Holding

The petition is barred by delay, laches and the availability of an alternative statutory remedy, and therefore the writ petition seeking removal of respondent No.4 is dismissed.

Summary

The petitioner, Rameshbhai Nathubhai Chaudhary, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 seeking the removal of respondent No.4 as Director and Chairman of Gujarat State Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd, alleging ineligibility under Section 74(1A)(ii) and non‑agriculturist status. The respondents argued that the appointment was made through a valid election and nomination process under Sections 145Z and 145U of the Act, and that the petitioner had not raised any objection for five years, thereby invoking delay, laches and the availability of an alternative tribunal remedy. The Court examined the statutory provisions, the election procedures, and the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate any violation of his fundamental rights or personal injury. It also considered extensive case law on delay, laches, and the discretion of courts under Article 226. Concluding that the petition was barred by delay, laches and the existence of an efficacious statutory remedy, the Court dismissed the writ petition and vacated any interim relief previously granted.

Issues considered

The petitioner’s standing and locus to challenge the appointment of respondent No.4 as Director and Chairman.
Whether the appointment of respondent No.4 violates Section 74(1A)(ii) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961.
Whether the petitioner’s delay of five years amounts to laches and bars the writ petition.
Whether an alternative remedy under Section 145U of the Act is available and must be exhausted before invoking Article 226.
Whether the election and nomination process complied with Sections 145Z and related provisions.

Legislation cited

Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961s. 116, s. 145(2), s. 145U, s. 145Z, s. 74(1A)(ii), s. 74(1A)(iii), s. 74C

Subjects

Cooperative Societies ActSection 74(1A)(ii)Election disputeDelay and lachesArticle 226Writ petitionDirector eligibilityChairman removalStatutory remedyTribunal jurisdictionNomination vs election

Judgment

C/SCA/13199/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 08/05/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13199 of 2025

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
==========================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
==========================================
RAMESHBHAI NATHUBHAI CHAUDHARY
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================
Appearance:
MR PK JANI SR ADVOCATE WITH MR. ARCHIT P JANI(7304) for the
Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR GK VIRK GP ASSISTED BY MS DHARITRI PANCHOLI WITH MR NIKUNJ
KANARA AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
MR DIPAN DESAI(2481) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
MR. RAHUL R DHOLAKIA(6765) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
MR ANSIN DESAI SR. ADVOCATE WITH VENU H NANAVATY(7458) for
the Respondent(s) No. 4
==========================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK

Date : 08/05/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT

1. RULE. Mr.Kanara, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives
service of notice of rule for respondents No.1 and 2, Mr.Desai, learned
counsel waives service of notice of rule for respondent No.3 and
Ms.Nanavaty, learned counsel waives service of notice of rule for
respondent No.4.

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2. With the consent of learned counsel for the respective parties,
the present petition is taken up for final hearing and disposal.

3. Present petition is filed by the petitioner under Articles 226 of
the Constitution of India and under the provisions of the Gujarat
Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 [hereinafter be referred to as “the
Act”] seeking the following reliefs:-

(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or
direction, directing the respondent No.1 and 2 to remove
respondent No.4 as Director and Chairman of Gujarat State
Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd (respondent No.3) by
holding respondent No.4 to be ineligible as per Section 74(1A)(ii)
and other provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961.

(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition of a writ
in the nature of prohibition commanding respondent No.1 – State of
Gujarat and respondent No.2 – Registrar of Cooperative Societies to
see that respondent No.4 is restrained from functioning as the
Chairman of the respondent No.3 – Bank.

(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present writ
petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to restrain the respondent
No.4 from functioning as Director and Chairman of Gujarat State
Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd.

(D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present writ
petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent
No.1 and 2 to restrain the respondent No.4 from carrying out any
function, including taking any policy decision as Chairman of the
respondent No.4 – Bank.

(E) Any other and further relief may be granted in the interest of
justice.

FACTS:

4. Brief facts of the present case are, in nutshell, as under:-

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4.1 The respondent no.3 Bank came to be incorporated. It was
termed as "Land Mortgage Bank" because its only activity was with
respect to the mortgage finance. In 1964, the Gujarat Act 24 of 1964
came to be passed, by which, the words "Land Mortgage Bank" were
substituted by the words "Land Development Bank". That the State
Legislature passed an Act being Gujarat Act no.6 of 1981 and the
Amending Act introduced numerous Sections including Section 74C in
the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961.

4.2 The all private Land Developments Banks are included in
Section 74C(iii) of the Act and the new Chapter was enacted, namely,
Chapter XI(A) which pertains to election of Committee and officers of
certain societies. The State Legislature passed Gujarat Cooperative
Societies (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1982 and amending
Section 26 of the said Act, made changes in Section 116 of the Act.
Sub-clause (1) of Section 116 was substituted which provides that the
provision would apply to the Land Development Bank for advancing
loans for improvement and development of agriculture and productive
purposes. Sub-clauses (v) to (vii) in Section 116 of the Act were
introduced, which provides that the provisions would be applicable to
the Land Development Bank advancing loan to the agriculturist for
purchase of agricultural lands whose agricultural lands have been
acquired, promoting the development of animal husbandry, dairy
farming, poultry farming, fishery and for purchase of share in a
Cooperative Society engaged in manufacture of sugar.

4.3 The respondent no.4 was nominated by Junagadh Commercial
Co-operative Bank Ltd on 06.11.2019 by way of Resolution No.4 (1) to

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participate in the election of Gujarat State Co-operative Bank Ltd and
thus respondent no.4 was nominated in the election of Gujarat State
Co-operative Bank and he was declared elected uncontested as
Director/member of managing committee of Gujarat State Co-
Operative Bank.

4.4 The resolution was passed by Gujarat State Co-Operative Bank
Ltd whereby respondent no.4 was appointed as the
representative/nominee by Gujarat State Co-Operative Bank Ltd to
respondent no.3. The election of managing committee of the
respondent no.3 bank was held whereby the election of 17 posts of
Director was held and respondent no.4 didn't contest the election
from any of the 17 seats. The respondent no.4 was inducted in the
board of the respondent no.3- bank as representative of Gujarat State
Co-operative Bank Ltd. The board of the respondent no.3 bank came
to be constituted in October, 2021.

