SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. (PRESENTLY KNOWN AS SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS DIVISION OF NIRMA LTD.)versusNATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.

24                      [2019]REPORTS
              SUPREME COURT    15 S.C.R. 24             [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A     SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. (PRESENTLY KNOWN AS
       SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS DIVISION OF NIRMA LTD.)
                                      v.
                    NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
B                          (C.A. No. 2059 of 2015)
                            DECEMBER 13, 2019
                [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
                     KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
            Consumer Protection – Loss of stock of goods insured – Claim
C
     for – Appellant-company purchased a standard fire and special
     perils policy from the respondent-insurer and further paid a
     additional premium to cover the risk of loss of the stock on account
     of spontaneous combustion – Thereafter, appellant was declared a
     sick unit and its factory was closed for some time – After re-opening
D    it was noticed that some amount of stock of coal and lignite was
     diminished/destroyed on account of spontaneous combustion,
     causing loss and damage – Appellant demanded claim of Rs.1.4
     crores on account of loss suffered by it from the respondent-insurer
     – Pursuant to the claim, the respondent-insurer appointed a surveyor
     – The surveyor submitted his report and assessed total loss to the
E
     tune of Rs.63,43,679/- – However, respondent-insurer repudiated
     the claim via letter solely on the ground that since spontaneous
     combustion did not result into fire and loss was not caused by fire
     as stipulated by policy conditions, there was no liability under the
     policy – Appellant filed complaint before the NCDRC – Before
F    NCDRC, respondent-insurer alleged that appellant contravened
     cl.6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy – The NCDRC rejected
     the claim of the appellant and held that intimation of claim was sent
     with considerable delay of over a month thereby violating cl.6(i) of
     the General Conditions of Policy – On appeal, held: It is a settled
     position that an insurance company cannot travel beyond the
G
     grounds mentioned in the letter of repudiation – If the insurer has
     not taken delay in intimation as a specific ground in letter of
     repudiation, they cannot do so at the stage of hearing of the
     consumer complaint before NCDRC – In the instant case, admittedly
     there was no reference of delay in intimation or lodging of the claim
H
                                      24
       SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                          25
                INSURANCE CO. LTD.

