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Supreme Court of India

SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE AND ANOTHERversusD.P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

Citation
1988 INSC 364
Decided
12 December 1988
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Section 14 read with Section 20(3) of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 bars the grant or renewal of any permit for a contract carriage, including special permits under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, thereby conferring a monopoly on the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.

Summary

D.P. Sharma, owner of a public service vehicle, applied for a special permit under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Regional Transport Authority refused, invoking the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, which it said barred such permits. A single judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed Sharma’s writ petition, but the Division Bench reversed, holding that only vehicles with a special permit before the Act’s commencement were excluded from the definition of ‘contract carriage’ and thus a special permit could still be granted. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, interpreting section 3(g) of the Karnataka Act to mean that the phrase “has been issued” refers to permits issued after the Act’s commencement, and held that section 14 read with section 20(3) of the Karnataka Act prohibits the grant or renewal of any permit for a contract carriage, including special permits, thereby giving a monopoly to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and Sharma’s writ petition dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether, after the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 came into force, a special permit under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 can be granted.
  • Interpretation of the phrase ‘has been issued’ in section 3(g) of the Karnataka Act – does it refer to permits issued before or after the Act’s commencement.
  • Whether a public service vehicle without a pre‑existing special permit falls within the definition of ‘contract carriage’ under section 3(g) and is thus subject to the Act’s prohibition on permits.
  • Whether section 14 read with section 20(3) of the Karnataka Act bars the grant or renewal of any permit, including special permits, for contract carriages.

Legislation cited

Subjects

special permitcontract carriageKarnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) ActMotor Vehicles Actmonopolyinterpretation of 'has been'acquisition of contract carriagespublic service vehiclepermit renewal

Judgment

       SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,                                  I
A         1
        '      BANGALORE AND ANOTHER
                           v.
                D.P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

          ··~
                            DECEMBER 12, 1988
B
                [M.M. DUTT AND S. NATARAJAN, JJ.]

          Motor Vehicles Act 1939: Sections 62, 63 and 63(6)-'Special
    permit' grant 'of~Whether permissible after Karnataka Contract Car-
    riages Acquisition Act 1976 came into force. '                   ·
c          Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Att 1976: Sections
    3(g), 3(m), 14 and 20(3)-'Contract Carriage'-'Special Permit'-
    Jssuance of--Undersection 63(6)-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-:-Permissibi-
    lity of.

D         Words and Phrases-'Has been'-Meaning of.

          Respondent No. 1, the owner of a public service vehicle, made an
    application to the Regional Transport Authority for the grant of a
    'special· permit' under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
    The Regional Transport Authority rejected the said application on the
£   ground that the provisions of the Karnataka Contract Carriages
    (Acquisition) Act, 1976 prohibited the grant of such permit.

           Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of refusal, respondent No. 1
    filed a writ petition in the High Court and a Single Judge of the High
    Court allowed the writ petition and directed the Regional Transport
F   Authority to consider the application of respondent No. 1 for the grant
    of a special permit.
                                                                                     I
          The Regional Transport Authority preferred a writ appeal. The
    Division Bench of the High Court taking the view that the intention of
    the Legislature was that only a public service vehicle in relation to
G   which a special permit had been issued when the 1976 Act came into
    force and which was not operating as a stage carriage should be ac-
    quired, held that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special
    permit had not been issued when the Act came into force would not
    come within the definition of 'contract carriage' under section 3(g) of
    the Act and the prohibition contained in section 20 of the Act against the
H   grant of contract carriage permit would not extend to the grant of
                                      1038
               SECY.; REGIONAL TPT .. AUTHORITY v. D.P. SHARMA             1039

     special permit under sub-section 6 of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles
                                                                                   A
     Act. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal.

