Holding

The unreasoned appellate and revisional orders are quashed and set aside as they violate the principles of natural justice.

Summary

The petitioner, a former General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) employee, resigned and later joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Despite receiving a discharge certificate from GREF, he was later charged for serving in CRPF without a formal resignation and was removed from service. The petitioner appealed the removal, but the appellate and revisional authorities dismissed his appeals without providing any reasons. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to quash the removal orders and stay their implementation, arguing that the orders were unreasoned and violated natural justice. The High Court examined precedents establishing that administrative orders must be reasoned and found the impugned orders to be non‑speaking and arbitrary. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside the orders and remanded the matter to the appellate authority for a reasoned decision, partially allowing the petition.

Issues considered

Whether the appellate and revisional orders quashing the petitioner’s removal were valid despite being unreasoned.
Whether the failure to record reasons violates the principles of natural justice and renders the orders void.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement and relief pending a reasoned decision.

Subjects

natural justiceunreasoned orderquashmandamusArticle 226disciplinary proceedingsservice lawreasoned orderadministrative law

Judgment

C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5594 of 2018

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
==============================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No

==============================================================
UPENDRAKUMAR JUGESHWAR GUPTA
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
==============================================================
Appearance:
MR DIPAK R DAVE(1232) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR SHUSHIL R SHUKLA(5603) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
==============================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI

Date : 10/08/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT

1. Heard Mr. Dipak R. Dave, learned advocate appearing for the

petitioner and Mr. Shushil R. Shukla, learned advocate appearing for

the respondents at length.

2. By way of the present petition, the petitioner herein has prayed

for the following reliefs:

7. For the reasons stated herein above and such other as may be
advanced at the time of hearing of this petition, the petitioner
above respectfully prays that:-named most

(A) A writ of mandamus and/or any order other appropriate writ,

Page 1 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

direction be issued

(i) to quash and set aside office order dated 13.08.2015
respondent passed Nos. 4 ordering by removal from service to the
petitioner and consequential order of reinstatement of the
petitioner with all consequential benefits may kindly be orderd.;

(ii) to quash and set aside the order dated 11.01.2016 passed by
respondent No.3 rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner;

(iii) to quash and set order passed aside the by the respondent
no.2 in revision petition confirming the order of removal from
service;

(B) Pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this
petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the
implementation orders further and dated 11.01.2016 and further
be execution, operation of 13.08.2015, 26.06.2016 pleased and
to direct respondent Nos.2 to 4 to allow the petitioner to resume
duty;

(C) Any other and further relief reliefs to or which this Hon'ble
Court deemed fit, in the interest of justice; may kindly be
granted;”

3. Briefly stated that the petitioner herein joined in General

Reserve Engineer Force - Multi Skilled Worker (Pioneer) [for short,

“GREF - MSW (PNR)”] as on 11.01.2010 and was on probation period

when he was on sanctioned casual leave from 16.02.2012 to

06.03.2013. Since his father met with an accident, the petitioner gave

an application to the Commandant GREF, Cargill requesting to accept

his resignation.

3.1. Thereafter, the petitioner joined in 221 st Battalion (BN) Central

Reserve Police Force (for short, “CRPF”) on 27.02.2012 and he was

under the impression that he already had submitted his resignation to

Page 2 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

GREF. The petitioner also made frequent application as well for other

required documents and in all fairness there were no other pending

proceedings or charge against the petitioner in GREF and in view

thereof, the petitioner’s resignation came to be accepted on

01.11.2014. However, the same was communicated to the petitioner

by the administrative order of GREF by Letter No. 96 dated

06.07.2015 and the said discharge certificate was also brought to the

notice of the competent official seeking relief. Suddenly upon

completing service of more than 3 years the petitioner received memo

of charge to dated 28.03.2015 with a direction to the petitioner to

submit show cause in view of his earlier service with GREF and in the

interregnum period, joining CRPF on 27.02.2012 without admitting

resignation in GREF.