as stipulated in cl.6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy in the   A
repudiation letter – Therefore, order of the NCDRC set aside – The
respondent-insurer directed to make payment of Rs.63,43,679/- as
assessed by the surveyor.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD : Whether the respondent-insurer had waived the            B
condition relating to delay in intimation and lodging of the claim,
by appointing a surveyor.
      1. In view of the law laid down by the three Judge Bench in
the Sonell Clocks and Gifts Ltd. v. New India Assurance Company
Ltd, the argument that by appointing a surveyor the respondent-       C
insurer is estopped from raising the plea of violation of condition
prescribing a time limit for intimation/lodging of the claim, has
no legs to stand. Thus, issue is answered accordingly. [Para
18][34-E-F]
      Sonell Clocks and Gifts Ltd. v. New India Assurance             D
      Company Ltd (2018) 9 SCC 784 : [2018] 10 SCR 35 –
      relied on.
      Galada Power and Telecommunication Ltd. v. United
      India Insurance Company Ltd & Another (2016) 14
      SCC 161 – referred to.                                          E
       Whether in the absence of any mention, of aspect of delay
in intimation and violation of conditions of Clause 6(i) of General
Conditions of Policy, in the repudiation letter, the same could be
taken as defence before the NCDRC.
                                                                      F
       2. Insofar as this issue is concerned it is undisputed that
the letter of repudiation did not even remotely mention anything
about violation of duration clause stipulated in Clause (6) (i) of
the General Conditions of Policy. The Respondent-insurer
repudiated the claim solely on the ground that since spontaneous
combustion did not result into fire and loss had not been caused      G
by fire as stipulated by policy conditions, there was no liability
under the policy. It was for the first time the respondent-insurer
raised the issue of delayed intimation of claim and violation of
stipulation of Clause 6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy in
its reply filed before NCDRC. [Para 19][34-G-H]
                                                                      H
26            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A          3. Undoubtedly, this Court in Sonell Clocks has distinguished
     Galada Power on facts and held that the appointment of a surveyor
     cannot, as a matter of law, be construed as a waiver of the terms
     and conditions of the insurance policy. However, in Sonell Clocks,
     the insurer had taken a specific plea in the repudiation letter that
     the loss was not conveyed within the stipulated period. Hence
B
     the singular issue before this Court was only whether the insurer
     had waived the condition as to delay in intimation by appointing a
     surveyor. This Court in Sonell Clocks did not have the occasion
     to consider whether the insurance company could have raised
     delay as a ground for repudiation for the first time before the
C    consumer forum. [Para 21][35-E-F]
            4. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
     law as laid down in ‘Galada’ on issue (2) still holds the field. It is
     a settled position that an insurance company cannot travel beyond
     the grounds mentioned in the letter of repudiation. If the insurer
D    has not taken delay in intimation as a specific ground in letter of
     repudiation, they cannot do so at the stage of hearing of the
     consumer complaint before NCDRC. [Para 22][35-G-H]
           Galada Power and Telecommunication Ltd. v. United
           India Insurance Company Ltd & Another (2016) 14
E          SCC 161 – relied on.
           Sonell Clocks and Gifts Ltd. v. New India Assurance
           Company Ltd (2018) 9 SCC 784 : [2018] 10 SCR 35 –
           referred to.
            5. Admittedly in the case at hand there was no reference of
F    delay in intimation or lodging of the claim as stipulated in Clause
     6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy in the repudiation letter.
     The NCDRC has failed to take into consideration this aspect of
     the matter and, therefore, cannot be held to be justified in
     rejecting the claim of the appellant, on that ground. [Paras 23
G    and 24]
                            Case Law Reference
     (2016) 14 SCC 161                referred to            Para 18
     [2018] 10 SCR 35                 relied on              Para 18
H
         SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                                   27
                  INSURANCE CO. LTD.

(2016) 14 SCC 161                   relied on                  Paras 21, 22      A
[2018] 10 SCR 35                    referred to                Paras 21, 22
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.2059 of
2015.
      From the final Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2015 of the                  B
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at New Delhi in
Consumer Case No.115 of 2007.
      Nikhil Goel, Ms. Naveen Goel, Dushyant Sarna, Advs. for the
Appellant.
        Yogesh Malhotra, Gaurav Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.                C
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        KRISHNA MURARI, J.
       1. The appellant purchased a standard fire and special perils policy
from the respondent National Insurance Company Ltd. thereby insuring             D
the risk of loss/damage to the stock of coal and lignite stored in its factory
compound. An additional premium of Rs. 59,200/- was paid by the
appellant company so as to cover the risk of loss of the aforesaid stock
on account of spontaneous combustion. The appellant was declared a
Sick Unit and was accordingly registered under SICA. The factory
remained closed from 17.02.2006 to 09.08.2006 and was re-opened on               E
10.08.2006.
       2. After re-opening it was noticed between the period from
11.8.2006 to 20.8.2006 that some amount of stock of coal and lignite has
been diminished/destroyed on account of spontaneous combustion, causing
loss and damage. Intimation in this regard was sent to the respondent-           F
insurer on 12.09.2006.
       3. Pursuant to the claim made, a surveyor was appointed who
visited the premises of the appellant on 18.09.2006 and sought certain
details, which were provided on 28.11.2006. After carrying out the requisite
survey, the surveyor submitted his report on 11.04.2007 assessing total          G
loss to the tune of Rs. 63,43,679/-.
      4. The claim lodged by the appellant was however repudiated by
the respondent-insurer vide communication dated 27.07.2007 on the
ground that since spontaneous combustion did not result into fire thus,
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28               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A    loss had not been caused by fire as stipulated in the relevant endorsement
     with respect to spontaneous combustion of the insurance policy. The
     appellant was further informed through the letter that unless spontaneous
     combustion results into fire, there is no liability under the policy.
             5. On denial of the claim the appellant approached the National
B    Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as
     the NCDRC) vide consumer complaint no. 115 of 2007 seeking following
     reliefs:-
           (a) To direct the respondent company to allow the demanded claim
                of Rs. 98,46,732/- on account of loss suffered by it on account
C               of loss of stock of goods insured with the respondent;
           (b) To award compensation of a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- on account
               of pain and suffering suffered by the appellant on account of
               deficient service provided by the respondent company;
           (c) Award of sum of Rs. 11,81,608/- being interest @ 18% from
D
               the date of the claim till the filing of the petition;
           (d) Award further interests @ 18% pendent lite on amounts
               specified in Clause (a) and (b);
           (e) Award cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the complainant;
E
           The complaint was resisted by the Insurer on three main grounds:-
           (i)    No claim was payable under the terms and conditions on
                  which policy was issued inasmuch as destruction or damage,
                  if any, caused to the property by fire on account of its own
                  fermentation, natural heating or spontaneous combustion or
F
                  undergoing natural heating or drying process is not covered.
           (ii) Since the factory remained closed from 17.02.2006 to
                09.08.2006, the insurance cover ceased to operate in view
                of the condition no. 3 of the policy which provides that unless
                the insured has obtained the prior sanction of the company in
G
                this regard, the insurance would cease to operate as regards
                the property affected :
                   (a) if the trade or manufacture carried on be altered or if
                   the nature of occupation of or other circumstances affecting
                   the building insured or containing the property insured be
H
        SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                                   29
        INSURANCE CO. LTD. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