           The Regional Transport Authority appealed by special leave to
     this Court. On the question: whether after the coming into force of the
     Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, a special permit
     under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 can be granted            B
     under the Act.                                       "

           Allowing the appeals,

           HELD: 1. Section 14 read with Section 20(3) of the Karnataka
     Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 confers a monopoly on the
     Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation to run vehicles as con-            c
     tract carriages. [IOSOA]

           2. Section 14 read with section 20(3) of the Act clearly prohibits
     the grant of renewal of any permit for the running of any contract
     carriage. [I049G]                                                             D

           3. The High Court was not therefore right in its view that a public
     service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not been Issued
     when the Act came into force, would not com~ within the defmition of
     'contract carriage' in section 3(g) and the prohibition contained in Sec-
     tion 20 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage permit cannot
     extend to grant of special permit under Section 63( 6) of the Motor
     Vehicles Act. [IOSOB-CJ

           4. Under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3(g) of the Act if a special
     permit under Section 63(6) or a temporary permit l!nder Section 62(1)
     or sub-section (1-C) of Section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act has been       F
\    issued, it will came within the purview of the definition of 'contract
     carriage'. [1046C-D]                                     ·

           5. If a special permit under Section 62(1) or under Section 63(6)
     of the Motor Vehicles Act was in force on January 30, 1976 in respect of
     a stage carriage, such a stage carriage will not be a 'contract carriage' G
     within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act. [1046D]

           6. Whether the expression 'has been' occurring in a provision of
     a statute denotes .transaction prior to the enactment of the statute in
.,   question or a transaction after the coming into force of the statute will
     depend upon the intention of the Legislature to be gathered from the          H
               I.




    1040            SUPREME COURT REPORTS               I1988) Supp. 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                       !
    provision in .which the said expression occurs or from the other provi-
A
    sions of the statute. [1046H; 1047A)

           In the instant case, the .words 'has been' contemplate the issuance
    of a special permit or a temporary permit as preferred to in clauses (i)
    and ·(ii) of Section 3(g) of the Act after the enactment of the Act .which is
B   clear from exclusion clause (ii) of Section 3(g) .which excludes a stage
    carriage from the definitio11 of 'contract carriage', if special permits
    issued under section 62(1) or Section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act
    .were in force on January 30, 1976. [1049F-G)

          7. The .words 'contract carriage occurring in Section 3(m) must
    be read in ihe light of the. defmition as contained in section 3(g) of the
c   Act. so· read, it is manifest that sectilin 14 read .with section 20(3) of the ·
    Act clearly bars the making of any application for a permit or for
    renewal of an existing permit for the running of a vehicle, .whether a .
    contract carriage or a stage carriage, as a contract carriage. [ 1049D-E]

         State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy, [1978[ I SCR 641
    and Athlumney Ex parte Wilson, [1898[ 2 QB 547 referred to.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
    3337-38 of 1982.

E         From the Judgments and order. dated 5.7.80 and 3.2.1981 of the
    Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 543/1976 and 1217 of 1981
    respectively.

          R.N. Narasimamurthy, Attorney General and P.R. Ramasesh
    for the Appellants.
F
         G.L. Sanghi, A.K. Sen, H.B. Datar, K.R. Nagaraja,                                 ,-
    N. Ganpathy, K.R. Nambiar, R.P. Wadh.wani, N.D.B: Raju,
    R. Ranga S.wamy, R.B. Datar and Ms. C.K. Sucharita for the
    Respondents.
           :.. 1
G          R.S. Hegde for the impleded party.
           '
           The
           , Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          DUTT, J. These appeals by special leave preferred at the
    instance of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore,
H   and the State of Karnataka, are directed against the judgment of the
                            '.<


              SECY., REGIONAL TPT. AUTHORITYv. D.P. SHARMA [DUTT, J.] 1041
,   I

        Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the appeal            A
        preferred by the appellants and affirming that of the learned Single
        Judge of the High Court whereby the Rule issued on the writ petition
        filed by the respondent No. I D.P. Sharma was made absolute.

