-section (5)
 E
               of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
               (v) no unreasonable amount of compensation can be directed to
               be paid.”
              23. This Court, in the above case, was dealing with the question
 F     of payment of compensation which was awarded by the Court under
       sub-Section (3) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. The Court was not dealing with
       fine which was part of the sentence. The Court, thus, had no occasion to
       consider the issue which has arisen in the present case. We, in the present
       case, are not concerned with payment of any compensation or applicability
       of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. with regard to payment of any such
 G     compensation.
             24. We also need to notice the judgment of this Court in Stanny
       Felix Pinto (supra). In the above case along with sentence of
       imprisonment, fine was also imposed under Section 138 of the Negotiable
       Instruments Act. The High Court while entertaining the revision granted
 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                    1047
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

suspension of the sentence by imposing a condition that part of the fine     A
shall be remitted in court within a specified time which direction was
challenged in this Court. This Court upheld the said direction. Following
was held in paragraph 2:
            “2. When a person was convicted under Section 138 of
        the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced to                      B
        imprisonment and fine he moved the superior court for
        suspension of the sentence. The High Court while
        entertaining his revision granted suspension of the sentence
        by imposing a condition that part of the fine shall be remitted
        in court within a specified time. It is against the said direction
        that this petition has been filed. In our view the High Court        C
        has done it correctly and in the interest of justice. We feel
        that while suspending the sentence for the offence under
        Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act it is advisable
        that the court imposes a condition that the fine part is remitted
        within a certain period. If the fine amount is heavy, the court      D
        can direct at least a portion thereof to be remitted as the
        convicted person wants the sentence to be suspended during
        the pendency of the appeal. In this case the grievance of the
        appellant is that he is required by the High Court to remit a
        huge amount of rupees four lakhs as a condition to suspend
        the sentence. When considering the total amount of fine              E
        imposed by the trial court (twenty lakhs of rupees) there is
        nothing unjust or unconscionable in imposing such a
        condition. Hence, there is no need to interfere with the
        impugned order. As such no notice need be issued to the
        respondent. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.”                        F
       25. It is true that this Court while deciding the said case did not
consider Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant is
right in his submission that the above judgment cannot be held to be
laying down any ratio on applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.
      26. We may also refer to a judgment of Karnataka High Court in         G
Irrigation Engineering Company (India) Private Limited and Anr.
vs. The Small-Scale Industrial Development Bank of India (SIDBI),
2003 (6) KarLJ 387, where while interpreting Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.,
Karnataka High Court had observed that word “payment” found in Section
357(2) Cr.P.C. does not refer to the ‘deposit’ of compensation or fine       H
1048            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     amount by the accused. In the case before the High Court appellant
       was convicted with sentence of fine. In appeal the High Court directed
       suspension of sentence on the condition that the appellant shall deposit
       20% of the total fine which was challenged before the High Court on
       the ground that in view of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C., Appellate Court was
       not right in asking them to deposit 20% of the total fine. In paragraphs
 B
       8,9 and 10 following was stated:
              “8. What Section 357(2) of the Cr. P.C. says is as under:
                “If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal,
                no such payment shall be made before the period allowed
 C              for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be
                presented, before the decision of the appeal”.
              Nowhere it says that the Court of Appeal, while suspending
              sentence imposed on an accused, cannot impose a condition
              of depositing a part of fine amount. It is true that as per the
 D            decision relied on for the petitioners, stay engrafted under
              the said provision of law equally applies to the compensation
              granted under Sub-section (3) of Section 357 of the Code,
              but it cannot be taken to hold or read that the Appellate
              Court cannot pass a conditional order for suspending a
              sentence.
 E
              9. According to me, the word “payment” found in Section
              357(2) of the Cr. P.C., does not refer to the ‘deposit’ of
              compensation or fine amount by an accused in pursuance
              of an order passed by Appellate Court while suspending
              sentence imposed on an accused since, to my mind, the word
 F            “payment” refers to payment to be made to the person, who
              is ordered to be paid compensation and not the fine amount,
              inclusive of compensation amount to be ‘deposited’ by
              accused. The stay engrafted into the said provision of law is
              with reference to the ‘payment’ of such amount earlier to the
 G            expiry of the appeal period or, where appeal has been
              preferred, during the pendency of such appeal. So, Section
              357 need not and cannot be read with Section 389 of the Cr.
              P.C. In fact, neither the petitioners/appellants applied for,
              nor the Appellate Court ordered suspension of the sentence
              relating to compensation of Rs. 16 lakhs only. On the other
 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                  1049
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       hand, when the suspension of impugned sentence passed               A
       against them is seen with the power given to the Appellate
       Court under Section 389 of the Cr. P.C., besides the ambit
       or scope of Section 357 of the Cr. P.C., there will not be any
       difficulty in holding that there is no error of record or
       infirmity or irregularity or illegality in the impugned order
                                                                           B
       passed by the Court of Sessions suspending the sentence on
       condition of depositing 20% of the total fine amount imposed
       on them (petitioners).
       10. In this view of the matter, neither Section 357(2) of the
       Cr. P.C. nor the decision relied on for the petitioners is of
       any help to the petitioners.”                                       C