             changed in such a way as to increase the risk of loss or           A
             damage.
             (b) if the building insured or containing the insured property
             becomes unoccupied and so remains for a period of more
             than 30 days.
                                                                                B
      (iii) Intimation of claim was sent with considerable delay of over
            a month thereby violating condition no. 6(i) of the General
            Conditions of Policy.
      6. Insofar as ground nos. (i) and (ii) are concerned, the same
were not accepted by NCDRC and were decided against the respondent-
                                                                                C
insurer. The said two grounds (i) and (ii) are not in issue before us in this
appeal as such we need not enter into the same.
        7. However ground no. (iii) raised by the respondent-insurer in
defence to the claim of the appellant found favour with the NCDRC and
the complaint was dismissed on the premise that there was breach of
                                                                                D
conditions incorporated in Clause 6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy.
Under Clause 6(i) the intimation of loss and damage was required to be
given in writing by way of notice within 15 days of the occurance thereof.
It is an admitted case between the parties that intimation of loss/damage
was given by the appellant to the respondent-insurer for the first time on
12.09.2006 and a claim for loss for a sum of Rs. 1.4 Crores to 1.5              E
Crores was made vide letter dated 14.09.2006.
     8. The NCDRC rejected the claim holding that since the
complainant (Appellant herein) had contravened Clause 6(i) of the General
Conditions of Policy, no claim is payable.
                                                                                F
      9. We have heard Sh. Nikhil Goel, Learned Counsel for the
appellant and Sh. Yogesh Malhotra for the respondent.
      10. It is submitted by Learned Counsel for the appellant that the
NCDRC has erred in holding that the claim stands defeated because of
delayed intimation as postulated in Clause 6(i) of the General Conditions       G
of Policy. It is also contended that, since respondent company had
appointed a surveyor, its right to advance the plea, with respect to the
claim being not maintainable because of delayed intimation as envisaged
in Clause 6(i), stood waived. It is further contended that since the letter
of repudiation does not even remotely refer to delayed intimation or
                                                                                H
30               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A    delayed claim, as postulated in Clause 6(i), the said ground cannot be
     taken as a defence to the claim. Reliance in support of the above
     contentions is placed upon judgment rendered by this Court in Galada
     Power and Telecommunication Ltd. vs. United India Insurance
     Company Ltd & Another.1
B           11. Mr. Yogesh Malhotra, Learned Counsel for the respondent-
     insurer while supporting the order passed by the NCDRC contended
     that by mere appointment of a surveyor, the insurer is not estopped from
     raising a plea of the violation of a condition warranting repudiation of the
     claim. Hence there is no waiver of the condition relating to delay in
C    intimation as stipulated in the General Conditions of Policy. It is further
     submitted that the judgment rendered by the two judge Bench of this
     Court in the case of Galada (Supra) was considered by a three Judge
     Bench in the case of Sonell Clocks and Gifts Ltd. v/s New India
     Assurance Company Ltd.2and was distinguished on the ground that
     dictum in Galada case was in context of peculiar facts of that case.
D
          12. We have considered the argument advanced by Learned
     Counsel at the bar.
              The twin issues which arise for consideration in this appeal are:-
              (1) Whether the respondent-insurer had waived the condition
E                 relating to delay in intimation and lodging of the claim, by
                  appointing a surveyor.
              (2) Whether in the absence of any mention, of aspect of delay in
                  intimation and violation of conditions of Clause 6(i) of General
                  Conditions of Policy, in the repudiation letter, the same could
F                 be taken as defence before the NCDRC.
           13. It is not disputed that on the basis of the communication made
     by the appellant, the respondent-insurer appointed a surveyor on
     18.09.2006 without any caveat and qualification.