3.2. It is the case of the petitioner that inspite of the discharge

certificate issued to the petitioner on 13.08.2015, an order came to be

passed by the respondent no. 4 - the Commandant 221 st Battalion,

CRPF removing the petitioner from his service. The aforesaid gave rise

to the filing of appeal before the before the respondent no.3 - Deputy

Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Gandhinagar Range, CRPF,

Gujarat which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated

11.01.2016. The petitioner moved a revision petition before Inspector

General CRPF, Belaganj, New Mumbai, Maharastra, which also came

to be rejected on 26.06.2016.

Page 3 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

3.3. The petitioner thereafter approached Hon’ble the Patna High by

preferring a writ wherein by order dated 10.07.2017 in Letters Patent

Appeal No. 1687 of 2016, the order passed in Civil Writ Jurisdiction

Case No. 11666 of 2016 was confirmed on the ground of territorial

jurisdiction. In view thereof, the petitioner approached this Court by

preferring the present petition.

4. Mr. Dave, learned advocate at the outset submits that the

orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated 11.01.2016 and the

Revisional Authority dated 21.06.2016 confirming the order passed by

the Disciplinary Authority are unreasoned orders. It is submitted it is

incumbent to pass a reasoned order by the competent authorities.

4.1. To substantiate the submissions, reliance is placed on the order

passed in Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 2012 dated 21.03.2025

duly confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1020 of 2025 dated

15.09.2025 wherein, it is held that reasons are the heart of the order.

It is submitted that both authorities erred while passing orders

without any reasons.

5. Mr. Shukla, learned advocate for the respondents is not in a

position to dispute the aforesaid factual position brought to the notice

of the Court by Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner.

6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was issued a discharge

certificate on 01.11.2014 which was communicated to the petitioner

Page 4 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

by the Administrative Officer of GREF vide Letter No. 96 dated

06.07.2015. The said certificate was also brought to the notice of the

competent officials seeking relief. Upon completion of more than three

years of service, the petitioner was issued the memo of charge dated

28.03.2015 with a direction to the petitioner to submit show cause in

view of his earlier service with GREF and meanwhile, joining CRPF on

27.02.2012 without submiting resignation of GREF. The respondent

no. 4 - the Commandant 221 st Battalion, CRPF removed the petitioner

from service by initiating departmental proceedings against the

petitioner.

6.1. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 13.08.2015, the

petitioner was constrained to file appeal before the respondent no. 3 -

DGIP, Gandhinagar Range, CRPF, Gujarat which came to be

dismissed by the impugned order dated 11.01.2016. The petitioner

thereafter, moved a revision petition before Inspector General CRPF,

Belaganj, New Mumbai, Maharastra, which also came to be rejected

by order dated 26.06.2016.

7. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective

parties, upon perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority

dated 11.01.2016 and order passed by the Revisional Authority dated

21.06.2016, it emerges that both the orders merely record the facts,

however, both the orders fail to assign any reasons to confirm the

order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.

Page 5 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

8. Upon perusal of the impugned orders passed by the Appellate

Authority and the Revisional Authority as referred to herein-above, the

said orders are unreasoned orders.

8.1. In the opinion of this Court, reasons are the heart of an order

and an unreasoned order could prejudicially affect the rights of the

petitioner herein which is well settled position of law.

9. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the order passed in

Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 2012 dated 21.03.2025 which is

duly confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1020 of 2025. The

relevant paragraphs of the said petition being Special Civil Application

No. 1743 of 2012 read thus:

“10. In the opinion of this Court, validity of an order hinges on the
relevance and adequacy of the reasons assigned. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in catena of decisions emphasized that providing
reasons for an order is a fundamental principle of natural justice.