        27. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on three
judgments of High Courts, one of Punjab and Haryana High Court and
two judgments of Patna High Court in support of his submissions. We
need to refer to above judgments relied by the learned counsel for the
appellant. The first judgment is judgment of Punjab and Haryana High       D
Court reported in 2006 (3) PLR 194, Kedar Nath versus State of
Haryana. In the above case, the petitioner was convicted for offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour
of several cheques amounting to Rs.1,50,000/-. The petitioner was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for period of one year and      E
to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000/-. It was also ordered that out of fine of
Rs.3,00,000/-, a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-be given to the complainant as
compensation. An appeal was filed where Appellate Court suspended
the sentence on the condition that petitioner will deposit an amount of
Rs.1,50,000/- before the trial court. The aforesaid condition was
challenged by the petitioner in the High Court. It was submitted that in   F
accordance with Section 357 sub-section (2) Cr.P.C. petitioner was not
liable to pay any amount of fine. The High Court accepted the submission
relying on Section 357 sub-section (2) Cr.P.C.. In paragraph 8 of the
judgment, following was held:
       “8. Against the judgment of conviction and order to sentence,       G
       an appeal was preferred by the petitioner, which was admitted
       for hearing. While suspending the sentence, the Appellate
       Court imposed a condition for depositing an amount of
       Rs.1,50,000/- out of the amount of fine of Rs.3 lacs imposed
       by the trial Court. In my opinion, by imposing the said             H
1050            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A             condition, the petitioner was compelled to pay the amount
               of fine, which according to sub-section (2) of Section 357
               Cr.P.C., the accused is not liable to pay till the final
               adjudication of the appeal. Merely because out of the
               amount of fine of Rs.3 lacs, Rs.2,50,000/- was ordered to be
               paid to the complainant as compensation, in my opinion,
 B
               does not change the nature of fine. The judgment of the trial
               court is very clear that a fine of Rs.3 lacs was imposed along
               with the sentence of one year. The facts of this case are
               squarely covered by the decision of the this Court in Sabita
               Behl’s case(supra). Thus, in my opinion, the Appellate Court
 C             was not justified while imposing the impugned condition
               directing the petitioner to deposit an amount of Rs.1,50,000/
               - before the trial Court at the time of furnishing the bail
               bonds in view of the order of suspension of sentence passed
               by the Appellate Court.”
 D            28. The above case is clearly distinguishable from the present
       case. In the above case, there was direction within the meaning of Section
       357 sub-section (1) (b) Cr.P.C. for payment of compensation. Hence
       Section 357 sub-section (2) Cr.P.C. was relied by the Court. Present is
       not a case of payment of any compensation out of fine imposed on
       appellant. Thus, the above case in no manner helps the appellant.
 E
              29. Now we come to the second case relied by the appellant i.e.
       Division Bench Judgment of Patna High court in Bharat Mandal son
       of Sitaram Mandal & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar, 2012 (2) PLJR
       855. In the above case accused were convicted under Section 307/149
       IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. They were sentenced for life
 F     imprisonment and further directed to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- each.
       The appeal was filed in which the Appellate Court declined to stay the
       payment of fine. The appellant pressed for stay of payment of fine which
       was considered by the High Court. High Court relied on Section 357
       sub-section (2) Cr.P.C. and accepted the submission of the appellant
 G     that the fine was not to be paid. Following was held in paragraph 7:
               “7. The argument of Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma, learned
               counsel for the appellant is based squarely upon the literal
               interpretation from the Section. In our view, the submission
               as made by Sri Verma has to be accepted. On the plain
 H             reading of sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the Code of
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                    1051
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        Criminal Procedure we find that there is absolutely no               A
        ambiguity in the provision as engrafted by the legislature, it
        clearly stipulates firstly, that no such payment shall be made
        before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has
        elapsed. Thus, this stops any court from enforcing payment,
        for the period in which appeal could be filed. It then secondly
                                                                             B
        provides that the stay of action of realization or payment
        would continue if an appeal is presented till the decision of
        the appeal. “Decision of the Appeal” would only mean the
        final judgment in the appeal and not any order at any
        interlocutory stage because that would not be the decision
        of the appeal. Thus, on the plain reading of Section 357(2)          C
        of the Code of Criminal Procedure a fine imposed, would
        automatically get stayed firstly for the period which is
        available to file appeal and once the appeal is filed then till
        the decision of the appeal. That is the mandate of the
        legislature itself, clear and unambiguous. The situation
                                                                             D
        would be different, if instead of awarding fine, in terms of
        Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
        compensation only is awarded. In such a case, the appellate
        court has judicial discretion to stay or, not to stay the
        compensation so awarded depending upon the facts of the
        case under consideration.”                                           E
        30. From the facts noticed by the High Court it is not clear as to
whether the amount of fine Rs.20,000/- was directed to be paid to the
victim. No such facts have been noticed in the judgment. If there was
no direction to pay any compensation out of the fine imposed the facts
of the said case are similar to the case in hand. We have taken the view     F
that if there is no direction to pay any compensation out of fine imposed,
Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is not attracted. We are of the view that the High
Court’s observation that in view of Section 357 sub-section (2) of Cr.P.C.
the realisation of fine would automatically get stayed does not take into
consideration the distinction in a case where fine is part of sentence and
there is direction to pay compensation and in a case where there is no       G
direction to pay any compensation.
       31. The third case relied by the learned Counsel for the appellant
is again a Division Bench Judgment of Patna High Court in Criminal
Appeal (DB) No.529 of 2012, Naresh Yadav@ Naresh Mahto &
                                                                             H
1052            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A     Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar, decided on 26.06.2012. The Judgment
       of Patna High Court has been placed on record along with the short
       submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. A perusal of the judgment
       indicate that Patna High Court has not noticed the facts of the case and
       the nature of Order passed by the trial Court regarding imposition of
       fine. The applicant prayed for modification of Order of the High Court
 B
       by which the direction was issued for depositing the fine. Section 357
       sub-section (2) Cr.P.C. was relied and the Division Bench relying on
       earlier judgment of Patna High Court in Bharat Mandal & Ors. (Supra)
       modified the last paragraph of the Order dated 04.06.2012 providing
       that the fine imposed shall remain stayed till the decision of the case.
 C     The above judgment relies only on Bharat Mandal & Ors. which has
       already been noted above by us hence this judgment also does not help
       the appellant.
             32. The object and purpose of Section 357 Cr.P.C. was considered
       by this Court in Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and others, (1988) 4
 D     SCC 551. This Court held that the power given to the Court to direct for
       payment of compensation is intended to do something for the victim.
       The provision was held to be a step forward in our criminal justice
       system. Following were the observations made in paragraph 10:
               “10...It empowers the court to award compensation to victims
 E             while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to
               conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some
               amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered
               by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of
               courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other
               sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was
 F             intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or
               she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a
               measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of
               reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent,
               a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward
 G             in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to
               all courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the
               ends of justice in a better way.”
            33. What is the purpose and object of sub-Section (2) of section
       357 Cr.P.C.? Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplated utilisation of fine
 H
  SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA @ SATENDERA KUMAR                                       1053
 MEHRA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

