Holding

The bona fide need of the landlord is to be determined at the date of filing the eviction petition, and if a decree for eviction is passed, the landlord's death thereafter does not affect the heirs' right to enforce the decree.

Summary

The appellants, heirs of Girdhari Lal Gattani, filed a suit in 1962 under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 seeking eviction of the respondents, tenants, on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non‑residential premises. The suit was decreed, but the tenants appealed; during the pendency of the appeal the landlord died and the heirs sought to amend the plaint to set up their own bona fide need, while the tenants sought to amend their defence to argue that the landlord's need had ceased. The lower appellate court allowed the amendments and remanded the case; the trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court later decreed eviction in favour of the heirs. The High Court, on a second appeal, dismissed the suit on the basis that the landlord’s death terminated the personal need. The Supreme Court held that the bona fide need must be examined at the date of filing the eviction petition, and once a decree is passed the landlord’s death does not affect the heirs’ right to enforce it; a suit validly filed cannot be struck down absent a specific statutory provision, and the case must be decided on the amended pleadings. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court judgment and restored the decree for eviction.

Issues considered

The effect of the landlord's death during pendency of the tenant's appeal on a suit for eviction based on the landlord's personal bona fide requirement
Whether the bona fide need of the landlord must subsist until a final decree is passed
Whether a suit validly filed under s.12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act can be dismissed after the death of the plaintiff in the absence of a specific statutory bar

Legislation cited

Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 12(1), s. 12(J)(j), s. 2(b)

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementlandlord deathamendment of plaintrent controlMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Actsuccessioncivil procedureactus curiae neminem gravabit

Judgment

A SHAKUNTALA BAI AND ORS.
v.
NARAYAN DAS AND ORS.

MAY 5, 2004
B
(S. RAJENDRA BABU, CJ. AND G.P. MATHUR, J.]

Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 :

C S.12(J)(j)-Non-residential premises-Suit for eviction on ground of
bonafide requirement of landlord-Decreed-Pending appeal plaintiff
died-His heirs amended plaint and pleaded their bonafide requirement-
High Court holding that with death of original plaintiff personal need of
bona fide requirement came to an end-Held, bonafide need of landlord
D has to be examined on the date of institution ofproceedings and if decree
for eviction is passed, death of landlord thereafter will make no difference
and heirs are entitled to defend the estate.

Administration ofJustice-Rent Control cases-Expeditious disposal
of-Emphasized.
E
Maxim-- 'actus curiae neminem gravabit '-Applicability of

A suit was filed under s.12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for eviction of the tenant from a
F 11ommercial premises on the ground of bona fide requirement of the
plaintiff-landlord. The suit was decreed. During the pendency of the
11ppeal filed by the tenant the landlord died and bis heirs and
legal representatives sought an amendment of the plaint pleading their
bona fide requirement. The tenant also sought an amendment of his
G pleadings to the effect that after death of the original plaintiff his plea
o,f bona fide requirement came to an end. The appellate court allowed
the amendments and remanded the suit to the trial court. The suit was
d,ismissed by the trial court but was decreed by the first appellate court.
However, in the second appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit
H holding that on the death of the original plaintiff his heirs could not
114
SHAKL1NTALA BAI v.N. DAS 115

have continued the suit which was based on personal bona fide A
need. Aggrieved, the heirs of the original plaintiff filed the present
appeal.

On the question : whether on account of death of a landlord
pending appeal, the suit validly instituted by him for eviction of a B
tenant on the ground of his personal need, is liable to be dismissed.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The legal position is well settled that the bona fide C
need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution
of proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the
landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant
will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the
estate. [123-D-E)
D
G.G. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, [2002) I SCC 610, relied on.

Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, [1997) 4 SCC 413;
Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, [2001) 2 SCC 604 and Shanti/al
Thakordas v. Chimanlal Magan/al Telwala, [1976) 4 sec 417, relied on. E

Smt. Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, AIR (1973) SC 2IIO,
referred to.

1.2. A suit validily filed cannot be scuttled or held no longer F
maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect. The bar
created by virtue of s.12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act,
1961 is against filing of the suit except on one of the grounds
enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) of the sub-section. Therefore, what is
to be seen is whether the suit was validly filed, i.e., whether on the date G
of filing of the suit one of the grounds was made out. Therefore, the
principle that "the need of the landlord must exist till the decree for
eviction is passed by the last court and attains finality" can even
t'
otherwise have no application here in view of the express language used
in section 12(1) of the Act. (125-A-B) H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A P. v Papanna v. K Padmanabhaiah, [1994) 2 sec 316, explained
and held inapplicable.