4.5 The AGM of respondent no.3 was convened where no
amendments in bye-laws were proposed. The agenda issued to
convene Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) and corrigendum was
issued for the EGM proposing to amend bye-laws to favour the
respondent no.4. The agenda and corrigendum of EGM was published
and the EGM was held whereby the resolution was passed for
amending the bye-laws of the society and even before the
amendment in bye-laws are approved by the Registrar, respondent
no.4 deposited Rs. 5 Lakh in respondent no.3 and got shares. It is only
with a view to make him eligible for the post of Director and Chairman
and the order was passed by the Registrar of Co-operatives whereby
the proposed amendments of the respondent no.3 came to be

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allowed.

4.6 Being aggrieved by the order passed by Registrar of Co-
operatives, the present petitioner preferred Revision Application
No.38 of 2025 before Deputy Secretary (Appeal); Agricultural,
Farmers Welfare and Co-operation Department. The Deputy Secretary
(Appeal) has stayed the order passed by the Registrar.

4.7 This Court, while passing the order in Special Civil Application
No. 9352 of 2025, has set aside the interim order passed by the
Deputy Secretary (Appel) upon consensus of the parties and directed
the Deputy Secretary to decide the revision application within 12
weeks. That the order was passed by the Deputy Secretary (Appeal)
in Revision Application No. 38 of 2025 whereby the order passed by
Registrar of Co-operatives was set aside and the matter was
remanded to the Registrar of Co-operatives for fresh consideration.

4.8 The petitioner addressed the letter to the Registrar of
Cooperatives whereby it was submitted that respondent no.4 was
ineligible to be the Director or Chairman of respondent no.3 – bank.
The petitioner has also written letters to the Registrar of the
Cooperatives wherein it has been stated by the petitioner that the
respondent no.4 cannot hold 5 position as Director or Chairman of the
respondent no.3 bank in view of section-74 (1A) (ii) of Gujarat
Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. The petitioner has also addressed
the letter requesting respondent authorities to exercise powers under
section- 76(b) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 of
removing the respondent no.3 as Chairman of the bank as he is not
qualified/eligible to hold the post. That the issue with respect to

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eligibility of the respondent no.4 to hold post as Chairman of the
respondent no.3 bank was also raised in debate before Gujarat
Assembly in the session.

4.9 The petitioner has addressed number of letters to the
respondent no. 1 and 2, however, there is no any action taken by the
respondent authorities even after number of representations made by
the petitioner pointing out the illegalities committed by the
respondent no.4. That the respondent no.4 is also not agriculturist
and is not even eligible to become member of the respondent no.3 -
bank. The request was made by the petitioner to take necessary steps
for removing respondent no.4 as Director and Chairman of the
respondent no.3 - bank but the same was not done and hence, the
present petition is filed.

5. Heard Mr.Prakash Jani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
Mr.Nikunj Kanara, learned Assistant Government Pleader for
respondent – authorities, Mr.Dipen Desai, learned counsel for
respondent No.4 and Mr.Ansin Desai, learned senior counsel assisted
by Ms.Venu Nanavaty, learned counsel for respondent No.3 at length.

6. Mr.Jani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted
the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petition and has
also submitted that the appointment of respondent No.4 as Director
and Chairman of respondent No.3 is illegal and violative of the
provisions of the Act and, therefore, the Court may pass an order to
remove respondent No.4. He has referred to Section 74(1A)(ii) of the
Act and submitted that as per said section, a person is required to be
elected in order to be eligible to become member of the managing

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committee and respondent No.4 herein is undisputably not elected
and hence he cannot be a member of the committee of respondent
No.3. He has submitted that the purpose and object of Section 74(1A)
(ii) of the Act is to ensure that a cooperative society is functioning in a
democratic manner and no person is made Director or Chairman of
the society without getting elected. He has submitted that respondent
No.4 is not an agriculturist and respondent No.3 is for agriculturists
and it’s bye-laws provides that only agriculturists can become
member and, therefore, respondent No.4 is not eligible to become
member of respondent No.3. According to Mr.Jani, learned counsel,
respondent No.4 was inducted in the board of respondent No.3 on the
basis of the resolution passed by Board of Gujarat State Cooperative
Bank for nominating respondent No.4 and the term of Gujarat State
Cooperative Bank came to an end in December 2024 and, therefore,
respondent No.4 is no more Director / Member of the committee of
the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank.

6.1 Mr.Jani, learned senior counsel has referred and relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vipul M.
Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation
reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 more particularly para 6 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed about the cooperative principles
which includes democratic set up of cooperative societies. The para –
6 of the said decision reads as under:-

“6. The Statement further provides for 'seven cooperative
principles' as guidelines by which the cooperatives put their values
into practice. Following are the principles:

"1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership Co-operatives are
voluntary organizations, open to all persons able to use their

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services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership,
without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination.

2nd Principle: Democratic Member Control Co-operatives are
democratic organizations controlled by their members, who actively
participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the
membership. In primary co-operatives members have equal voting
rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at other levels are
also organized in a democratic manner.

3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation Members contribute
equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-
operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common
property of the co-operative. Members usually receive limited
compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of
membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the
following purposes: developing their co-operative, possibly by
setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible;
benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-
operative; and supporting other activities approved by the
membership.

4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence Co-operatives are
autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their members. If
they enter to agreements with other organizations, including
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on
terms that ensure democratic control by their members and
maintain their co- operative autonomy.

5th Principle: Education, Training and Information Co-operatives
provide education and training for their members, elected
representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute
effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They inform
the general public - particularly young people and opinion leaders -
about the nature and benefits of co-operation.

6th Principle: Co-operation among Co- operatives Co-operatives
serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-
operative movement by working together through local, national,
regional and international structures.

7th Principle: Concern for Community Co-operatives work for the
sustainable development of their communities through policies
approved by their members." (Emphasis supplied)”

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6.2 In support of his submissions, Mr.Jani, learned senior counsel
has relied upon the following decisions:-

(1) MD. Firoz Ahmad Khalid Vs. The State of Manipur and others
reported in 2025 INSC 535;
(2) Desai Govindbhai Shivlal Vs. State of Gujarat Through
Secretary reported in 2010 (1) GCD 326;
(3) Agricultural Produce Market Committee Vs. Patel Jayantilal
Purshottamdas reported in 2002 (1) GLR 924;
(4) Patel Gaurangbhai Naranbhai Vs. State of Gujarat reported in
2021 (1) GLR 319

6.3 Over-and-above the aforesaid oral submissions, Mr.Jani, learned
senior counsel has submitted the written submissions, which is taken
on record.

