SHANKER RAJUversusUNION OF INDIA

                     [2011] 2 S.C.R. 1


                     SHANKER RAJU                             A
                             v.
                     UNION OF INDIA
                (W.P. (C) No. 311 of 2010)
                    JANUARY 04, 2011
                                                              B
            [D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATIU, JJ.]

      Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - ss.10A and B -
"Term of Office" of a Member of the Tribunal - Whether a
Member of the Tribunal is eligible for re-appointment after C
completion of term of ten years - Held: A member of a
Tribunal can hold such office for a fixed and definite period
of time, i.e. for a period of five years from the date on which
he enters upon his office and that period may be extended
for one more term of five years - Thus the total term that a  o
person can hold the office of the Member of the Tribunal is
only for a period of 10 years - After completion of 10 years,
he does not superannuate but goes out of the office.

    Doctrines/Principles:
                                                              E
     Doctrine of stare decisis - Held: A judgment, which has
held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled only
because another view is possible :... The underlying logic of
this doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty
- Maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere".                  F
     Doctrine of binding precedent - Held: The doctrine of
binding precedent has the merit of promoting certainty and
consistency in judicial decisions.

      Words and Phrases - "Term of Office" - Expressions G
'term' and 'tenure' - .Meaning of - Held: The expresslon'term'
signifies a fixed period or a determined or prescribed duration
- T~e word 'term' when used in reference to the tenure of
office, means ordinarily 'a fixed and definite time - There is
                             1                                H
   2         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A distinction b~•-·words 'term' and 'tenure' as applied to
   a pub/le officer ot'employee - The 'term', as applied to an
   office, refers to a fixed and definite period of time ~ The word
 · 'tenure' has more extended meaning than the word 'term' and
   'tenure'.of an office means the manner in which the office is
s held especially with regard to time.
         Interpretation of Statutes - Legislative intention -
  . Ascertainment of - Duty of the Court - Held: In a court of law
    or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to
C be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has
    chosen to enact either in express words or by reasonable and
    necessary implication - Where the Legislature clearly
    declares its intent in the scheme of a language of Statute, it
    is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without
    scanning its wisdom or policy and without engrafting, adding
i) or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent
    with such express intent of legislature.
       Interpretation of Statutes - Held: A statute is designed
  to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by Court should
E be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear
  direction makes that end unattainable.
       The petitioner was appointed as a Judicial Member
  of the Central Administrative Tribunal on 10.12.2000. After
F completion of his five-year term, he was re-appointed for
  another term of five years and was due to complete his
  second term of five years on 09.12.2010. In April, 2010, in
  response to an advertisement issued by the respondent .
  regarding vacancies of Members in the Tribunal, Principal
  Bench, Delhi, the Petitioner made application for the post
G of Judicial Member of the Tribunal, the post which he had
  held for nine and a half years at the time of making
  application. Though the petitioner was eligible for the
  appointment in terms of his qualification, the respondent
  vide the impugned communication dated 12-08-2010
H
          SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                 3

 refused to consider his claim for appointment for the A
 vacancy, on the ground that the petitioner was to
 complete his second term of 5 years as a Judicial Member
 of the Tribunal on 09.12.2010.
      The petitioner challenged the said communication
                                                              8
 contending that after completion of a tenure of 10 years,
 he was eligible to apply for the post afresh and should
 be considered on merits and should not be disqualified
 for appointment merely because he had completed 10
 years in that office. The petitioner sought appropriate writ C
 from this Court mainly in respect of the communication
 dated 12-08-2010 and for a direction to the respondent to
 consider his case for appointment to the advertised post
 of Judicial Member in Tribunal on its own merit sans
 eligibility.
                                                              D
      The question which,· therefore, arose for
 consideration in the present petition was whether a
 Member of the Tribunal is eligible for re-appointment after
 completion of term of ten years.
                                                              E
      Dismissing the petition, the Court
       HELD:1. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was
  amended in. the year 2006 by the Administrative Tribunals
  (Amendment) Act 2006. The amendments were made
  effective from 19.02.2007. Some of the principal changes F ·
  brought about were, the abolition of the post of Vice·
  Chairman; changes in the terms of office in the form of
  increase fn the age of superannuation of the Chairman
  from .,65. years to 68 years and that of the other Members
·.from:&~ years to 65 years; the.term of the Members was G
· fixed :to'S. years, extendabfe by another term of 5 years;
  and, Incorporation of.Section 10A,as a savings clause, for
  saving the terni of office of the Chairman, Vice.Chairman
  and Members, who were appointed prior to the coming
  into force of the Amendment Act. [Para 3] [11-E-G]         H
    4       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A        2.1. In the case of A.K. Behra, a three Judges Bench
    of this Court had the occasion to consider the legislative
    competence and validity of the Administrative Tribunals
    (Amendment) Act, 2006. In that case, one of the reliefs
    sought for by the petitioner was to declare the newly
s   inserted Section 10A of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
    1985 as unconstitutional to the extent it stipulated that
    the term of office of the Member of the Central
    Administrative Tribunal shall n'ot exceed 1O years. The
    Court declined to grant the said relief holding that the
c   provision restricting the total tenure of a Member to ten
    years could not be held either arbitrary or illegal. The said
    decision of this Court is binding and is clearly applicable
    to the instant case. [Paras 4, 6 and 7] [11-H; 13-D-E; 16·
    A·B]
D      2. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment, which
  has held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled.
  The doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in the maxim
  "stare decisis et non quieta movere", which means "to
  stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled."
E The underlying logic of this doctrine is to maintain
  consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding
  philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a
  long time should not be disturbed only because another
  view is possible. The doctrine of binding precedent has
F the merit of promoting certainty and consistency in
  judicial decisions. The pronouncement of law by a larger
  Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of this
  Court, especlally where the particular determination by
  this Court not only disposes of the case, but also decides
G a principle of law. Further It would be Inappropriate to re·
  agitate the very Issue or a particular provision, which this
  Court .had already considered and upheld. [Paras 9, 17]
   [16·D·F; 20·D·E]
     Waman Rao v. Union of Ind/a, (1981) 2 SCC 362;
H Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. Regional Asstt. CST, (1976) 4
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                    5


SCC 124; Ganga Sugar Corpn. v. State of U.P., (1980) 1 SCC .   Al
223; Union of India v, Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754;
Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207; Union
of India & Anr. v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd, (1990) 4 SCC 453; .
Harl Singh v. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114 - relied
on.                                                             B
    A.K. EJehra v. Union of India, (2010) 5 SCALE 472 -
referred to.