Observations regarding taking into consideration the events
subsequent to filing of eviction petition, held to be obiter and not
B representing correct legal position. (124-F-G)
1.3. It is well settled that when amendment is allowed, the
proceedings have to be decided on the basis ofsuch amended pleadings.
Oesides, after the case had been remanded, the plaint had been
amended and the need of the sons had been set up who had all attained
C majority by that time. The Courts thereafter proceeded to decide the
controversy on the ,basis of the need of the sons and the lower appellate
court, after finding their need to be bona fide, passed a decree for
eviction in their favour. It was, therefore, wholly impermissible on the
part of the High Court to examine the question as to the effect of death
D of the original plaintiff and thereafter to dismiss the suit on the finding
that his need having come to an end, the suit ought to have been
dismissed. The view taken by the High Court is wholly illegal.
[125-F-G; 126-A-B)

2.1. As the preamble shows the Act has been enacted for expeditious
E t11ial of eviction cases on the gl'ound of bona fide requirement of
la'ndlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If
the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note
of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will, be no end
to litigation. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may at
F times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and
colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a
Rent Control Legislation in such a manner the basic object of which
is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The
object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to
G come. [125-C-E)
2.2. In the instant case, the suit was instituted 42 years back. After
the suit was decreed, pending appeal the landlord died leaving a widow
and minor sons, but this, the High Court thought, came to the advantage
of the tenant, little realizing that they also needed some place to carry
H on business for survival. Such extreme views erode the faith of people
SHAKUNTALA BAI v. N. DAS [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 117
..__
in judicial system prompting them to take recourse to extra-judicial A
methods to recover possession of their property. (117-D-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4496-
4497 of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.97 of the Madhya Pradesh B
High Court in S.A. Nos. 347 and 246 of 1996.

K. Ramamurthy, M.P. Shorawala, Shriram, T.N. Sexana and Rajendra
Maheshwari for the Appellants.

Badri Prasad Singh for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.P. MATHUR, J.: I. It is a shocking case. A suit for eviction of
a tenant was instituted more than 42 years back in March, 1962 for the D
bona fide need of carrying on business by the owner landlord but his widow
and sons are still knocking the doors of court of justice. During the
pendency of the appeal filed by the tenant the landlord died leaving a
widow and minor sons but this, the High Court thought, came to the
advantage of the tenant, rendering the suit liable for dismissal, little E
realizing that they also needed some place to carry on business for survival.
Such extreme views erode the faith of people in the judicial system
prompting them to take recourse to extra judicial methods to recover
possession of their property.

2. These appeals by special leave have been preferred against the F
judgment and order dated 3.9.1997 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
by which the second appeals filed by the respondents/tenants were allowed
and the suit for their eviction was dismissed.

3. Girdhari Lal Gattani (husband of appellant no. I and father of G
appellants no.2 to 4) filed a suit on 31.3.1962 for eviction of Magan Lal
(father of respondents) from a non-residential premises. The suit was filed
on the ground that he required the premises for carrying on his own
business. The suit was decreed by the trial Court against which an appeal
was preferred by Magan Lal. During the pendency of the appeal, Girdhari
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Lal died and the appellants herein were substituted as his heirs and legal r
representatives. The appellants sought an amendment of the plaint and
pleaded that they bonafidely require the premises for carrying on business.
The tenant Magan Lal sought an amendment in the written statement to
the effect that after the death of Girdhari Lal, the bona fide requirement
B of the premises for carrying on business pleaded in the suit came to an end.
The lower appellate Court allowed the amendments and remanded the
matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration. During the pendency of
the suit, the plaint was further amended and it was pleaded that the
appellants no.2, 3 and 4 had also attained majority and they wanted to start
C a cloth business in the premises in dispute. The trial Court, after affording
the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence, dismissed the suit. The
appellants then preferred an appeal and during the pendency thereof the
original tenant Magan Lal died and his sons, respondents no. I and 2 were
substituted in the plaint. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and
decreed the suit for eviction. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment
D and decree of eviction, the respondents preferred second appeal which has
been allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment/decree dated
3.9.1997 and the suit has been dismissed.