7. Mr.Kanara, learned Assistant Government Pleader has referred
to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No.2 and raised
objections with regard to maintainability of present petition i.e. (i)
availability of alternative and efficacious remedy under Section 145U
of the Act before the Tribunal with regard to present fact-intensive
dispute and (ii) no plausible explanation with reference to delay in
initiation of present proceedings.

7.1 It is humbly submitted by the learned Assistant Government
Pleader that the petitioner had previously filed various
representations before the respondent - authority, to which the
respondent - authority directed the District Registrar, Ahmedabad to
conduct an inquiry. It is also submitted that upon perusal of the

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inquiry report and relevant legal provisions, it is evident that any
dispute regarding the election of respondent No. 4 falls within the
jurisdiction of the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal under Section
145U. It is submitted that so far as the contention that Respondent
No. 4 cannot hold office under Section 74(1-A)(2) if not an elected
Director is concerned, the selection of respondent No.4 was
conducted by an authorized election officer under Section 74-C and
Section 145Z (Chapter 11-A) and as disputes relating to this election
process rest solely with the Board of Nominees under Section 96, no
further action is required from this office. It is further submitted that
an order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the Deputy Secretary in
Revision Application No. 38 of 2025, concerning the amendment of
the respondent No.3’s bye-laws, is currently challenged by way of
filing Special Civil Application No. 12935 of 2025 and since the Court
has stayed the remand proceedings, no further action can be
undertaken at this stage.

7.2 Mr.Kanara, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that
the Court may not entertain the petition and the same being meritless
deserves to be dismissed.

8. Mr.Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has objected the
petition and has 4 1 state that the main prayer of the petitioner is to
remove the respondent No.4 as Director and Chairman of the
respondent No. 3 Bank. It is submitted that the petition would not lie
against a cooperative society and the petition deserves to be
rejected.

8.1 It is submitted that though the petitioner has sought directions

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against the State Authority, however, the main challenge is against
respondents No.3 and 4 and, therefore, the petition does not require
to be entertain and the same is required to be dismissed on the
ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. It is submitted that the
petitioner has challenged the qualification of respondent No.4 for
being Director and Chairman of respondent No. 3 Bank, however, the
respondent No.4 has been continuing as Director and Chairman of the
respondent No.3 since year 2021 and he has never challenged the
same till filing of the present petition. It is submitted that the
petitioner has all throughout accepted the respondent No.4 as
Chairman of respondent No. 3 Bank without any objections or demure
and the petitioner has also attended various meetings where
respondent No.4 has chaired the said meetings and thereby the
petitioner has accepted respondent No.4 as Chairman respondent
No.3 without any objection whatsoever regarding his qualification and
now after lapse of about four years because of the political reasons,
the petitioner has preferred the petition.

8.2 It is submitted that the contentions raised by the petitioner in
the petition are misconceived and baseless and respondent No.4 was
elected as Director of the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank Limited in
the year 2021. It is submitted that the bye-law No. 28(1) of
respondent No.3 provides that there shall be one Director who shall
be nominated by the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank Limited from
amongst its Board of Directors, provided that it holds a particular
quantity of shares. It is submitted that respondent No.4 is an elected
Director of the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank Limited and thereafter,
as far as one Director being sent to the Board of Directors of the
respondent No.3 bank is concerned, as provided under Section

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145D(2) of the Act, an election was held by the Deputy Collector on
26.07.2021, in which, respondent No.4 was elected as uncontested to
be sent as Director of respondent No.3.

8.4 It is submitted that respondent No.4 has become a Director of
the respondent No.3 by way of conducting the elections and
therefore, it cannot be said that respondent No.4 is only a nominated
member and, thereafter, on 06.09.2021, election of the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of respondent No.3 was held, wherein, respondent
No.4 was elected as Chairman.

8.5 It is submitted the term of the Chairman and Vice Chairman is
two and half years and on expiry of the term, again election was held
on 26.02.2024, wherein the respondent No.4 was again elected as the
Chairman. It is submitted that the petitioner neither questioned the
election held in the year 2021 nor challenged the election held in the
year 2024. Therefore, now the petitioner cannot be permitted to
contend that respondent No.4 is not qualified to be a Chairman of the
respondent No. 3 society.

8.6 It is further submitted that earlier in the year 2014, respondent
No.4 was similarly sent as Director of respondent No.3 and at that
time, respondent No.4 became the Vice Chairman of the respondent
No.3 Bank. However, even though the petitioner was member of the
Sakha Samiti since 2014 and, thereafter, has become the delegate in
the 2021. The petitioner has never challenged election / appointment
of respondent No.4 and therefore, there is no cause now for the
petitioner to challenge or question the eligibility of the respondent
No.4.

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8.7 So far as the contentions raised by the petitioner that
respondent No.4 is not qualified to be Director of the respondent No.3
and that amendment in the bye-laws were made by respondent No.3
only to make respondent No.4 eligible is concerned, Mr.Desai, learned
counsel submitted that the said contentions are clearly false, baseless
and answering respondents in the proceeding of Special Civil
Application No. 12933 of 2025 and 12935 of 2025, which are relating
to the amendment of the bye-laws, have explained in detail the
procedure undertaken for amendment of bye-laws and the present
petitioner is party to the said proceeding and is aware about the
same.

8.8 It is submitted that respondent No.3 Bank proposed various
amendments in the byelaws in the 70th Annual General Meeting,
which was scheduled to be held on 28.06.2022, wherein amendment
to various byelaws were proposed, including amendment to byelaw
No.28, more particularly to the effect that there shall one seat in the
Board of Directors for persons from amongst non-agriculturist and
such seat shall be filled by way of election. The said amendment
proposed and agenda to that effect was issued on 14.06.2022 to each
and every member of the respondent No.3 Bank and was also
published in daily newspaper "Sandesh" on 14.06.2022.

8.9 It is submitted that in the Annual General body Meeting,
petitioner had remained present and it was unanimously resolved to
approve the said amendment. The petitioner has not objected to the
said proposed amendment and inspite of the fact that he was present
in the Annual General Meeting, he is falsely stating before this Court

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that the said byelaws was approved in the general body meeting
dated 28.12.2024, which is completely false.