              The respondent No. I, who is the owner of a public service
                                                                                    B
        vehicle, made an application on October 10, 1976 to the Regional
        Transport Authority for the grant of a special permit under sub-section
        (6) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the period from
        November 15, 1976 to November 22, 1976. The Regional Transport
        Authority rejected the said application on the ground that the provi-
        sions of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976,
        hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', prohibit the grant of such permits.   c
        The respondent No. 1 being aggrieved by the refusal by the Regional
        Transport Authority to grant a special permit filed a writ petition in
        the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court ailowed the
        writ petition and directed the Regional Transport Authority to con-
        sider the application of the respondent No. l for the grant of special
                                                                                    D
        permit.

              Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellants
        preferred a writ appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. The
        Bench took the view that the intention of the Legislature was that only
        a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had been
                                                                                    E
        issued when the Act came into force and which was not operating as a
        stage carriage should be acquired. Accordingly, it was held that a
        public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not
        been issued when the Act came into force would not come within the
        definition of 'contract carriage' under section 3(g) of the Act and the
        prohibition contained in section 28 of the Act against the grant of
                                                                                    F
        contract carriage .permit would not extend to the grant of special
        permit under sub-section (6) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
        In that view of the matter, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal
        preferred by the appellants.

              The only point that is involved in these appeals is whether after
        the coming into force of the Act, a special permit under section 63(6)      G
        of the Motor Vehicles Act can be granted under the Act.

             The Act is to provide for the acquisition of contract carriages and
        for matters incidental, ancillary or subservient thereto. The preamble
        provides, inter a/ia as follows:
                                                                                    H
    1042         • SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                    (   '

                 "Whereas contract carriages and certain other categories of
A
                 public service vehicles are being operated in the State in a
                 manner highly· detrimental and prejudicial to public
                 interest;

                        And Whereas with a view to prevent such misuse and
B                 also to provide betier facilities for the transport of passen-
              .. gers by road and to give effect to the policy of the State
                 ·towards securing that the ownership and control of the
                  material resources of the community are so distributed as
                  best to subserve the common good and that the operation               .r
                                                                                        ')
              ·' of the economic system does not ~esult in the concentration
              .! .of wealth· and ineans of production to the comm oil ,detri- ·.
c            l ;ment;                 . '
              . 1      And Whereas for the aforesaid purposes it is consi-
                 dered necessary to provide for the acquisition of contract
                 carriages and certain other categories of public service               •
D                vehicles in the State and for matters incidential, 1tncillary or
                 subservient thereto;"
             '
        It is apparent from the preamble of the Act that the primary
  object of the Act is acquisition of contract carriages with a view to
  preventing misuse and also to provide better facilities for the transport
E of bassengers by road. Besides the preamble, we may refer to the State-
  ment of Objects and Reasons for the Act which will show the back-
  ground for the. enactment of the Act. The Statement of Objects and
  Reasons for the Act is as follows:

                  "A large number of contract carriages were being operated
F                'in the State to the detriment of public interest and were
                  also functioning stealthily as stage carriages. This ~ad to be
                  prevented. Article 39(b) and (c) enjoins upon the State to
                  see that the ownership and control of the material
                 'resources of the community are so distributed as best to
                  subserve the common good and that the operation of the
G                 economic system does not result in the concentration of
                  wealth to the common detriment.

                        In' view of the aforesaid it was considered necessary ·
                  io acquire the contract carriages run by private operators. ·
H                      Accordingly the Karnataka Contract Carriages
              SECY., REGIONAL TPT. AUTHORITY v. D.P. SHARMA'{DUTT, J.I 1043·.
    '
                    (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1976 was promulgated. The Bill
                                                                                  A
                  ~seeks to replace the Ordinance."