G            14. The Surveyor submitted his report dated 11.04.2007 assessing
     total loss to the tune of Rs. 63,43,679/-. Subsequently, vide letter dated
     27.07.2007 the respondent-insurer repudiated the claim by stating as
     under:-
     1
         (2016) 14 SCC 161
     2
H        (2018) 9 SCC 784
         SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                               31
         INSURANCE CO. LTD. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

        M/s Saurashtra Chemicals Ltd.                                        A
        Nirma House,
        Ashram Road,
        Ahmedabad,
              Kind Attn: Sh. Deepak Shah, Company Secretary.
        Dear Sir,                                                            B

        Re:- Policy No. 301200/11/06/3300000033
        Claim No. 301200/33/37/2007
        Loss/Damage due to Spontaneous Combustion to Lignite and
Coal.                                                                        C
        This has reference to the claim lodged by you as above.
       On scrutiny of survey reports, various claim documents, the
nature cause and circumstances of the loss, it is noticed that in the
instant case the Spontaneous Combustion has occurred, but it did             D
not result into the fire and loss has not been caused by fire only as
stipulated in the relevant endorsement of spontaneous combustion.
     Further, the spontaneous combustion endorsement is clear
and unambiguous in this regard and unless the spontaneous
combustion results into fire, there is no liability under the policy.        E
      In view of the above the competent authority has decided to
repudiate the said claim which please note.
                    Sd/-
        (George Valamchery)
                                                                             F
        Sr. Divisional Manager.
       15. As is evident from the repudiation letter there is no reference
to any of the aspects enumerated in Clause 6(i) of the General Conditions
of Policy which reads as under:-
        “6(i) On the happening of any loss or damage, the insured            G
        shall forthwith give notice thereof to the company and shall
        within 15 days after the loss or damage or such further time
        as the company may in writing allow in that behalf deliver to
        the company.”
                                                                             H
32            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A          16. Insofar as issue (1) is concerned, a two Judge Bench of this
     Court in the case of Galada (supra) where despite violation of duration
     clause stipulated in Clause 5(3) to Clause 5(5) of the policy insurance
     company had appointed a surveyor held as under:-
           “13. The National Commission has relied upon Clause 5 and
B          on that basis has rejected the claim by putting the blame on
           the complainant. The letter of repudiation dated 20-9-1999,
           which we have reproduced hereinbefore, interestingly, does
           not whisper a single word with regard to delay or, in fact,
           does not refer at all to the duration clause. What has been
           stated in the letter of repudiation is that the claim lodged by
C          the complainant does not fall under the purview of transit
           loss because of the subsequent investigation report. It is
           evincible, the insurer had taken cognizance of the
           communication made by the Appellant and nominated a
           surveyor to verify the loss. Once the said exercise has been
D          undertaken, we are disposed to think that the insurer could
           not have been allowed to take a stand that the claim is hit by
           the clause pertaining to duration…………….
           18. In the instant case, the insurer was in custody of the policy.
           It had prescribed the clause relating to duration. It was very
E          much aware about the stipulation made in Clauses 5(3) to
           5(5), but despite the stipulations therein, it appointed a
           surveyor. Additionally, as has been stated earlier, in the letter
           of repudiation, it only stated that the claim lodged by the
           insured was not falling under the purview of transit loss. Thus,
           by positive action, the insurer has waived its right to advance
F          the plea that the claim was not entertainable because
           conditions enumerated in duration clause were not satisfied.
           In our considered opinion, the National Commission could
           not have placed reliance on the said terms to come to the
           conclusion that there was no policy cover in existence and
G          that the risks stood not covered after delivery of goods to the
           consignee.”
           17. However, the dictum in Galada case (supra) came up for
     consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
     Sonell Clocks and Gifts Ltd. (supra) and it was distinguished on the
H    ground that dictum in Galada is in context of the peculiar facts and
        SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                                    33
        INSURANCE CO. LTD. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