8.10 It is submitted that the general body meeting dated 28.06.2022
approved the said amendment and the same was placed for approval
of the Registrar under Section 13 of the Act by the respondent No.3
Bank vide proposal dated 03.08.2022 and the Registrar, Co-operative
Societies vide order dated 20.02.2023 approved the said amendment.

8.11 It is submitted that thereafter, a special general body meeting
of respondent No.3 was held on 05.02.2023, wherein one of the
agenda items was with regard to approval of the minutes of the
general body meeting dated 28.06.2022 and there were other agenda
items also including agenda items to amend certain other byel-aws. In
the said special general meeting dated 05.02.2023, petitioner was
present and never raised any objection with regard to the approval of
the minutes of the meeting dated 28.06.2022, wherein byelaw No.28
was approved.

8.12 It is submitted that thereafter, next general body meeting of
respondent No.3 Bank was held on 28.08.2023, wherein. the agenda
notice was issued on 11.08.2023. In the said agenda notice, item No.9
was with regards to the consideration of the order passed by the
Registrar approving bye-laws No. 28(6) which is the bye-laws
permitting depositors to be members of the bank and to challenge the
said decision of the Registrar in so far as it rejected the certain other
amendments. In the said general body meeting also, petitioner
Ramesh Nathubhai Chatrubhai had remained present, but did not
object.

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8.13 It is further submitted that the petitioner is making completely
false statement to the effect that the amendments allowing
depositors to be the Directors has been passed in the general body
meeting dated 18.02.2024 which in not the case at all and as stated
above, the said amendment was approved in the general body
meeting dated 28.06.2022 and the same was approved by the
Registrar on 20.02.2023. In all the general body meetings, petitioner
was present and never objected, inspite of which completely false
statement is being made before this Court and therefore, objection of
petitioner is required to be rejected on this count alone.

8.14 So far as the contentions with regard to the challenge to the
amendment of the byelaws and the order passed by the Registrar and
Deputy Secretary (Appeals) is concerned, it is submitted that the
order passed by the Deputy Secretary (Appeals) dated 29.08.2025 is
subject matter of the challenge before this Court in Special Civil
Application No. 12933 of 2025 and 12935 of 2025, wherein this Court
has issued notice and has passed interim order in favour of
respondent No.3, where, this Court by way of order dated 18.11.2025
has been pleased to issue notice and grant interim relief directing that
the Registrar shall not proceed with the hearing of the remand
proceedings till the date of hearing.

8.15 Mr.Desai, learned counsel has submitted that the petition may
not be entertained and the same being meritless deserves to be
dismissed.

8.16 In support of his submissions, Mr.Desai, learned counsel has

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relied upon the relied upon the following decisions:-

(1) Ram Chandra Choudhary and others Vs. Roop Nagar Dugdh
Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Limited and others reported in 2026
INSC 347;
(2) Kanubhai Ishvarbhai Patel Vs. Municipal Commissioner
reported in 2012 (0) GUJHC 8610;
(3) Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1985) 2 SCC
670;
(4) Bengal Secretariat Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank and
Housing Society Limited Vs. Sri Aloke Kumar reported in (2024)
14 SCC 466;

8.17 Over-and-above the aforesaid oral submissions, Mr.Desai,
learned counsel for respondent No.3 has submitted the written
submissions, which is taken on record.

9. Mr.Desai, learned senior counsel for respondent No.4 has
submitted that the petition suffers from vice of suppression of
material facts because till date the petitioner has deliberately
concealed about the issue of amendment which is stayed by this
Court. It is submitted that the petitioner being a member of
respondent No.3, in absence of any personal right being affected, he
has no locus to file this petition because it is settled legal position that
members have no independent right and once a person becomes
member of the cooperative society, he loses his individuality. He has
submitted that the present petition is filed in the nature of personal
interest and/or political interest when no particulars of the petitioner
are mentioned, a petition in the nature of private or cooperative

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dispute is not maintainable in the eyes of law. He has submitted that
the petition is barred by delay, laches and acquiescence and the
petitioner has deliberately not mentioned the dates of challenge nor
has he given dates in the prayer clause and the original challenge in
the petition is hit by delay and laches of about 4 years. He has
submitted that no fundamental rights of the petitioner can be said to
be infringed so as to attract writ jurisdiction of this Court and even
there is alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioner to
challenge the election before the appropriate forum and when
statutory remedy provided under the statute then unless the same is
availed of, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be
entertained.

9.1 Mr.Desai, learned senior counsel has referred and relied upon
the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No.4. The relevant
paragraphs of the affidavit-in-reply reads as under:-

“So far as first ground with regard to Section 74 (1A) (iii) is
concerned, the same is clearly barred by delay, laches and
acquiescence. It is also submitted that the petitioner is trying to
assert before this Hon'ble Court as if nomination is not permissible
in law and a person nominated, though provided in law, cannot be
equated to elected post. I humbly deny such an assertion and when
there is a provision for nomination the necessary corollary would be
that the person can be equated to elected post. This contention may
kindly not be accepted as there is no implied or express bar that a
nominated member cannot be elected as Chairman only because
the source of reaching to the post is through nomination. There is
no distinction provided between 'nomination' and 'election'. The
Petitioner by narrowly construing the provision of Section 74 (1A)(ii)
is trying to raise a dispute despite the above legal position.

So far as second ground is concerned the contention is raised i.e the
term of the qualifying post is over in December 2024 so the
deponent cannot continue on the post of Chairman is absurd and
lacks merit; this contention is frivolous because neither is such a

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contention based on any provision of law under the Act nor does
any such by-law is provided. It is also submitted that my term has
got over because of efflux of time and not on any other ground of
disqualification by removal, stigma or on any other ground. The
petitioner strangely tries to contend that because my term has got
over in December 2024 in the board of Gujarat State Cooperative
Bank I cannot continue as Chairman of the Respondent no.3 Bank.
This contention of the petitioner is legally incorrect, the proposition
being placed before this Hon'ble Court if accepted then, many terms
in many posts would be interrupted leading to a situation where
elections are to be held all the time and functioning of the society or
the body concerned would be left in jeopardy.

So far as third ground is is concerned, the same is denied and the
so-called principal issue raised is denied and is devoid of merits as
the petitioner is trying to raise multiple issues pleaded in the
alternative and the same is irrelevant to the so-called principal
allegation being leveled in the petition, the petitioner is trying to
develop theory of elimination of grounds which is also devoid of
merits of the main issue raised and such alternative pleas without
any basis may not be permitted and even otherwise highly dispute
questions of fact are being raised before this Hon'ble Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner has deliberately approached this Court for ventilating
political grievance which amounts to abuse of process of the court;
no public interest is involved and internal problems are being
brought up indirectly through this petition. Hence, the petition may
kindly be dismissed with costs.

