Holding

The prosecution proved the charge under Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act, and the court may presume the appellant's knowledge of smuggling under Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act.

Summary

Gumman Mal was found to be in possession of 28 gold biscuits with foreign markings hidden in a secret chamber of his safe. He admitted that the gold was brought from outside the country by an unknown person and that he held no permit under the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control Administrator. He was convicted under Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962, while his conviction under the Gold Control Act was set aside for lack of sanction. The principal issue was whether, in the absence of the statutory presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, the court could infer his knowledge that the gold was smuggled by applying Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances—foreign markings, concealment, and the appellant’s refusal to disclose the source—sufficiently raised a presumption of knowledge, satisfying the element of knowledge under Section 135(1)(b)(ii). It also ruled that the nine‑month rigorous imprisonment sentence could not be reduced. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution can prove the appellant's knowledge or belief that the gold biscuits were smuggled and imported without a permit in the absence of the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act.
Whether Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act may be invoked to draw a presumption of knowledge against the appellant.
Whether the nine‑month rigorous imprisonment sentence warrants any reduction.

Legislation cited

Customs Act, 1962s. 111, s. 123, s. 135(1)(b)(ii)
Gold (Control) Act, 1968s. 85(ii), s. 8(i)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 114

Subjects

Customs ActSmugglingPresumption of knowledgeEvidence ActGold Control ActRigorous imprisonmentBurden of proof

Judgment

1005

SHAH GUMMAN MAL A
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
February 6, l 98U

[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosH,\L, JJ.]
• B
Custoins Act I 962, Section 135 ( 1) (b) & Erh'ence Act, 1872, Sections 106
and 114-Preniises searched-Gold 'biscuits with /oreign niarkings recovered-
Accused not disclosing identity of person who gu ve the gold-Whether court
can presume that the gold was smuggled and in1ported without permit.

An offence under section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 is punish-
,. able if the offender, acquires possession of or is in any way concerned
in carrying removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or
c
purchasing or in any other manner deaJ.ing \vith any goods which he kno\vs
or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111.
Section 111 enumerates the categories. of goods which are imported into
India and are liable to confiscation.
The Central Excise officials searched the house of the appellant and found D
in a secret chamber of an iron safe, \vhich was opened by him \'i'ith the keys
in his possession, a. bundle containing 28 gold biscuits and a half biscuit, all
of which bore foreign markings. In another secret chamber were found gold
earnings in plnstic boxes and a bundle of currency notes. When questioned
in the presence of the witnesses he stated that he had been receiving gold
biscuits from some unkno\vn person from Bombay and that the other artides
belonged to him and his mother. He admitted that be had no general or E
special permit from either the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control
Administrator to import or keep foreign gold. The statement of the appellant
was recorded. Thereafter the appellant was prosecuted for offences under
Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act. 1962 and Section 85(ii) read
with Section 8(i) of the Gold Control Act, 1968.

The Magistrate convicted and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprison~ F
ment for nine months under each count. On appeal, the Sessions Judge set
aside the conviction and sentence under the Gold Control Act as the requisite
sanction for prosecution was not accorded, but maintained the conviction and
sentence nnder Section 135(i)(b){ii) of the Customs Act, which order was
confirmed by the High Court in revision.

In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :· G
( 1) that if the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act is not
available to the prosecution, then there is no legal evidence to show that
the appellant bad any knowledge or had any reason to believe that the goods
were imported or were smuggled without a lawful permit and (2) as the
case had been going on for eight years, a lenient view on the question
of sentence may be taken; while on behalf of the respondent-State it was sub-
mitted that the fact that the gold bore foreign markings and was recovered H
from the possession of the appellant who had admitted in his statement
before the Customs Officers that some unknown person had given it to him,
' 1006 SUPR1~i\1E C01JR r RLPOR r~ [i 980] 2 s.c.R.

A \Vould itself raise a suflicient presumption to attribute knov.·ll:dge to the
a.ppel11.nt that the gold i.vris s~nuggled wilhvut any permit.

_Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) The prosecuti.Jn has clearly proved the charge under Section
135(1) (b)(ii) of the Customs Act. [1014Dl
B (2) The sentence being one only of rigorous imprisonment for nine
month~. there i~ no room for any reduction thereof. [1014E-1
(3) The fact as to ho\v the appellant came into possession of the gold
and whether it was import,~d or not being v,,·ithin the special knowledge of
the appellant, if he frriled to disclose the identity of the person who gave
him the gold, it Vias open to the Court to presume under sections 106 and
114 of the Evidence Act that the appellant kncv..· that the gold in his possession
c \vas srnnggled and in1po1te<l without a permit. [lOliJE-_F]
( 4) The broad e!Icct of the application of the basic principles under-
lying section 106 of the Evidence A.ct would be that the onus is disch:trged
if the prosecution ndduces only so. much evidence, circumstantial or direct,
as is sufficient to raise a. presumption in its f:ivour \vith regard to the existence
0

of facts sought to be proved. [1012F:
0 l.rsarda.r DauTat Rani &: Ors. v. Th~ [h1io11 of India & Or.r. [1962] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 358: Co1111r:i.uiuuer ,)f lncon1t' Tax. ,i.Jadras v. lvle.urs Best & Co.
[1966] 2 S.C.R. 480: Collector of Cnito1ns, 1'It1dras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormul
[1974] 3 S.C.R. 833: Labchand Dl1a11p(lf Si11gh Jain v. -The State of Maha-
rashtra [1975] 2 S.C.R. 907; Bnl:11n(d Ja11111ados Batra v. State o_f ,\faherashtra
[1976] 1 S.C.R. 539 reft·rrcd to; Bl'rluun Khurslied Pt'sikaka v. State of
Bor11bay rt955] 1 S.C.R. 613; Stat(' of Punjeb v. Uian Ch,,.nd & 01hcrs Ct!. A.
E 195/62 dispo~cd of on April 2, 1968 di<1tinguishcd.
In the instant case 1_hough the seizure v.-as not n1adc nnl"kr Section 111
of the Cu'itoms Act and the prosecution could not press into service the pre-
sumption arising from ~cction 123 of the Customs Act. It is proved that the
appellant \V<1~ in th~ possession of gold bi~cuits with foreign nuukings which
were kept in <l •.ccret chamb~r of the safe. a11d he admitted that the gold was
brought from outside the country and given to him by son1ebody, who~e identity
F be was not prerared to disclose. These circumstances are sufficient to raise a
presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act so as to attribute kno~v1edge
to the appellant that the gold was smuggled. [1014B-D]

CRIMINAL -APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 47 of
1974.
G Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
10-8-1973 of the Andhrn Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision
Case No. 648/72 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 992/72.
Dr. Y. S. Chitale and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant.
M. A. Khader and Venkatarao & G. N. Rao for the Respondent.
H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment dated August 18. 1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
GUMMAN MAL v. A.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) I 007

The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the High
Court and it is not necessary to repeat them all over again. The appel-
lant was tried by the Magistrate for offences under s. 135 (1) (b )(ii) of
the Customs Act, 1962 and s.85(ii) read withs. 8(i) of the Gold Con-
trol Act, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for nine months under
• each count. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently .
Sentences of fine were also imposed. The Sessions Judge, on appeal, B
set aside the conviction and sentence under the Gold Control Act and
' acquitted the appellant of that charge for the reason that the requisite
sanction for his prosecution was not accorded, but maintained the
conviction and sentence of the appellant under s. 135 (1) ( b) (ii) of
the Customs Act. Thereafter, the appellant went up in revision to
the High Court which confirmed the conviction and sentence upheld
c
by the Sessions Judge. Then the appellant moved this Court and
this appeal is by special leave.
The allegations made against the appellant may be briefly stated.
On 16-4-1971 P.W. 4, Superintendent of Central Excise issued a war-
rant (Ext. P-3) authorising P.W. 3 and another Inspectono proceed D
to the house of the appellant at 6.30 a.m. P. W. 3 calied P.W. 1 and
• one Nihalchand as mediators and informed them that the accused
had concealed gold biscuits of foreign origin in his house and hence
it was decided to search his house. When the search was conducted,
the accused was directed to produce the gold biscuits of foreign origin
in his possession. The accused denied that he possessed any but the E
Excise ofticials searched the house and found in a secret chamber
of an iiron safe, which was opened by the accused with the keys in
his possession, a bundle containing 28 gold biscuits and a half biscuit
marked as M. Os. 1-29. All these biscuits bore foreign markings.
In another secret chamber were found gold earrings in plastic boxes
and a bundle of currency notes. The accused was then questioned F
in the presence of the witnesses and he stated that he had been recei>-
ving gold biscuits from some unknown person from Bombay and that
the other articles belonged to him and his mother. On being ques-
tioned further, the accused admitted that he had no general or special
permit from the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control Admi- G
nistrator to import or keep foreign gold. The statement of the accus-
ed was recorded and is marked Ext. P4. Before launching a prose-
cution, the Collector of Central Excise issued a notice calling upon
·the appellant to show cause why M. Os. 1 to 51 be not confiscated
and penalty levied. The accused gave his explanation, Ext. P-7.
Thereafter, the Collector passed orders of adjudication confiscating H
the articles and imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000/. On appeal,
10-138 SCI/80
1008 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.