     Tiverton Estates Ltd. v. Wearwell Ltd., (1975) Ch 146 -
referred to.                                                   C
     3. In any event, both prior to and after Its amendment,
Section 8 of the Act speaks of "Term of Office" (of the
Chairman and other Members of the Tribunal). The
Legislature has used this expression consciously. The 0
expression 'term' signifies a fixed period or a determined
or prescribed duration. The word 'term' when used in
reference to the tenure of office,. means ordinarily a fixed
and definite time. There is a distinction between the words
'term' and 'tenure' as applied to a public officer or E
employee. The 'term', as applied to an office, refers to a
fixed and definite period of time. The word 'tenure' has
more extended meaning than the word 'term' and 'tenure'
of an office means the manner in which the office !s held
especially with regard to time. [Para 25) [25-D-E]
                                                             F
     4. The language employed in Section 8 of the Act
does not admit any ambiguity. Section 8(1) of the Act
provides the term of office of Chairman of the Tribunal,
which shall be five years from the date he assumes his
office. The proviso quallfles and carves out an exception G
to the main enactment. The exception Is, though a
Chairman can hold office as such for a term of five years,
he cannot hold such office after he attains the age of
sixty-eight years. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act
                                                             H
   6         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2011] 2 S.C.R.


A provides the "Term of Office" of a Member of the Tribunal.
  First part of the Section envisages that a member of the
  Tribunal shall hold the office for a 'term of five years'. The
  term as applied to an office, refers to a fixed and definite
  period of time that an appointee is authorised to serve
B .in office. Alternatively, it can be said that the term of office
  that Is used by the Legislature could only mean the
  period or limit of time during which the Incumbent Is
   permitted to hold the office. The second part of the
   Section gives discretion to the appointing authority to
C extend the term of office of a member of the Tribunal to
   one more term of five years. The expression 'extendable',
   that finds a place in the sub-section, could only mean that
   the term of office of an Incumbent as a member of the
   Tribunal can be extended If the parties agree. The
   proviso appended to the sub-section again carves out
0 an exception to the main provision and restricts a
   member for holding office after he has attained the age
   of sixty five years. The proviso takes care of a situation
   where a member whose term of office is extended for a
   further period of five years cannot hold such office if he
E has attained the age of 65 years during the extended
   period of five years. A combined reading of both parts
   of Section 8(2) of the Act clearly demonstrates that a
   member of a Tribunal can hold such office for a fixed and
   definite period of time, i.e. for a period of five years from
F the date on which he enters upon his office and that
   period may be extended for one more term of five years.
   The contention raised by the petitioner that there is
   neither prohibition nor any embargo for a member who•
   has completed 10 years as Member to participate ln the
G selection process for being appointed as a Member of
   the Tribunal for another term of five years, Is not
   acceptable since the total term that a person can hold the
   office of the Member of the Tribunal is only for a period
   of 1O years. If the office is created by the Legislature
H under due authority, it may fix the term and alter it. One 1
          SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                  7

   can understand the heart burn of a person who has A
   served. as Member of the Tribunal for ten years and
  thereafter, is ineligible for being appointed as a Member
  of the Tribunal, but one cannot help this situation. In a
  court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be
  done or not to be done can only be legitimately B
. ascertained from what it has chosen to enact either in
  express words or by reasonable and necessary
  Implication. Where the Legislature clearly declares Its
  intent in the scheme of a language of Statute, It is the duty
  of the Court to give full effect to the same without C
  scanning its wisdom or policy and without engrafting,
  adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or
  consistent with such express intent of legislature.
  Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning
  employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on
  the face of the Statute. If the Statutory provisions do not D
  go far enough to relieve the hardship of the member, the
  remedy lies with the Legislature and not in the hand.s of
  the Court. [Para 26] [25-H; 26-A-H; 27 ·A·E]

      /RC v. Ross Minister Ltd. (1979) 52 TC 160 (HL) -       E
 referred to.

      5. Section 10A of the Amended Act is the saving
clause. By virtue of this Section, the Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and Members of a Tribunal appointed prior to F
the commencement of the Administrative Tribunals
{Amendment) Act, 2006, are to be governed by the
provisions of the unamended Act, and the rules made
thereunder, thereby their conditions of service are
:-irotected. From a plain reading of the proviso appended G
to ~ection 10A, it is clear that the only conclusion that
coula ..... reached is that the Chairman and Members
appointed prior to the Amendment of 2007 on completion
of either their term of service or on attainment of 65 years
in the case of Chairman or 62 years in the case of
                                                             H
   8        SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A Members of the Tribunal, whichever is earlier, may be
  considered for fresh appointment. If they are eligible in
  terms of Section 8 of the Amended Act that only means
  if a member has not completed 10 years term as a
  member of the Tribunal, he is eligible for fresh
B appointment, provided he has not completed 65 years of
  age. The proviso makes it abundantly clear that such
  fresh appointment could be done provided they satisfy
  the criteria prescribed under the amended Section 8 of
  the Act and further, it is made subject to the condition that
C the total term of office of the Chairman shall not exceed
  5 years and that of the Member, ten years. [Para 27) [27-
   F-H; 28·A·F]
      6. Section 6 of the Act provides for qualification for
  appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman anr' -:ther
D Members. Section 8 of the Amended Act provides for
  "Term of Office". These provisions are required to be read
  harmoniously. The term of office of a Member of a
  Tribunal is 10 years and after completion of 10 years, he
  does not superannuate but he goes out of the office. The
E language of Section 10A is plain and unambiguous,
  hence there is no need to call in aid any of the rules of
  construction. [Para 28) [28·G·H; 29·A·C]

       7. If the construction suggested by the petitioner is
F accepted, then it would lead to a situation where a person
  who has been a Member of the Tribunal for 10 years
  would have to start at the bottom of the ladder as a fresh
  appointee. In that circumstance, those persons who are
  appointed as Members such as the Petitioner, who were
  till the previous day junior to persons such as the
G Petitioner, would suddenly become senior to Members
  such as the Petitioner. This would lead to an anomalous
  situation where a person who would have presided over
  a Bench in the Tribunal for years, would suddenly
  become the junior Member on the same Bench. This
H
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                     9


certainly cannot be the intention of the Legislature. A         A
statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation
thereof by Court should be to secure that object unless
crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
unattainable., The doctrine of 'independence of judiciary'
has nothing to do when the tenure js fixed by a statute.        B
[Paras 30, 32] [30 A-D; 32-D·E]

    Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India & Anr. (1992) 4 SCC
711; Oswal ~gro Mills Ltd. Vs. CCE, 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 316;
Omvalika Das Vs. Hulisa Shaw, (2002) 4 SCC 539; Natni
Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271; Tirath Singh C
v. Bachittar Singh,(1955) 2 SCR 457; Nasiruddin v. STAT,
(1975) 2 SCC 671 and Kashmir Singh v. Union of India,
(2008) 7 sec 259 - relied on.