So far as paragraph no. 3.1 is concerned, so far as the fact is
concerned, no comments are offered. It is most humbly submitted
that the Petitioner is member of the Respondent no.3 Bank
therefore in absence of any personal right being affected, the
Petitioner has no locus to file the present petition because it is
settled position of law that members have no independent right and
once a person becomes member of a co-operative society, he loses
his individuality to that of the Society. Hence, the Petitioner have no
locus to file and maintain the present petition. Just because he is
member does not give him a right to challenge without there being
any breach of fundamental right.

As per Resolution no.4 (1) passed by the Executive Committee
Meeting of the Junagadh Commercial Co. Operative Bank Ltd.,
Dolarrai Kotecha came to be nominated on its behalf to participate
in the upcoming elections for Managing Committee of The Gujarat
State Co. Operative Bank Ltd. Subsequently the deponent was

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elected uncontested as Director in the Gujarat State Co. Operative
Bank.

The deponent has submitted the following facts:

A meeting was held on 26.07.2021 for the purpose of appointment
of representative of the Gujarat State Co. Op. Bank Ltd. from
amongst its members to be sent to the Respondent no. 3 Bank. In
pursuance to the agenda, the Election Officer and City Dy. Collector
(East), Ahmedabad was present and Directors as per the list were
present, wherein the deponent was declared uncontested for the
same.

The new Board of Respondent no.3 Bank was constituted on
06.09.2021 and Dolarrai Kotecha was elected uncontested as
Chairman of Respondent no.3 Bank. The communication
dtd.06.10.2021 mentions that First meeting of Board of Directors in
presence of City Dy. Collector (East) Ahmedabad was held on
dt.06.09.2021, in which election of Chairman and Vice Chairman
election having completed, new Board has come in force from this
date.

On 26.02.2024, Election meeting was held in presence of members
and the Election Officer for the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman
wherein the deponent herein was elected uncontested as Chairman
of Respondent no.3 Bank.

It is pertinent to note that none of the above nominations or
elections have been challenged by the Petitioner herein at the
relevant point of time despite the Petitioner being well aware and
informed with regard to the same and the present petition is now
filed on 16.09.2025 which clearly depicts the malafides of the
petitioner and that the petitioner has deliberately approached this
Court for ventilating political grievance.

It is most humbly submitted that the allegations are baseless, false
and incorrect and misleading. It is submitted that the since the
Petitioner is not in a position to validate his claim through any legal
or valid basis, the petitioner is trying to raise such issues as
mentioned in these paragraphs only with a view to prejudice this
Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that as such the averments are not
relevant to the present dispute and ground is raised the same is
denied and the so-called principal issue raised is denied and is
devoid of merits as the petitioner is trying to raise multiple issues
pleaded in the alternative and the same is irrelevant to the so-called
principal allegation being leveled in the petition, the petitioner is
trying to develop theory of elimination of grounds which is also

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devoid of merits of the main issue raised and such alternative pleas
without any basis may not be permitted and even otherwise highly
dispute questions of fact are being raised before this Hon'ble Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is most humbly
submitted that the Petitioner has deliberately concealed about the
issue of amendment which is stayed by this Hon'ble Court, though
from paragraphs 3.15 to paragraphs 3.27 issue of amendment in
by-laws is loudly raised and subsequently, the Petitioner has not
disclosed this fact even by any Additional Affidavit.

It is most humbly submitted the interpretation of the provisions of
law are deliberate being misinterpreted without any basis by the
Petitioner. The said ground is clearly barred by delay, laches and
acquiescence. It is also submitted that the petitioner is trying to
assert before this Hon'ble Court as if nomination is not permissible
in law and a person nominated, though provided in law, cannot be
equated to elected post. I humbly deny such an assertion and when
there is a provision for nomination the necessary corollary would be
that the person can be equated to elected post. This contention may
kindly not be accepted as there is no implied or express bar that a
nominated member cannot be elected as Chairman only because
the source of reaching to the post is through nomination. There is
no distinction provided between 'nomination' and 'election'. The
Petitioner by narrowly construing the provision of Section 74 (1A)(ii)
is trying to raise a dispute despite the above legal position. It is
most humbly submitted that the judgement relied upon by the
petitioner is not applicable to the present case and not relevant in
the facts of the present case.

The submissions and contentions present reply may kindly be
considered as reply in extenso to the arguments raised in this
paragraph in order to avoid repetition and in order to avoid
burdening the record because the contents of the said paragraph of
the petition are repetitions. The deponent begs to add, amend,
alter, rescind as and when required.

Even assuming without admitting that the grievance of the
Petitioner is to be agitated even then an alternative, efficacious
remedy lies before the appropriate court/forum by way of an
appropriate application. available to the petitioner by challenging

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the election before appropriate forum. As per settled legal
proposition of law that when any statutory remedy specifically
provided under the statute is the most efficacious remedy then,
unless the same is availed of, a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India cannot be entertained and therefore the
present petition deserves to be dismissed.

The petitioner seems to have preferred the present petition in the
nature of 'personal interest' and/or 'political interest', when no
particulars of the petitioner are mentioned such a petition in the
nature of private or co-operative dispute is not maintainable and
even a petition in public interest is not maintainable in the eyes of
law. The petitioner has deliberately not set out dates of challenge in
the initial paragraphs, nor has the petitioner given dates in the
prayer clause; hence, the petitioner has deliberately drafted the
petition in a shrewd and crafty manner so as to come out of delay,
laches and acquiescence. The original challenge in the petition is
also hit by delay and laches of about 4 years. The memo of the
petition especially the prayers do not mention the dates of orders
under challenge and even if dates of all the relevant orders passed
in favour of the deponent herein are seen, even then the petition is
clearly hit by delay, laches and acquiescence.”

9.2 Mr.Desai, learned senior counsel has submitted that the petition
may not be entertained and the same being meritless deserves to be
dismissed.