imposed in certain circumstances as compensation to be paid to victim.          A
Sub-section (2) engrafted an embargo that such payment shall not be
made till the period allowed for appeal has elapsed or if the appeal is
filed, till the same is decided. Legislature was conscious that compensation
paid if utilised, there may not be appropriate measures to recover the
said amount utilised from victim to whom the compensation is paid hence
                                                                                B
embargo in payment has been engrafted in sub-section (2). Thus at best
sub-section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. is a provision which differs or
withholds the utilisation of the amount of compensation awarded till the
limitation of appeal elapses or if filed till it is decided. The provision in
no manner stays the sentence of fine during the pendency of the appeal.
The purpose for which sub-section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been           C
enacted is different as noted above and it never contemplates as stay of
sentence of fine imposed on accused.
       34. We, however, make it clear that Appellate Court while
exercising power under Section 389 Cr.P.C. can suspend the sentence
of imprisonment as well as of fine without any condition or with conditions.    D
There are no fetters on the power of the Appellate Court while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 389 Cr.P.C.. The Appellate Court could have
suspended the sentence and fine both or could have directed for deposit
of fine or part of fine.
     35. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the               E
judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen vs. C.B.I. Chandigarh, (2001)
6 SCC 584, where this Court has made the following observation:
            “No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal
        filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the
        offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally            F
        suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the
        appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal
        otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing
        of the appeal.”
       36. The above observation was made by this Court in the context          G
of suspension of sentence of imprisonment. The present is not a case
where question of suspension of sentence of imprisonment is involved
rather Appellate Court has already suspended the sentence of
imprisonment. The above case also thus does not help the appellant in
the facts of the present case.
                                                                                H
1054                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 4 S.C.R.


 A            37. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that
       Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. was not attracted in the present case since there
       was no direction of payment of any compensation out of the fine imposed
       by the trial court as part of sentence. Section 357 Cr.P.C.(2) comes into
       play only where any order of payment of compensation utilising the fine
       imposed as sentence under Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. or compensation as
 B
       directed under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. is made. Present being neither a
       case of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. nor Section 357(3), sub-section(2) of
       Section 357 Cr.P.C. is clearly not applicable and the submissions raised
       by the learned counsel for the appellant are without any substance. We,
       thus, do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of the High Court
 C     where the High Court has directed the appellant to deposit the fine
       awarded by the trial court. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.


       Ankit Gyan                                                Appeal dismissed.

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