    Holmes v. Bradfield Rural District Council, (1949) 1 A!I    D
ER 381 - referred to.··
                     Case law reference:
    (2010) 5 SCALE 472       referred to          Para 4
                                                                E
    (1981) 2 sec 362         relied on            Para 9
    (1976) 4 sec 124         relied on            Para 10
    (1980) 1 sec 223        relied on             Para 11
    (1989) 2 sec 754        relied on            para 12        F
    (1990) 4 sec 201        relied on            Para 13
    (1990) 4 sec 453        relied on            Para 14
    (1993) 3 sec 114        relied on            Para 15        G·
    (197c; i;h'146          referred to          Para 16
    (1979) 52 TC 160 (HL) referred to           ·Para 26
    (1992) 4 sec 111        relied on            Para 30
                                                                H
    10        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A        1993 Supp. 3 SCC 316 relied on                    Para 30
         (2002) 4 sec 539           relied on              Para 30
         (2005) 2 sec 211           relied on              Para 30
         (1949) 1 All ER 381        referred to            Para 31
B
         (1955) 2 SCR 457           relied on             · Para 32
         (1975) 2 sec 671           relied on              Para 33
         (2008) 1 sec 259           relied on              Para 35
c
         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

         Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

      Indira Jaising, R. Venkataramani (A.C) .:ind P.S.
D Narasimha, Aljo K. Joseph, Vinay Kumar Garg, Fazal Ahmad,
  Namarata Singh, Sonam Anand, Anil Katiyar and Samridhi
  Sinha for the appearing parties.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E        H.L. DATTU, J. 1. Since the petitioner purports to invoke
    the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
    of India, it is necessary to note the relevant facts and reliefs
    sought for in the petition.

F      2. The material facts which are essential to mention are
  very few and they lie within a narrow compass. Shri Shanker
  Raju, the petitioner, was appointed as a Judicial Member of
  the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short, "the Tribunal") on
  10.12.2000. After completion of his five-year term, he was
G reappointed for another term of five years and was due to
  complete his second term of five years on 09.12.2010. In April,
  2010, in response to an advertisement issued by the
  respondent regarding vacancies of Members in the Tribunal,
  Principal Bench, Delhi, he made application for the post of
H Judicial Member of the Tribunal, the post which he had held for
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                       11
                [H.L. DATTU, J.]

nine and a half years at the time of making application. Though     A
the petitioner was eligible for the appointment in terms of his
qualification,· the respondent refused to consider his claim for
appointment for the vacancy, for the reason that the petitioner
would complete his second term of 5 years on 09.12.2010 as
a Judicial Member of the Tribunal vide the impugned                 B
communication dated 12-08-2010. The main premise of the
petitioner's challenge of the said communication is that after
completion of a tenure of 10 years, he is eligible to apply for
the post afresh and must be considered on merits for his
appointment as a Member of the Tribunal and should not be           C
disqualified for appointment merely because he has completed
10 years in that office. The petitioner seeks appropriate writ
from this Court mainly in respect of the communication dated
12.08.2010 and for a direction to the respondent to consider
his case for appointment to the post of Member (J) in Tribunal      o
advertised vide D.O. No.A1103/9/2010·AT dated 20.04.2010
on its own merit sans eligibility.

     3. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 [hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was amended in the year 2006 by the       E
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act 2006. The
amendments were made effective from 19.02.2007. Some of
the principal changes brought about, which are relevant for the
purpose of the case are, the abolition of the post of Vice-
Chairman; changes in the terms of office in the form of increase    F
in the age of superannuation of the Chairman from 65 years to
68 years and that of the other Members from 62 years to 65
years; the term of the Members was fixed to 5 years, extendable
by another term of 5 years; and, incorporation of Section 10A           1

as a savings clause, for saving the term of office of the               1

Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members, who were appointed             G
prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act.

    4. It was just a few months ago, a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court had the occasion to consider the legislative
                                                                    H
    12       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A competence and validity of the Administrative Tribunals
  (Amendment) Act, 2006 in the case of A.K. Behra v. Union of
  India, (2010) 5 SCALE 472. The reliefs prayed for by the
  petitioner in that writ petition were:

B        (i) Quash and set aside the decision of the respondent to
         abolish the posts of Vice-Chairman in the Central
         Administrative Tribunal as reflected in the Administrative
         Tribunal (Amendment) Act 2006 and direct the respondents
         to restore the said posts of Vice-Chairman in Central
c        Administrative Tribunal forthwith;

         (ii) Declare that the newly inserted Section 1OA of the
         Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to the extent it
         postulates different conditions of service for the Members
         of the Central Administrative Tribunal on the basis of their
D        appointment under the Un-amended Rules and under the
         Amended Rules as unconstitutional, arbitrary and not
         legally sustainable;
         (iii) Direct the respondents to accord the conditions of
E        service as applicable to the Judges of the High Court to
         all the Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal
         irrespective of their appointment under the Un-amended
         or amended Rules;

F        (iv) Declare that the newly inserted Section 1OA of the 1
         Administrative Tribunals Act is further unconstitutional to the
         extent it stipulates that the total term in office of the
         Members of the Tribunal shall not exceed 1Oyears;
         (v) Direct the respondents to continue all the Members
G        appointed under the un-amended or amended rules till they
         attain the age of superannuation of 65 years;
         (vi) Declare the newly inserted qualifications for
         appointment as Administrative Members as reflected in
H
           SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                  13
                       [H.L. DATTU, J.]
                                           ,,
      the Amended Section 6(2) as arbitrary and unsustainable A
      in the eyes of law and quash the same;
      (vii) Quash and set aside the newly added Sec. 12(2) of
      the Act which impinges upon the independence of
      judiciary;                                                        B

      (viii) Pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble
      Court thinks fit and proper in the facts and circumstances
      of the case.h

       5. In the case of A.K. Behra (supra), two learned judges         C
  (K.G. Balakrishnan, CJI and J.ty1. Panchal, J.) upheld the validity
  of the impugned amendment and dismissed the writ petition,
  whereas, the other learned Judge (Dalveer Bhandari, J.)
I allowed the writ petition and struck down the impugned
  amendment as being arbitrary and violative of Fundamental             D
  Rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
        6. In AK. Behra's case (supra), the court has noticed,
 apart from others, one of the reliefs sought for by the petitioner.
 It is relevant to notice the prayer made and discussion on that        E
 issue by the Court. They are as under:-

      "to declare that newly inserted Section 10 A of the
      Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as unconstitutional .to
      the extent it stipulates that the tenn of office of the Member
      of the Central Administrative· Tribunal shall not exceed          F
      10 years."