9.3 In support of his submissions, Mr.Desai, learned senior counsel
has relied upon the following decisions:

(1) State of Gujarat Vs. Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Appeals
and others, reported in 2019 (2) GLR 1095 more particularly
paras 41 to 50;
(2) Sarvepalli Ramaiah (dead) Lrs and others Vs. District Collector,
Chittoor District and others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 500 more
particularly paras 46 and 47;
(3) Jharkhand Mazdoor Sangh Vs. President Officer, reported in

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(2002) 10 SCC 703 more particularly paras 1 and 2;
(4) Karnataka Power Corporation Limited Vs. K. Thangappan
reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 more particularly paras 6 to 10;

9.4 Over-and-above the aforesaid oral submissions, Mr.Desai,
learned senior counsel for respondent No.4 has submitted the written
submissions, which is taken on record.

ANALYSIS:

10. The following points are framed for determination:

(1) Whether the petitioner has right to file the petition challenging
the appointment of respondent No.4 as Chairman of
respondent No.3 – society in the second term or not?
(2) Whether the petitioner proves that any of his rights including
fundamental rights have been prejudiced by appointment of
respondent No.4 or not?
(3) Whether the petitioner has any locus to challenge the
appointment of respondent No.4 or not?
(4) Whether the appointment of respondent No.4 is against the
provisions of law more particularly Section 74(1)(a)(ii) of the
Act?
(5) Whether the petition is barred by delay, laches and
acquiescence or not?

FINDINGS:

11. On perusal of material on record and above stated facts, let first

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go to the petitioner’s status as he has stated in para 3.1 that he has
become the member of the Gujarat State Cooperative Agriculture and
Rural Development Bank i.e. respondent No.3 and, therefore, he is
being delegate and having locus to file this petition. While considering
the prayers made in the petition more particularly prayer 8(A), the
petitioner seeks removal of respondent No.4 from respondent No.3 as
a Chairman and the direction was sought against respondents No.1
and 2 to remove respondent No.4. Since respondent No.4 was elected
on 06.09.2021 as a Chairman of respondent No.3 and now almost
after five years, the petitioner has raised the grievance against
appointment of respondent No.4 as Chairman of respondent No.3. It is
an admitted fact that till 2025 i.e. on 03.04.2025, for the first time,
the petitioner has raised grievance against appointment of
respondent No.4 by way of making representation to the concerned
respondent – authority and thereafter representations were also made
on 05.06.2025, 15.07.2025 and 18.07.2025. On perusal of these
dates, it is clearly established that for the period of five years, the
petitioner has not chosen to raise any objection. It is also to be noted
herein that whether the petitioner has any right to challenge the
appointment of respondent No.4 as he was an elected member of the
society and after election he was declared as elected Chairman of the
society and in the election, no any mala fide was noticed by
respondents No.1 and 2 and he was elected as member cannot be
removed by merely at whims of the petitioner because there is no any
illegality or disqualification incurred to respondent No.4. Therefore,
merely by saying that respondent No.4 is not a member of the
agricultural society and he was only elected for the Gujarat
Cooperative Society. That respondent No.4 was the original member
of the Gujarat State Cooperative Finance Corporation Limited and he

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was elected in the society and he was elected in the Gujarat State
Cooperative Bank as a Director on 31.12.2019 and as he is a member
of the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank he was nominated by the
society for appointing as a Director / Chairman in the Gujarat State
Cooperative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank i.e. respondent
No.3 and except for respondent No.4 no one has contested the
election and, therefore, he was declared uncontested member of
respondent No.3 – society on 26.07.2021 and, thereafter, he became
elected Chairman of respondent No.3. Now, in the process, there was
no any breach or fundamental rights was violated of the petitioner
and he has not stated that how he is affected by appointment of
respondent No.4 as he was originally appointed in 2021 and since
more than five years there was no grievance raised by the petitioner
against respondent No.4 as he become the member of respondent
No.3, he loses his individual status and if at all he has any grievance,
it is to be route to the society instead of that the petitioner has filed
this petition seeking to remove respondent No.4 though he is an
elected member. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the
petitioner has failed to prove the fact that how he become affected by
election of respondent No.4 and what fundamental rights are
prejudice or violated by election of respondent No.4 as Chairman of
respondent No.3. Since more than five years, respondent No.4 was
working as Chairman and till date the petitioner has not raised any
objection and suddenly in 2025 he has raised objection against
respondent No.4 as there is no breach committed by respondent No.4
as provided under the statute nor he was declared ineligible or
incurred any disqualification. In my opinion, the petitioner has failed
to prove the fact that whether there is any independent right of the
petitioner is violated or not and under that circumstances, the petition

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deserves to be dismissed.

12. Now on going to another contention raised by the learned
senior counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.4 is not an
agriculturist and cannot become the member of respondent No.3 as
he was member of the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank and he was
nominated by the Gujarat State Cooperative Bank for respondent No.3
and, therefore, he is not qualified to be even member, therefore, he is
also not qualified for holding the post of Chairman of respondent No.3.
So far as the contention with regard to the fact that there is no
prohibition provided under the statute or there is no distinguished
provided under the statute or not is concerned, whether the elected
member or nominated member cannot contest election and cannot
appoint as a committee member or the Chairman or Vice Chairman of
the society. Looking to the provisions of Section 74C of the Act, it is
contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent
No.3 – State Development Bank is incorporated in 1951 which is an
affixed society and governed under the provisions of Section 74C of
the Act. On perusal of the provisions of Section 116 to Section 145, it
appears that power is vested with respondent No.2 and its
appointment as an instrumentality of the State and, therefore, it has
power to remove but how this power can be exercised and under
what circumstances, it can be exercised. Whether respondent No.4
loses status by incurring any disqualification; there is no material
worth the name produced by the petitioner that these are the reasons
respondent No.4 has incurred disqualification and therefore he cannot
be appointed as Chairman of respondent No.3. Under such
circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner has
failed to establish the fact that whether respondent No.4 is incurred

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any disqualification because he is a nominated member and not
primary member of the society. It is to be noted that the petitioner
has contended that respondent No.4 is not qualified being Director or
member of respondent No.3 and therefore respondent No.4 cannot be
allowed to make any amendment in bye-laws of respondent No.3 as
proposed. In fact, for the similar purpose, one another petition was
filed wherein this Court has granted stay in favour of respondent No.4
and though the petitioner is aware this fact, he has not stated correct
facts while going through the submissions made in the petition from
para 3.15 to 3.28. The proposed bye laws challenged before this Court
by filing petition which is at present pending wherein the petitioner is
a party and therefore on the ground of suppression of material facts,
the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