circumstances of that case and does not lay down that on appointment             A
of the surveyor, the insurer is estopped from raising of plea of violation
of condition stipulated in the insurance policy. It may be relevant to extract
the following from the said report:-
       “20. The Respondent has rightly pointed out the other
       distinguishing features in the present case. To wit, in that case         B
       [Galada], the Court had considered Clause 5 of a Marine
       Insurance Policy wherein the issue was whether the insurance
       cover itself had extinguished by efflux of time and that the
       intimation given by the insured to the insurer was not made
       within 7 days of arrival of the vehicle at the destination
       mentioned in the policy. According to the insurer, on expiry              C
       of 7 days from delivery the insurance cover stood perished
       and no cover would subsist beyond the said 7 days’ period. It
       is in that context, the Court noted that appointment of the
       surveyor by the insurer beyond the said period can be
       construed as an act of waiver by the insurer of the position              D
       that the policy stands extinguished. In other words,
       appointment of a surveyor by the insurer was interpreted as
       a manifestation of the stand of the insurer that the insurance
       cover still subsists. This is evident from the dictum in para 13
       of the reported decision as the Court noted that once a
       surveyor was nominated to verify the loss, the insurer could              E
       not be allowed to take a stand that the claim is hit by the
       clause pertaining to duration and more so because of absence
       of any mention in the letter of repudiation. Thus, it went on to
       hold that from the positive conduct of the insurer in
       unequivocally appointing a surveyor, the insurer had waived               F
       the right which was in its favour under the duration clause.
       21. The expression “duration” is of some significance which
       is reflective of the existence or otherwise of the policy itself.
       In the present case, there is no dispute about the subsistence
       of the policy but is one of violation of Condition 6 of the               G
       policy. Furthermore, in the present case the controversy will
       have to be answered on the basis of Standard Fire and Special
       Perils Policy relatable to Condition 6 obligating the insured
       to give forthwith intimation of the loss to the insurer. The two
       clauses are materially different and relate to two different
                                                                                 H
34             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A          and distinct insurance policies. In other words, Clause 5 of
           the Marine Insurance Policy and Clause 6 of the present policy
           are incomparable being qualitatively different.
           22. To put it differently, Galada case was not a case which
           considered repudiation based on a premise or a reason similar
B          to Condition 6 of the present policy and a specific plea taken
           by the insurer in that behalf in the repudiation letter itself.
           Notably, Clause 5 of the Marine Insurance Policy which was
           the subject-matter in Galada case did not have a negative
           covenant as in this case in the proviso to Condition 6 of the
C          subject policy. The fulfilment of the stipulation in Clause 6 of
           the General Conditions of the Policy is the sine qua non to
           maintain a valid claim under the policy.
           23. We, therefore, agree with the Respondent that the dictum
           in Galada case is in the context of the facts of that case and
D          does not lay down that on the appointment of a surveyor, per
           se, the insurer is estopped from raising a plea of violation of
           the condition warranting a repudiation of the claim. The factum
           of waiver has to be gathered from the totality of the obtaining
           circumstances.”