      The Court while considering the said relief has concluded:
      "15. The plea that Section 10A, which restricts the total         G
      term of the Member of the Administrative Tribunal to ten
      years should be regarded as unconstitutional has also no
      substance at all. The age of retirement of a Government
      servant has been raised from 58 years to 60 years. Initially
      under the unamended provisions of the Act a retired               H
    14        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A        Government servant had a tenure of only two years as a
         Member of the Tribunal and it was noticed that he was not
         able to contribute much while performing duties as a
         Member of the Tribunal. It was felt necessary that every
         Member of the Tribunal should have a tenure of five years.
B        Therefore, the provisions relating to term of office
         incorporated in Section 8 of the Act were amended in the
         year 1987 and provision was made fixing term of office of
         Chairman, Vice-chairman and Members at five years
         period. This Court, in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of
C        India and others [(1987) 1 SCC 124], expressed the view
         that the term of five years, for holding the posts mentioned
         in Section 8 of the Act was so short that it was neither
         convenient to the person selected for the job nor expedient
         to the scheme. This Court found that it became a
D        disincentive for well qualified people as after five years,
         they had no scope to return to the place from where they
         had come. The constitutional validity of the provisions of
         Section 8, fixing term of office of Chairman, Vice-chairman
         and Members of the Tribunal at five years period was
E         upheld by this Court in Durgadas Purkyastha v. Union of
          India and others [(2002) 6   sec      242]. Therefore, now
          provision is made for extension of term of office by a
          further period of five years. Thus the Government has
         decided to provide for extension in term of office by five
F        years of a Member so that he can effectively contribute to
          speedy disposal of cases, on merits after gaining expertise
          in the service jurisprudence and having good grip over the
          subject. Under the unamended provisions of the Act also
          the term of Vice-Chairman and Member was extendable
G         by a further period of five years and under the unamended
          provisions also a Member of the Bar, who was appointed
          as Judicial Member of the Tribunal, had maximum tenure
          of ten years. It is not the case of the petitioners that the
          unamended provisions of the Act, which prescribed total
H         tenure of ten years for a Member of the Bar was/is
     SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                           15
            [H.L. DATIU, J.)
 unconstitutional. The provisions of Section 8 fixing               A
 maximu_m term of office of the chairman at sixty eight years
 and of a Member of the Tribunal at 10 years, cannot be
 regarded as unconstitutional because concept of security
 of tenure does not apply to ... uch appointments. Said
 provision cannot be assailed as arbitrary having effect of         B
jeopardizing security of tenure. An Advocate practising at
the Bar is eligible to be appointed as Member of Tribunal
subject to his fulfilling required qualifications. In all, such a
 Member would have term of office for ten years. On
 ceasing to hold office, a Member, subject to the other             c
 provisions of the Act, is eligible for appointment as the
Chairman of the Tribun-al or as the Chairman, Vice-
chairman or other Member of any other Tribunal and is also
eligible to appear, act or plead before any Tribunal except
before the Tribunal of which he was Member. Under the               o
circumstances, this Court fails to appreciate as to how the
amended provisions restricting the total tenure of a
 Member of the Tribunal to ten years would be
unconstitutional. The unamended Section 6 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 indicated !hat the               E
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other Members, held
respective offices in one capacity or the other, had
reasonably spent sufficient number of years of service in
those posts before they were appointed in the Tribunal and,
therefore, the concept of security of tenure of service in          F
respect of those whose term was reduced was not
regarded as appropriate. The impugned provision,
therefore, cannot be assailed on the ground of
arbitrariness having the effect of jeopardizing the security
of tenure of Members of the Bar beyond reasonable limits.           G
An option is reserved to the Government to re-appoint a
Member on the expiry of the first term beyond five years.
The outer limit for the Member is that he should be within
the age of 65 years. Thus, it would not be in every case
that the Government would put an end to the term of the             H
    16        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011) 2 S.C.R.

A        office at the end of five years because such Chairman or
         Member is eligible for appointment for another period of
         five years after consideration of his case by a committee
         headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated
         by the Chief Justice of India and two other Members, one
B        of whom will be the Chairman of the Tribunal. Under the
         circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the provision
         restricting the total tenure of a Member to ten years is either
         arbitrary or illegal.•

C        7. The decision of the aforesaid Bench of this Court is
    binding
      •
            on us and is clearly applicable to the. case before us .
    However, out of respect to the learned senior counsel, who
    pressed the contentions very seriously, we may briefly and
    independently examine the question in this case also.
D        8. Before we turn to the facts of the present petition, we
    would like to make certain general observations and explain
    the legal position with regard to them.
    The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
E
       9. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment, which has
  held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled. The
  doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in the maxim "stare
  decisis et non quieta moveren, which means "to stand by
F decisions and not to disturb what is settled." Lord Coke aptly
  described this in his classic English version as "those things
  which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace."
  The underlying logic of this doctrine is to maintain consistency
  and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view
G which has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed
  only because another view is possible. This has been aptly
  pointed out by Chandrachud, C.J. in Waman Rao v. Union of
  India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 at pg. 392 thus:
         "40.... for the application of the rule of stare decisls, it is
H
           SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                       17
                 . [H.L. DATTU, J.]
        not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of A
       longstanding should have considered and either accepted
       or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in
       the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could
       more easily be treated as bindi~g by applying the law of
     . precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort to the B
       principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for
       invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision
       was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued,
       no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the
       basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of C
       applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to
       enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the
       earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis."
       10. In Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. Regional Asstt. CST,     0
. (1976) 4 sec 124, at page 127, it was opined that the doctrine
  of stare decisis is a very valuable principle of precedent which
  cannot be departed from unless there are extraordinary or
  special reasons to do so.
      11. In Ganga Sugar Corpn. v. State of U.P., (1980) 1 SCC
                                                                     El
 223 at page 233, this Court cautioned that, "the Judgments of
 this Court are decisional between litigants but declaratory for
 the nation.· This Court further observed:

      "28 .... Enlightened litigative policy in the country must F
      accept as final the pronouncements of this Court ... unless ··
      the subject be of such fundamental importance to national
      life or the reasoning is so plainly erroneous in the light of
    . later thought that it is wiser to be ultimately right rather than
      to be consistently wrong. Stare decisis is not a ritual of G
      convenience but a rule with limited exceptions."
     12. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC
754, at page 766, this Court has enunciated the importance of
doctrine of binding precedent in the development of                  H
     18         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A jurisprudence of law:

          "8. Taking note of the hierarchical character of the judicial
          system in India, it is of paramount importance that the law
          declared by this Court should be certain, clear and
B         consistent. It is commonly known that most decisions of
          the courts are of significance not merely because they
          constitute an adjudication on the rights of the parties and
          resolve the dispute between them, but also because in
          doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a
c         binding principle in future cases. In this latter aspect lies
          their particular value in developing the jurisprudence of the
          law.

          9. The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of
D         promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions,
          and enables an organic development of the law, besides
          providing assurance to the individual as to the
          consequence of transactions forming part of his daily
          affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent
E         enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court."

         13. In Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC
     207, at page 233, this Court has explained the meaning and
     importance of sparing application of the doctrine of Stare
     Decisis:
F
          "33. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. To adhere to
          precedent and not to unsettle things which are settled. But
          it applies to litigated facts and necessarily decided
          questions. Apart from Article 141 of the Constitution of
G         India, the policy of courts is to stand by precedent and
          not to disturb settled point. When court has once laid
          down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of
          facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all
          future cases where facts are substantially the same. A
H·        deliberate and solemn decision of court made after
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                         19
                [H.L. DATIU, J.]
     argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and      A
     necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding
     precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equai
     or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point
     is again in controversy unless there are occasions when
     departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain,              B
     obvious principles o_f law and remedy continued injustice.
     It should be invariably applied and should not ordinarily
     be departed from where decision is of long standing and
     rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations
     of public policy demand it."                                     c
    14. In Union of India & Anr. v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd,
(1990) 4 SCC 453 at pg. 457, this Court observed as under:-

     "9. It is true that a bench of two members must not lightly
     disregard the decision of another bench of the same              D
     Tribunal on an identical question. This is particularly true
     when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger bench.
     The rationale of this rule is the need for continuity,
     certainty and predictability in the administration of justice.
     Persons affected by decisions of tribunals or courts have        E
     a right to ex;>ect that those exercising judicial functions
     will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in
     the earlier cases on identical matters".
     It has been opined that in the absence of a strict rule of       F
precedent, litigants would take every case to the highest court,
in spite of a ruling to the contrary, in the hope that the decision
may be overruled.

     15. In Hari Singh v. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114,         G
at page 120, this Court stated the importance of consistent
opinions in achieving harmony in Judicial System:

    "10. It is true that in the system of justice which is being
    administered by the courts, one of the basic principles
    which has to be kept in view, is that courts of coordinate        H
    20        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A        jurisdiction, should have consistent opinions in respect
          of an identical set of facts or on a question of law. If courts
          express different opinions on the identical sets of facts
          or question of law while exercising the same jurisdiction,
          then instead of achieving hannony in the judicial system,
B         it will lead to judicial anarchy."
         16. In Tiverton Estates Ltd. v. Wearwell Ltd., (1975) Ch
    146 at page 371, Sorman L. J., while not agreeing with the view
    of Lord Denning, M.R. about desirability of not accepting
c   previous decisions, said as follows:
         "I decline to accept his lead only because I think it
         damaging to the law to the long term-though it would
         undoubtedly do justice in the present case. To some it
         will appear that justice is being denied by a timid,
D        conservative adherence to judicial precedent. They
         would be wrong. Consistency is necessary to certainty-
         one of great objectives of law."
       17. The second observation we wish to make Is, the
E doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting
  certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. The
  pronouncement of law by a larger Bench of the this Court is
  binding on a Division Bench of this court, especially where the
  particular determination by this Court not only disposes of the
F case, but also decides a principle of law. We further add ~hat
  it would be inappropriate to reagitate the very issue o~ a
  particular provision, which this Court had already considered
  and upheld.
G·      18. Faced with this situation, Shri. P.S. Narasimha, reamed
   senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the
 , issue before this Court in the present writ pe•:tion is different
   from the issue raised and canvassed in A.K. Behra's case
   (supra} by pointing out that the relief sought for in the two cases
H are not identical. He contends that the case of A.K. Behra
          SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA ·                      21
                 [H.L. DATIU, J.]
 (supra) was limited to the challenge to Constitutional validity of   A
 the Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2006, and further
 in that case, the question, whether a Member of the Tribunal
 appointed under the Act, prior to its amendment, is eligible for
 re-appointment after completion of a term of ten years, was
 neither argued, nor considered by this Court. It is further          B
contended by Shri Narasimha that this Court was not called
upon to decide the validity of Section 8 and Section 1OA of the
Act. It is contended that in AK Behara's case (supra), this Court
did not deal with the question of appointment of a member
afresh after completion of his term under Section 8 or of the         c
appointment of the existing members protected under Section
 10 of the pre-amended Act. According to the learned senior
counsel, a person who is appointed as a Member of the
Tribunal, is appointed for a term of five years, which is
extendable by one more term of five years by the Government,          o
if such person is found to be suitable and effective for the job,
and there is no embargo for such a person to re-apply again
after completion of his term of 1Oyears and such person can
be appointed again on a fresh term, if the eligibility criteria
prescribed in Section 6(2)(b) are met, till he attains the age of     E
65 years. The learned senior counsel further submits that the
"Terms of Office" for a Member as prescribed in Section 8, and
Section 1OA is merely a transitory provision meant only to save
the terms and conditions of service of existing members, as
on the date of amendment and not a substantive provision that         F
regulates the eligibility for fresh appointment. In sum and
substance, the argument of Shri Narasimha is that a person is
eligible for appointment as a Member as many times as he is
selected and appointed, but after a term of 10 years, he has
to seek fresh appointment. He states that this can be done by         G
a member till such time, he attains the age of 65 years.
     19. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General,
per contra, would submit that Section 8 of the Amended Act is
clear and unambiguous. The ~egislature clearly declar,s the
                                                                      H
    22       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A term of office for a member of the Tribunal as 10 years and,
  therefore, petitioner is ineligible for fresh appointment. However,
  on a pointed query by the Court, the learned ASG submits that
  a person, who has completed term of 10 years, is eligible for
  appointment as Chairman of such other Tribunal, but not
B member of the Tribunal. The learned ASG states that the
  Amended Act has put in clear terms that there is a limitation of
   10 years for a person to hold office as a Member, and this
  amendment made explicit what was implicit earlier. In a nut-
   shell, the argument of the learned ASG is that once a person
c has completed 1Oyears in office as Member of the Tribunal,
   he is not eligible for re-appointment.