A the confiscation of jewellery and cash was set aside. Subse-
quently, PW 5, the Assistant Collector of Customs filed a complaint
for the prosecution of the appellant under the Customs Act. We
have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under
the Gold Control Act was set aside for lack of proper sanction. It
is also admitted by the prosecution in the instant case that as no •
B
seizure was made in accordance with the provisions of the Customs
Act, the presumption under s. 123 thereof was not available to the
prosecution.
Section 135(1) (b), under which the appellant has been convicted,
runs thus:-
c "135 (1) Without prejudice to any action that may be
taken under this Act, if any person-
(b) acquires possession of or is in any way concerned
in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, con-
cealing, selling or purchasing or in any other manner deal-
D ing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe
are liable to confiscation under section 111." •
Analysing the essential ingredients of clause (b), it is manifest
that before a conviction can be recorded under it, the prosecution
must prove that the accused has acquired possession of or is in any ·~
E way concerned in depositing, keeping, etc., any goods which he knows
or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under s. 111. Thus
in the instant case, as no presumption under s. 123 was available,
it was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant
was in possession of smuggled gold knowing full well that it was im-
ported from outside the country so as to fall within the ambit of s. 111.
F Dr. Chitale, appearing for the ,appellant, contended that if the pre-
sumption under s. 123 is not available to the prosecution, then there
is no legal evidence to show that the appellant had any knowledge
or had any reason to believe that the gocds were imported or were
smuggled without a lawful permit. The counsel appearing for the
G
State, however, submitted that the fact that the gold bore fore;gn
markings and was recovered from the possession of the appellant who
had admitted in his statement before the Customs officers that some
unknown person had given it to him, would itself raise a sufficient
presumption to attribute knowledge to the appellant that the gold was
smuggled without any permit. Although the question raised by the
H counsel for the parties is not free from difficulty, an overall consider-
ation of the special facts of the present case would show that there
could no difficulty in holding that having regard to the admissions
•

GUMMAN MAL V. A.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 1009

·made by the appellant and his subsequent conduct, the onus would A'
shift to the appellant to show that the gold found (ram him with foreign
markings was imported without any permit to his knowledge. This
will be the combined effect of the provisions of ss. 106 and 114 of
'!he Evidence Act. The matter was considered at great length in the
• case of Berham Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay(!) where
this Court holding that s. 106 could not be construed to place the B
'Onus on the accused to prove the prosecution case, observed as fol-
lows:-- · '
"Section I 06 of the Evidence Act cannot be construed
to mean that the accused has by reason of the circumstance
that the facts are especially within his own knowledge to c
prove that he has not committed the offence. (See At-
iygalle v. The King-A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 169, also In re :
Kanakasabai Pillai-A. I. R. 1940 Madras 1). It is for
the prosecution to prove that he has committed the offence
• and that burden is not in any manner whatsoever displaced
by section 106 of the Evidence Act." D
These observations were made wHh respect to the peculiar facts of
that case. It appears that what had happened in that case was tha~
the appellant was found to be guilty of an offence under the Prohibi-
tion Act and the only evidence to prove his guilt was that he was
smelling of alcohol. This Court held that it was for the prosecution E
to prove the. contravention of the provisions of the Prohibitpn Act and
to prove further that a particular intoxicant which was a liquor under
the Act, was consumed by the accused and merely because the accus-
ed knew what he had taken (which was a matter within his know-
·~. 1edge) could not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving
that the liquor consumed was an intoxicant as defined under the Act. F •
It is, therefore, clear that the observations made by this Court re-
garding the interpretation of s. 106 of the Evidence Act would not
apply to the facts of the present case. In the case of lssardas Dau/at
Ram & Ors. v. The Union of.India & Ors.(') this Court, after dis-
cussing the admitted circumstances of the case, found that the rele-
'Vant pieces of evidence would prove the guilty knowledge of the ac- G.
<CUsed. That was a case which arose under s. 178(A) of the Sea
-customs ;\cJ and this Court observed as follows : -
"If the gold now in question had been imported earlier
it would be extremely improbable that the gold would re-
main in the same shape of bars and with the same fineness H
(I) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613.
_, (2) [1962) Supp. (l) S.C.R. 358.
•

1 010 SUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1980J 2 s.c.R.