4. The main ground on which the appeal has been allowed by the High
E Court is that in a suit filed by the landlord for eviction of a tenant, the
requirement or need set up by him must subsist till the appeal filed by the
tenant is finally decided and that a tenant can always take advantage of
subsequent event like death of the landlord at a later stage during the
pendency of the appeal etc. to urge that the requirement or need of the
F landlord has come to an end. Accordingly, it has been held that on the death
of Girdhari Lal Gattani, the Civil Suit filed by him ought to have been
dismissed as his legal heirs, the appellants herein, could not have continued
the suit which was based on personal bona fide need.

5. The question which requires consideration is whether on account
G of death of a landlord during the pendency of the appeal, a suit validly
instituted by him for eviction of a tenant on the ground of his personal need,
is liable to be dismissed.

6. The enactment with which we are concerned is the Madhya Pradesh
H Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No.41 of 1961 ). The preamble of
SHAKUNTALA BAI v. N. DAS (G.P. MATHUR, J.] 119

the Act reads as under : A
"An Act to provide for the regulation and control of letting and
rent of accommodations, for expeditious trial of eviction cases on
ground of "bona fide" requirement of certain categories of
landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants B
from accommodations and for other matter connected therewith
or incidental thereto."

As the preamble shows the Act has been enacted to. regulate and
control eviction of tenants and for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the
ground of bona fide requirement of certain categories oflandlords. Section C
2(b) defines a "landlord" and it reads as under :

2(b). "landlord" means a person, who, for the time being, is
receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation,
whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or D
for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or
receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent
or be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodation were let
to a tenant and includes every person not being a tenant who from
time to time derives title under a landlord.
E
7. Chapter III deals with control of eviction of tenants and sub-section
(!)of Section 12 therein lays down that notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law or contract; no suit shall be filed in
any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation
except on one or more of the grounds enumerated in the sub-section. Clause F
(f) of this sub-section reads as under :

(f) that the accommodation let for non-resid~ntial purposes is
required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing
or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or
unmarried daughters if.he is the owner thereof or for any person G
for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord
or such person has· no other reasonably non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town
concerned.
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The aforesaid provisions show that a suit for eviction of a tenant
from an accommodation let for non-residential purposes can be instituted
by a landlord for the purpose of his own business or that of any of his major
unmarried sons or daughters, if he is the owner of the premises or for any
person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. It may be noticed that
B this clause does not say that only such a landlord who has attained majority
qm institute a suit. But if the need which is set up is that of the sons of
the landlord then they should be major sons. There is no restriction on a
landlord who may be minor to seek eviction of a tenant if the premises
is bonafidely required by him.

c 8. As mentioned earlier, the suit filed by the original landlord Girdhari
Lal Gattani was decreed by the trial Court but he died during the pendency
of the appeal preferred by the tenant Magan Lal. Thereafter, the appellants
(heirs of Girdhari Lal) applied for amendment of the plaint which was
D allowed. The amended para 58 reads as under :

"(58). The need for which eviction was sought by the late Shri
Girdharilal still persists if any this it has been much more
accentuated. The contemplated business will now be run by the
widow of the deceased. She has a son - the respondent no.3
E Laxminarayan who will shortly attain majority. He is about 16
years old. He is an intelligent boy and is already trained in the
trade. These respondents have enough money with them.
Laxminarayan recently earned first price ofRs.7500, Girdharilal's
insurance money of Rs. I I 000 has also been received by the
F respondents. This will enable them to start business for their
livelihood."

The lower appellate Court remanded the case to the trial Court for
fresh consideration and during the pendency of the suit after remand, the
G plaintiffs again applied for amendment of the plaint, which was allowed
and the main amendment so incorporated reads as under :

"(58). The plaintiffs in right earnest shall start business of ready
made garments in the suit premises. The plaintiff no.3 and 4 also •
H attained majority during the pendency of suit. The plaintiffs no.2,
SHAKUNTALA BAI v. N. DAS [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 121

3 and 4 shall start business of ready made garments after receiving A
vacant possession of suit accommodation."