       20. This Court was also assisted by Shri R. Venkataramani,
  learned senior counsel, in his role as Amicus Curiae. Shri
  Venkataramani, submits that the interpretation of Section 10A
0
  of the Amended Act did not come up for consideration before
  this Court in the case of A.K. Behra (supra.). He further submits
  that Section 1OA of the Act was in the form of a transitory
  provision, which was made applicable to those persons who
E had been appointed prior to Amendment Act (Act No.1 of
  2007}. He further submits that the persons who are appointed
  after coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2006, Section
   10A will have no application.

       21. In order to appreciate the contentions urged, it will be
F necessary to have regard to some of the relevant provisions
  of the Act. Section 3(ia} defines 'Member' to mean a Member
  (whether Judicial or Administrative) of a Tribunal, and includes
  the Chairman. Section 6 of the Act prescribes qualification for
  appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other Members.
G We may now trace somewhat vacillating steps by which
  Section 8 reached its present form. For immediate reference,
  we may set out Section 8 of the Act prior to and after its
  amendment by Act 1 of 2007. We may set out the two Sections
  in juxta position. :
H
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF !NOIA                          23
                [H.L. DATTU, J.]

          Section 8                           Section 8
                                                                       A
     (Before Amendment)                   (After Amendment)

8. Term of office. - The 8. Term of office. - (1) The
Chairman, Vice-Chairman or          Chairman shall hold office as
other Member sha'll hold            such for a term of five years      .B
office as such for a term of        from the date on which he
five years from the date on         enters upon his office:
which he enters upon his            Provided that no Chairman
office, but shall be eligible for   shali hold office as such after
re-appointment for another          he has   attained the age of       C
                                          I
term of five years:                 sixty-eight years.
Provided that no Chairman,          (2) A Member shall hold office
Vice-Chairman or other              as such for a term of five years
Member shall hold office as         from the date on which he
such after he has attained, -                                          D
                                    enters upon his office
  (a) in the case of the            extenoable by one more term
       Chairman or Vice-            of five years:
       Chairman, the age of
       sixty-five years, and        Provided that no Member shall
  (b) in the case of any            hold office as such after he has   E
       other Member, the            attained the age of sixty-five
       age of sixty-two             years.
       years.                       (3) The conditions of service of
                                    Chairman and Members shall
                                    be the same as applicable to       F
                                    Judges of the High Court.


     22. Since some emphasis was laid on Section 1OA of the
Amer-fed Provision by the Amendment Act of 2006, we notice             G
that pro\i:~ion also and it read~as under:

    "10A. Saving terms and conditions of service of Vice-
    Chairman. - The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Member
    of the Tribunal appointed before the commencement of the
    Administrative Tribunals (Amend~ent) Act, 2006 shall               H
    24       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2011] 2 S.C.R.

A        continue to be governed by the provisions of the Act, and
         the rules made thereunder as if the Administrative Tribunals
         (Amendment) Act, 2006 had not come into force:
         Provided that, however, such Chairman and the Members
B        appointed before the coming into force of Administrative
         Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 2006, may on completion of
         their term or attainment of the age of sixty-five or sixty-two
         years, as the case may be, whichever is earlier may, if
         eligible in terms of section 8 as amended by the
         Administrative Tribunals (Amendment), 2006 be
c        considered for fresh appointments subject to the condition
         that the total term in office of the Chairman shall not exceed
         five years and that of the Members, ten years."
                                                               •
         23. Section 8 of the Act, prior to its amendment, provided
D   for the term of office of Chairman, Vice Chairman and other
    Members of the Tribunal. By virtue of this provision, they would
    hold the office as such for a term of five years from the date
    they enter upon such office. However, they are eligible for re-
    appointment for another term of five years. The proviso that is
E   appended to the Section, provides some sort of restriction of
    'age bar' in the case of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
    Members. The Chairman and Vice Chairman shall not hold their
    offices as such after they have attained the age of sixty five 1
    years and in the case of any other Member, he shall not hold
F   office after the age of sixty-two years.
       24. Section 8 was amended by Act 1 of 2007. The
  amended provision also provides the "Term of Office" of the
  Chairman and Members of the Tribunal. From the language
  employed in the Section, what we can decipher is that the
G Chairman of the Tribunal shall hold office as such for a term of
  five years from the date on which he enters upon his office. The
  proviso appended to the Section is couched in the negative
  language. It states that a person appointed as a Chairman
  cannot hold office as such after he has attained the age of sixty
H eight years. Sub section (2) of Section 8 speaks of the term of ,
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                     25
                [H.L. DATTU, J.]
 office of a Member of the Tribunal. It only says that a person A
appointed as a Member of the Tribunal, if he is found eligible
for the post in terms of Section 6, shall hold office, for a term
of five years. In the normal course, this term of five years is
extendable by a term of another five years, giving a person a
total term of ten years. Continuation from 5 years to 10 years B
appears to be as a matter of course subject to exceptions as
provided in service law jurisprudence. Further, if such person
has attained the age of 65 years, then he will have to retire,
irrespective of whether he has completed ten years in office
as a Member or not.                                               c
     25. Prior to and after its amendment, Section 8 speaks
of "Term of Office". In our view the Legislature has used this
expression consciously. The expression 'Term' signifies a fixed
period or a determined or prescribed duration. The word 'term'
when used in reference to the tenure of office, means ordinarily 0
a fixed and definite time. There is a distinction between the
words 'term' and 'tenure' as applied to a public officer or
employee. The 'term', as applied to an office, refers to a fixed
and definite period of time. The word 'tenure' has more
extended meaning than the word 'term' and 'tenure' of an office E
means the manner in which the office is held especially with
regard to time.