               The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged before this.
        Court and a Constitution Bench of Seven Judges in State of Karnaiaka
        v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy, [1978] 1SCR641 upheld the validity of the
        Act. In considering the question of validity of the Act, this Court B•
                                                                                     "
        referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act and on
        the basis of various affidavits filed· on behalf of the State, observed that
        the operators were misusing their permits granted fo them as contract
        carriage permits, and that in many cases the vehicles were used as: ,
        stage carriages picking up and dropping passengers in the way. Accord:
        ingly, the Legi~lature thought that to prevent such misuse and to pro-
        vide for better facilities to transport passengers and to the general c          ,
        public, it was necessary to acquire the vehicles, permits·and all rights.
        title and interest of the contract carriage operators etc.

              Keeping in view the objects and reasons for the enactment of the
        Act, we have to consider whether after the'coming into force of the       D·
        Act, it is permissible to grant a special permit under section 68(6) of
        the Motor Vehicles Act. But before we do that we may refer to the
        Scheme of the Act.

              We have already referred to the preamble to the Act providing
        for the acquisition of contract carriages. The Act shall be deemed to E
        have come into force on January 30, 1976 as provided in sub-section
        (3) of section 1 of the Act. Section 2 contains a declaration that the Act
        is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the
        principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitu-
        tion of India and the acquisition therefor of the contract carriages and
        other property reforred to in section 4 of the Act. Section 3 is the F..
        definition section. Clause (g) of section 3 is an extended definition of
        "contract carriage' as given in section 3(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
        and we shall presently refer to and deal with the definition in detail.
        Clause (h) of section 3 of the Act defines .'contract carriage operator'.
        Under clause (m) of section 3 of the Act, 'permit' means the permit
        granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, authorising the use of a vehi- G · ·
        cle as a contraci carriage. Section 4 is the vesting provision of contract
        carriages etc. Section 6 provides for the determination of the amount
        for the vesting of the acquired property under section 4 of the Act.
        Section 14 bars the issuance of a fresh permit or renewal of the exist-
        ing permit for the running of any contract carriage. Sub-section (1) of
        section 20 provides inter alia that all contract carriage permits granted H



'
      1044          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                       I
      or renewed in respect of any vehicle, other than a vehicle acquired
A
      under the Act or belonging to the Karnataka State Road Transport
      Corporation or referred io in section 24 of the Act, shall stand cancel-
      led. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 provides that "no officer or authority
      shall invite any application or entertain any such application of persons
      other than the Corporation for the grant of permit for the running of
B     any contract carriage".

             It has been already noticed that the Act provides for acquisition
       of contract carriages. The words 'contract carriage' have been defined
     , in section 3(g) of the Act as follows:

                  "3(g). 'contract carriage' shall have the same meaning as
c              .. in clause(3) of section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act and
               .. includes-                           ·

                          (i) a public service vehicle in relation to which a
                    special permit has been issued under sub-section (6) of sec-
D                   tion 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act;

                          (ii) a public service vehicle in relation to which a
                    temporary permit has been issued under sub-section (1) of
                    section 62 or sub-section ( lC) of section 68F of the Motor
                    Vehicles Act;
E
                          (iii) a public service vehicle without a contract car-
                    riage permit but which is specified as contract carriage in
                    the concerned certificate of registration;

                         (iv) any right in or over such vehicles or moveable
F.                  property; but does not include,

                        -(i) a tourist vehicle in relation to which a permit has
                    been issued under sub-section (7) of section 63 of. the
                    Motor Vehicles Act;

G                          (ii) a vehicle opera.ting as a stage carriage in relation
                    to which on the 30th day of January,· 1976 a temporary
                    contract carriage permit or a special permit issued under
                    sub-section ( 1) of section 62 or sub-section (6) of section 63
                    respectively of the Motor Vehicles Act, is in force;

H                         {iii) a motor cab;"



                                                                                           '
                 SECY., REGIONAL TPT. AUTHORITY v. D.P. SHARMA [DUTT, J.J 1045
        \

                  Under section 3(g), the 'contract carriage' shall, in the first
            place, have the same meaning as in section 2(3) of the Motor Vehicles       A "·
            Act, which provides as follows:

                        "2(3). 'contract carriage' means a motor vehicle which car-
                        ries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a
                        contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a   B
                        whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum-

                        (i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any
                        route or distance, or

                        (ii) from one point to another, and in either case without
                        stopping to pick up,                                            c
                              or set down along. the line of route passengers not
                        included in the contract, and includes a motor cab notwith-
                        standing that the passengers may pay separate fares;"
                                                                                        D
                  In the secondlplace, section 3(g) gives an extended meaning to
            'contract carriage'. Under the extended meaning, 'contract carriage'
            will include a public service vehicle in relation to which a special
            permit has been issued under section ( 6) of section 63 of the Motor
            Vehicles Act or in relation to which a temporary permit has been
            issued under sub-section (I) of section 62 or sub-section (IC) of sec-      E
            tion 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act. It also includes a public service
            vehicle without a contract carriage permit but which is specified as
            contract carriage in the concerned certificate of registration. We are
            not referring to clauses (iv) and (v) of the extended definition, as the
            same are not relevant for our purpose.
                                                                                         F
'   '             A 'public service vehicle' has been defined in section 2(25) of the
            Motor Vehicles Act as meaning any motor vehicle used or adapted to
            be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes
            a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. Thus, it is apparent
            from the ·definition of 'public service vehicle' that it includes a contract
            carriage and a stage carriage as well. Under clauses (i) and (ii) of G
            section 3(g) of the Act if a special permit under section 63(6) or a
            temporary permit under section 62(1) or sub-section (IC) ofsection
            68F of the Motor Vehicles Act has been issued, it will come within the
            purview of the definition of 'contract carriage'. In other words, if a
            'contract carriage' or a 'stage carriage' within the meaning of the
    ')
            Motor Vehicles Act has been issued a special permit or a temporary          H
     1046           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                    {


     permit, as.referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g), such 'con-
A
     tract carriage' or 'stage carriage' will be a 'contract carriage' within the
     meaning of section 3(g) of the Act.

         Now we may refer to the latter part of the definition of 'contract
   carriage' under section 3(g) of the Act which excludes certain vehicles
B from the definition of 'contract carriage'. The exclusion that has been
   provided in clause (ii) is important for our purpose. It excludes a stage
   carriage in respect of which a temporary contract carriage permit
   under section 62( l) or a special permit under section 63( 6) of the
   Motor Vehicles Act is in force on January 30, 1976, that is, the date on
   which the Act is deemed to have come into force.· Under clauses (i)
   and (ii) of section 3(g) of the Act, which form a part of the extended
C, definition of 'contract carriage', a public service vehicle, that is to say,
   a contract carriage or a stage carriage in .respect of which a special
   permit under section 63(6) or a temporary permit under section 62(1)
   or section 68F( lC) of the Motor Vehicles Act has been issued, will
   come within the meaning of 'contract carriage' under the Act. On the
D other harid, if a special permit under section 62(1) or under section
   63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act was in force on January 30, 1976 in
   respect of a stage carriage, such a stage carriage will not be a 'contract
   carriage' within the meaning of section 3(g) of the Act.
               '·
          The High Court seems to think that if any special permit had not
E   been granted to a.public service vehicle when the Act came into force,
    such a vehicle .will· not .come within the meaning of the definition of
    'contract carriage' under section; 3(g). This view of the High Court is
    not correct. In clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g), the expression 'has
    been issued' occurs. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General
    of Karnataka that in view of the expression 'has .been issued', clauses
F   (i) and (ii) contemplate the issuance of a special permit or a temporary
                                                                                        I •
    permit after the coming into force of the Act. It does not include the
    issuance of a special permit or a temporary permit earlier than the date
    of the commencement of the Act. The learned Advocate General has
    placed reliance on an English decision in re Athlumney Ex parte
    Wilson, [1898] 2 QB 547. In that case, the words 'where a date has
G   been proved under the principal Act' came to be construed and it was
    observed "But this fotm of words is often used to refer, not to a past
    time which preceded the enactment, but to a time which is made past
    by anticipation a time which will have become a past time only when
    the event occurs on which the statute is to operate." In our opinion,
    whether the expression 'has been' occurring in a provision of a statute
                                                                                        ('
H   denotes transaction prior to the enactment of the statute in question or
           SECY., REGIONAL TPT. AUTHORITY v. D.P. Sl'!ARMA (DUTT, J.J' 1047

     a transaction after the coming into force· of the statute will depend A
     upon the intention of the Legislature to be gathered from the provision·
     in which the said expression occurs or from the other provisions of the
     statute.