10.1 At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Director (Marketing), Indian
Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Santosh Kumar, reported in
2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 388. Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the said
decision read thus:

“6. Before the High Court, a solitary contention was raised
on behalf of respondent stating that despite a detailed
response preferred by the respondent herein, the Appellate
Authority passed the order dated 15.5.2000 without
considering any of the issues raised by the respondent
herein as petitioner in the writ petition. The learned Judges
of the High Court had also perused the records placed
before them by the Corporation. It is seen from the
impugned order passed by the High Court that the Judges
were satisfied that no reasons whatever had been
recorded in either not accepting the issues raised by the
respondent in response to the show cause notice nor had

Page 6 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

the claim of the respondent made in the various grounds
raised by him in his appeal been considered. The learned
Judges of the Division Bench felt that the orders of
punishment dated 30.12.1999 as well as the order dated
15.5.2000 by which the respondent's appeal had been
rejected are cryptic and non-speaking orders and,
therefore, the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority
and Appellate Authority are liable to be set-aside on the
ground of non-application of mind. The High Court also
held that the action taken by the authorities is arbitrary.
However, the learned Judges, while setting- aside the
order of dismissal as well as the appellate order, issued a
direction to the appellant-Corporation to reinstate into
service with continuity in service with all consequential
benefits. Liberty was also reserved to the appellant to re-
initiate the enquiry from the stage of consideration by the
Punishing Authority and pass appropriate orders in
accordance with law.
9. We have also perused the order passed by the General
Manager (Operations) which is available at page 51 and
the order passed by the Director (Marketing) who is the
appellate authority. A close scrutiny of both the orders
would only go to show that the Appellate Authority has
simply adopted the language employed by the Disciplinary
Authority and inflicted the punishment of dismissal on the
respondent herein.”

10.2 It is also apposite to refer to the decision rendered inLetters
Patent Appeal No.1464 of 2004, dated 29.11.2011 Paragraphs 2
of the said order reads thus:

“2. The respondent was serving as s Superintendent
Engineer in the State Government and he retired on
31.12.1996. A departmental inquiry was initiated against
him on 25.11.1994, and after the retirement the
respondent No.1 by order 16.11.1998 a monthly cut of
Rs.200/- on permanent basis from the pension of the
respondent- workman has been imposed by the appellant.
The respondent challenged the order dated 16.11.1998 by
filing Special Civil Application No.2696 of 1999 which has
been allowed by the learned Single Judge on the ground
that the disciplinary authority while awarding the pension
has not considered the representation of the respondent
and straightway passed the order of monthly cut of of
Rs.200/- on permanent basis from the pension of the
respondent without assigning any reasons. The relevant

Page 7 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

observations made by the learned Single Judge reads as
under:
“The submissions made by the learned advocates for
the parties have been considered by me. After the
respondent authority issued show cause notice and
supplied the findings recorded by the inquiry officer to
the petitioner while calling the explanation from the
petitioner about the proposed punishment, the
petitioner submitted detailed reply on 8.12.1997 which
is at page 31 to 34 wherein various contentions
including the contention that the findings have been
vitiated and contradictory were raised and though the
reply was submitted by the petitioner against the
proposed punishment and though the findings recorded
by the inquiry officer were challenged by the petitioner,
the authority has not at all discussed as to what is the
answer or explanation given by the petitioner and what
are the contentions raised by the petitioner in his
answer or explanation given by the petitioner and why
the same are not acceptable and on what ground, they
are not acceptable. Bare reading of the order in
question would make it clear that it does not disclose
anything in that regard and, therefore, this court is of
the view that it amounts to non application of mind and
it is an unreasoned order and, therefore, contrary to
the law laid down by the apex court in the matter of
Anilkumar versus Presiding Officer and others reported
in 1985 SCC 1121 that the findings given by the
inquiry officer are required to be reasoned one. Same
principle would also apply to the facts of the present
case. The respondents herein have also, after serving
show cause notice as well as the findings of the inquiry
officer to the petitioner and after receiving reply cum
explanation of the petitioner as to why the punishment
proposed should not be imposed, passed order of
punishment without considering the reply of the
petitioner and also without assigning any reason as to
why the explanation tendered by the petitioner is not
acceptable. Therefore, in absence of such discussion, in
absence of reasons, I am of the opinion that the order
in question is required to be quashed and set aside on
that ground alone and without entering into other
aspects of the matter.”