A as when imported after the passage of this length of time.
It was precisely for this reason that at the stage of the en- J
quiry before the Collector the principal point which was
urged on behalf of the appellants was to deny that the
seized gold was of foreign origin and it is the nature of the
defence that accounts for the order of the Collector dealing •
B almost wholly with the consideration of that question. In
order to reach his finding about the gold being smuggled,
the Collector has referred to the conduct of the appellants
. . . . . . These were undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence
which bore on the question regard:ng the character of the
' c gold, whether it was licit or illicit. Learned counsel is,
therefore, not right in his submission regarding the absence of
material before the Collector to justify the finding recorded
--
in paragraph 6 we have set out earlier."
The facts of the present case appear to us to be almost on a!I
fours with the facts of the case mentioned above. Here, also, the
D facts are that gold with foreign marking in the shape of biscuits with-
out indicating any change was recovered from the possession of the
appellant. Secondly, the appellant admitted that the gold was brought
from outside the country. The appellant further admitted that he did
not hold any permit for importing the gold and the plea iaken by him
was that some unknown person had delivered the gold to him. In view
E
of these circumstances and the fact as to how the accused came into
possession of the gold and whether it was imported or not being within
the special knowledge of the accused, if he failed to disclose the identity
of the person who gave him the gold, then it was open to the Court
to presume under ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act that the appel~
. F !ant knew that the gold in his possession was smuggled and imported ... ;--
without permit.
In The State of Punjab v. Gian Chand & Ors. (Criminal Appear
No. 195 of 1962 disposed of on 2-4-1968), while examining thtl

'G
validity of conviction and sentence under s. 167 ( 81) of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878, this Court held that as the accused did not claim l
any ownership over the gold and was a bullion merchant, the mere
fact that the gold had foreign markings would not be sufficient to prove
that the accused had knowledge that the gold was smuggled. In this
connection, this Court observed as follows : - •
"In our view, the High Court was right in its conclusion
H because the fact that none of the respondents claimed owner-
ship over the said gold could not necessarily mean either
that the gold was smuggled gold or that the respondents were
GUMMAN MAL v. A.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 1011

in possession thereof with the knowledge that it was so. The A
fact that the gold has foreign marks stamped on it can only
mean that the gold was foreign. But since such foreign gold
used to be imported before the present restrictions were im-
posed on its importation, it could have been imported with-
out any violation of law. Consequently, that fact alone
• B
would not establish either of the two ingredients of
s. 167(81)."
' The facts of this case are, however, clearly distinguishable from
-those of the present case. In the first place, in the case mentioned above,
the accused was a bullion merchant and it was in the very nature of
circumstances and as a part of his profession, natural for him to be in c
possession of gold. Secondly, the Court clearly held that during those
days foreign gold used to be freely imported in our country and therefore
the mere presence of foreign markings would not be snfficient to raise
a presumption under s. 106 of the Evidence Act so as to attribute
'knowledge to the accused that the gold was smuggled. In the instant case,
·the facts are quite different and so is the nature of the admission made D
by the appellant.
In a later decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax, Madras v. Messrs Best & Co.(') this Court observed as
•. t ,follows : -
"When sufficient evidence, either direct .or circumstantial, E
in respect of its contention was disclosed by the Revenue, ad-
verse inference could be drawn against the assessee if he
failed to put before the Department material which was in
his exclusive pos~ession. The process is described in tl1e law
of evidence as shifting of the onus in the course of a pro- F
ceeding from one party to the other."
(It is true that case arose under the provisions of the income Tax Act
1mt the principles laid down by this Court would apply equally to the
:facts of the present case. In the case of Collector of Customs, Madras &
-Ors. v. 'D. Bhoormull(') a case under the Customs Act, while dwelling
on the nature and purport of the onus which lay on the prosecutfon, G
cthis Court observed as follows : -
"It cannot be disputed that in p~oceeding for imposing
•penalties under clause (8) of s. 167 to which s. 178-A
does not apply; the burden of proving that the goods are
smuggled goods, is on the Department. This is a fundamental H
(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 480,
(2) [1974] 3 S.C.R. 833.
1012 SUPREME COURf REPORTS (1980) 2 S.C.R>.