           In the instant case, the words 'has been' contemplate the
     issuance of a special permit or a temporary permit as referred to in         B
     clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g) of the Act after the enactment of the
     Act which is clear from the exclusion clause (ii) of section 3(g) which
     excludes a stage carriage from the definition of 'contract carriage', if
     special permits issued under section 62(1) or section 63(6) of the
     Motor Vehicles Act were in force on January 30, 1976. It is difficult to
     interpret clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g) as contemplating the is-      c
     suance of a temporary permit or a-special permit, as referred to therein
     before the coming into force of the Act. Merely because of the use of
     the words 'has been' in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(g), such an
     interpretation is not possible to be made, particularly in view of the
     legislative intent apparent from the exclusion clause (ii), namely, that
     the Legislature only excluded a stage carriage in respect of which a         D
     temporary contract carriage or a special permit issued under section
     62(1) or 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Ad was in force on January 30,
     1976.

           It has, however, been urged by Mr. A.K. Sen, learned Counsel
     appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, that a stage carriage           E
     vehicle in respect of which a special permit has been granted, .is
     excluded from the operation of the Act. Counsel submits that the Act
     only contemplates the acquisition of a contract carriage within the
     meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act and not a stage carriage in respect
     of which a special permit was or has been granted. In support of his
     contention, the learned Counsel has placed strong reliance on the            F
     definition of the word 'permit' under section 3(m) of the Act, as mean-
     ing the permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, authorising the
     use of a vehicle as a contract carriage. It is submitted by him that the
     word 'permit' means the permit granted for the use of a vehicle as a
     contract carriage under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is urged by the
     learned Counsel that the word 'permit' used in the different provisions      G
     of the Act will have the same meaning of the word as defined in section
     3( m), that is to say, the permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act
     for the use of a vehicle as a contract carriage.

           In section 3(h) 'contract carriage operator' has been defined as
-)
     follows:                                                                     H
                                                                                    !



         1048        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
    '.
                    "3(h). 'contract carriage operator' means an operator ·
A
                    holding one cir more contract carriage permit and includes
                    any person in whose name a public service vehicle is
                    registered and is specified as a contract carriage in the
                    certificate or registration of such vehicle;"

B               According to the learned Counsel, the word 'permit' in section
         3(h) refers only to permit granted in respect of a contract carriage
         under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 4 is the vesting provision of
         contract carriages. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 4 provides        /
         as follows:

                    "4. Vesting of contract carriages, etc.-(1) On and from
c                   such date as may be specified by the State Government in
                    this behalf by notification in respect of any contract car-
                    riage operator,

                    (a) every contract carriage owned or operated by such con-
D                   tract carriage operator along with the permit or the certifi-
                    cate of registration or both as the case may be shall vest in
                    the State Government absolutely free from all encum-
                    brances;"

    Counsel sub.mi ts that the word 'permit' in clause (a) refers to a permit
E .granted to a vehicle for the use of a contract carriage under the Motor
  . Vehicles Act. In other words, the sum and substance of the argument
    of Mr. Sen is that the word 'permit' in section 3(m) relates to the
   permit granted to a vehicle for the use as a contract carriage under the
   Motor VehiclesAct and the definition with this interpretation should
    be applied to the word 'permit' occurring in the different provisions of
F the Act including section 3(h) and.should also be applied to the word
    occuring in section· 14 of the Act. Section 14 provides as follows:

                    "14. Fresh permit or renewal of the existing permit
                    barred.-Except otherwise provided in this Act

G                         ( 1) no person shall on or after the commencement of
                    this Act apply for any permit or fresh permit or for renewal
                    of an existing permit for the running of any contract car-
                    riage in the State; and

                          (2) every application for the grant of a permit or
H                   fresh permit or for the renewal of the existing permit and          <-
                                                                         ,.,.