10.3 The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Moni Shankar Vs.
Union of India & Anr., reported in 2008 (3) SCC 484 in

Page 8 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

paragraphs 4, 9 and 10 has observed as under:

“4. In the said departmental proceeding, appellant inter
alia raised a contention as regard to non compliance of
paragraphs 704 and 705 of the Railway Vigilance Manual
(the Manual) in the manner in which the purported trap
was laid. It was furthermore contended that provisions of
Rule 9(21) of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal
Rules have not been complied with.

9. Dr. R.G. Padia, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on
behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would
contend :

1. That finding of fact having been arrived at by the
disciplinary authority, the same should not have been
interfered with by the Tribunal particularly when some
evidences have been led on behalf of the department.

2. The High Court has rightly opined that paragraphs 704
and 705 of the Manual pertaining to the manner in which
the trap could be laid, contain only administrative
instructions and are, thus, not enforceable in a court of
law.

3. Since there was sufficient compliance of Rule 9(21), the
impugned judgment should not be interfered with.

10. We may at the outset notice that with a view to protect
innocent employees from such traps, appropriate
safeguards have been provided in the Railway Manual.
Paragraphs 704 and 705 thereof read thus :-
"704. Traps. - (i)-(iv)
(v) When laying a trap, the following important points
have to be kept in view:
(a) Two or more independent witnesses must hear the
conversation, which should establish that the money
was being passed as illegal gratification to meet the
defence that the money was actually received as a loan
or something else, if put up by the accused.
(b) The transaction should be within the sight and
hearing of two independent witnesses.
(c) There should be an opportunity to catch the culprit
red-handed immediately after passing of the illegal
gratification so that the accused may not be able to
dispose it of.
(d) The witnesses selected should be responsible

Page 9 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

witnesses who have not appeared as witnesses in
earlier cases of the department or the police and are
men of status, considering the status of the accused. It
is safer to take witnesses who are Government
employees and of other departments.
(e) After satisfying the above conditions, the
Investigating Officer should take the decoy to the
SP/SPE and pass on the information to him for
necessary action. If the office of the S.P., S.P.E., is not
nearby and immediate action is required for laying the
trap, the help of the local police may be obtained. It may
be noted that the trap can be laid only by an officer not
below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Local
Police. After the S.P.E. or local police official have been
entrusted with the work, all arrangements for laying the
trap and execution of the same should be done by them.
All necessary help required by them should be
rendered.
(vi)-(vii)
705. Departmental Traps. - For Departmental traps, the
following instructions in addition to those contained
under paras 704 are to be followed:
(a) The Investigating Officer/Inspector should arrange
two gazetted officers from Railways to act as
independent witnesses as far as possible. However, in
certain exceptional cases where two gazetted officers
are not available immediately, the services of non-
gazetted staff can be utilised.
All employees, particularly, gazetted officers, should
assist and witness a trap whenever they are
approached by any officer or branch. The Head of
Branch detail a suitable person or persons to be present
at the scene of trap. Refusal to assist or witness a trap
without a just cause/without sufficient reason may be
regarded as a breach of duty, making him liable to
disciplinary action.
(b) The decoy will present the money which he will give
to the defaulting officers/employees as bribe money on
demand. A memo should be prepared by the
Investigating Officer/Inspector in the presence of the
independent witnesses and the decoy indicating the
numbers of the G.C. notes for legal and illegal
transactions.
The memo, thus prepared should bear the signature of
decoy, independent witnesses and the Investigating
Officer/Inspector.

Page 10 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

Another memo, for returning the G.D. notes to the decoy
will be prepared for making over the G.C. notes to the
delinquent employee on demand. This memo should
also contain signatures of decoy, witnesses and
Investigating Officer/Inspector. The independent
witnesses will take up position at such a place where
from they can see the transaction and also hear the
conversation between the decoy and delinquent, with a
view to satisfy themselves that the money was
demanded, given and accepted as bribe a fact to which
they will be deposing in the departmental proceeding at
a later date. After the money has been passed on, the
Investigating Officer/Inspector should disclose the
identity and demand, in the presence of the witnesses,
to produce all money including private, and bribe
money. Then the total money produced will be verified
from relevant records and memo for seizure of the
money and verification particulars will be prepared.
The recovered notes will be kept in an envelope sealed
in the presence of the witnesses, decoy and the accused
as also his immediate superior who should be called s a
witness in case the accused refuses to sign the recovery
memo, and sealing of the notes in the envelope.
(c)-(d) * * *”