13. Now on going through the third primary objection raised by
respondent No.4 with regard to delay, laches and acquiescence, it is
an admitted fact that upto 03.04.2025, the petitioner has never raised
any objection against the appointment of respondent No.4 being
Director / Chairman in respondent No.3 and, therefore, the present
petition is filed after almost more than five years and hence, it is clear
that the petition is not filed immediately challenging the appointment
of respondent No.4 though respondent No.4 was already elected way
back in 2021 as Director / Chairman of respondent No.3, now after
more than five years, his appointment was challenged by the
petitioner seeking to remove him is barred by law of limitation. The
petitioner is disentitled to challenge the appointment of respondent
No.4 being Director / Chairman of respondent No.3 after almost five
years and, therefore, the petition itself is barred by delay, laches and
acquiescence as the petitioner has waived his right available under

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the law from 2021 to 2025. Unless and until, there is any fundamental
right violated or any order passed against the petitioner by any
authority, he cannot approach the High Court by way of the writ
petition under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 226 of the Constitution of India
as there is no breach or violation is noticed from the record that all
the fundamental rights were violated by appointment of respondent
No.4 as Chairman / Director of respondent No.3. Whether any right
was infringed by the act of appointment of respondent No.4 or not.
This Court is satisfied that the petitioner has not shown any act or
omission on the part of the respondents whereby any fundamental
right was prejudice or infringed by the act or omission to the
petitioner and, therefore, this Court cannot exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction merely at whims or capris of the petitioner.

14. It is pointed out by the learned Assistant Government Pleader
that there was efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under
Section 145U of the Act, which reads thus:-

“145U. Disputes relating to elections to be submitted to the [Tribunal].
- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 96 or any other
provisions of this Act, any dispute relating to an election shall be
referred to the [Tribunal]

(2) Such reference may be made by an aggrieved party by presenting
an election petition to the [Tribunal]:

Provided that no such petition shall be made till after the final result of
the election is declared and where any such petition is made it shall
not be admitted by the [Tribunal] unless it is made within two months
from the date of such declaration:

Provided further that, the [Tribunal] may admit any petition after the
expiry of that period, if the petitioner satisfies the [Tribunal] that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said
period.

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(3) In exercising the functions conferred on it by or under this Chapter,
the [Tribunal] shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court in
respect of —

(a) proof of facts by affidavit;

(b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;

(c) compelling discovery or the production of documents, and

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.

In the case of any such affidavit, an officer appointed by the [Tribunal]
in this behalf may administer the oath to the deponent.

(4) [Subject to any regulations] made by the [Tribunal] in this behalf,
any such petition shall be heard and disposed of by the [Tribunal] as
expeditiously as possible. An order made by the [Tribunal] on such
petition shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in
question in any Court.”

15. It is contended that without approaching the concerned
authority i.e. Tribunal, the petitioner has directly approached this
Court by way of present petition seeking extraordinary jurisdiction to
be exercised on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. It is also
contended that the petitioner has preferred numerous representations
after almost five years and on the basis of that, respondent No.2 has
called for the report and ordered to inquire into the matter and also
called for the report and on receipt of the said report dated
19.01.2026, the concerned authority has given reply to the petitioner
that if at all he wanted to challenge the election of the respondent
then the petitioner ought to have approached the competent
authority provided under the statute before whom he can challenge
the election of respondent No.4. The respondent No.4 was duly
elected as election was conducted as per the provisions of Section
145Z of the Act which reads as under:-

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“145Z. Special provision for election of officers of specified
societies. - (1) This section shall apply only to election of officers by
members of committees of societies belonging to the categories
specified in section 74C.

(2) After the election of the members of the committee, or
whenever such election is due, the election of the officer or officers
of any such society shall be held as provided in its bye-laws, but any
meeting of the committee for this purpose shall be presided over by
the Collector or an officer nominated by him' in this behalf.]”

16. Now the contention raised by the petitioner in the petition more
particularly in paras 3.15 to 3.28, there is specific mention about
Special Civil Application No. 12935 of 2025 which is pending before
this Court and since the subject matter of the present petition is
already challenged by way of the said petition, which is pending, on
that ground also the present petition cannot be entertained.

17. On perusal of Section 74(1A)(iii) of the Act, it is barred by delay,
laches and acquiescence as the petitioner is trying to assert that
respondent No.4 was a nominated member and he is not qualified
under the law to become elected Chairman / Director, to which the
petitioner has not produced any relevant document that whether any
distinguished in the law which is provided that the person is either
nominated or elected to the due election process not capable to hold
the post of Director / Chairman. This Court has gone through the
relevant provisions, but there is no any expressed or ample bar found
that nominated member cannot be filed his candidature to contest the
election either for the post of Director or the Chairman. The
respondent No.4 is duly elected through the proper election process
undertaken by the concerned respondent as per Section 145(2) of the
Act and, therefore, the dispute raised by the petitioner is devoid of

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merits.

18. So far as the contention raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner that respondent No.4 was elected originally in the Gujarat
State Cooperative Society in 2019 and his term got over in December
2024, therefore, he cannot hold the post after 2024 in respondent
No.3 as his second term is completely is illegal. The said contention is
not supported by any material or cogent reason as the petitioner has
not produced any provisions provided in the bye-laws or in the Act
also; there is no provision provided that by afflux of time the person
gets disqualified automatically. Unless and until, there is any
disqualification as mentioned in the Act, incurred by the petitioner or
any stigmatic reason or act against the interest of the society, the
person cannot be removed or disqualified. But in the present case,
there is no whisper about there being any disqualification incurred by
respondent No.4 and, therefore, under such circumstances, this Court
is of the view that the petition deserves to be dismissed at threshold.

19. On perusal of the averments made in the petition, prima facie it
emerges that due to some political rivalry between the groups this
petition is filed by the petitioner as there was no direct or indirect
interest or rights violated by the Act to elect as a Director / Chairman
in the society and if at all, he wants to challenge the election then this
is provided under the statute and statutory mechanism is provided for
which the petitioner has to approach the competent authority by
preferring appropriate proceedings and present election of
respondent No.3.

20. Mr.Dipen Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has tried

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to submit that the petition itself is not maintainable and has referred
and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Ram Chandra Choudhary (supra). This Court is of the view that
the fact of the said case is not similar to the fact of the present
petition and hence the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
is not applicable to the present case.