     26. The learned counsel Shri Narasimha submits that the
Legislature, while amending Section 8 of the Act, has not F
pla~d any bar or embargo or any outer limit of number of years
that can be served by a Member of the Tribunal. Therefore, a
Member of the Tribunal who has served for ten years as a
Member is still eligible to apply and participate in the selection
process f.;r being appointed as a Member. Though the G
argument aavanced looks attractive, but on a deeper
consideration, we 1:.--:d·no merit in the contention canvassed by
the learned counsel. In ~ur view, the language employed in the
Section does not admit any ambiguity. The language of the
Statute is clear and unambiguous. Section 8(1) of the Act H
    26        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A provides the term of office of Chairman of the Tribunal, which
  shall be five years from the date he assumes his office. The
  proviso qualifies and carves out an exception to the main
  enactment. The exception is, though a Chairman can hold office
  as such for a term of five years, he cannot hold such office after
B he attains the age of sixty-eight years. Sub-section (2) of
  Section 8 of the Act provides the "Term of Office" of a Member
  of the Tribunal. First part of the Section envisages that a
  member of the Tribunal shall hold the office for a 'term of five
  years'. The term as applied to an office, refers to a fixed and
c definite period of time that an appointee is authorised to serve
  in office. Alternatively, it can be said that the term of office that
  is used by the Legislature could only mean the period or limit
  of time during which the incumbent is permitted to hold the
  office. The second part of the Section gives discretion to the
0 appointing authority to extend the term of office of a member
  of the Tribunal to one more term of five years. The expression
  'extendable', that finds a place in the sub-section, could only
  mean that the term of office of an incumbent as a member of
  the Tribunal can be extended if the parties agree. The proviso
  appended to the sub-section again carves out an exception to
E the main provision and restricts a member for holding office
  after he has attained the age of sixty five years. The proviso
  takes care of a situation where a member whose term of office
  is extended for a further period of five years cannot hold such
  office if he has attained the age of 65 years during the extended
F period of five years. A combined reading of both parts of
  Section 8(2) of the Act clearly demonstrates that a member of
  a Tribunal can hold such office for a fixed and definite period
  of time, i.e. for a period of five years from the date on which
   he enters upon his office and that period may be extended for
G one more term of five years. What is contended before us by
   the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is neither
   prohibition nor any embargo for a member who has completed
   10 years as Member to participate in the selection process for
   being appointed as a Member of the Tribunal for another term
H of five years. This, in our opinion, is impermissible since the
         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                     27
                [H.L. DATTU, J.]
   ~otal term that a person can hold the office of the Member of A ·
  ~he Tribunal is only for a period of 10 years. In our view, if the
   office is created by the Legislature under due authority, it may
  fix the term and alter it. We can understand the heart burn of a
 '
  person who has served as Member of the Tribunal for ten years
  and thereafter, is ineligible for being appointed as a Member B
  of the Tribunal. We cannot help this situation. In a court of law
  or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be
Idone can only be legitimately as_certained from what it has
  chosen to enact either in express words or by reasonable and
   necessary implication. It is apt to remember the words of Lord c
   Salmon in IRC Vs. Ross Minister Ltd. {1979) 52 TC 160 {HL).
   It is stated, "however, much the courts may deprecate an Act,
they must apply it. It is not possible by torturing its language
or by any other means to <;onstrue-it so as to give it a meaning
which Parliament clearly intend it to bear." We may also add D
that where the Legislature clearly declares its intent in the
scheme of a language of Statute, it is the duty of the Court to
give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy
and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not
congenial to or consistent with such express intent of
legislature. Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning E
employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the
face of the Statute. If the Statutory provisions do not go far
enough to relieve the hardship of the member, the· re.Qiedy lies
with the Legislature and not in the hands of the Court.
                                                                 F
     27. Section 10 A of the Amended Act is the saving clause.
By virtue of this Section, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
Members of a Tribunal appointed prior to the commencement
of the Administrative Tribunals {Amendment) Act, 2006, are to
be governed by the provisions of the unamended Act, and the G
rules made thereunder, thereby their conditions of service are
protected. The proviso appended to the Section fell for
discussion at the time of hearing of the petition. According to ·
Shri Venkataramani, learned Amicus and Shri Narasimha,
proviso to Section 1OA of the Act provides that the Chairman H
                I
•
        28      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A and Members appointed prior to coming into force of the
  Amendment Act may, on completion of their term or attainment
  of the age of sixty five or sixty two years, as the case may be,
  be considered for a fresh appointment, provided they are
  eligible in terms of Section 8 of the Amendment Act. The other
B condition that requires to be satisfied is that the total term in
  the office of the Chairman shall not exceed five years and that
  of the members ten years. According to the learned counsel.
  reference of Section 8 in the proviso to Section 1OA merely
  refers to the tenure and does not create any ineligibility in a
c Member only because he has once completed the tenure
  prescribed thereunder. We cannot agree with this contention.
  The proviso, if read plainly, the only conclusion that could be
  reached is that the Chairman and Members appointed prior to
  Amendment Act 1 of 2007 on completion of either their term
0 of service or on attainment of 65 years in the case of Chairman
  or 62 years in the case of Members of the Tribunal, whichever
  is earlier, may be considered for fresh appointment. If they are
  eligible in terms of Section 8 of the Amended Act that only
  means if a member has not completed 10 years term as a
E member of the Tribunal, he is eligible for fresh appointment,
  provided he has not completed 65 years of age. The proviso
  makes it abundantly clear that such fresh appointment could be
  done provided they satisfy the criteria prescribed under the
  amended Section 8 of the Act and further, it is made subject
  to the condition that the total term of office of the Chairman shall
F not exceed 5 years and that of the Member, ten years.
             28. Section 6 of the Act provides for qualification for
        appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other Members.
        Section 8 of the Amended Act provides for "Term of Office".
    G   These provisions require to be read harmoniously. However,
        the learned counsel for the petitioner wants us to read both
        these Sections separately, if so read according to him, since
        the petitioner satisfies all the conditions prescribed under
        Section 6(2)(b) of the Amended Act, the requirements of
    H   Section 8 of the Act should not be put against the Petitioner
          SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                        29
                 [H.L. DATIU, J.]
and make him ineligible for fresh app'"'liritment. It is difficult fo~ A
us to accept this argument. In our view, if the argument now put
forward is accepted, it would mean that the amendment
achieved no purpose whatsoever. Undoubtedly, the words of
the amendment, on their plain reading, are sufficient to hold that
the term of office of a Member of a Tribunal is 10 years and B
after completion of 10 years, he does not superannuate but he
goes out of the office. In our view, the language of Section 10A
is plain and unambiguous, hence there is no need to call in aid
any of the rules of construction. We wish to add that the
Constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 1OA pertaining c
to the eligibility of a Member for being considered for a fresh
appointment after completing his term of office as a member
was specifically pleaded in AK. Behra's case (supra) and the
Constitutional validity of the said proviso has been upheld by·
the said decision in para 16 of the Judgment.                          D
      29. Shri Narasimha, learned senior counsel, contends that
a member, who has completed a term of five years, can get an
extension of another term of five years. Even after completing
a term of ten years in office, he is still eligible for fresh
appointment and this can continue till such person attains the        E
age of 65 years. He contends that the embargo, if any, is on
the tenure of a Member and not on the person applying for the
post of Member. The only embargo on such person is the age
limit prescribed by Section 8 of the Act. In support of his
contention, Shri Narasimha pointed out to the Court that one          F
Shri J.S. Dhaliwal was re-appointed as a Member of the
Tribunal for a fresh term, after completion of his 10 year tenure.
However, the learned ASG was quick to point out that the case
of Shri Dhaliwal was the only a stray case in which this had
happened, and attributed this to administrative lapses, rather        G
than accede to the interpretation that a Member was eligible
for fresh appointment after completion of 10 years. We are
inclined to agree with the learned ASG that the appointment of
Shri Dhaliwal for another term after completion of his 10 year
tenure is an exception and not the rule as Shri Narasimha has         H
    30        .SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A   put forth before us.
       30. If we have to accept the construction suggested by Shri
  Narasimha, then it would lead to a situation where a person who
  has been a Member of the Tribunal for 10 years would have to
  start at the bottom of the ladder as a fresh appointee. In that
B circumstance, those persons who are appointed as Members
  such as the Petitioner, who were till the previous day junior to
  persons such as the Petitioner, would suddenly become senior
  to Members such as the Petitioner. This would lead to an
  anomalous situation where a person who would have presided
C over a Bench in the Tribunal for years, would suddenly become
  the junior Member on the same Bench. This certainly cannot
  be the intention of the Legislature. A statute is designed to be
  workable, and the interpretation thereof by Court should be to
  secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction
D makes that end unattainable. [see Nelson Motis Vs. Union of
  India & Anr. (1992) 4 SCC 711, Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. Vs.
  CCE, 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 316, Omva/ika Das Vs. Hu/isa
  Shaw, (2002) 4 SCC 539, Natni Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta,
  (2005) 2 sec 2111.
E
        31. This principle is stated in the case of Holmes v. ·
    Bradfield Rural District Councf/, (1949) 1 All ER 381 at pg.
    384, in which Finnemore, J. held:
         "The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust
F        or absurd does not entitle this Court to refuse to give it
         effect, but, if there are two different interpretations of the
         words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just,
         reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of
         those things."
G       32. In the case of Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh,(1955)
    2 SCR 457, this Court observed:
         "5.... But it is a rule of interpretation well-established that,
         "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning
         and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest
H
                                                .,