10.4 Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of S.N. Mukherjee
Vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 in
paragraphs 9, 15, 24, 25, 26, 32, 35, 36, 39 and 40, has
observed as under:

“9. The question under consideration can be divided into two
parts:

(i) Is there any general principle of law which requires an
administrative authority to record the reasons for its
decision; and (ii) If so, does the said principle apply to an
order confirming the findings and sentence of a Court-
Martial and post-confirmation proceedings under the Act?
15. The Committee on Ministers' Powers (Donoughmore
Commit-tee) in its report submitted in 1932, recommended
that "any party affected by a decision should be informed
of the reasons on which the decision is based" and that
"such a decision should be in the form of a reasoned
document available to the parties affected." (P. 100) The
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries
(Franks Committee) in its report submitted in 1957,
recommended that "decisions of tribunals should be

Page 11 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

reasoned and as full as possible." The said Committee has
observed:

"Almost all witnesses have advocated the giving of
reasoned decisions by tribunals. We are convinced that if
tribunal proceedings are to be fair to the citizen reasons
should be given to the fullest practicable extent. A decision
is apt to be better if the reasons for it have to be set out in
writing because the reasons are then more likely to have
been properly thought out. Further, a reasoned decision is
essential in order that, where there is a right of appeal, the
applicant can assess whether he has good grounds of
appeal and know the case he will have to meet if he
decides to appeal."

24. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India
and Others, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466 the order passed by the
Central Government dismissing the revision petition under
Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Roles, 1960, was
challenged before this Court on the ground that it did not
contain reasons. Bachawat, J., speaking for himself and
Mudholkar, J., re- jected this contention on the view that
the reason for rejecting the revision application appeared
on the face of the order because the Central Government
had agreed with the reasons given by the State
Government in its order. The learned Judges did not agree
with the submission that omission to give reasons for the
decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quash- ing it and
held that for the purpose of an appeal under Article 136
orders of courts and tribunals stand on the same footing.
The learned Judges pointed out that an order of court
dismissing a revision application often gives no reasons
but this is not a sufficient ground for quashing it and
likewise an order of an administrative tribunal reject- ing a
revision application cannot be pronounced to be in- valid on
the sole ground that it does not give reasons for the
rejection. The decision in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills case
(supra) was distinguished on the ground that in that case
the Central Government had reversed the decision
appealed against without giving any reasons and the
record did not disclose any apparent ground for the
reversal. According to the learned Judges there is a vital
difference between an order of reversal and an order of
affirmance. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, did to concur
with this view and found that the order of the Central
Government was vitiated as it did not disclose any reasons

Page 12 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

for rejecting the revision application. The learned Judge
has observed:

"In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals
have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necessary
concomi- tants of a Welfare State. But arbitrariness in their
func- tioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself.
Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate
minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to
disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees
consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces
clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness;
it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is
made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court
to keep the tribunals within bounds, A reasoned order is a
desirable condition of judicial disposal."

"If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the
said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest
officer may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of
power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an
effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if its
discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be
subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order
will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least
a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this
only safeguard."

"There is an essential distinction between a court and an
administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things
objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or
expediency; but an executive officer generally looks at
things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. The
habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be
expected to change from function to function or from act to
act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be
imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affect-
ing the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to
give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appel- late
courts invariably reasons are given, except when they
dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because
the appellate or revisional court agrees with the reasoned
judgment of the subordinate court or there are no legally
permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same
reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as
often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and
does not give any reasons."

Page 13 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

25. With reference to an order of affirmance the learned
Judge observed that where the original tribunal gives rea-
sons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the
revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons
and that what is essential is that reasons shall be given by
an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by refer-
ence to those given by the original tribunal.