9. The first amendment sought by the appellants was that need of the
premises in dispute not only persist but had been accentuated on account
of death of Girdhari Lal. According to the plaintiffs, the business shall be B
carried on by his widow, who shall be assisted by her intelligent son
Laxminarayan, who was then aged about 16 years and was already trained
in trade. The business was required to be carried on for their livelihood.
It appears that after the remand, the suit remained pending in the trial Court
for quite some time and during this period, the other sons, namely,
plaintiffs no.3 and 4 also attained majority and it was pleaded that all the C
sons will carry on the business. Thus, at the time when the trial Court
finally heard the suit, all the plaintiffs were major and they had specifically
set up their own bona fide need for the premises in question for carrying
on business for their livelihood.
D
10. The effect of death of a landlord during the pendency of the
proceedings has been considered in several decisions of this Court. In Smt.
Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, AIR (1973) SC 2110, the landlord
filed an ejectment application under Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act and eviction of the tenant was sought on the ground that the E
premises were required by the plaintiff "for occupation as a residence for
himself and members of his family". The Additional Rent Controller
dismissed the application on a preliminary ground that the notices to quit
were not valid, without examining the case on merits. The plaintiff died
during the pendency of the appeal preferred by him and his heirs were F
substituted. The case was remanded and the Rent Controller passed an
order of eviction. In appeal a contention was raised that the right to sue
did not survive to the heirs of the plaintiff, which was rejected by the Rent
Control Tribunal but was accepted in appeal by the High Court. This court
held that different result may follow according to the stage at which the
death occurs. One of the situations considered in para 13 of the reports is G
as under :

"(i) cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after a
decree for possession was passed in his favour; say, during the
pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant." H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A With regard to tqis, cat~gory of cases it was held that the estate is
entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, has accrued in favour of the
plaintiff and, therefore, the legal representatives are entitled to defend
further proceedings, like an appeal, which constitute a challenge to that
benefit. Even otherwise this appears to be quite logical. In normal
B circumstances after passing of the decree by the trial Court, the original
landlord would have got possession of the premises. But ifhe does not and
the tenant continues to remain in occupation of the premises it can only
be on account of the stay order passed by the appellate Court. In such a
situation, the well known maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' that 'an
act of the Court shall prejudice no man' shall come into operation.
C Therefore, the heirs of the landlord will be fully entitled to defend the
appeal preferred by the tenant and claim possession of the premises on the
cause of action which had been originally pleaded and on the basis whereof
the lower Court had decided the matter and had passed the decree for
eviction. However, in regard to the case before the court it was held that
D the requirement pleaded in the ejectment application on which the plaintiff
founded his right to relief was his personal requirement and such a personal
cause of action must perish with the plaintiff. On this ground it was held
that the plaintiffs right to sue will not survive to his heirs and they cannot
take the benefit of the original right to sue.
E
1I. In Shanti/al Thakordas v. Chimanlal Magan/al Telwala, [1976)
4 SCC 417, a larger Bench overruled the decision rendered in Phool Rani
v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (supra) in so far it held that the requirement of
the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was
F his personal requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the m<:mbers
of his family on his death. The court took the view that after the death of
the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and
is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and
occupation of the other members of the family. Thus, this decision held
that the substituted heirs of the deceased landlord were entitled to maintain
G the suit for eviction of the tenant. The ratio of this decision by larger Bench
does not in any manner affect the view expressed in Phool Rani (supra)
that where the death of the landlord occurs after a decree for possession
has been passed in his favour, his legal representatives are entitled to
defend further proceedings lik~ an appeal and the benefit accrued to them
H under the decree. In fact, the ratio of Shanti/al Thakordas (supra) would
' .
SHAKUNTALA BAI v. N. DAS [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 123

reinforce the aforesaid view. There are several decisions of this Court on A
the same line. In Kam/eshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, [1997] 4
sec 413 it was held that the need of the landlord for premises in question
must exist on the date of application for eviction, which is the crucial date
and it is on the said date the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted
therefrom. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ B
petition in the High Court, the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed
as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other
son. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, [200 I] 2 SCC 604 it was held
that the crucial date for deciding as to the bonafides of requirement of
landlord is the date of his application for eviction. Here the landlord had
instituted eviction proceedings for the bona fide requirement of his son who C
wanted to start a clinic. The litigation continued for a long period and
during this period the son joined Provincial Medical Service and was
posted at different places. The subsequent event i.e. the joining of the
service by the son was not taken into consideration on the ground that the

- crucial date was the date of filing of the eviction petition. Similar view has D
been taken in G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, [2002] 1 SCC 610.
Therefore, the legal position is well settled that the bona fide need of the
landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of proceedings
and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the
pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as E
his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate.