22. In the case of Union Of India Vs. N.Murugesan Etc. reported
in (2022) 2 SCC 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and
observed in paras 21 and 28 as under:-

“21. The word laches is derived from the French language meaning
"remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or
negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while
causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a
party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and
therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or
remedy.

28. We would not dwell deep into the extraordinary and
discretionary nature of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. This principle is to be extended much more when an element
of undue delay, laches and acquiescence is involved. The following
decisions of this Court would suffice:

28.1 UP Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464:

"8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya [(1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
1488] . In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief
which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an
application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay.
Therefore, the state approached this Court and this Court after
considering the matter observed as under: (SCC p. 268)

"Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay
which occurred within the period mentioned in subsections (1) or (2)
of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which

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occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period
applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy
itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant
case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the
relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the
petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at
all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and
(2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of
their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under
sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given.
Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the
delay."

9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [(1997) 6 SCC 538 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1550] this Court reaffirmed the rule that if a person
chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of
the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it
was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542)

"The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article
226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping
over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus
from Virpal Singh Chauhan case [Union of India v. Virpal Singh
Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC
813] . The appellants desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not
amenable to judicial review at this belated stage."

10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta [(1997) 3 SCC 395 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 821] it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9)

"9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the
judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA
No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] gives relief only to Joshi, the
benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to
any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is
seeking benefit of Joshi case [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497
of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] . In view of our finding that the
benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3- 1987 could only
be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled
to any relief."

11. In Govt. of WB v. Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC
(L&S) 225] their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and
have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp.
359-60, para 34)

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"34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief
on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the
writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976
wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992.
In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been
decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been
considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar [State of WB v. Debdas
Kumar, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 841 : (1991) 17
ATC 261]. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be
a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly
situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the
other employees not being before this Court although they are
ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no
order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a
situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the
purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are
not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be
found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."

28.2 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar, (2008) 14 SCC 295:

"24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there
is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant
Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse
relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come
to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an
adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the
applicant.

25. Under the English law, an application for leave for judicial review
should be made "promptly". If it is made tardily, it may be rejected.
The fact that there is breach of public law duty does not necessarily
make it irrelevant to consider delay or laches on the part of the
applicant. Even if leave is granted, the question can be considered
at the time of final hearing whether relief should be granted in
favour of such applicant or not. (Vide R. v. Essex County Council
[1993 COD 344] .)

26. In R. v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal, ex p Caswell [(1990) 2
AC 738 : (1990) 2 WLR 1320 : (1990) 2 All ER 434 (HL)] , AC at p.

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749, the House of Lords stated [Ed.: Quoting from O'Reilly v.
Mackman, (1982) 3 All ER 1124 at p. 1131a-b.] : (All ER p. 441a-b)

"The public interest in good administration requires that public
authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to
the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in
purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period
than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by
the decision."

27. The underlying object of refusing to issue a writ has been
succinctly explained by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co.
v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [1874 LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , thus:
(LR pp. 239-40)

"Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or
a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause
a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy." (emphasis supplied)

28. This Court has accepted the above principles of English law. In
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1969) 2
SCR 824] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC
84 : (1970) 2 SCR 697] this Court ruled that even in cases of
violation or infringement of fundamental rights, a writ court may
take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in
approaching the court. And if there is gross or unexplained delay,
the court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such petitioner."

28.3 State of J&K v. R.K. Zalpuri, (2015) 15 SCC 602:

"20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from City
and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala
[City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir

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Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168] , wherein this Court while dwelling
upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 175, para 30)

"30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is
duty-bound to consider whether:

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed
questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) the petition reveals all material facts;

(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the
resolution of the dispute;

(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay
and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law;
and host of other factors."

21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791] would be
apposite: (SCC p. 325, para 6)

"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind
by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is
such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert
his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party." After so
stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v.
Nandlal Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566]
restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which
is to the following effect: (SCC p. 326, para 9)

"9. .....the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the
lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner
and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of
factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort

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to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction."

22. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar [State of Maharashtra v.
Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683] a three-Judge Bench laid down that:
(SCC p. 692, para 19)

"19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of
the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious
and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a
person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is
founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to
necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person
seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief
to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it
with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct."

23. Recently in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1
SCC (L&S) 38] , it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 117, para 16)

"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.
As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would
be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the
way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who
has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the
greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes

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injury to the lis."

24. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the question of
delay and laches in all kinds of cases would not curb or curtail the
power of the writ court to exercise the discretion. In Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. [Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn., (2013) 1 SCC
353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] it has been ruled that: (SCC pp. 359-
60, para 12)

"12. ... Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to
decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet.
The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said
discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases.
Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion.
It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors,
continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing
shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the
discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus
analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches
as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is
continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial
conscience."

And again: (SCC p. 360, para 14)

"14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High
Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party
who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of
laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In
the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally
sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where
circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is
manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When
substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against
each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in
the injustice being done, because of a nondeliberate delay. The
court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact
emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide Durga
Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [Durga Prashad v.
Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] , Collector (LA)
v. Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax)
172] , Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur
[Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur,
(1992) 2 SCC 598] , Dayal Singh v. Union of India [Dayal Singh v.
Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593] and Shankara Coop. Housing

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Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar [Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v.
M. Prabhakar, (2011) 5 SCC 607 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 56] .)"

23. This Court has considered the facts of the case and the
averments made in the petition as well as the contents of the
affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respective respondents and
considered the fact that the petition is filed after a long period of five
years. This Court has also considered the decisions cited at the Bar
and the decisions relied upon by Mr.Desai, learned senior counsel for
respondent No.4 in the case of (1) Deputy Collector (Land
Reforms) Appeals (supra), (2) Sarvepalli Ramaiah (dead) Lrs
(supra), (3) Jharkhand Mazdoor Sangh and K. Thangappan
(supra) are applicable to the facts of the present case.

24. In view of the aforesaid foregoing reasons and the facts and
circumstances of the case and the decisions of this Court as well as
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petition being meritless deserves to be
dismissed. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. Rule is
discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated
forthwith. There shall be no order as to costs.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
V.R. PANCHAL

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: VIJAYKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PANCHAL(HC00171), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 08/05/2026 15:17:10

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