          SECY., REGIONAL TPT. AUTHORITY v. D.P. SHARMA [DUTT, {J 1049

                all appeals or revisions arising therefrom relating thereto
                                                                                A
                made or preferred before the commencement of this Act
                and pending in any court or with any officer, authority or
                Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act shall
                abate."

          It is submitted that only the grant or renewal of a permit in         B
    respect of a 'contract carriage' within the meaning of the Motor Vehi-
    cles Act is prohibited under section 14 of the Act, and such prohibition
    does not relate to a stage carriage for the running of the same as a
    contract carriage.

          We are unable to accept the contention. If the interpretation as
    given by Mr. Sen of the definition of the word 'permit', under section
                                                                                c
    3(m) of the Act is accepted, it will make the definition of the words
    'contract carriage' under section 3(g) of the Act meaningless. and
    nugatory and also set at naught the object of the Act and the clear
    intention of the Legislature to acquire a stage carriage as well in '
    respect of which a special permit or a temporary permit, as referred to D
    in clauses (i) or (ii) of section 3(g), has been granted. The words
)   'contract carriage' occurring in section 3(m) must, in our opinion, be
    read in the light of the definition as contained in section 3(g) of the
    Act. So read, it is manifest that section 14 read with section 20(3) of
    the Act clearly bars the making of any application for a permit or fresh
    permit or for renewal of an existing permit for the running of a vehicle, E
    whether a contract carriage or a stage carriage, as a contract carriage.

          It is not disputed before us that the Act does not contemplate the
    vesting of stage carriages simpliciter. But section 14 read with section
    20(3) of the Act clearly prohibits the grant or renewal of any permit for
    the running of any contract carriage. A stage carriage in respect of        F
    which a temporary contract carriage permit or a special permit under
    section 62( 1) or section 63( 6) respectively of the Motor Vehicles Act
    was in force on January 30, 1976, has been excluded from the defini-
    tion of a 'contract carriage' and, consequently, from the operation of
    the Act by virtue of the extFnsion clause (ii) under section 3(g) of the
    Act. But in view of section 14 read with section 20(3) of the Act, after    G
    such a temporary contract carriage permit or a special permit ceases to
    be in force, such permit shall not be renewed or a fresh permit shall not
    be granted for the running of the stage carriage as a contract carriage.
    The owner of the vehicle can, however, run it as a stage carriage after
    obtaining a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. But whether a spe-
    cial permit was granted in respect of a stage carriage or not, no such      H
    1050         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A permit can be granted in respect of a stage carriage for the running of it
    as a contract carriage. Jn other words, section 14 read with section 20(3 l
    of the Act confers a monopoly on the Karnataka State Road Transport
    Corporation to run vehicles as contract carriages.

           The High Court is not, therefore, right in its view that a public
B
    service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not been
    issued when the Act came into force, would not come within the de-
    finition of 'contract carriage' in section 3(g) and the prohibition con-
    tained in section 20 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage            /
    permit cannot extend to grant of special permit under section 63(6) of
    the Motor Vehicles Act.
c
          Eut !Jefore we conclude, we may observe that but for the object
    of the Act as stated above, it would have been very difficult for us to
    interpret the provisions of the Act in view of bad drafting of the same.

        Be that as it may, for the reasons aforesaid, these appeals are
D allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ
  petition filed by the respondent No. 1 in the High Court is dismissed.
  There will, however, be no order as to costs.

    N.V.K.                                                  Appeals allowed.




                                                                                  I


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