12. The High Court in the present case no doubt noticed the decisions
rendered in Phool Rani (Supra) and Shanti/a/ Thakordas (supra), but chose
to rely upon a decision by two Judge Bench rendered in P. V. Papanna v. F
K. Padmanabhaiah, (1994] 2 SCC 316. In this case the trial Court had
passed a decree for eviction which was challenged by the tenant by filing
a revision in the High Court which wa5 dismissed but four years time was
granted to vacate the premises. The special leave petition preferred by the
tenant was also dismissed. During the pendency of this period of four years,
the landlord died leaving a will in favour of his brothers. When the tenant G
did not vacate the premises after the expiry of four years, the appellants
applied for execution of the decree. The execution petition was allowed
by the trial Court and order for eviction was passed but the order was
reversed by the High Court in a revision filed by the tenant on the ground
that the cause of action did not survive on the death of the landlord H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and the appellants (Tegatees - claiming as legal representatives of the
deceased landlord) could not execute the decree for eviction which was
purely personal. After examining several earlier decisfons, the Court held
as under :

"18. For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that events which
B
take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under
any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of
adjudication until a decree is made by the final court determining
the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the
decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopcming the
c decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot
be reopened by the executing court for readjudication on the
ground that some event or the other has altered the situation. As
a corollary thereto it must also be held that once the decree
becomes final it became a part of the estate of the landlord and
D
-
therefore the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased
landlord are entitled to execute the same."

13. The limited question for consideration in this case was whether
a decree which had attained finality would become unexecutable on
E account of death of the landlord and this question was answered in favour
of the landlord and against the tenant basically on the principle that the
excecuting court cannot go behind the decree. For the decision of the
appeal it was wholly unnecessary to examine the question as to the effect
of death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal pre.ferred by
F the tenant after a decree for eviction has been passed. The decisions
rendered in Phool Rani (Supra) and Shanti/al Thakordas (supra) were not •
brought to the notice of the Bench. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the observations made in the aforesaid case that "events which take place
subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under any Rent Act can be
taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is
G made by the final Court determining the rights of the parties", which are
more in the nature of obiter do not represent the correct legal position.

14. Sub-section (I) of section 12 of the Act says "no suit shall be filed
in civil court against a tenant for his eviction ........ " The language employed
H does not say "no decree shall be passed ........ " So the bar created is against
SHAKUNTALA BAI v. N. DAS [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 125

filing of the suit except on one of grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to A
(p) of the sub-section. Therefore what is to be seen is whether the suit was
validly filed i.e. whether on the date of filing of the suit one of the grounds
was made out. A suit validly filed cannot be scuttled or held no longer
maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect. Therefore
the principle that "the need of the landlord must exist till the decree for B
eviction is passed by the last court and attains finality" can even otherwise
have no application here in view of the express language used in the
section.

15. As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Acco:nmodation
Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases C
on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to
regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the
death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree
attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second
appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and D
on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the
proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into
merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and
it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the
subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings E
taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant
for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object
of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The
object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come.
~-
' '
F
16. There is another aspect of the matter which needs consideration.
After the case had been remanded, the plaint had been amended and the
need of the..sons had been set up who had all attained majority by that time.
The Courts thereafte"r proceeded to decide the controversy on the basis of
the need of the sons and the lower appellate Court, after finding their need
to be bona fide, passed a decree for eviction in their favour. In the second G
appeal preferred by the tenant, the High Court, instead of examining the
issues on the basis of which the case had been decided, went on to hold
that on account of death of Girdhari Lal, the need set up by him came to
an end and on that finding dismissed the suit. The parties having amended
their respective pleadings and the two Courts below having decided the H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A matter on such amended pleadings and the evidence adduced thereon, it
was wholly impermissible on the part of the High Court to examine the
question as to the effect of death of the original plaintiff and thereafter to
dismiss the suit on the finding that his need having come to an end, the
suit ought to have been dismissed. It is well settled that when amendment
B is allowed, the proceedings have to be decided on the basis of such
amended pleadings. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken
by the High Court is wholly illegal.

17. The appeals are accordingly allowed with cost. The judgment and
C decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Additional
District Judge decreeing the suit for eviction is restored.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents (tenants) made a prayer that
they may be granted some time to vacate the premises. Shri K. Ramamurthy,
learned senior counsel for the appellants has very fairly stated that the
D respondents may be given four months' time to vacate the premises. In
view of this statement, we grant four months' time to the respondents to
vacate the premises subject to their filing the usual undertaking within one
month in the trial Court.

E R.P. Appeals allowed.

... ..