26. This matter was considered by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bhagat Raja case (supra) where also the order
under challenge had been passed by the Central
Government in exercise of its revisional powers under
Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957 read with rules 54 and 55 of the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Dealing with the question
as to whether it was incum- bent on the Central
Government to give any reasons for its decision on review
this Court has observed:

"The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the
supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art. 227 of
the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court
under Art. 136. It goes without saying that both the High
Court and this Court are placed under a great
disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is
dismissed curtly by the use of the single word "rejected", or
"dismissed". In such a case, this Court can probably only
exercise its appeallate jurisdiction satisfactorily by
examining the entire records of the case and after giving a
hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal.
This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of
dealing with the appeal."

32. In Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India
Limited case (supra) this Court was dealing with an appeal
against the order of the Central Government on a revision
application under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. This Court
has laid down:

"It is now settled law that where an authority makes
an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function it must
record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every
quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons." (P 495)
"If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative
authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of
cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law they

Page 14 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

may have to be so replaced, it is essential that
administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair
and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by
their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons
in support of the orders made by them. Then along
administrative authorities and tribunals, exercising quasi-
judicial function will be able to justify their existence and
carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in
the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be
given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi
alteram partera, a basic principle of natural justice which
must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must
be observed in its proper spirit and merepretence of
compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of
law."

35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate
that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the
approach of this Court is more in line with that of the
American Courts. An important consideration which has
weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative
authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record
the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is
subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the
Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would
enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise
the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole
consideration. The other considerations which have also
weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the
requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee
consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the
decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in
decision making. In this regard a distinction has been
drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and
authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that
a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced
by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an
executive officer generally looks at things from the
standpoint of policy and expediency.

36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative
authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-
judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of
its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority.

Page 15 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

But the other considerations, referred to above, which have
also weighed with this Court in holding that an
administrative authority must record reasons for its
decision, are of no less significance. These considerations
show that the re- cording of reasons by an administrative
authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes
chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness
in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would
apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be
confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision
or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement
that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an
administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions
irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to
appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be
added that it is not required that the reasons should be as
elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent
and nature of the reasons would depend on particular
facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the
reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the
authority has given due consideration to the points in
controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in
a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The
appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order,
need not give separate reasons if the appellate or
revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in
the order under challenge.

39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to
prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fairplay in
action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about re-
cording of reasons for its decision by an administrative
authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this
object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring
a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making.
Keep- ing in view the expanding horizon of the principles of
natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement
to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of
natural justice which govern exercise of power by
administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are
not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends
upon the particular statutory framework whereunder
jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative
authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power
by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial
or quasi- judicial functions the legislature, while conferring

Page 16 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger
public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the
administrative authority be recorded in the order and be
communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense
with such a requirement. It may do so by making an
express provision to that affect as those contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of
Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified
authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment.
Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication
from the nature of the sub- ject matter, the scheme and the
provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying
such a provision would outweight the salutary purpose
served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said
requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a
case.

40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that
except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed
with expressly or by necessary implication, an
administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.”

12. Upon harmonious consideration of the facts of the present
case read with the position of law, as referred above, this is a fit
case to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The impugned orders are non-speaking
orders; violative of principles of natural justice, are required to be
quashed and set aside.”

10. Considering the aforesaid factual position which is not in

dispute, the impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated

11.01.2016 and the Revisional Authority dated 21.06.2016 being

unreasoned orders are non-speaking orders and are violative of

principles of natural justice and are required to be quashed and set

aside which are hereby quashed and set aside in exercise of powers

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The matter is remanded

back to the Appellate Authority to decide the Appeal Bearing no. R-13-

Page 17 of 18
C/SCA/5594/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/08/2026

1/2015 preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt

of this order, independently and in accordance with law.

11. This Court has otherwise not opined on the merits of the

matter.

The present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to

the aforesaid extent.

(VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)
KUMKUM

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: KUMKUM MAHENDRA SHARMA(HC02349), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 11/08/2026 17:05:18

Page 18 of 18