         SHANKER RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA                      31
                [H.L. DATTU, J.]
    contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or A
    to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
    presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon
    it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
    structure of the sentence ......... ."
     33. In the case of Nasiruddin v. STAT, (1975) 2 SCC 671,      B
this Court held:
    "27 .... If the precise words used are plaih and
    unambiguous, they are bound. to be construed in their
    ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results of a statute    c
    may be unjust does not entitle a court to refuse to give it
    effect. If there are two different interpretations of the words
    in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable
    and sensible rather than that which is none of those things.
    If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by
                                                                    0
    reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it
    is read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in
    an ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience
    at all; there would be reason why one should not read it
    according to its ordinary grammatical meaning. Where the E
    words are plain the Court would not make any alteration."
     34. Before we conclude, we intend to notice the statement
made by learned senior counsel that we need to place our
interpretation on the provisions of the Amended Act. which
further principles of Judicial independence. Reference is made     F
to a passage from the book of an American author, Laurence
H. Tribe named "Constitutional Choices". The author, while
offering his views on the topic "Entrusting Federal Judicial
Power to Hybrid Tribunals", has stated:
    "The independence of the federal judiciary is at least as G
    important a constitutional value today as it was when
    Hamilton articulated the need for it in Federalist 78 and
    79: "{A}s liberty can· have nothing to fear from the judiciary
    alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with
    either of the other departments; ... {permanence in office} H
    32        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A        may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable
         ingredient in its constitution, and, in great measure, as the
         citadel of the public justice and the public security.: Next
         to life tenure, Hamilton argued, "nothing can contribute
         more to the independence of judges than a fixed provision
B        for their support ..... [A] power over a man's subsistence
         amounts to a power over his will."
       35. In our view, firstly, the passage from the book, referred
  to by the learned senior counsel, pertains to the legal system
  in American Courts and Hybrid Tribunals, which has nothing to
C do with our legal system. Secondly, the statement relied on by
  the learned senior counsel is an extract from the book of a jurist,
  which in our view has neither any persuasive value nor legal
  binding on us. If the suggestien made by an American author
  suits our legal system, it is for the Legislature to take note of it
D and at any rate not for us. This Court, in the case of Kashmir
  Singh vs. Union of India (2008) 7 SCC 259 at page 273, has
  observed that "the doctrine of 'independence of judiciary' has
  nothing to do when the tenure is fixed by a statute". We are in
  agreement with this view.
E
         36. In view of the above discussion, we do not see any
    merit in this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
    of India.
        37. Before parting with the case, we place on record our
F deep appreciation for the assistance rendered by Shri
  Venkataramani, the learned Amicus Curiae in understanding
  and appreciating the nuances of the controversy involved in this
  petition.
      38. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition. No
G order as to costs.
    B.B.B.                                    Writ Petition dismissed.