A rule relating to proof in all criminal or quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings, where there is no statutory provision to the contra- I
rary. But in appreciating its scope and the nature of the onus
cost by it, we must pay due regard to other kindred princi-
ples, no less fundamental, of universal application. One of
them is that the prosecution or the Department is not requir-
B
ed to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demons-
•
trable degree ............ -All that it requires is the esta-
blishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man •
may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue,
Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof, often it
is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the
' c probabilities of the case."
Similarly, while dealing with the merits of the case, this Court made
the following observations : -
' "In the case before us, the circumstantial evidence sugges-
. D ting the inference that the goods were illicitly imported into
India, was similar and reasonably pointed towards the con-
clusion drawn by the Collector .......... The Collector had •
given the fullest opportunity to Bhoormull to establish the
alleged acquisition of the goods in the normal course of busi-
ness. In doing so, he was not throwing the burden of proving
E what the Department had to establish,_ on Bhoormull. He was
simply giving him a fair opportunity of rebutting the first and
the foremost presumption that arose out of the tell-tale
circumstances in which the goods were found, regarding 'their
being smuggled goods by disclosing facts within his special
knowledge."
F
It was also pointed out that the broad effect of the application of the
basic principles underlying s. 106 of the Evidence Act would be that
onus is discharged if the prosecution adduces only so much evidence,
circumstantial or direct, as is sufficient to raise a presumption in its
favour with regard to the existence of the facts sought to be proved.
G In the case of Labchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. The State of Maha-
rashtra, while this Court was again considering the extent and applica-
tion of ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act and in this connection,
pbserved as follows : -
\
"Even if we were to apply the ratio deddendi of Gian
, H Chand's case (supra) in the case before us, we find that the
(1) [1974] 3 S.C.R. 833:
(2) [19751 2 S.C.R. 907.
GUMMAN MAL v. A.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 1013

result would only be that no presumption uruder section 123 A
of the Act could be used against t4e appellant. We do not
think that the High Court or the Magistrate had used this
presumption. We fin<rthat they had relied upcn circumstan-
tial evidence in the case to infer the character of the gold re..
covered and the accused's guilty knowledge .......... A
• reference to lssardas Dau/at Ram & Ors. v. Union of India B
& Ors. ((1962) Supp. (1) S.C.R. 358] is enough to show
that the GOnduct of the accused and the incredible version
set up by him were enough to saddle the accused with the
necessary knowledge of the character of the goods found in
his possession. c
........................................
Atleast, the burden of proving an innocent receipt of gold
lay upcn the appellant under section 106 Evidence Act. The
totality of facts p~oved was enough, in our opinion, to raise
a presumption under section 114 Evidence Act t!Jat the gold D
had been illegally imported into the country so as to (be)
• covered by section 111 ( d) of the Act. The appellant had
not offered any other reasonable exp1anation of the manner
in which it was being carried."
• t The facts in this case app~ar to be very similar to the facts in the pre-
sent case. Furthermore, the case of Balumal Jamnadas Batra v. State E
of Maharashtra(') was also a case under the Customs Act and there
also the presumption m1dcr section 123 was not applicable. It was
held therein that having regard to the conduct of the accused and
nature of the articles me11s rea was established. In this connection,
··1.._. this Court observed as follows :-- F
"The very appearance of the goods and the manner in
which they were packed indicated that they were newly
manufactured and brought into this country very recently
{
from another country. The il\scriptions i:>n them and writ-
ing on the boxes were par\s of the state in which the goods
in unopened boxes were found from which inferences about G
their origin and recent import qiuld arise. The appellant's
conduct, including his untruthful denial of their possession,
indicated consciousness of their smuggled character or mens
rea."
From the af0l'esaid case also it would apl"'ar that this Court was H
prepared to draw a presumption against the accused from the fac~ that
(!) [ 1976] 1S.C.R.539.
1014 SUPREME C0URT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A the articles concerned were concealed and had particular markings and
special features and from the nature of the unsatisfactory explanation
given ·by the accused.
While it is, therefore, true that in the instant case the seizure was
not made under s. 111 of the C\Jstoms Act and the prosecution could
B not press into service the presumption arising from s. 123 of the Cus- •
toms Act, that does not clinch the issue. It is proved that the appellant
was in possession of gold with foreign markings which was found to be
in the shape of biscuits or bars kept in a secret chamber of the safe, •
and that the accused admitted that the gold was brought from outside \~--.
the country and was given to him by somebody whose identity he was
c not prepared to disclose. Thus, the appellant knew as to who was the
person who had given him the gold and if he also knew, as he says,
that the gold was smuggled, he must have known whether the person
who delivered the gold to him brought it under a permit or without any
permit because at the time of the occurrence the import of gold was
banned excepting nnder special circumstances. Having regard to the
D totality of the situation, there is no reason why the prosecution would
not be entitled to call into aid the combined effect of the presumptions
under ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, satis-
fied that the prosecution has clearly proved the charge under s. 135 ( 1)
(b) (ii) of the Customs Act.
••
E It was also contended by Dr. Chitale that as the case had been
going on for eight years, a lenient view on the question of sentence may
be taken. The sentence being one only of rigorous imprisonment for
nine months, we think there is no room for any reduction thereof.
For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is accordingly
dismissed.
F
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.