E                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
           18. In view of the law laid down by the three Judge Bench in the
     Sonell Clocks (supra), the argument that by appointing a surveyor the
     respondent-insurer is estopped from raising the plea of violation of
     condition prescribing a time limit for intimation/lodging of the claim, has
F    no legs to stand. Thus issue no. (1) is answered accordingly.
             19. Insofar as issue no. (2) is concerned it is undisputed that the
     letter of repudiation did not even remotely mention anything about violation
     of duration clause stipulated in Clause (6) (i) of the General Conditions
     of Policy. The Respondent-insurer repudiated the claim solely on the
G    ground that since spontaneous combustion did not result into fire and
     loss had not been caused by fire as stipulated by policy conditions, there
     was no liability under the policy. It was for the first time the respondent-
     insurer raised the issue of delayed intimation of claim and violation of
     stipulation of Clause 6(i) of the General Conditions of Policy in its reply
     filed before NCDRC.
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        SAURASHTRA CHEMICALS LTD. v. NATIONAL                                    35
        INSURANCE CO. LTD. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

      20. This court in the case of Galada Power Ltd. (supra) has                A
elucidated upon issue (2) as under :
       “It is evincible, the insurer had taken cognizance of the
       communication made by the Appellant and nominated a
       surveyor to verify the loss. Once the said exercise has been
       undertaken, we are disposed to think that the insurer could               B
       not have been allowed to take a stand that the claim is hit by
       the clause pertaining to duration. In the absence of any
       mention in the letter of repudiation and also from the conduct
       of the insurer in appointing a surveyor, it can safely be
       concluded that the insurer had waived the right which was in              C
       its favour under the duration clause. In this regard, Mr.
       Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
       Appellant has commended us to a decision of the High Court
       of Delhi in Krishna Wanti v. LIC, wherein the High Court has
       taken note of the fact that if the letter of repudiation did not
       mention an aspect, the same could not be taken as a stand                 D
       when the matter is decided. We approve the said view.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
         21. Undoubtedly, as mentioned supra, this Court in Sonell Clocks
(supra) has distinguished Galada Power on facts and held that the
appointment of a surveyor cannot, as a matter of law, be construed as a          E
waiver of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. However, in
Sonell Clocks, the insurer had taken a specific plea in the repudiation
letter that the loss was not conveyed within the stipulated period. Hence
the singular issue before this Court was only whether the insurer had
waived the condition as to delay in intimation by appointing a surveyor.         F
This Court in Sonell Clocks did not have the occasion to consider whether
the insurance company could have raised delay as a ground for repudiation
for the first time before the consumer forum.
        22. Hence we are of the considered opinion that the law as laid
down in ‘Galada’ on issue (2) still holds the field. It is a settled position    G
that an insurance company cannot travel beyond the grounds mentioned
in the letter of repudiation. If the insurer has not taken delay in intimation
as a specific ground in letter of repudiation, they cannot do so at the
stage of hearing of the consumer complaint before NCDRC.
                                                                                 H
36                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 15 S.C.R.


A           23. Admittedly in the case at hand there was no reference of
     delay in intimation or lodging of the claim as stipulated in Clause 6(i) of
     the General Conditions of Policy in the repudiation letter.
            24. The NCDRC has failed to take into consideration this aspect
     of the matter and, therefore, cannot be held to be justified in rejecting
B    the claim of the appellant, on that ground.
             25. In view of the aforesaid analysis the appeal stands allowed
     and the impugned judgment and the order of the NCDRC is set aside.
     The Respondent-insurer is directed to make payment of Rs. 63,43,679/
     -, as assessed by the surveyor, to the appellant with interest @ 8% from
C    the date of the filing of the claim of petition till date of payment. The
     payment, as above, be made within eight weeks from today.
           26. There will be no order as to costs.


     Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeal allowed.
D




E




F




G




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